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 This dissertation examines the rise and fall of participative and humanistic management 
in American organizational culture.  In the years surrounding World War II, an influential 
network of psychologists and human-relations experts successfully promoted the idea that 
managers’ involvement of subordinates in decision-making, along with their cultivation of 
underlings’ authentic self-expression, would boost the effectiveness of organizations, 
individuals, and the nation as a whole.  Four men proved particularly influential in this endeavor: 
German social psychologist Kurt Lewin (co-founder of the National Training Laboratories), 
survey pioneer Rensis Likert (founder of the Institute for Social Research at the University of 
Michigan), humanistic psychologist Abraham Maslow (developer of the “hierarchy of needs”), 
and industrial psychologist Douglas McGregor (author of The Human Side of Enterprise).  Each 
of these men was deeply concerned about the fate of democracy in modern society, which they 
feared was endangered by both authoritarianism abroad and bureaucratic dehumanization at 
home.  Each insisted that the nurturing of participation and “self-actualization” within 
organizations could help build an increasingly peaceful order in industry and the world at large.  
Ultimately, they found their most enthusiastic converts within the corner offices and personnel 
departments of corporations.   
 The dissertation argues that for roughly two and a half decades after World War II, this 
network of anti-fascist, pro-democratic theorists and practitioners injected their idealism into 




organizational work and selfhood.  These theorists’ ability to make humanistic and participative 
management palatable to industrial leaders– largely through promises of intertwined 
psychological and economic growth –offered them significant inroads into mainstream 
organizational culture and helped shape a humanistic rhetoric of personal growth that still thrives 
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 In 1955, General Mills, Inc. hosted a Management Development Conference dedicated to 
the cutting-edge management practices of its day.  The conference featured lectures and training 
on conventional topics like “Methods of Leadership” and “Principles of Manpowerbuilding,” but 
its central focus was the concept that had become General Mills’ official management slogan by 
the mid-1950s: “Bottom-Up Management.”  The opening lecture on this topic assured managers 
that “as the arbitrary power of rank and authority is decreasing, the importance of participative 
and cooperative leadership is increasing.”1  New times called for new styles of leadership.  
Whereas the manager of the past had been prized for his “experience and technical ability,” the 
manager of the future needed to demonstrate his ability “to motivate, to create good morale and 
teamwork.” This manager would not simply tell subordinates what to do but would also enlist 
their feedback, for he recognized that “Persons do more and better work if they feel they have 
helped to plan it and are fully informed about it.” 2  
 The General Mills management manual expanded on these principles with detailed 
descriptions of bottom-up practices (alternately referred to as “consultative” or “participative” 
management).
3
  The bottom-up manager empathically recognized that each of his employees was 
a “unique individual” with “separate and personal aims, viewpoints, needs, and desires” and 
treated each employee as such.  He offered opportunities for each subordinate “to expand and 
stretch his abilities and to become the larger person he is capable of being.”  At the same time, he 
                                                 
1
 “The Importance of Leadership and Good Human Relations in Bottom-Up Management,” General Mills 
Management Development Conference Training Materials, 1955-56, folder and box unknown, General Mills 
Corporate Archive, 2. 
 
2
 “The Importance of Leadership and Good Human Relations in Bottom-Up Management,” 1. 
 
3





enlisted “group thinking, group feeling, and group action” rather than treating employees as 
isolated individuals—because he recognized that most people thrive through teamwork in small 
groups.  The bottom-up manager functioned less as a boss than as a “guide” or “coach” who 
“develops while he directs.”4  In contrast to the “bureaucratic” or “autocratic leader” of days 
gone by, he sought recognition for his subordinates and delegated responsibilities and authority 
to them, soliciting continual feedback.  This two-way flow of communication defined the 
“Democratic leader” in the modern age.5 
 General Mills’ Management Development Conference model stressed that participative 
and empathic techniques of management had developed from the failures of scientific 
management in the first half of the century.  Frederick Winslow Taylor, the definitive turn-of-
the-century management theorist, had conducted innumerable time-motion studies aimed at 
reducing assembly line work to its most efficient and therefore profitable tasks.
6
  But in equating 
human laborers with cogs in a machine, Taylor’s later critics argued, he had demoralized them. 
What savings might have been made in task efficiency were lost to workers’ resistance, 
absenteeism, and turnover.  Bottom-up management offered a revision of Taylor’s approach and 
promised that by restoring the humanity to workers, managers could increase profit-making and 
efficiency.  The management developers at General Mills made no bones about the central 
motives underlying the bottom-up approach.  Their first stated purpose was “greater productivity 
                                                 
4
 “The Importance of Leadership and Good Human Relations in Bottom-Up Management,” 3. 
 
5
 Charles W. Nelson, “Methods of Leadership,” Training materials from the General Mills Management 
Development Conference, 1955-56, folder and box unknown, General Mills Corporate Archive, 54. 
 
6
Frederick Winslow Taylor, Concrete Costs; Tables and Recommendations for Estimating the Time and Cost of 
Labor Operations in Concrete Construction and for Introducing Economical Methods of Management, 1st ed. (New 
York: J. Wiley & sons; [etc., etc.], 1912); Frederick Winslow Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management (New 
York; London: Harper, 1911).  For more on the history of Taylorism, see Daniel A Wren, The Evolution of 





and higher profits through better satisfied employees.”  Their second was the desire to “[build] 
competent managers to carry on and expand the business in the future.”7   
 In 1958, the Harvard Business Review’s Robert McMurry celebrated General Mills’  
“sincere effort to integrate the humanistic philosophy of management.”  The “climate is 
favorable,” McMurry remarked, and “an active campaign is being waged from the top down” 
thanks to the support of the company’s president, Charles Bell. 8  Throughout the second half of 
the 1950s, General Mills conducted Management Development Conferences with assistance 
from some of the giants of postwar human relations.  The idea of bottom-up management 
originally stemmed from work with psychologist Douglas McGregor, one of the most prominent 
management theorists of the postwar era.  Collaborating with Dewey Balch, the company’s vice 
president of personnel, and fellow psychologist Richard Beckhard, McGregor conducted what 
has been called one of the defining organizational experiments of the era.
9
  Central to 
McGregor’s project at General Mills was the implementation of supervisors’ performance self-
appraisals, in which supervisors set goals for themselves and then evaluated their own 
completion of those goals.  
                                                 
7
 “The Importance of Leadership and Good Human Relations in Bottom-Up Management,” 1. 
 
8
 Robert N. McMurry, “The Case for Benevolent Autocracy,” Harvard Business Review 36, no. 1 (February 1958): 
82–90, 85. McMurry, openly skeptical of most participative management techniques, believed that General Mills’ 
efforts were among the few corporate experiments in democratic leadership that showed promise.  See Chapter 10 of 
this dissertation for further discussion of McMurry’s article.   
 
9
 This assessment comes from an interview with Warner Burke, a professor at Columbia University’s Teachers 
College and former staff member of NTL who worked on the Management Development Conferences of the 1960s.  
I interviewed Professor Burke on July 23, 2008 at Columbia University.  The other major Organizational 
Development (OD) experience he cited was the collaboration between Herb Shephard (of Case Western University), 
Robert Blake, and Jane Mouton (both of the University of Texas and founders of the Managerial Grid) at Esso 
Refineries in Houston, Texas.  Burke explained of Beckhard and McGregor’s work at General Mills that they did 
“empowerment stuff” without calling their work T-groups, and coined the term “organizational development” 
because they thought this term was more likely to catch on than “bottom-up management.”   For more on the history 
and definition of Organizational Development, see Warren G Bennis, Organization Development: Its Nature, 
Origins, and Prospects (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co, 1969); W. Warner Burke, Organization 
Development: A Process of Learning and Changing, 2nd Edition, 2nd ed. (Prentice Hall, 1993); Joan V. Gallos, ed., 





 In 1957, an organization called the National Training Laboratories visited General Mills 
for ten days to offer sessions on organizational theory, analysis of day-to-day management 
planning at General Mills, and workshop sessions on the communication problems facing 
managers.  In these experiential workshop sessions, called “T-groups” (short for “training 
groups”),  managers spent days offering each other frank feedback about each other’s 
communication styles and temperaments.  According to business historian Andrea Gabor, 
General Mills’ “innovative bottoms-up approach to cultural change” marked “possibly the first 
attempt to consciously change a company’s organizational culture.”10   
 
 This dissertation examines the rise and eventual fall of what I call participative and 
humanistic management in American organizational culture.  Proponents of participative 
techniques argued that the best managers delegated responsibility to underlings, from whom they 
solicited continual feedback about workplace procedures and their own management styles.  As 
demonstrated at General Mills, “bottom-up” consultants advocated for what they called 
“democratic” communication styles in place of the autocratic methods of days gone by.  They 
promised that their reforms would foster not just increased profits but also more democratic 
organizational environments and, by extension, a healthier social structure.  Supporters of 
humanistic management, who often advocated for participation as part of a larger process of 
organizational evolution (the two approaches were by no means mutually exclusive), tended to 
focus on the personal growth of the individual as much as on the culture of the workplace as a 
whole.  They argued that the healthiest and most effective organizational cultures offered 
workers opportunities for self-actualization; that the most successful workplaces were ones in 
which workers derived deep satisfaction from their tasks and experienced meaningful, expressive 
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 Andrea Gabor, The Capitalist Philosophers: The Geniuses of Modern Business--Their Lives, Times, and Ideas, 1st 





interactions with superiors and coworkers.  While participative advocates tended to emphasize 
the value of democracy, their humanistic counterparts also prized the more personal virtue of 
authenticity.  By the time of General Mills’ experiments in “bottom-up management” in the mid-
1950s, participative and humanistic rhetoric and practice thrived in dozens of corporations and 
mainstream management journals.  These practices continued to spread until their fall from grace 
in the early 1970s, though they have experienced waves of revival in the decades since.  
 In this project, I identify a powerful movement in postwar human relations that alters our 
understanding of the management and labor histories of the era.  This network of theorists, 
practitioners, and organizations emerged from the influences of New Deal liberalism, wartime 
anti-authoritarianism, and Cold War boosterism to promote a new model of management in 
American corporations.  Their ideas deviated from both Taylorism and traditional models of 
human relations with their inherent idealism and social conscience.  I focus on the intellectual 
biographies and institutional lineages of four men in particular: Kurt Lewin, Rensis Likert, 
Abraham Maslow, and Douglas McGregor.  These men, all trained in psychology in the early 
decades of the 20
th
 century, worked in a variety of subfields including survey science, humanistic 
psychology, and group dynamics.  Each was deeply concerned about the relationships between 
individuals, groups, and organizations in democratic society, which they believed were seriously 
endangered by authoritarianism abroad and bureaucratic dehumanization at home.  Significantly, 
none of them came from a specifically industrial background. Instead, they worked in a range of 
institutional contexts, including government service and social justice, before introducing their 
ideas in the corporate arena.  Through decades of writing, teaching, and training, they expressed 





institutions.  Ultimately, they found their most enthusiastic converts within the corner offices and 
personnel departments of corporations.   
 The psychologist Kurt Lewin (1890-1947) immigrated to the United States from 
Germany in the 1930s with a determination to eliminate prejudice and totalitarian leadership 
through training in small groups.  He labeled his distinct brand of inquiry “action research,” 
because it addressed problems that needed solving in the real world.  He also initiated an 
influential psychological subfield called “group dynamics,” which focused on the pivotal role of 
groups in the formation of larger social dynamics.  Lewin conducted research for the University 
of Iowa and the American government during World War II before establishing two research 
centers: the Research Center for Group Dynamics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
and the Commission on Community Interrelations, a branch of the American Jewish Congress.   
Lewin promoted the idea that social science could enhance democratic leadership and 
harmonious relationships between different groups, whether they be Jews and Catholics or 
workers and management.   
 Before Lewin’s death in 1947, he helped establish one of the postwar era’s most 
important sites of humanistic management training: the National Training Laboratories for 
Group Development.  NTLGD opened its doors in Bethel, Maine in 1947 as a non-profit wing of 
the National Education Association, its founders committed to the study of group dynamics as a 
pathway to social reform. They hoped to teach individuals how to be more effective leaders and 
teachers, developing the T-group as an exercise in experiential, group-focused education. T-
groups were often held in remote locations far from the organizational fray and lasted for as long 
as three weeks.  Participants, gently guided by “non-directive” group leaders, were encouraged to 





Proponents of T-groups believed that people who were aware of themselves as individuals would 
function better in groups and in organizations.  In the late 1940s, NTL began conducting T-
groups for community leaders, clergy, government officials and other individuals who wanted to 
become more effective “change agents” in a democratic society.  But the T-group soon took off 
with one group more than any other: corporate managers. 
 Rensis Likert (1903-1981) was an American psychologist trained in survey 
administration at Columbia University.  He launched his career as a researcher of consumer 
preference and the psychology of salesmen, and went on to establish himself as a pivotal player 
in governmental survey research during the late New Deal and World War II.  While working for 
the Department of Agriculture and the military, he became committed to the study of morale and 
the method of open-ended survey administration.  He carried both of these foci to the University 
of Michigan, where he launched the Survey Research Center (SRC) in 1946 and became 
committed to the study of organizations after receiving a large grant from the Office of Naval 
Research.  Likert emerged from decades of organizational studies with a strong belief in 
participative management and published one of the most influential management treatises of his 
day in the early 1960s.  He insisted that principles that democratic management would propel the 
nation as a whole to socially harmonious and economically prosperous heights. 
 Abraham Maslow (1908-1970), unlike the other psychologists in this cohort, never 
worked for a governmental agency or independent research organization.  Born and raised in 
Brooklyn, he received early exposure to Jewish Socialist activists and European émigré social 
scientists, and developed a conviction that psychology could be used to change the world.  He 
spent much of his life as a professor at Brandeis University, where he cultivated his famous 





and shelter, Maslow argued, humans pursue satisfaction of an ever-more-sophisticated and 
complex range of needs: to feel safe, to be loved, and, ultimately, to be “self-actualized.”  Self-
actualization described the moment at which a person reached such pinnacles of creativity and 
self-expression that he became authentically purposeful, in harmony with the people and 
environments around him.  This theory became the centerpiece of what he called “Third Force” 
psychology and left a profound impression on corporate culture and management training.  
Maslow provided a humanistic vocabulary for the organizational theorists of his day who 
incorporated self-actualization as a goal of corporate reform.   
 Finally, Douglas McGregor (1906-1964) served as the linchpin who combined group 
dynamics, humanistic psychology, and participative philosophy into a bestselling management 
treatise published in 1960.  McGregor, trained in social psychology, worked for much of his life 
as a psychologist in the Industrial Relations Department of MIT, and served as president of the 
progressive Antioch College for six years (1948-54).  Deeply committed to social justice and 
democratic administration, his seminal book The Human Side of Enterprise explicitly 
incorporated Maslow’s ideal of self-actualization with Kurt Lewin’s model of democratic 
leadership. In this work, McGregor cited the hierarchy of needs as a model for the organizations 
of the future.  He asserted that “we have not learned enough about…the creation of an 
organizational climate conducive to human growth” and proposed a new set of management 
principles that he called “Theory Y.”11  Theory Y assumed that workers were self-directed, self-
controlled, motivated, and eager for challenges.   It was meant to debunk what McGregor labeled 
“Theory X”: the traditional management credo that most people dislike their work, abhor 
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responsibility, and have little ambition.
12
  According to McGregor, Theory X neglected the 
fundamental “egoistic needs” that most human beings have “for continued self-development, for 
creativity in the broadest sense of the term.”13  McGregor placed the responsibility for successful 
organizations on managers.  It was up to them to boost their underlings’ self-esteem, to give 
them chances to take on new responsibilities and spark their imaginations.
14
    In the 1950s and 
1960s, he became both a corporate consultant and a practitioner of T-group training with the 
National Laboratories for Group Development.  In these roles, he trained managers and 
executives in the methods of Theory Y management. 
 These four men – Lewin, Likert, Maslow, and McGregor– built a powerful circuitry of 
people, organizations, and ideas in the middle decades in the 20
th
 century.  Kurt Lewin and 
Rensis Likert met while working for the US government in wartime, and Likert’s Survey 
Research Center attracted Lewin’s Research Center for Group Dynamics to the University of 
Michigan after Lewin’s death in 1947.  The SRC and RCGD went on to collaborate on decades 
of organizational studies that incorporated both survey methods and group-dynamics training 
practices.  Douglas McGregor lobbied for MIT’s president to hire Lewin in the mid-1940s, and 
Lewin earned his own chapter within McGregor’s The Human Side of Enterprise.  Maslow and 
McGregor began corresponding in the 1940s and exerted strong influence on each other’s 
writings.  Finally, Likert, McGregor, and Maslow all participated in or worked with the National 
Training Laboratories, Lewin’s brainchild, conducting T-groups and helping to direct the 
organization’s development.  Together, they built a new school of organizational theory and 
practice rooted in both democratic leadership and self-actualization.   
                                                 
12
 McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise, 34. 
 
13
 McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise, 38-39. 
 
14





 These men personify developments taking place in the new field of behavioral science in 
the middle years of the 20
th
 century.  Behavioral science was one of the “new social sciences” 
that gained momentum in American education, government, and industry after World War II,  
broadly defined as the “the systematic study of people and their relationships to each other”15—
an integration of methods from sociology, psychology, and anthropology.  In the field of 
management studies, postwar behavioral scientists investigated the motivations and behavioral 
patterns that fueled productive organizations, focusing particularly on interpersonal 
communication within groups.  Kurt Lewin, Rensis Likert, Abraham Maslow, and Douglas 
McGregor advocated candor and transparency for personal and organizational success; they also 
stressed small group work and manager-subordinate feedback.  According to a lengthy report 
published by the National Industrial Conference Board in 1969, behavioral science’s most 
prominent theorists employed an approach to modern management that was, above all, 
“humanistic and optimistic.”  They agreed about “the innate potential of man to be independent, 
creative, productive, and capable of contributing positively to the objectives of the organization” 
and shared “an assumption that man not only has these potentialities but, under the proper 
conditions, will actualize them.”16 
                                                 
15
 Harold M. F Rush, Behavioral Science; Concepts and Management Application, Studies in Personnel Policy no. 
216 (New York: National Industrial Conference Board, 1969), page labeled “highlights.”  For more works on 
behavioral science in industry, see: Chris Argyris, Intervention Theory and Method; a Behavioral Science View, 
Addison-Wesley Series in Social Science and Administration (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1970); William 
Eddy, Warner Burke, Valedimir Dupre, and Oron South, Editors, Behavioral Science and the Manager’s Role (New 
York: NTL Institute for Applied Behavioral Sciences, 1969); Industrial Relations Counselors, inc, Behavioral 
Science Research in Industrial Relations; Papers Presented at a Symposium Colors, 1962); Renato Tagiuri, 
Behavioral Science Concepts in Case Analysis: The Relationship of Ideas to Management Action (Boston: Division 
of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1968); Robert Tannenbaum, 
Leadership and Organization: A Behavioral Science Approach (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961); Robert 
Tannenbaum, Leadership and Organization: A Behavioral Science Approach, McGraw-Hill Series in Management; 
(New York, McGraw-Hill, 1961); Behavioral Science Concepts in Case Analysis: The Relationship of Ideas to 









The institutional affiliations and written works of these protagonists reveal a lofty set of 
motives in their formulation of humanistic and participative management principles.  Lewin and 
Likert’s work for New Deal and wartime agencies persuaded them that psychology could aid 
democracy by making leaders aware of the needs and realities of their constituencies.  In the case 
of Lewin, this commitment to democracy also fueled his work in the nascent Intergroup 
movement, which insisted that a democratic society could and should accommodate 
communication between different faiths, ethnicities, and races.  Lewin and Maslow’s vehement 
anti-fascism, gleaned from Lewin’s exposure to Nazi Germany and Maslow’s schooling by 
European exiles, inspired them to reshape the nature of authority and leadership in American 
society.  Both men believed that social science could guide a new generation of leaders who 
sought the common good rather than arbitrary power or authority.  McGregor’s presidency of 
Antioch College taught him the possibilities of democratic administration, while his close work 
with labor leader Joseph Scanlon at MIT reinforced his commitment to labor-management 
cooperation and the power of unions.  For these four men, the American organization emerged as 
the ideal microcosm in which to test their idealistic principles of participative communication 
and self-actualization for all.   
In this dissertation I argue that for roughly two and a half decades after World War II, 
this cadre of humanistic and activist psychologists successfully injected their idealism into many 
segments of American corporate culture.  Though they were personally inspired by anti-fascist 
and pro-democratic sentiments, their ability to make management theory palatable to industrial 
leaders and personnel directors offered them significant inroads into mainstream organizational 
culture.  They developed a program that promised both human development and increased 





ascent was short-lived.  By the mid-1970s, their ideas had faded from mainstream management 
theory, displaced by more autocratic and traditionally efficiency-oriented techniques.  In the 
decades that followed, humanistic idealism returned in flush economic times –  corporate 
rhetoric of personal growth is in some ways still with us today – but it continued to battle the 
bottom-line incentives of recessions and the depersonalizing nature of globalization.
17
 
 Mid-century behavioral scientists functioned as prototypes for the utopian 
“postindustrial” visionaries theory that Howard Brick has addressed in his work.18  According to 
Brick, the period of 1958-1967 witnessed a flurry of theorists who imagined a new “post-
scarcity” affluent age as an opportunity for the crafting of the ultimate welfare state and stronger 
networks of social cohesion.  With the economic problems of capitalism “solved,” government 
could move on to solving the social dilemmas of modern life.  And with the gradual 
displacement of manual labor by intellectual labor and technology, the mind would be the next 
frontier of capitalist fulfillment.   Humanistic and participative management training marked an 
extension of these ideas within the field of behavioral science.  As epitomized by McGregor’s 
The Human Side of Enterprise, behavioral scientists were consumed by the project of making 
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capitalism more “human” and ultimately more fulfilling for every level of worker within it.19  In 
shifting their focus to metaphysical needs, behavioral scientists suggested that the psychological 
frontier would be the most important site of satisfaction for managers and workers alike. 
We can also situate humanistic management theories within the intellectual context of the 
postwar period, when intellectuals like Theodor Adorno and Erich Fromm emphasized “mass 
man’s” vulnerability to authoritarianism and warned that the conformity engendered by large 
organizations spelled psychological and political disaster.
20
 An international critique of the “new 
middle classes” similarly argued that postwar corporate developments had spawned a new brand 
of white collar worker particularly prone to dangerous levels of conformity.
21
 More popular, 
domestic versions of this critique circulated in the 1950s as the “Organization Man” literature, 
which targeted the so-called men in grey flannel suits as impotent, lifeless cogs.
22
  Participative 
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 In Escape from Freedom (1941), Erich Fromm located the roots of Nazism in a psychological condition 
embodied by the middle-class masses, arguing that totalitarianism seized upon its feelings of alienation and 
powerlessness in the modern world. Several years later, two of his colleagues in the Germany’s Frankfurt School of 
Research—Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer—launched a critique against the “culture industry” of mass 
society, alleging that forms of popular culture and mass communication “manipulated consumers into a classless 
social conformity and submission.”  See Adorno and Horkheimer, “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass 
Deception” in  Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York: Continuum, 1993), originally published as Dialektik der 
Aufklarung in 1944; Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1941).   
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and humanistic management techniques belonged to a larger intellectual project of theorizing and 
crafting the “Cold War individual”—one simultaneously capable of retaining his autonomy and 
working within the large organizations that increasingly dotted the American landscape.  The 
“small group” apparatus created a new space for authenticity within bureaucracy.  The 
managerial experiments of my protagonists and their institutions reveal legions of so-called 
Organization Men eager to embrace a fundamentally anti-organizational ethic. 
 
My narrative of mid-century behavioral scientists deviates from those of business and 
labor historians of the same era.  Historians have convincingly portrayed the field of human 





 Elton Mayo, a professor at Harvard Business School, pioneered the field of human 
relations with his techniques for increasing workers’ morale. The central findings of his famous 
Hawthorne Studies, conducted at the Hawthorne plant of the American Telephone and Telegraph 
Company (AT&T) from 1924-1933, are still contested, but their motives were clear.
24
  Mayo 
was hired by AT&T to devise strategies for making workers more productive.  His studies soon 
thereafter attracted the funding of the John Rockefeller, who, scarred by the previous decade’s 
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bloody industrial strife, was interested in increasing industrial peace while also boosting 
industrial profits.
25
   
In Mayo’s first Hawthorne study, he and his researchers observed the effects of a variety 
of lighting conditions on worker efficiency.  But they soon concluded that lighting mattered little 
as a variable, since all female workers brought to the researchers’ observation room produced at 
higher rates than they had on the large shop floor.  Mayo concluded that the workers had 
responded positively to the increased attention granted to them by supervisors and researchers, 
and that they responded positively to their isolation in a study room as a work group with its own 
cohesive social dynamics.  Consequently, Mayo advised supervisors to treat their employees 
more like “patients,” speaking to them attentively about their problems and grievances.  He 
urged industrial leaders to appreciate the “anthropology of work”; the ways in which the shop 
floor constituted a kind of culture with its own relationships and norms.
26
  According to one 
historian of the Hawthorne Studies, the research also revealed the extent to which interviewing 
workers—12,000 employees, in the case of Hawthorne—could boost worker attitudes and help 
them adjust psychologically to work conditions by making them feel listened to and valued.  The 
Hawthorne Studies introduced the principle that an elusive quality called morale could affect 
workers’ productivity more strongly than material working conditions. 
Historians are right to situate Mayo and his colleagues in a larger narrative of labor-
management relations, in which Mayo’s interests were aligned with the corporation and 
foundation that funded his studies.  He revised Taylor’s scientific management principles 
because he and his funders found those principles to be inefficient and counterproductive.  
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Mayo’s human-relations principles inspired decades of experiments in corporate recreational 
opportunities and publications aimed at making employees feel that they were part of something 
larger than themselves.
27
  To be clear, many of the corporate executives and personnel directors 
who subsequently employed participative or humanistic management techniques were inspired 
by a similar set of concerns about poor worker productivity, high rates of turnover, or increased 
rates of union membership.  But the motives of the theorists themselves were different. 
  
 This project serves as a cultural and intellectual history of organizational theories and 
practices in the middle decades of the 20
th
 century. Somewhat surprisingly, there is no thorough 
account of the mid-century transformation of management training techniques—of the transition 
from an emphasis on workers’ morale to organizational democracy and the personal growth of 
workers and managers alike.  Alfred Chandler reigns supreme as the leading historian of 
management, and his history of managers’ visible hand in the rise of American business lays 
important historiographic foundations for my work.
28
  But how did the changing nature of 
postwar corporate capitalism create a new set of possibilities and challenges for middle 
managers?  The most comprehensive book that attempts to pick up where Chandler left off, 
Daniel Wren’s The History of Management Thought, provides a textbook account of evolutions 
in management theory, but offers little historical analysis.
29
  Art Kleiner also offers a history of 
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post-1945 management history, but his insider perspective makes the book as much a primary 
source as a secondary one.
30
   
In exploring the connections between personality and corporate capitalism, I have called 
upon the work of historians who have examined the cultural implications of salesmanship, 
advertising, and other brands of corporate image-making.  Roland Marchand, William Leach, 
and Jackson Lears have addressed attempts to humanize and romanticize corporations in the first 
half of the 20
th
 century through methods of public relations, commodity display, and 
advertising.
31
  But few historians have examined the internal workings of corporate culture in 
20
th
 century.  Walter Friedman stands out as a critical exception.
32
  In Friedman’s work, the well-
trained salesman emerges as one of the most important agents of consumer capitalism in the first 
half of the 20
th
 century, when salesmanship took on veneers of both scientific expertise and 
emotional connection. In this project, managers pick up where Friedman’s salesmen left off as 
agents of capitalist economic and cultural order.  Given that the international economic climate 
changed dramatically after the middle of the 20
th
 century, expectations for capitalism’s 
custodians necessarily shifted as well.   
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A number of historians have touched on industrial psychologists’ quest for more 
“humanized” management techniques in the twentieth century, as noted above.  Scholars like 
Elizabeth Fones-Wolf, Donald Meyer, Loren Baritz, and Richard Gillespie have chronicled the 
role of social science and industrial psychology in the transformation of postwar labor 
relations.
33
  David Montgomery, Nelson Lichtenstein, and Kim Phillips-Fein have examined the 
changing relationship between labor and the state in the middle of the twentieth century.
34
   But 
in their works, human relations and related industrial endeavors emerge as emblems of corporate 
conservatism.  A rare exception to the conservative narrative is Jennifer Delton’s recent work on 
racial integration in American corporations, which argues that progressive corporations initiated 
the movement toward affirmative action in the postwar United States.
35
   
I incorporate the work of labor and business historians with the perspectives of historians 
who have examined 20
th
 century social science as a force in and of itself, a powerful marker of 
changing ideas about self and society.  Jeffrey Sklansky, Rebecca Lemov, Sarah Igo and Pamela 
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Laird stand out in this arena, but their work does not specifically address the integration of social 
science and management theory.
36
  Stuart Svonkin has offered a particularly useful examination 
of the Jewish Intergroup movement, including the work of Kurt Lewin, but has not considered 
the extensions of this movement’s key theories into the business realm.37  Ellen Herman has 
argued persuasively that the field of psychology exerted a profound influence on political culture 
in the 20
th
 century, illuminating the ways in which psychological discourse and expertise shaped 
the American government’s management of policy and public opinion from 1940 through 
1975.
38
  Her argument about psychologists’ conceptions of the “subjective and emotional 
realities of power” within the political realm offers a helpful lens for my project.  Corporate 
culture served as an equally pivotal site for the creation of ideas about power and selfhood. 
There is a growing literature on the rise of the idea of corporate culture, as reflected by 
the works of Luc Boltanski & Eve Chiapello, Howard Brick, Thomas Frank, and Eugene 
McCarrahar.
39
  Frank has examined, in particular, the intersections between the counterculture 
and the advertising industry of the 1960s.  My work draws on his challenges of the 
counterculture/corporate culture dichotomy but offers an alternative conception of both 
                                                 
36
 Sarah Elizabeth Igo, The Averaged American: Surveys, Citizens, and the Making of a Mass Public (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 2007); Pamela Laird, Pull: Networking and Success Since Benjamin Franklin 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006);  Rebecca M Lemov, World as Laboratory: Experiments with Mice, 
Mazes, and Men, 1st ed. (New York: Hill and Wang, 2005); Jeffrey P. Sklansky, The Soul’s Economy: Market 
Society and Selfhood in American Thought, 1820-1920 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002). 
 
37
 Stuart Svonkin, Jews Against Prejudice: American Jews and the Fight for Civil Liberties, Columbia Studies in 
Contemporary American History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).  For the Christian counterpoint see 
Eugene McCarraher, Christian Critics: Religion and the Impasse in Modern American Social Thought (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2000). 
 
38
 Ellen Herman, The Romance of American Psychology: Political Culture in the Age of Experts (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1995). 
 
39
 Boltanski, The New Spirit of Capitalism; Howard Brick, Transcending Capitalism: Visions of a New Society in 
Modern American Thought (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006); Thomas Frank, The Conquest of Cool: Business 
Culture, Counterculture, and the Rise of Hip Consumerism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); Eugene 
McCarraher, "Me, Myself, and Inc.: 'Social Selfhood,' Corporate Humanism, and Religious Longing in American 
Management Theory 1908-1956," in Wilfred McClay, Ed., Figures in the Carpet: Finding the Human Person in the 





chronology and causality.  Boltanski and Chiapello have argued that a “new spirit of capitalism” 
emerged from the managerial literature of postwar France, which co-opted the participatory and 
humanistic rhetoric of the left in order to undermine union strength and diffuse criticism of 
corporate practices.  While their subject matter and themes are deeply consistent with my own, 
we have reached different conclusions about the motivations and chronology behind humanistic 
management theory.   
Histories of ideologies of the Left have provided important underpinnings for this project.  
In considering the intellectual and political milieu of the 1960s, particularly the rhetoric of both 
participation and authenticity, the works of Douglas Rossinow, Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, and 
Jim Miller have proven helpful.  These scholars have examined the evolution of democratic and 
humanistic ideologies (as epitomized by the SDS’s “Port Huron Statement” in 1962), but without 
granting deserved attention to their emergence in the business arena.
40
  I have also benefitted 
from studies that connect postwar foundations, social work, and community action, whose 
intersections climaxed with the War on Poverty's support for community action.
41
 I suggest that 
the same guiding principles and foundations that supported the growth of community action 
exerted an underappreciated influence on philosophies of participation in the private sphere. 
Studies of popular psychology and sociology have informed my own understanding of the larger 
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conversation surrounding self and society in the 20
th
 century.  Philip Cushman, Wilfred McClay, 
and Donald Myers have offered examinations of psychology’s impact on 20th-century ideologies 
of individualism.
42
  Richard Pell’s intellectual history of mid-century social critics, like Howard 
Brick’s examination of post-capitalist visionaries, examines the intersection of social criticism, 
academic social science, and the public sphere—but again, both writers focus on the world 
outside of the corporation rather than the brands of dissent issued from inside of it. 
 Because T-groups and sensitivity training have extended beyond the bounds of 
corporations and business culture, my dissertation draws on more general histories of encounter 
and sensitivity training.  Kurt Back, Laura Kim Lee, and Jerold Hirsch have told the story of the 
National Training Laboratories and its T-groups from its development in the 1940s through its 
application in wider circles through the early 1970s.
43
  These works provide excellent narrative 
detail but treat the development of sensitivity training as a trend isolated from other, equally 
potent behavioral science techniques of the 20
th
 century.  It has been helpful to draw upon 
polemic treatises on sensitivity training and its related popular-psychology cultural expressions, 
as in the work of Elizabeth Lasch-Quinn, Christopher Lasch, and Wendy Kaminer, who 
respectively position sensitivity training and the recovery movement as attacks on political 
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 These works tie into a broader literature on the intersection of 
sensitivity training and identity politics: women’s consciousness-raising groups, men’s groups, 
and the spate of recovery groups related to Alcoholics Anonymous.
45
 They also reinforce a body 
of literature on 1970s narcissism, which presents “talking about me” as an inevitable outgrowth 
of political disillusionment in the early 1970s.
46
  My work departs from the above literature in its 
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examination of sensitivity training in the corporate context, and as a more ideologically 
complicated project than Kaminer and Lasch-Quinn suggest.  
Finally, my dissertation engages with a growing body of literature that takes new age and 
metaphysical religion seriously as an area of investigation.  Catherine Albanese, Courtney 
Bender, and Sarah Pike, and Jeffrey Kripal have offered scholarly analyses of new age religion 
as a bona fide religious tradition.
47
  They emphasize inner healing, here-and-now experiencing, 
and “flow” as principle tenets of new age religion, and frequently include encounter and “self-
actualization” (akin to the “divine inner self”) as components of new age religion in the 1960s 
and 1970s.   This project adds a focus on what many ultimately deemed spiritual values within an 
increasingly expressive and experiential corporate culture.  
 
 This dissertation is the first to investigate systematically the rise of participative 
philosophy and humanistic psychology in the management theory and practices of the middle 
decades of the 20
th
 century, and the first to link those practices to the broader political and social 
concerns of that period’s social scientists.  Chapter One examines Kurt Lewin’s emergence as a 
”scientist-citizen” through his early training in Germany, his formulation of his theory of “life 
force,” his famous “Autocracy/Democracy Studies” at the University of Iowa, and his early 
industrial experiments at the Harwood Corporation pajama factory.  Chapter Two follows a 
similar chronological trajectory in the life of Rensis Likert.  Likert translated his training in 
attitudinal surveys into the realm of market research and the study of morale among life 
insurance salesmen, bridging the young fields of survey science and human relations. 
                                                 
47
 Catherine Albanese, A Republic of Mind and Spirit: A Cultural History of American Metaphysical Religion (New 
Haven : Yale University Press, 2007); Courtney Bender, The New Metaphysicals: Spirituality and the American 
Religious Imagination (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010); Jeffrey Kripal, Esalen: America and the 
Religion of No Religion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007); Sarah Pike, New Age and Neopagan 





 Chapter Three examines Abraham Maslow’s early ideological and psychological 
education, which fueled his formulation of “Third Force Psychology” and its centerpiece, the 
hierarchy of needs.  This chapter aligns Maslow’s roots with the early biography of Douglas 
McGrgeor, who grew up under the influence of the Social Gospel and found himself, as the first 
psychologist in MIT’s Industrial Relations department, integrating his larger concerns about the 
social good with more focused concerns about industrial psychology.  
 Chapter Four returns to Lewin, examining his training of democratic leaders in wartime 
and his establishment of the two groups that exemplified a lifetime of “action research”: the 
Commission on Community Interrelations and the Research Center for Group Dynamics, which 
gave rise to the National Training Laboratories for Group Development (and its most popular 
innovation, the T-group) in the year of Lewin’s death.  Chapter Five chronicles Rensis Likert’s 
parallel journey from the US government’s Division of Program Surveys, where he performed 
work for both New Deal agencies and military strategists during World War II, to the University 
of Michigan, where his Survey Research Center embodied his commitment to the democratic 
function of research and humanistic techniques of surveying.  Chapter Six examines McGregor’s 
own psychological explorations in wartime and its immediate aftermath, epitomized by his 
articulation of Theory Y, his presidency of Antioch College, his collaborations with Lewin and 
Scanlon at MIT, and his eventual venture into corporate consulting. 
 Chapters Seven and Eight trace the application of Lewin and Likert’s ideas within the 
corporate sphere.  The former examines the establishment of the National Training Laboratories 
and the spread of T-groups among managers and executives in the US and abroad, and the latter 
situates Likert’s forays into the realm of Organizational Behavior as precedents for his definitive 





growth developed largely within non-industrial spheres reached unprecedented popularity within 
corporate contexts.  Chapter Nine examines Abraham’s Maslow’s own entry into corporate 
realm, from his publication of his first management treatise to his work within organizations as a 
consultant in the years preceding his death.  This chapter emphasizes Maslow’s developing 
conviction that corporations would be sites of psychological transformation for culture at large. 
 The dissertation concludes with Chapter 10, an examination of the controversy and 
ultimate disenchantment that plagued participative and humanistic management theorists from 
the late 1960s through the mid-1970s.  By the early 1970s, T-group methods and humanistic 
psychology had not only spread throughout corporate and bureaucratic culture, but had also been 
adopted by leaders of the predominantly West Coast “Human Potential” movement.  As 
humanistic methods and theories became centerpieces of the counterculture, their organizational 
effectiveness fell into hot dispute.  A legion of critics argued that after more than a decade of 
industrial use, there was little to no evidence that participative management or self-actualization 
had any effect on organizational performance.  By the middle of the 1970s, faced with a larger 
economic crisis, self-actualization and related discourses had disappeared from the agendas of 
most corporate executives, replaced by a renewed appreciation for the power of managerial 
authority and hierarchical decision-making.   
 The dissertation thus leaves us with the central questions that Lewin, Likert, McGregor, 
and Maslow considered throughout their long careers: Are the psychological needs of 
organizations and individuals fundamentally incompatible?  If not, can they be reconciled for 
fundamental transformations of democracy and capitalism?  The history of participative and 
humanistic management theory suggests few concrete answers to these questions, but reveals a 
powerful movement of 20
th






The Scientist-Citizen:  
Kurt Lewin’s Interwar Action Research and Democracy at Work 
 
 
 On May 13, 1954, The Pajama Game opened on Broadway as the first and only musical 
to locate romantic intrigue in the industrial strife of a pajama factory.  The show, which was 
based on Richard Bissell’s novel 7 ½ Cents and later turned into a film starring Doris Day, 
concerns the drama that erupts at the Sleepytime Pajama Factory when a new labor 
superintendent, Sid Sorokin, comes to town from Chicago.
1
  The head of the factory, Myron 
Hasler, is desperate for assistance: His girls are slowing down, sabotaging the machines, and 
talking back.  Rumor has it that when the union contract goes up for negotiation, they’re going to 
demand a seven-and-a-half-cent raise.  Hasler brings in superintendent Sorokin to whip them into 
shape, and to stand up to the union’s ever-agitating grievance committee.   
 In the cinematic version of the musical, the first tour of the Sleepytime factory introduces 
viewers to goofy Vernon 'Hinesie' Hines, the “efficiency expert” who is commanding the girls to 
“hurry up” through song and dance.  “I’m a time study man!“ he sings.  “I’ve got a stop 
watch…Can’t waste time, can’t waste time!…Cut out the laughing!”  The workers, feeling 
defeated by Hines’ Taylorist expectations, complain that their wages aren’t sufficient to provide 
them with a decent standard of living.  They half-heartedly, haphazardly toss pajama tops and 
pants into larger piles of the same.  The arrival of superintendent Sorokin makes things more 
complicated when he and the sassy head of the grievance committee, Babe Williams, fall head 
over heels in love. She resists submitting a grievance against him after a male technician 
complains of abuse, and Sid later declares his infatuation at a frolicking company picnic.  Soon 
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enough, however, Babe has declared her primary allegiance to the union. During an elegantly 
choreographed slowdown, she sabotages a machine and leaves Sid with no choice but to fire her.   
She later resists his overtures to win her back, urging, “You stick to your side and I’ll stick to 
mine.” 
 The climax of The Pajama Game arrives during a union rally, when the Amalgamated 
Shirt and Pajama Workers of America Local 343 officially agitate (through song) for their seven-
and-a-half-cent raise.  The raise may not sound substantial at first, they explain, but the 
cumulative effect will be great (“I’ll buy myself a pajama factory!  Make Old Man Hasler work 
for me!”).  Hasler once objected to making even the slightest concession to their demands, but 
Sorokin assures him that “Labor problems have got to end up one way: compromise.”  Hasler 
relents, and the workers burst into cheerful song about their raise.   Babe and Sid soon marry and 
perform together in the company’s pajama fashion show (she in just a pajama shirt, and he in the 
corresponding pants).  Industrial and romantic harmony abound. 
 The Pajama Game offers viewers a surprising portrait of labor relations in the 1950s.  Its 
allegiances are clear: The efficiency expert is an emasculated bozo, while the head of the 
grievance committee is gutsy, smart, and beautiful.  The owner of the factory is a stingy 
curmudgeon, while the heroic and hunky superintendent ultimately recognizes the union’s right 
to a raise.  Released at a time when the power of American unions had started to diminish, and 
when time-motion experts were a thing of the past, the musical provided a simultaneously 
utopian and anachronistic vision of American labor relations.   
  It turns out, however, that The Pajama Game was not woven from whole cloth: It was 
developed in consultation with the Weldon Company, owned by Alfred Marrow, one of the 20
th
 





psychologist in his own right.
2
   While Marrow’s pajama factories might not have spawned real-
life labor-management romances or song-and-dance numbers, his company was home to a series 
of ground-breaking experiments in post-Taylorist management—experiments that lasted in some 
form from the late 1930s into the 1970s.  In contrast to the bitter, fictional owner of The Pajama 
Game’s Sleepytime, Marrow decided before World War II that Taylorist management techniques 
had run their course, and that time-management experts impeded workers’ productivity rather 
than promoting it.  For decades, he employed a team of social scientists who promoted what they 
called “democratic participation” through leadership training, group decision-making, and self-
management.
3
  His factory became a laboratory for multiple manifestations of “participative 
management” and humanistic management training that flourished in the middle years of 20th 
century.  As Marrow himself traveled through a network of progressive institutions—including 
the American Jewish Congress, the New School for Social Research, Antioch College, and the 
Mayor’s Commission on Intergroup Relations—he became one of his era’s most committed 
proselytizers of participation, ego-satisfaction, and candid emotional expression at work. 
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 Marrow credited his enlightened management to the social scientist who inspired and 
shaped the first phase of experimentation at Marrow’s Harwood pajama factory: a man named 





  Kurt Lewin died in 1947, having bequeathed to the social science community a 
conviction that social science could save democracy.   Lewin was a German psychologist who 
fled Berlin in 1933 and established himself as a force on the American scene through work with 
a number of American agencies, from the Iowa Child Welfare Research Center to the Office of 
Strategic Services.  His work in the field he helped christen “group dynamics” shaped two 
agencies he helped establish: the American Jewish Congress’s Commission for Community 
Interrelations and MIT’s Research Center for Group Dynamics, out of which the National 
Training Laboratories for Group Development was born.  In this latter group, Lewin helped 
develop the “T-group,” also known as sensitivity training, which became one of the most 
celebrated—and then reviled—social science techniques of the century.  Although Lewin was 
broadly concerned with the public sphere, he engaged extensively with the private sector. He 
authored an indictment of Taylor’s scientific management early in his career, and later served as 
consultant to the Harwood Manufacturing Company where he helped develop the “participatory 
management” experiments mentioned above.  Some scholars have suggested that in spite of his 
broad political vision, his most lasting impact was upon the field of industrial psychology.
5
 
 From Lewin’s arrival in the United States in 1933 through his death in 1947, every 
project that he embarked on communicated his zealous advocacy of democracy and participation.  
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He immigrated from Nazi Germany with a keen sense of totalitarian’s dangers, intent on 
combating authoritarianism and social conflict through psychological means.  His famous 
method of “Forcefield Analysis” insisted that a person’s behavior and attitudes could not be 
viewed as separate from his or her environment—meaning that reforming an environment could 
change the individuals within it, and that people have more control over their surroundings than 
they tend to imagine.
6
  In the 1930s and 1940s, he focused this field theory research on the small 
group as the primary unit of change.  Within small groups, he insisted, all kinds of people 
(children, factory workers, African-Americans, Jews) could learn to lead and participate in 
fundamentally democratic ways, and could—by extension—influence all of society.  Lewin, 
whom Alfred Marrow labeled “a natural, spontaneous democrat,” 7 advocated what he called 
“action research.”  Action research challenged the notion that science should be objectively 
detached from the affairs or political concerns of everyday life. Quite the opposite: Lewin 
suggested that science could and should be practiced with the intent of fixing the world’s 
troubled social relations.  Though he became famous for his saying that “There is nothing so 
practical as a good theory,”8 he firmly believed that theories were not worth developing unless 
for the betterment of humankind, and that his work as a scientist meant little if not “integrated 
with his life as a citizen.”9  Lewin’s work spanned a broad range of social contexts – the 
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industrial workplace, the family, the school, the segregated community—because he believed 
that democracy could only work if its principles were lived out in  every arena of life. 
 Lewin’s life and work ultimately exemplified a synthesis taking place in interwar social 
science, both in America and abroad.  His commitment to democratic action research – 
exemplified by his studies of authoritarian leadership and democratic participation among groups 
of young boys – found its most prolific and lasting impact in the world of industrial research.  
His early intellectual and life experience, as a German exile and critic of authoritarianism, 
inspired him to revisit existing theories of human relations and emerge with a participatory 
model of industrial change.  His work at Marrow’s Harwood Plant, originally born in the study 
of intergroup relations and the problem of prejudice, ultimately transformed the way industrial 
leaders approached what Elton Mayo had called “the human problems of industrial 
civilization.”10 
 
 Kurt Lewin was born in 1890 in the small village of Mogilno, in the Prussian province of 
Posen (now part of Poland).  His father, Leopold, owned a general store above which the family 
lived, and operated a small farm a several miles away; his mother, Recha, energetically 
encouraged the pursuits of their four children.   The family comfortably occupied the middle 
class, but anti-Semitism pervaded Prussia, and Lewin’s Jewish family encountered persistent, 
publicly sanctioned discrimination.
11
  In 1905, Lewin’s family moved to Berlin, where Kurt 
(then fifteen years old) enrolled in the Kaiserin Augusta Gymnasium.  There, he basked in the 
glories of a humanistic curriculum that stressed Latin and Greek classics and integration of the 
arts and sciences.  Upon completion of high school, Lewin moved on to the University of 
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Freiburg, where he intended to train as a doctor, but having lost interest in biology one semester 
into his education there, he transferred to the University of Munich and then to the University of 
Berlin in 1910.  It was at the University of Berlin that he found his calling in psychology, which 
was just emerging as a field distinct from philosophy, and still contained an active strain of 
philosophical inquiry.   
 At the University of Berlin, where Lewin ultimately pursued a doctorate in psychology, 
he found himself uninspired by the autocratic methods of many professors and the attendant 
passivity – even apathy-- that he witnessed in fellow students.12   Yet he also entered a 
community of psychologists who would shape his theoretical orientation for years to come.  At 
the University’s Psychological Institute, he took classes in both philosophy and the theory of 
science, continually examining the connections between the two fields.  He located a simpatico 
dissertation advisor named Carl Stumpf (both philosopher and psychologist), a “decided 
empiricist” committed to experimental psychology.   
 Whereas many of Stumpf’s colleagues disdained the use of experimental method in 
psychology—preferring methods of philosophical inquiry—he insisted that the scientific method 
could guide inquiry into matters of the mind.  His experimental spirit attracted psychological 
pioneers like Max Wertheimer, Wölfgang Kohler, and Kurt Koffka to Berlin’s Psychological 
Institute, transforming it into a hotbed of experimentalism.  The four psychologists embraced the 
emerging field of Gestalt psychology, arguing that perception could be understood in terms of 
“‘forms of organized wholes.’” Although Lewin never considered himself an orthodox Gestaltist, 
the “holism” of their ideas appealed to him.13  Lewin respected Stumpf tremendously and 
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ultimately emulated both his experimental spirit and his focus on child psychology (Stumpf was 
the founder of the Berlin Association for Child Psychology).  Lewin also found inspiration 
among a likeminded group of graduate students at the Institute who believed that psychology 
could and should address contemporary social problems.  With this group of students, he set up a 
series of evening classes for working-class adults (called “workingmen’s courses”) about which 
the German authorities were “deeply suspicious.”14 
 Lewin signed up for German military service in early 1914, soon before the outbreak of 
World War I, and served in the army for most of the ensuing four years of fighting.  According 
to Marrow, he “adapted very well to being a soldier,” entering as a private and leaving as a 
lieutenant.
15
  While convalescing, he came up with the idea for what became his first published 
article, entitled “The War Landscape,” published in 1917.16  Here, he articulated the theory that 
later became known as “life space,” arguing that a soldier’s immediate needs (his own “life 
space”) altered his perceptions of the world around him.  The physical environment could look 
different to a soldier depending on the progress of the war, or the soldier’s need for safety or 
food.  As the soldier approached the front of the war, the landscape’s very boundaries changed in 
his perception, taking on firm lines of definition.  The soldier’s perception of objects would also 
depend on whether they were “peace things” or “battle things”—associations that they would 
lose outside of the context of battle.  A soldier might view an enemy’s piece of furniture as his 
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own property in wartime, giving him the right to burn it, while he would never commit such an 
act against a stranger in times of peace.   This 1917 article set precedent for Lewin’s later 
examinations of the ways that people’s behavior and attitudes shift in accordance with social 
context. 
 After the war, Lewin returned to the Psychological Institute at the University of Berlin 
and began work on his next two articles, in which he articulated ideas about the psychology of 
work.  In the first, published in 1919, he examined the role of the laborer in agriculture
17
; in the 
second, whose title translated to “Humanization of the Taylor System: An Inquiry into the 
Fundamental Psychology of Work and Motivation” (1920), he critiqued Frederick Winslow 
Taylor’s Principles of Scientific Management (1911).18   Taylor’s scientific management had, by 
the late teens (and following Taylor’s death in 1915) gained great attention in Germany for its 
promises of maximal industrial efficiency.
19
  Taylor proposed not just that managers break down 
factory tasks to their simplest components to ensure efficient expertise, but also that they 
vigilantly monitor workers, via time-motion studies, to ensure that they performed at utmost 
productivity.   
 On the one hand, Lewin saluted Taylor’s efforts to apply scientific method to an 
everyday arena of human existence; the two men recognized the need for what became known as 
“behavioral science” in industry decades before the field’s industrial applications were 
commonplace.    On the other hand, Lewin expressed deep concern with Taylor’s focus on 
productivity as the only goal of human labors.   By mechanizing and reducing work to its most 
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minute and basic components, he argued, scientific managers might gain short-term efficiency, 
but they also spawned feelings of monotony and overspecialization among their workers.   
Taylor’s system negated the possibility that workers could achieve psychological satisfaction 
through their jobs, which Lewin called the “life value” of work, and the fact that for many men, 
work was a defining aspect of existence.
20
  He loftily explained: 
‘The worker wants his work to be rich, wide, and Protean, not crippling and 
narrow.  Work should not limit personal potential but develop it.  Work can 
involve love, beauty, and the soaring joy of creating.  Progress, in that case, does 
not mean shortening the workday, but an increase in the human value of work.’21  
 
According to Lewin, industrial experts needed to extend their range of concern beyond efficiency 
and recognize that jobs filled psychological roles in workers lives; that some jobs suited certain 
workers better than others; and that, in the words of Marrow, “the work itself must be made 
worth doing.”22   
 As one historian of management has explained, Lewin’s emphasis on the idea later 
labeled “morale” was prescient. By 1920, “Lewin understood (before anybody else) what would 
later be called job satisfaction.  Psychologists and efficiency experts, he suggested in a 
foreshadowing of early work-design practice, should team up to enhance both productivity and 
satisfaction.”23 Lewin suggested that if work became more fundamentally rewarding, workers 
would ultimately become more productive, and that with greater levels of satisfaction would 
come higher levels of output.  Though Lewin would not engage directly with industrial 
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production for almost two decades after the publication of this article in Germany, he never 
strayed from his conviction that job satisfaction and economic productivity were mutually 
dependent in modern society.  Through the rest of his career, he conceived of the workplace as 
the site of complex interpersonal dynamics with powerful economic and psychological 
repercussions. 
 Throughout the 1920s and into the early 1930s, Lewin gained renown as both teacher and 
student at the Psychological Institute in Berlin.  As a professor, he became famous for his 
impassioned, sometimes frenetic lectures and deep commitment to his graduate students.  Former 
students later explained to Alfred Marrow that while they could not always follow Lewin’s logic 
or progression of ideas—often expressed through elaborate charts and drawings on the boards—
his charisma and manic enthusiasm made him a contagiously effective professor.
24
   As a 
researcher, he began gaining attention across Germany and the Atlantic for his theories of “field 
force” and “life space.”  An individual’s “life space ” (an idea that grew from Lewin’s article on 
perceptions in wartime)  was the set of events and experiences – past, present, and future—that 
shaped his  behavior and perceptions in the world around him.   By the early 1930s, he was 
particularly interested in the life spaces of infants and children, and how these life spaces shaped 
their psychological development.
25
   
 If “life space” described the unique psychological landscape of the individual, “field 
force” described the environmental forces that acted upon an individual, specifically through 
social situations that shaped their goals, behaviors, and needs.
26
  Lewin grew increasingly 
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interested in what Marrow has called the “circular causal relationship between self and 
environment”: the conviction that as environmental factors shape our relationship with the world, 
our ever-shifting psychological landscapes alter the ways in which we perceive the world around 
us.
27
  Though Lewin focused in his early “field force” work on the effect of environments on 
child development, these two theories exerted tremendous force on his and others’ analysis of 
events that soon unfolded on the national and international stage. 
 In January 1933, Adolph Hitler was appointed Chancellor of Germany and began to 
transform Weimar Germany into the Third Reich.  Lewin, having risen as high in the ranks of the 
academy as possible for a Jew (associate professor without civil service rank) recognized that he 
and his family needed to leave Germany swiftly.  (The other three of the “Big Four” German 
psychologists—Wertheimer, Koffka, and Kohler – decided to do so at the same time.) Thanks to 
Lewin’s increasing renown in the psychological community, he had begun to build relationships 
with American social scientists, and had recently visited both New York and California in May 
1932.
28
  Before his emigration in August 1933, he was recruited for a two-year position in the 
Home Economics Department of Cornell University, thanks to his friendly relations with a 
colleague named Ethel Waring in that department.
29
  Cornell proved to be a poor match for 
Lewin: Its academic atmosphere provided far less stimulation and excitement than his beloved 
Psychological Institute in Berlin, and his appointment to the Home Economics Department made 
little sense given his interests.  During his two-year appointment at the school, Lewin bided his 
time conducting studies of nursery children, publishing his first book (A Dynamic Theory of 
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Personality), and raising funds for the establishment of a Psychological Institute at the Hebrew 
University in Jerusalem.
30
   
 In 1935, Lewin won a better suited position at the University of Iowa’s Child Welfare 
Research Station, which was funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and already served as an 
important hub of American psychological research by the time of his arrival.
31
 In addition to 
existing staff, Lewin soon won a number of fellowships that enabled him to build his own 
coalition of researchers.  Over the course of a decade working in the Research Station, from 1935 
to 1945, Lewin basked in the glories of both research and teaching, recruiting and identifying a 
group of likeminded colleagues who were interested in applying the psychological theories and 
techniques to contemporary social problems.  It was at Iowa that Lewin announced himself on 
the American scene as a pioneer of social psychology and a shaper of ideas.  His decade there 
cemented his commitment to “action research” and reinforced his sense that, in spite of all the 
injustices and horrors in the world around him, the field of psychology offered promising 
solutions to the most unfathomable of social evils.  One of his colleagues later reflected 
admiringly that for Lewin, “’[a]ll these terrible events” –the anti-Semitism of his youth,  his 
experience as a soldier in World War I, Germany’s violent defeat, the rise of Hitler --  “deepened 
his commitment to mankind and the betterment of man’s lot.’”32  Alfred Marrow, who became 
close friends with Lewin during his years in Iowa, compared him to “Toqueville a hundred years 
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earlier,” for he “looked at American life using his European experience as a continued and 
inescapable point of reference” as he tackled the most fundamental issues of social conflict, 
intergroup relations, and democratic leadership.
33
  Increasingly, and especially after Lewin 
conducted groundbreaking research in the late 1930s, graduate students came to the University of 
Iowa specifically because they wanted to conduct experiments related to pressing social 
problems with Lewin and his team. 
 In 1938, Lewin embarked on a long-term series of experiments that came to define his 
career.  Often referred to as the “Autocracy/Democracy” studies, the experiments (conducted 
with Ronald Lippitt and later with Ralph White) blazed a new trail in social psychology, even 
though they were conducted on a relatively small scale.
34
  In the experiments, Lewin and his 
team set out to compare the effectiveness of different leadership styles through a series of 
creative experiments featuring young children and adult mediators acting in different styles: 
democratic, autocratic, and laissez-faire.  Their studies not only affirmed the superiority of 
democratic leadership above alternative methods, but also helped popularize “group dynamics” 
and “leadership training” as vital areas of study for psychologists in the mid-20th century.  
Though first presented as a study of different educational methods, the Autocracy/Democracy 
studies predictably emerged as ammunition in the nation’s ideological war against 
Totalitarianism, and also propelled some of the most important developments in industrial 
management of the 20
th
 century. 
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 By 1938 Lewin had moved away from his earlier interest in individuals’ psychology and 
zealously embraced the group as the foundation for most human social processes. 
35
  He had 
grown particularly interested in the psychology of anti-Semitism and the perceptions of 
difference between groups of people.  In 1936, he published a paper comparing Germans and 
Americans in which he concluded that the two cultures were “psychologically opposite” in most 
ways. He cited German children’s servility versus American children’s independence, and the 
“habit of blind obedience” common to most Germans but lacking in the US.36  Lewin had also 
grown interested in the particular psychological problems facing minority groups, and the ways 
in which group membership affected the status of the perpetrators and victims of 
discrimination.
37
  Lewin saw a social landscape in which group membership determined the 
status, behavior, and attitudes of individuals.  The engineering of social change, by extension, 
required a clear understanding of group mechanisms and interpersonal dynamics. 
 The Iowa Studies in Autocracy and Democracy began with a fortuitous encounter 
between Kurt Lewin and a young graduate Student named Ronald Lippitt.  Lippitt arrived at the 
University of Iowa in 1937 after two pivotal encounters during his undergraduate education at 
Springfield College: He worked in his “very exciting” junior year with the famous child 
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 and in his senior year with a new professor named Harold Seashore, 
who had just completed his doctorate at the University of Iowa and would eventually serve as 
Vice President and founder of the Testing Division of the Psychological Corporation in New 
York City.
39
  When Lippitt decided to scrap his previous career plans in journalism, Seashore 
helped arrange for him to earn a slot in the University of Iowa’s graduate program in 
psychology.   
 Upon arriving in Iowa, Lippitt and the other graduate students received a list of potential 
Masters Thesis projects on which to work with the program’s professors, and he was attracted to 
a project on “Groups and Influence Structures” listed next to Lewin’s.  What followed was a 
fruitful accident: Lippitt met with Lewin and proposed that they produce “a comparative study of 
different kinds of leadership on children’s groups,” and Lewin quickly approved, encouraging 
Lippitt to write a proposal for an experiment comparing autocratic and democratic methods of 
leadership. Lippitt learned later that what Lewin “really meant” on the original project list was 
“some development of algebra-type analyses of group structure,”  but that Lippitt’s “‘gung-ho’ 
enthusiasm for group work” won Lewin over, and he “never let me know that this wasn’t quite 
what he had in mind.”  The confusion helped propel Lewin from the field of individual child 
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 The two men embarked on the experiment in 1938, and were joined in the second stage 
of their studies by Ralph White.
41
  It is worth noting White’s recollection of the research team’s 
dynamic:  
 Ron was unequivocally the Number One person in the triad.  It was his 
experiment from the beginning.  If Kurt were here, I think he would be the first to 
grant that that was true …  It grew out of Ron’s highly practical approach, going 
back to his Springfield College days when the big subject of discussion was how 
to handle a bunch of kids.  And Kurt was simply delighted by the directness of 
Ron’s experimental approach to the practical side of group leadership.42 
 
While Lippitt led the day-to-day activities of the first phase of the Autocracy/Democracy 
experiments, Lewin “look[ed] on benevolently” and filled a “very democratic” role without 
taking a firm lead.
43
 
 The goal of the first of the Autocracy/Democracy studies, conducted in 1938, was 
striking in its simplicity: to “develop … techniques to investigate ‘democracy’ and ‘autocracy’ in 
group atmospheres.”44  Lewin and Lippitt believed that in order to investigate socio-
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psychological problems, they needed to “create a setup where group life might be studied under 
rather free but well defined conditions.”  So instead of observing subjects in a pre-existing social 
climate—a club, school, or factory—they set out to build their own tightly controlled 
environment.  Lippitt and Lewin selected a small number of 11-yr old children (girls and boys, 
unlike the later boy-only studies) from the fifth and sixth grade of the local University 
Elementary School.  The researchers divided the children into two groups of five children each, 
both with the same leader (Lippitt), and the groups went on to meet on twelve different 
occasions, in half-hour meetings twice a week.   In dividing the children into groups, the 
researchers avoided choosing pre-established cliques—preferring groups of children who had 
little relation to one another.   
 The children, all volunteers, were told in a preliminary meeting that they were going to 
meet after school to make masks for a theater production, and that instead of making the masks 
as individuals, they would construct one mask at a time as a group.  Lippitt led both groups 
through their six weeks of meetings.  In one group, Lippitt played an “autocratic” role.  He 
issued orders regarding when and with whom to work and gave them no say in their creative 
process.   While the children worked, he stayed aloof and refrained from participating.  While 
trying to maintain a somewhat “impersonal” tone in both groups (so as to limit variables in the 
study), he nonetheless dominated the group and criticized the children’s work freely. In the 
second group, Lippitt played a “democratic” role.  He met with the children before starting their 
mask-making to develop longterm goals and scheme the best methods for reaching them.  He 
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explained all steps of the mask-building process (steps including the use of clay molds, papier 
mache, etc.) and gave the children options to choose from as they developed their techniques.  
He allowed them to choose their own work teams and decide their own division of tasks, and he 
“attempted to be a group member in spirit”—offering generous praise to the group as a whole, or 
constructive criticism when necessary.
45
  
 As the children in the different groups made their masks, four observers took continuous 
notes on their behavior.  They noted (in both qualitative and quantitative forms) the groups’ 
changing structures and subgroupings; the “ascendant” and “submissive” responses of 
participants; running comments from the children; and minute-to-minute “shifts of interest.”  The 
observers paid attention, too, to the volume and tone of social interactions between the children 
and their responses to Lippitt – particularly their levels of hostility, resistance, cooperation, 
dependence, competition, and their “’I-centeredness’ (ego-centrism) versus ‘we-centeredness’ 
(group spirit).”46  The goal was not to isolate the behavior of individual children, but to trace the 
dynamics of the group as a whole.  Observers looked to detect both levels of the groups’ 
productivity and the tone of interactions between the children and their leader.  When the 
experiment was complete, Lewin and Lippitt tabulated these results in conjunction with Lippitt’s 
own post-meeting observations. 
 Lippitt and Lewin published the results of this first study both in Sociometry and as 
Lippitt’s Master’s thesis. 47  The experiment had, the psychologists argued, produced clear 
results.  Although the groups exhibited similar behaviors at the outset of the study, they quickly 
developed opposing sets of behavior and outcomes. In the autocratic group, the children 
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exhibited a “higher state of tension,” a less stable group structure, and less submissiveness.  They 
engaged in more interactions than the democratic group, yet produced careless and sometimes 
unfinished work.  The children tended to be productive in the presence of their leader, but 
became disorganized the instant their leader was not present.  Lewin and Lippitt were 
particularly interested in the social dynamics of the group under the autocratic leader, in which 
the children never developed a strong group identity.   Even worse, observers noted almost thirty 
times as much hostility in the autocratic group than in the democratic one, and cited a disturbing 
pattern: Over the course of twelve meetings, the autocratic leader’s subjects had developed two 
“scapegoats.”“[T]he group combined its aggression against one individual” and in both cases, the 
scapegoat quit the experiment entirely.
48
 
 Analyses of the democratic group’s behavior stood in striking contrast to those results.  In 
the democratic group, the children both asked for and offered much higher levels of cooperation 
and demonstrated more constructive tendencies in general. They were able to develop clear 
group goals and “give and take of objective criticism without personal involvement,” which 
resulted in superior products.    The social structure of this group was far more stable than in the 
autocratic group.  Not only did the democratic children never choose scapegoats for their 
aggression, but they seemed to lack aggressive tendencies in general.  They demonstrated “many 
more occurrences of praise and expressions of friendliness” within their  generally more unified 
group structure. Lewin and Lippitt heralded their achievement as a “greater feeling of “we’ness’” 
than of “’I-ness.’” 
 Soon after the first Autocracy/Democracy study was conducted in 1938, Ralph White 
arrived at Iowa as a General Education Board postdoctoral fellow.  He was interested in political 
science but drawn to the same brand of experimental research as Lippitt and Lewin, so the three 
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men planned a broader experiment on autocracy and democracy.  This time, they limited their 
experiment to 11-year-old boys (as opposed to a coed sample), whom they assembled in a greater 
number in four clubs (instead of two), to be led by both White and Lippitt.  Club activities would 
include mask-making as before, with the addition of airplane model construction, painting, and 
soap carving.
49
  In the interest of controlling the experiment more closely than they had the first 
time around, the researchers made sure that each boy had experience in both autocratic and 
democratic groups, and observers carefully monitored the social transitions from one to the 
other.   As a result, Lippitt, Lewin, and White emerged from these studies with six times more 
evidence than they had gathered in the first. 
 Though originally designed as a further study of the differences between autocratic and 
democratic leadership, the project accidentally evolved into something broader, thanks to 
White’s own interpretation of the term “democratic.” Lippitt remembered later that Ralph, 
playing the role of democratic leader,  
‘behaved in a way that was quite different from the other democratic-leader roles 
as we had defined them.  He was obviously getting quite a different effect in 
terms of responses from the children.  Kurt’s observation of this, as he stood 
behind the burlap wall and operated the movie camera, led to an excited gleam in 
his eye as he perceived a basic genotypic difference between the democratic 
pattern and what we labeled the laissez-faire pattern of leadership.  So instead of 
correcting Ralph’s style we moved it more toward a pure case of laissez-faire 
pattern and planned for other leaders to use the same role to get a more complete 
analysis of the dynamics of the difference.’50  
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Thus the new incarnation of the Autocracy/Democracy study was born, with the addition of 
“laissez-faire” leadership style—often referred to as “anarchic” in the popular press.51  The 
laissez-faire leader, enacted by either Lippitt or White, offered his club members almost no 
direction or mediation. While not averse to group participation, he did nothing to encourage it. 
 The findings of the Lewin/Lippitt/White leadership studies reinforced the conclusions of 
the first.  As in the previous study, the researchers found the autocratic subjects more prone to 
hostility, restlessness, aggression, and scapegoating than the members of the other two groups. 
The children damaged materials and demanded attention for negative behaviors.  They expressed 
less “individual originality” in the work process.52  Tellingly, the four boys who dropped out of 
the study altogether dropped out of an autocratic group.    
 The boys in the laissez-faire group demonstrated less hostility and aggression than their 
peers under autocratic leadership, but the group was by no means functional.  The boys in this 
group accomplished less than their peers in either of the other two groups, with far less “work-
centered behavior and discussion,” and a great deal of confusion about goals and tasks.  The boys 
who transferred into this group from an authoritarian group became “frightened and disturbed,” 
and some of the boys resorted to scapegoating just as the autocratic boys had.  Lewin, Lippitt, 
and White surmised that the “frustration brought on by too little leadership” and “vague feelings 
of inadequacy” led some of the boys to ridicule others.53  If forced to choose between laissez-
faire and autocracy, seven out ten children chose the former over the “hard discipline” of the 
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 but the boys’ preference for democracy rang clear. At the end of the study, 19 of the 20 
boys ranked democratic leadership above the other two modes.   
 A New York Times article published in 1940 gave readers a window into the interactions 
within these groups.  Catherine Mackenzie, who reported  repeatedly on the 
Autocracy/Democracy studies for the Times, described a democratic leader who offered his 
group a range of options for the completion of a given task:  “‘I know several ways you could fix 
that,’” he suggested “’—you could grease it with Vaseline, or use some talcum powder, or they 
use liquid soap sometimes.  Maybe there are other ways too.’”  After group discussion of these 
options, he encouraged the children to select a method by vote.
55
 The children expressed 
universal approval of his methods: “He was a good sport, worked along with us and thinks of 
things just like we do”; “He never did try to be the boss, but we always had plenty to do”; “Just 
the right combination—nothing I didn’t like about him.”  Of the autocratic leader, on the other 
hand, the children had few positive things to say.  One called him “too strict.”  Another 
complained, “We just had to do things; he wanted us to get them done in a hurry.”56  Mackenzie 
noted the dramatic change in group dynamics when the members of a democratic group 
transferred to an autocratic leader and the “friendly, open and cooperative group, full of life, 
came within a short half hour a rather apathetic-looking gathering without initiative.”  
 Having conducted their series of studies on 11-year-old children, the question remained 
for Lewin, Lippitt and White: What conclusions, if any, could be drawn from the studies about 
society or the world in general?  In 1938, White resisted extending the studies into the realm of 
metaphor.   The goal of the studies, he explained in the New York Times, was “not to test 
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dictatorships, but to find the best way to educate children.”57  In a period of active debate about 
the virtues of Progressive education—a movement that celebrated children’s participation and 
creativity in the educational process—the Autocracy/Democracy could be modestly interpreted 
as confirmation that students perform best when directly engaged in learning.
58
  The findings of 
the studies did indeed circulate among members of the Progressive education community.  At a 
roundtable discussion on “Bringing Democracy to Our Schools” at a meeting of the Institute of 
the Ethical Culture Schools in New York City, one presenter cited the Iowa experiments as 
evidence that “the democratic process provides the best way to educate children.”  Democracy 
could, the panelist suggested, be both a method (through pedagogy) and an outcome (as a learned 
“way of life”) of the effective education of young people in schools.59  The next year, Dr. 
Goodwin Watson of Columbia University’s Teachers College endorsed the findings of the Iowa 
studies to a sea of listeners at the opening session of the Child Study Association conference.
60
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 The Autocracy/Democracy studies quickly took on far greater significance within society 
at large.  Almost immediately after the publication of their results, commentators were citing the 
studies as confirmation of the American political system and renunciation of autocratic 
dictatorships. In the popular press, even the titles of articles about the experiments suggested the 
scope of their conclusions: “School Governments Show Autocracies Breed Hate,” advertised 
one, while another announced, “Democracy Wins.”  In article after article, authors insisted that 
the subject of the studies had been citizenship, not learning styles.  One reporter referred to the 
creation of “mini-governments” in the study (though “mini-governments” were nowhere to be 
seen in the craft activities) and called children “the citizens” in an experiment to discover “just 
what effect government has on the individual.”61  The scapegoats of the study were “refugees” 
from an autocratic system whose “citizens…cannot work together.”62  Mackenzie of the New 
York Times situated the Iowa studies in the context of ideological warfare. “It is a proud boast of 
autocracy that it is efficient,” she wrote, because “It makes the trains run on time,” and “[n]ow 
the question of whether it is more efficient than democracy is being tested on a world scale by 
contending armies.”  She argued that the Iowa studies clearly contributed ammunition to the anti-
autocracy cause. Not only did autocratic governments fail to inspire cooperation or harmony 
among their citizens, but they were less efficient as well.
63
 Lewin, Lippitt, and White had 
furnished precisely the right research for their ideological moment, in spite the their more limited 
stated intentions.  
 For Kurt Lewin, the studies had grand implications.  He later wrote of the experiments:  
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‘On the whole… I think that there is ample proof that the difference in behavior in 
autocratic and democratic situations is not a result of differences in the 
individuals.  There have been few experiences for me as impressive as seeing the 
expression on children’s faces during the first day under an autocratic leader.  The 
group that had formerly been friendly, open, cooperative, and full of life, became 
within a short half-hour a rather apathetic-looking gathering without initiative.  
The change from autocracy to democracy seemed to take somewhat more time 
than from democracy to autocracy.  Autocracy is imposed on the individual.  
Democracy he has to learn!’64 
 
From the experiment, he extrapolated the idea that genuinely Democratic leaders promoted 
cohesion, cooperation, “we-feelings,” and productivity at the same time.  In enabling 
participation, they delivered what Lewin had celebrated in his critique of Taylor’s scientific 
management: Higher levels of productivity and work quality along with the sustained “ego 
satisfaction” of all involved.65 
 
 No matter how persuasive the results of the Autocracy/Democracy study, the research 
lacked the quality of real-world application that Lewin so often sought in his studies.  So 
democratic leaders were more effective than autocratic ones.  What to do with this knowledge?  
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Where was the action research for which Lewin the “scientist-citizen”66 was becoming known?  
Fortuitously, at just the time that Lewin oversaw the Autocracy/Democracy experiments at the 
Iowa Child Welfare Research Station, he received an opportunity to test principles of democratic 
participation in a real-world context: one of Alfred Marrow’s pajama factories.  It was at 
Marrow’s Harwood Corporation that Lewin first connected his theoretical revisions of 
Taylorism, the findings of the Autocracy-Democracy studies, and new principles of industrial 
management.  At Harwood, Lewin and his disciples launched an extensive action research 
program that extended democratic principles to the shop floor.  His Harwood work ultimately 
had profound implications for the theory and practice of participatory management. 
 Lewin had first met Alfred Marrow in 1934 when Marrow, then a young PhD student at 
New York University, sought Lewin’s advice on his psychology dissertation about “Goal 
Tensions.”   Lewin, then in his second year at the Home Economics Department of Cornell 
University, invited Marrow to visit his home in Ithaca and stay overnight to discuss ideas.  The 
two men clicked and stayed in touch over coming years as Marrow completed his doctorate and 
Lewin moved to Iowa.  By 1939 they were close friends, and Marrow found himself in a 
predicament. He was at this point dividing his time between teaching in New York (where he 
had also become involved with the American Jewish Congress) and overseeing his family’s 
business, the Harwood Manufacturing Company (later renamed the Weldon company).  
Harwood, a pajama company, had been founded by Marrow’s grandfather.  When his father died 
in 1940, Marrow became president.
67
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 By the late 1930s, it had become clear that Harwood’s labor relations were troubled. 
Marrow approached Lewin to discuss the problems at one plant in particular, in Marion, 
Virginia.  This rural plant, staffed almost entirely by young women from the surrounding 
mountain region
68, was suffering from high levels of turnover and absenteeism.  Workers’ output 
there was significantly lower than at Harwood’s other plants.  After the customary twelve weeks 
of training, workers in Marion were producing only about half as much as their peers in the 
North.
69
  Marrow noticed particular problems surrounding the plant’s attempts at modernization 
of machinery.  The production workers balked at the prospect of changing machines or learning 
new skills, and plant supervisors struggled to keep productivity rates high in the face of change.  
Marrow struggled to make sense of his 300 workers’ inefficency. While it was true that the 
women rarely arrived to Harwood with any factory experience, he found them to be generally 
“eager to work,” and couldn’t account for the profound difference between their productivity and 
that in “the industrialized areas of the north.”70   Marrow asked Lewin if he would visit the plant 
in rural Virginia, to meet with workers and supervisors and assess the plant’s problems with an 
objective eye. 
 Lewin made his first trip to the Marion plant in 1939, beginning a collaborative 
relationship with the company that would last until his death in 1947.   Upon arriving, he met 
with a plant manager who explained Marion’s problems in his own terms. On the one hand, he 
said, the workers’ wages were higher than those they had been earning before as waitresses or 
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domestics, and he observed that the women “felt good about their jobs.”71  Yet turnover 
remained high, and the plant suffered heavy losses.  When supervisors put pressure on the 
workers, turnover increased.  When management offered different systems of rewards for 
production or attendance, they were greeted by only small improvements if any.
72
  In the late 
1930s, such labor predicaments were the norm, yet Harwood’s managers struggled to reconcile 
the differences between their plant’s productivity and others in the corporation.   
 During Lewin’s visit to the Marion plant, he met with managers and workers and 
observed the production process on the floor.  He emerged with a clear diagnosis of Marion’s 
problems: The production goals were too high.  Harwood’s quotas were, in fact “impossible to 
attain,” and were so unrealistic that they lacked a “social reality,” so workers stopped putting 
pressure on themselves to achieve them.
73
  Lewin made a series of recommendations for turning 
things around.  First, he suggested, supervisors needed to stop putting pressure on individual 
employees; they needed to deal with workers as members as small groups instead.  Second, 
management needed to find ways to “give the group the feeling that the standard was realistic 
and could be reached.”74  Management, guided by Lewin’s suggestions, instituted a system of 
more realistic goals and “sub-goals” designed to give workers a sense of satisfaction as they 
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strode toward production quotas.
75
  They witnessed some improvements, but not enough to make 
their plant competitive.  Harwood’s next step, at Lewin’s recommendation, was to start hiring 
more experienced and skilled operators from communities outside of Marion, and to integrate 
them with the plant’s less experienced workers.  Because these new workers made quotas look 
feasible, output slowly improved.   
 Marrow asked Lewin if he would be willing to visit the plant over coming years.  The 
German psychologist had, Marrow later reflected, become “popular with production workers and 
supervisors alike,” and had “won their confidence by his warmth, his understanding of their 
problems, and his good humor.”76  In the eight ensuing years, Lewin sometimes had closer 
contact with the employees than Marrow himself, because Marrow was based at the company’s 
main office in New York City and maintained contact largely via letter and telephone. 
 From 1939-1947, Lewin launched the first period of what officially became known as the 
“Harwood Studies”: an extended series of “action research” projects that addressed a wide range 
of industrial problems and involved a growing cast of social psychologists.  Management 
historian Bernard Burnes has suggested that for Lewin, Harwood became the “main vehicle” for 
the application of his research to the “real world.”  His consulting work there became “a logical 
extension of earlier work he had conducted with Lippitt and White,” for it allowed him to study 
the impact of different modes of leadership among controlled work groups.  “In a world where 
autocratic management was the norm,” Burnes has explained, Lewin introduced a distinctly 
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participative brand of management and group decision-making that “was not only a breath of 
fresh air, but it also brought impressive results.”77  
 This is not to say that change at Harwood came about easily.   Lewin visited the Marion 
plant in 1944, when Harwood was manufacturing both civilian and military supplies, and found 
that many of the difficulties he had first observed in 1939 persisted, reporting to Marrow that 
“the situation at the factory as a whole seems quite difficult.”78   He noted several primary 
symptoms of distress: girls were still quitting in disproportionately high numbers; efficiency had 
dropped substantially and, as a result; and the cost of each unit produced had risen from $.85 per 
work hour to $1.01.
79
  Once again, Lewin set out to locate the root of the low production and low 
morale.  This time, he found that both sank when Harwood’s employees were forced to transition 
from one machine or garment to another; that as methods of production changed, workers 
became discouraged and either quit or slow down.  He also learned that workers could not earn 
overtime pay unless they produced a certain number of garments in a given day, and the decline 
in available overtime hours felt to workers like punishment.   
 Lewin met with the plant’s team captains (discussed below), who observed the “feeling 
of failure” in their ranks.  They described one common sentiment expressed by their workers: “’I 
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can’t make the units….Therefore, I can’t get overtime.’ Therefore, ‘[I] quit.’”80   Lewin 
immediately proposed the loosening of overtime restrictions, which would cost Harwood more in 
terms of overtime pay, but less in terms of turnover and training costs.  He also suggested that 
managers be candid with their workers about impending production changes, so as to not raise 
workers’ hopes for an unrealistically smooth transition, and that they set more realistic quotas for 
productivity.   Finally, Lewin proposed the establishment of regular meetings between workers 




 As Lewin continued his work with Harwood in the late 1930s and 1940s, he urged 
Marrow to hire two of his Iowa students, Alex Bavelas and Jack French, to conduct more regular 
studies of productivity and morale at Harwood.  The studies conducted by these two men, who 
were joined by Lester Coch in the period immediately preceding Lewin’s death, became 
legendary in the field of participative management.  Under the guidance of Lewin and with the 
support of the unusually progressive Marrow,
82
 Bavelas and French approached Harwood as a 
testing ground for multiple manifestations of Lewin’s democratic management philosophy – 
                                                 
LLewin, “Observation about the Present State of the Plant at Marion and Some Suggestions.”  Lewin presented 
statistics on the last nine quitters at the Marion Plant: Six quit because they disliked their job or wanted a different 
job; the rest quit for personal or family reasons.  In Henry’s department of 48 “girls,” he explained, seven had 
recently quit, and of these all but one seemed to be related to the newly decreased availability of overtime.  
 
81
 Lewin offered some additional suggestions in his memo, “Observation about the Present State of the Plant at 
Marion and Some Suggestions”: That Harwood establish a bonus plan for supervisors and  give the title of 
“experienced operator” to workers with production rates of 50-60 (to increase their ego-satisfaction).  He also 
recommended that the company start conducting more routine diagnostics: to 1) keep a “quitters’ chart” that would 
explain people’s reasons for quitting; and 2) give a monthly “morale questionnaire” to all workers and supervisors. 
 
82
 Burnes notes that some critics have commented that we should disregard, or at least understate, the lessons of the 
Harwood studies precisely because they took place in such an unusual context: in a company whose president was 
not only a social psychologist himself, but also a zealous advocate of democratic participation with particular 
openness to group experimentation.  The researchers did not come “‘cold’ to the company,” in other words, and 
“and the employees were predisposed to to respond well to the participative approach.” Burnes cites Carleton S 
Bartlem and Edwin A Locke, “The Coch and French Study: A Critique and Reinterpretation,” Human Relations 34, 





from “self-management” and group-decision making among workers to role-playing leadership 
training of supervisors.  All of their studies rested on the principle that modern factory labor 
would work best if companies discarded outmoded, authoritarian methods of scientific 
management.   
 As a result of this research, Harwood emerged as an emblem of effective corporate 
democracy, the real-life embodiment of Lippitt and White’s “democratic” play group, in which 
efficiency and harmony peacefully coexisted.  Furthermore, the coalition of researchers 
cemented an increasing institutional circuitry that had started to develop among Group Dynamics 
advocates.  As Burnes has written, “Harwood acted as a revolving door for people and ideas”:  
Bavelas traveled back and forth between Harwood and the University of Iowa, establishing a 
steady chain of communication between the organization and his colleagues, and French soon 
joined him in his itinerant endeavors.
83
  Meanwhile, Marrow observed operations from his office 
in New York City while practicing as an academic and actively working to develop the 
intergroup relations division of the American Jewish Congress.  By the end of the 1940s, these 
groups and individuals constituted a tangible community committed to the research of group 
dynamics. 
 Alex Bavelas arrived at Harwood in the late 1930s to become the company’s first onsite 
researcher, intent on studying the “human factors of management,” and particularly the role of 
small groups in an industrial setting.  Bavelas’s studies involved most of the Marion plant’s 200 
workers and almost all of the managers between 1940 and 1947.
84
 In his first experiment, 
Bavelas began meeting informally several times a week with a group of “high-producing 
operators.”  In group discussions, they explored the difficulties involved in increasing 
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production, which led to a discussion of the different methods that different workers used to 
attain their goals and the challenges that blocked their progress.  As the operators revealed 
roadblocks, management worked to fix them.   
 Next, Bavelas asked the group to vote on the issue of increasing their daily output.   
Surprisingly, they decided to lift the daily output from a ceiling of 75 units to 87 units, “a level 
never before attained.”85 They aimed to reach that goal within five days, and when they 
succeeded, they raised the goal to 90 units.  Having reached that goal, they maintained it for five 
months.  Lewin, learning of the experiment with awestruck delight, concluded that Bavelas’s 
group had been successful because the very act of group decision-making had solidified their 
motivation and commitment to a task.  Because the group had devised concrete goals and 
strategies, their meetings carried more weight than open-ended, non-goal-oriented discussion. 
Bavelas confirmed these findings in his next study on what he called “Self-management,” in 
which he offered a small group of workers the chance to plan their own hourly rates using what 
he called “pacing cards.”  As long as they kept at or above a minimum quote, he explained, they 
could determine their own hourly and daily rates of production.  The workers involved in this 
study soon increased their production from 67 units a day to 82, and then stabilized at that 
level.
86
   
 Bavelas repeated a similar version of this experiment in 1943, when he appointed a 
committee of twenty “team captains” (nineteen of them women; one from each production line) 
from Harwood’s workforce to meet weekly as part of a labor-management committee.  
Harwood’s higher management resisted at first, fearing that the committee might “stir up 
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trouble” and bring them one-step closer to unionization.87   They finally relented to the team 
captain system, but on the condition that the captains discuss only factory procedures—not 
“management prerogatives” like wages and hours.  In the early meetings of the committee, the 
captains, having “no previous experience in democratic participation,” were mostly “passive” 
and quiet.  As they gradually spoke up, they tackled a number of innocuous plant projects: They  
organized war bond drives; scheduled weekly prayer services to be conducted over the Harwood 
PA system; instituted a system of “employee choice of industrial music” to be played over 
Harwood’s speakers throughout the day; and lobbied for  improved lunch room services.88   
 Gradually, the team captains started participating more in meetings and expressing 
themselves freely; at the same time, they expressed a sense of greater “responsibility to their 
constituents.” As their confidence increased, management grew more confident in them, and 
began turning to them for input on a range of issues: Harwood’s absenteeism problem, discipline 
issues, and methods for improving the quality of their products.  At the same time, workers on 
the shop floor learned to use their team captains to communicate their “desires and grievances” 
to management.  “As in our political democracy,” a company memo explained, “such actions by 
the workers occurred most frequently where there were dissatisfactions.” 
 Harwood’s Democratic communication system worked.  At one point, the workers 
submitted a petition for a 5-cent pay raise – the kind of situation that often “leads to months of 
negotiation if not strikes and lockouts” (see the fictional drama of The Pajama Game) – but 
management agreed to it.  They agreed that the raise was “justified and desirable” and could be 
used as an incentive for more production.  Management also agreed to increase in the minimum 
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daily pay after discussing the issue at length with team captains.  By the end of the specified time 
of the experiment, the team captains’ recommendations were “almost identical” to those put forth 
by management.  The company’s report on the experiment celebrated it as “the conscious effort 
of a group of psychologists to introduce democratic participation in the factory of Harwood.”89 
 With the arrival of social psychologist Jack French, whom one author has described as “a 
Lewinian’s Lewinian,”90 Harwood expanded its social psychology experiments to include the 
training of managers and supervisors, as opposed to focusing exclusively on shop floor.  French, 
inspired by the Autocracy/Democracy Studies, began to focus in the early 1940s on methods of 
democratic leadership training.  He was particularly interested in the liminal role of supervisors 
(also known as “foremen”) at Harwood and elsewhere.  Supervisors lacked both the authority of 
managers and the power of workers to determine production rates; they were, in many ways, the 
most powerless members of the corporate hierarchy, often viewed as management by workers 
and as workers by management.  After Harwood’s troubling production and turnover difficulties 
in early 1944, French devised a program of leadership training for all levels of supervision.  It 
would include role-playing, “sociodrama,”91 problem solving, and other “action techniques,” 
with an emphasis on experiential learning as opposed of lectures or discussions of theory.
92
  
Harwood issued a Supervisor’s Memorandum in December 1945 explaining that French’s 
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training would help supervisors deal with the effects of “girls failing to make their units,” and 




 French went on to conduct six role-playing sessions at Marrow’s plant in 1944 and 1945, 
and soon thereafter published an article in which he outlined the “promising results” of his 
endeavor.
94
  (Marrow himself later referred to role-playing as “one of the more successful 
techniques used to elicit participation.”95)   French’s first role-playing exercise, in December 
1944, involved four Harwood supervisors:  Roy Blanchett, Frances Williams, Viola Sawyers, 
and Myrtle Hopkins.
96
  French opened the session by explaining that it was intended as a 
clinic—not a class or lecture—to which supervisors could bring problems, and urged them to 
begin by making lists of the most pressing problems they encountered on the job.  Reading the 
lists aloud, it became clear that they shared a preoccupation with one problem in particular: the 
tendency of the “girls” they oversaw to talk too much and too loudly while on the job (“That’s 
pretty much our biggest problem,” affirmed Frances Williams).97  French devised a role-playing 
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exercise in which two of the supervisors pretended to be workers talking on the job, while 
another supervisor walked up to them and tried to quiet them.  The supervisors approached the 
task awkwardly at first (Roy: “Well, Viola, if we’ve got to talk about something, we might as 
well talk about this idea.  What do you think of it, Viola?”  French: “No, that’s not it.  Girls 
wouldn’t talk about that…Come on, be girls.  Go ahead and talk about what you did last night.”)  
But soon enough, they’d fallen into the rhythms of shop floor conversation and cathartically 
enacted some realistic confrontations:  
Frances, acting as supervisor:  [In a scolding tone of voice] You girls are making 
much too much noise. 
 
Roy [acting as worker]: We’re just talking.  
 
Frances: You’re not supposed to talk.  
 
Viola: Why we’ve got to talk.  You can’t live without talking. 
 
Frances: You can’t talk.  It bothers others.  Now quit talking.  
 
Viola: If I can’t talk, I’m going to kick somebody. 
 
Frances: Okay.  Suppose you go tell Mr. Green down in the office.  
 
Viola: Ok, I will! 
 
Roy: If you’re gonna talk that way, I quit!98 
 
After enacting multiple confrontations between supervisor and worker, which repeatedly 
escalated in both tone and the scale of both parties’ threats, French asked the participants, “Do 
the girls really talk back to you the way you did to Frances?” “Roy assured him, “They sure do!” 
and the other supervisors nodded in emphatic agreement.
99
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 The group then went on to discuss what they had witnessed in each other’s performances.  
One supervisor concluded that she and her peers too often cited the authority of their manager, 
Mr. Green, instead of invoking their own clout, and that this tendency threatened to undermine 
their status.  Another suggested that if supervisors leveled with workers and respectfully 
explained the rationale behind company policy, they wouldn’t have to do so much scolding.  
Another suggested taking a sensitive approach to communication, citing a moment when a 
worker whom she asked to stop “yelling” had “flared up and got real mad.   So I said that I 
hadn’t talked hateful to her and there was no reason for her to talk hateful to me.  She said, ‘I’m 
sorry,’ and after that was nice and quiet.”100    
 By the end of the first session, the supervisors had agreed both to continue management 
techniques in their small group, and to meet with their workers to calmly explain company 
policy.  French pointed to these outcomes when he publicized the experiment in Sociometry.  He 
explained that role-playing worked not just because it served as a forum for the discussion of 
organizational problems, but because it taught foremen social skills and helped them form a 
strong, supportive group of their own.  Labeling it a form of “sensitivity training,” French 
explained that “supervisors (even the women) are often insensitive to both the reactions of their 
workers and their own methods of leadership.”101  Role-playing simultaneously offered 
opportunities for cathartic discussion, reflective self-analysis, and the planning of change.  
 Though Bavelas and French continued to conduct studies at Harwood throughout the 
1940s
102
, no single experiment proved more significant than French and Coch’s 1947 experiment 
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in “Overcoming Resistance to Change.”103  This experiment involved the most direct application 
of Lewin, Lippitt, and White’s studies to the context of a factory, offering its researchers the 
opportunity to watch autocratic and democratic leadership play out in an industrial context.  (It 
also inspired the most heated critiques for years to come.
104
)  As noted above, the Harwood 
company struggled in the 1940s to maintain productivity as they modernized their production 
process.  One plant manager explained: 
‘Our product is pajamas.  We have to make changes on our assembly line, 
whenever we put out a new model.   That causes all sorts of labor trouble for us.  
Yet we can’t help ourselves, because the changes are imposed on us.   We have to 
keep ahead of our competitors.  As it is, we face each new season with dread; as 
soon as the assembly-line routine is changed, we have an immediate jump in 
resistance by workers: they produce less, to show their resentment; the absentee 
rate rises sharply; many of our best people quit.  Can anything be done about 
it?’105 
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According to one report, the turnover rate after a production change could be as high as 60%, 
even though the workers, who were protected at this point by a strong union, received “transfer 
bonuses” and incentive pay with no maximum daily rate.106  “Attempts to reason with the highly 
emotional girls,” one report explained, “were futile.”107  Coch and French set out to find out why 
the girls resisted and what might be done to earn their cooperation. 
  French and Coch began their experiments at the Marion plant, but later expanded the 
study to include all three Harwood plants (a total of approximately 800 employees).
108
  In classic 
Lewinian fashion, they began by diagnosing the root of the problem at Harwood.  Why did 
workers dislike change so much?  They concluded that when workers moved onto new machines 
or new tasks, they lost the status and confidence that came with mastering their previous job.  It 
was hard to feel like a “beginner” again, and learning a new skill could be exhausting.  
Furthermore, if forced to leave one work team for another, a worker lost the social support of her 
old team and “she might never feel at home again.” 109  One report explained, “Her complex of 
emotional attitudes—her fatigue, humiliation, loneliness and resentment—inhibit her from 
regaining her former skill” and feeling discouraged, she “no longer expects to excel.”110  One of 
the first steps suggested by Coch and French, therefore, was to transfer workers as groups instead 
of as individuals, so that their social bonds could remain intact. 
 The larger question remained, however, of how to “transform the attitude of the whole 
group” upon being transferred to a new task or machine.  Coch and French insisted that intra-
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group relationships were far more important than any other dynamics at the plant – more 
important than workers’ relationships with management, and more important than their 
relationships with the remote leadership of the union. “What concerns the woman operator in the 
plant,” they insisted, “is the good opinion of the girls who work at the sewing machine alongside 
her, with whom she gossips and shares her lunch.”111  The social scientists determined that in 
order to increase Harwood workers’ productivity, they needed to expand those workers’ sense of 
group membership to include the company as a whole.  They needed to feel that they were “truly 
part of the company, that in some sense it was their enterprise,” and their managers needed to 
truly believe this to be the case as well.
112
  Building on knowledge gained at Harwood after 
almost a decade of experiments, Coch and French concluded that “workers should participate in 
the definition of change to the maximum possible extent.”113  Soon after Lewin’s death of 1947, 
they decided to draw from methods used in the famous Autocracy/Democracy studies of the late 
1930s. 
 French and Coch broke the Marion plant employees into three groups with three different 
levels of collaboration with management: total participation, some participation, and no 
participation.  The “zero-participation” group members were given no say in the process of 
production change.  As was standard practice, their supervisors simply called them into a 
conference room, informed them of changes to come, demonstrated new production techniques, 
and outlined the new piece-rate pay scale.  The “some-participation” group had the opportunity 
to choose spokespeople to “sit down with management and discuss the task.”  Workers were 
shown two garments, one manufactured at about half the price of the other, and told to discuss 
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potential methods of lowering cost with their elected representatives.  The third “total 
participation” group “did not deputize a committee...but instead participated as a whole” in 
conversations with management so that “every member of the group had a direct voice.”114  
Together, supervisors and staff reviewed all aspects of the problem with equal respect given to 
all. 
 Coch and French immediately noticed stark contrasts between the performances of the 
groups.   In the “zero-participation” group the workers demonstrated typical levels of hostility 
and resistance in the face of change. Their production went down by 35% the day after the 
meeting and stayed that low for a month.   It came out later that there was a “deliberate pact” 
among the women to “get even” with management by slowing down their rates. Within two 
weeks, 9% had quit, and others filed grievances about their pay rate.  The group was eventually 
disbanded because of its quarrelsome nature.   
 In the “some-participation” group, the women “responded enthusiastically,” offered 
practical suggestions to their representatives, and began to talk about Harwood in terms of “we.”  
They adjusted to their new routine in a “remarkably short period” and recovered a standard 
production rate in two weeks.  By the end of 30 days, production was higher than it had been 
before.  Supervisors observed “smiles and good-humored banter” among their workers.  For the 
first month and a considerable time after, no one quit.   
 Group 3, the “total-participation” group, “jumped into the lead immediately.”  In this 
group, “Practical suggestions came so freely, and were offered so eagerly, that the stenographer 
could hardly keep up” and the group reached “a consensus without difficulty.”  The researchers 
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later heralded these meetings as “a triumph of spontaneity” and goodwill. 115  They were back to 
their previous pace of work within two days after the production change, and were soon 
operating at a rate 14% more productive than before the experiment began.  Observers noted that 
they got along “excellently with foreman” and no one spoke of quitting.  Without question, this 
was the most successful group.  When a new job opened at the plant ten weeks later, the 
disgruntled zero-participation group was reunited and the psychologists tried offering them total 
participation in the design of a new production process. The results were excellent, with workers 
achieving “a new and much higher level of production in almost no time,” along with “an 
unprecedentedly friendly spirit toward the foreman.”116   
 For Coch and French, the results of the experiment were strikingly clear.  Participation 
lifted both morale and productivity in the face of change, as long as opportunities for 
participation were “genuine” and not mere “lip service,” with supervisors truly listening to the 
suggestions of their underlings.
117
  At its best, participation would lead to the worker identifying 
with her job to an unprecedented extent, feeling that, instead of being a mere “hired hand,” “his 
brain has also been employed.”118  Coch and French had affirmed the findings of Lippitt, Lewin, 
and White’s Autocracy/Democracy studies.  Participative democracy, it turned out, was good for 
both the personalities and efficiency of all involved. 
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 Alfred Marrow, president of the Harwood Manufacturing Company, later referred to 
these results as “clearcut and dramatic.”119  He initiated a plant-wide policy of participation at 
Harwood, and became a zealous advocate of so-called participative management for years to 
come.  Presenting at conferences in the early 1950s, Marrow cited the French/Coch study as 
evidence that full participation was “the best method of obtaining cooperation and satisfying the 
basic psychological needs of personnel at all levels of an industrial structure.“120  Such 
participation, Marrow promised, “results in an ego-investment” among workers that fuels 
corporate productivity and makes their own lives more satisfying.  Invoking Lewin’s earlier 
critique of Taylor’s scientific management, Marrow lamented: 
 Work is no longer a part of living.  There is no relationship between the doer and 
the job done.  The assembly line has replaced self expression with frustration.  
Industrial life is so organized and administered  as to keep workers, most of 
whom are ready for training in self-discipline, self-rule, and social responsibility , 




He also criticized the potential for worker engagement in labor unions, explaining that while 
unions emphasized the role of employer-employee communications, they “restricted worker 
participation to members of the bargaining and grievance committee,” limiting full participation 
to representation.
122
   
 In his endorsements of workplace participation, Marrow invoked the American political 
tradition.  Autocratic management methods and the corporate “chain of command,” he explained, 
stood in “striking contrast to the democracy of community life in which the worker and 
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executive can participate on a level of equality.” 123 The average worker was a “citizen of his 
country but only a subject of his industry,” and “[t]his contrast between the democracy in the 
community and autocracy in industry is responsible for much of the frustration that leads to 
industrial conflict.”124 Taylorist management techniques endangered the nation as a whole.  And 
unlike other corporate heads and managers who employed participative management for 
explicitly economic ends, Marrow remained committed to the role of participation in promoting 
the productivity of the corporation, the ego needs of the individual, and the functioning of the 
democratic system writ large.  He continued to reiterate his message for decades to come, 
publishing multiple books on participative management and working closely with social 
scientists on longitudinal studies of his plant.
125
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 The Harwood Studies had provided the ideal real-world context in which to test Lewin’s 
broader concerns about intergroup dynamics and participatory communication.  Ground-breaking 
in both theory and practice, they demonstrated the compatibility between broadly anti-
authoritarian social science principles and the realities of industrial management in the first half 
of the 20
th
 century.  From Kurt Lewin’s anti-authoritarian convictions and his commitment to 
real-world applications sprang a model of humanistic management that went on to have a 










Building the Psychological Corporation: 
Rensis Likert and Interwar Survey Research 
 
 
 In a 1935 article in Advertising and Selling, market researcher Henry Link announced 
some new revelations about the art of cigarette selling.  He explained that ever since Dr. John 
Watson's test showing that habitual smokers could not distinguish between cigarette brands, the 
project of selling cigarettes had become one of "creating such differences in people's minds."
1
  
His article drew from extensive research conducted by a surveying agency called the 
Psychological Corporation, for which he was employed.  The Corporation’s researchers, funded 
by  RJ Reynolds Tobacco (the manufacturers of Camel cigarettes), had surveyed 4000 smokers 
in 47 cities and towns and concluded that smokers cherished their habit not because of cigarettes’ 
taste or smell, but because smoking “calms the nerves.” The survey results led the Psychological 
Corporation to suggest:  
What should be done is to compliment [customers] by suggesting that they are 
important enough to occupy positions where a tense or difficult situation may be 
encountered, and that a Camel can be their companion when doing things, big 
things.  Thus, when a man smokes a Camel when he has jangled nerves or is 




The market researchers also recommended that cigarette packaging be made more appealing to 
women (by fitting easily into small purses), and that advertisements associate smoking with 
leisure time and sociability.  Link concluded in his report, "The changes in people's cigarette 
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habits have depended largely on changes in their minds and feelings[,] and these changes were 
bought and paid for."
3
   
 The Psychological Corporation promised repeatedly to its clients in the mid-1930s – 
producers and advertisers of alarm clocks, cold remedies, and auto liability insurance – that the 
study of motivations and behaviors would be the first step in a larger process of consumer 
manipulation.  As Link frankly promised in an address to life insurance salesmen, “Psychology is 
the science of measuring people’s reactions in order that those actions may be better understood 
and controlled.”4  To understand a consumer’s mind was to predict and ultimately engineer his 
actions.   
 The Psychological Corporation was one of a growing number of market research services 
in the interwar period.  Its mission reflected, on the one hand, social scientists’ increasing 
recognition of the profitable connections between survey research and consumer culture.  
Beyond these profit-oriented aims, the Corporation also sated its social scientists’ hunger for 
real-world contexts in which to test hypotheses about human motivation, one of the most 
prominent areas of inquiry in interwar psychology.  Market research offered unprecedented 
opportunities to gather concrete data about the links between attitudes and behaviors, perceived 
needs and expressed desires. 
  The Psychological Corporation helped launch many a social-science career in the 1920s 
and 1930s.  One of the its success stories from that time was Rensis Likert, a social scientist 
whose intellectual trajectory encapsulated the tangled web of commerce and scientific inquiry of 
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the interwar period.  Originally schooled in attitude research at Columbia University, and later 
known for his establishment of the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan, 
Likert was drawn to the Psychological Corporation’s opportunities for in-depth, large-scale, well 
funded research projects.  But it would be a mistake to label Likert a primarily profit-minded 
researcher, or to detach his work in market research from the lofty concerns of his day.  In fact, 
market research provided an important entry into a world of democratic, idealistic social science 
research that characterized much of Likert’s career.  Through his work with the Psychological 
Corporation and related organizations, Likert gained knowledge of survey techniques and 
principles that he believed would propel total reform of American society and its foundational 
institutions. 
 
 Upon Likert retirement from the University of Michigan’s Institute for Social Research 
(ISR) in 1971, the Institute’s newsletter reflected on his legacy in an ode entitled “Using Science 
for Man: A Gentle Revolution.” The article articulated the lofty mission of Likert and the ISR, 
the institute he had founded in 1946.  According to the article, Likert, more than any other social 
scientist of his day, promoted “social science as a valuable tool in building a more humane 
society."
5
  He envisioned  
the kind of society that is more responsive to people's needs and gives them a 
greater sense of pride and worth by tapping their basic motivations.  For Likert, it 
is a society that is eminently possible, and the idea continues to excite him, to 
drive him... It's not the kind of excitement one would expect from a man who has 
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Likert was, from the 1920s through the 1970s, a social scientist committed to both rigorous 
quantitative research and humanistic goals; he spent his career employing modern survey 
technology for utopian ends.  Rensis Likert believed that bureaucratic organizations – the 
reputably cold, faceless foundations of 20
th
 century society – could be “humanized” with the 
right kind of leadership, and that scientific methods could identify the ideal contours of that 
leadership.  Conceding that science was responsible for much of the counterproductive 
rationalizing of modern organizations, he nonetheless insisted that it offered the best hopes for 
humanistic reform. 
Likert’s career appears on first examination as an unrelated collection of organizational 
endeavors.  Having trained as a psychologist, he spent the first half of his career conducting 
research on advertising effectiveness, college student attitudes, and the morale of life insurance 
salesmen.  In the late 1930s, he shifted into the public sphere, working for the Department of 
Agriculture’s Department of Program Surveys and the Office of War Information, before 
founding the Institute of Social Research at the University of Michigan, where he applied the 
lessons he had learned working for large-scale government agencies.  After leaving ISR in the 
1970s, he started a management consulting firm called Rensis Likert Associates, which offered 
corporations training in the system of “participative management” he had coined in his earlier 
writing and research.   
 While Likert’s research spanned a wide-ranging set of subjects – from advertising and 
agriculture to wartime bombing and industrial management –  his endeavors were united by a 
singular conviction: that social science research would be the most important agent of 
democratic reform in the twentieth century.  He believed that any social process could be 





Likert, one tool reigned supreme: the survey.  He spent the first part of his career perfecting a 
form of survey research that was unprecedentedly far-reaching and richly detailed, combining 
the open-ended research techniques of humanistic psychologist Carl Rogers with the largescale 
“sample survey” techniques introduced by researchers like George Gallup and Elmo Roper.  The 
survey techniques he promoted in the Psychological Corporation, at the ISR, and in his own 
management consultancy firm reflected dual commitments to “objective” science steeped in data 
and the subjective “human” factors he believed had been neglected in previous generations of 
social study.  Likert applied his convictions about social science, research, and leadership 
enthusiastically to any sphere that would have him, and made few distinctions between the 
methodology most useful to a public school, government agency, or life insurance firm.  His 
disparate areas of study were united by a commitment to the humanistic potential of social 
science. 
 Likert cemented his reputation through his work for American corporations.  In 1968, he 
was named by the National Industrial Conference Board (cite) as one of the six most important 
behavioral scientists working in industry.  He had risen to prominence through his development 
of “System 4”: a management theory that urged managers to replace “authoritarian” techniques 
of domination with participative, cooperative forms of supervision.  First popularized in his 1961 
New Patterns of Management (cite), System 4 (also known as “participative management”) 
eventually became shorthand for Likert’s philosophy of management and society in general.   
System 4 offered an alternative to the human relations theories of Frederick Winslow Taylor and 
Elton Mayo.  It dictated that organizations functioned best (in terms of morale and productivity) 
when their leaders invested their underlings with freedom and responsibility.  Thousands of 





treated as “human” individuals—when their superiors valued their opinions and expressed 
concern toward their personal lives.  System 4 dictated that organizations would be more 
productive, profitable, and personally satisfying if they encouraged shared responsibility and 
creativity as opposed to top-down impositions.   Likert built upon this theory in subsequent 
books and articles and in the consulting agency he established after retiring from ISR.   
 Likert’s development as a theorist and practitioner was marked by a consistently 
participative philosophy.  This philosophy found expressions in the open-ended survey 
techniques he promoted throughout his career, and in his commitment to democratic rhetoric and 
behaviors in both private and public organizations.  On the one hand, Likert openly prioritized 
productivity and profit when pitching System 4 to corporations, and was deeply invested in 
maintaining the economic and cultural clout of large organizations in the US; on the other, he 
embraced the democratic principles of the New Left and tried to spread participative methods 
throughout voluntary organizations.  His commitment to democratic principles, as embodied by 
the mass surveys he popularized, reflected deep concerns about Cold War individuality, 
authoritarianism, and large-scale capitalism.  Likert believed that his particular brand of survey 
science would propel the US into an egalitarian postwar era.   
 Likert’s commitment to participative management was an intellectual by-product of his 
elaborate institutional circuitry, reflecting his lifetime of work for the military, corporations, the 
US government, schools and voluntary associations.  His commitments to New Deal liberalism 
and vehement anti-authoritarianism produced one of the most influential management theories of 
the postwar period.  This chapter explores the early foundations of his ideological and 
methodological commitments, from his academic training in survey research to his work for two 





the early decades of his work as a social scientist, Likert immersed himself in modern survey 
research techniques and emerged with a set of methods that suited his democratic impulses.  He 
also entered the nascent field of human relations, extensively researching the morale of life 
insurance salesmen and emerging with clear ideas about the nature of leadership and motivation.  
In the early decades of his social science career, Likert became the first social scientist to bridge 
the rapidly expanding field of survey research with the new field of management research and 
training.   
 
 Rensis Likert was born in Cheyenne, Wyoming in 1903, the son of George – an engineer 
for the Union Pacific Railroad—and Cornelia.  He began his academic career in his father’s 
footsteps, studying chemical engineering for the first three years of his undergraduate studies at 
the University of Michigan.  But his experiences in the physical sciences soon unleashed his 
appetite for the social sciences.  In his sophomore year of college, Likert was working at the 
Omaha Union Pacific Railroad in the physical science testing laboratory, conducting complex 
analysis of metals and alloys like steel, when a strike erupted among the railroad’s workers.7  
Witnessing the difficulty of negotiations, Likert was “impressed [by]…  the irrationality of labor-
management relations and the kinds of unnecessary conflicts that occurred because of poor 
capacity for conflict resolution.”8  The experience evoked parallels to the global politics of the 
period:  Looking at the “international situation” of 1922, he observed fifty years later, gave him 
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“the same impression, that the international conflicts certainly did not reflect an imaginative, 
competent approach to negotiating or resolving conflicts and differences.” 9  
 At the same time, Likert was influenced by his exposure to World War I and the 
philosophical quandaries it had introduced.  He later  recalled: 
I was fairly active in the student Christian association and there were a lot of 
questions like there are today--- we didn't have Vietnam or anything like that, but 
we did have sore repercussions at the end of [World War I] -- and a lot of people 
were looking at costs and consequences of war and how little had been 
accomplished by WWI.  They were beginning to wonder if, perhaps, there weren't 
better ways of dealing with international differences than warfare.  All these kinds 
of questions began to ferment, and to the student Christian movement, [the] 
YMCA … this became quite an important kind of issue.  And … the more I 




Likert’s subsequent career trajectory can therefore be viewed as a product of the labor conflict 
and global instability that followed World War I, which convinced him that “his interests were 
more in people than things."
11
   
 At the University of Michigan, he shifted his attentions from the world of chemical 
agents to human ones.  He enrolled in Carter Guttridge’s courses in labor economics and Charles 
Cooley’s courses in the nascent field of sociology.12 Likert never surrendered the optimism he 
possessed as a 19-year-old engineering-student-cum-social scientist, nor his conviction that the 
world of human interactions, with all its messy conflicts and unstable relationships, could be 
made as simple as the realm of the physical sciences if its researchers developed the right set of 
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tools.  Likert spent the rest of his career experimenting and refining those tools, from surveys and 
measurements to theories of behavioral science.  His entire career rested on a conviction that the 
meticulous collection of social science data could bring a permanent end to conflict of all stripes. 
 Having graduated from the University of Michigan with a degree in Sociology, Likert 
spent a year at the Union Theological Seminary and then decided to pursue a PhD in Psychology 
at Columbia University.  He arrived at an important moment in the history of the social sciences, 
when men like Elmo Roper, George Gallup and Paul Lazarsfeld were heralding the survey as a 
revolutionary new tool of data collection.
13
  Likert, who had never taken a psychology course, 
wanted to focus on issues of “human motivation,” and found a mentor in the form of professor 
Gardner Murphy.  Murphy had received a grant of $3600 from the Columbia University Council 
on the Social Sciences, via the Rockefeller Foundation, to research student attitudes.
14
  He 
prepared a lengthy student questionnaire on contemporary issues related to race, politics, 
religion, and economic affairs.  The first survey took an hour and 45 minutes to administer, and it 
was followed by a more descriptive second questionnaire containing more questions about the 
history of the individual.  According to Likert, the key questions he and Murphy aimed to answer 
in the survey were, “What determines a person's attitude?  And what makes it change?”  This 
survey, which was ultimately administered to eight more schools (including the University of 
Michigan and Oberlin) marked Likert’s initiation into one of the most vital areas of social 
research in the early 20
th
 century. 
By the end of his graduate school career, Likert had co-written a book with Murphy 
(Public Opinion and the Individual [1938]) and published his dissertation in the Annals of 
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  This latter work, A Technique for the Measurement of Attitudes, 
introduced the “Likert Scales” for attitude measurement: a five-point scale used in personnel 
surveys designed to convey respondents’ attitudes.  A Likert-scale survey offered the respondent 
a statement and asked him/her to rate the extent to which that statement reflected his/her 
attitudes:  “1. Strongly disagree; 2. Disagree; 3. Neither agree nor disagree; 4. Agree; 5. Strongly 
agree.”  The choices, which Likert listed next to the survey statements, as marked by small 
circles, could then be added up to arrive at final summative scores.  This technique (still used 
today) marked a distinctly early phase of Likert’s methodological evolution.  Likert never 
renounced the value of his scale, but as he grew increasingly committed to open-ended survey 
questions and a more qualitative approach, he found himself struggling to bridge subjective, 
narrative data and static scores. 
In 1931, having completed his preliminary exams for his PhD, Likert took a job that had 
opened up at the University College of NYU at University Heights in the arts and engineering 
colleges.  This opportunity marked a turning point in his career as a surveyor and shaped his 
methodology for years to come.
16
   An early epiphany came in the form of an ostensibly simple 
recommendation from a supervisor.  When teaching psychology to aspiring engineers, Likert 
tried to bridge the language of his discipline with the essentially quantitative language of theirs, 
emphasizing the behaviorist logic of early 20
th
-century psychology.  Behavioral psychologists 
ruled the disciplinary roost in this still-early phase of psychology’s legitimation as an academic 
field.  They emphasized the application of the scientific method of their work, conducting 
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laboratory experiments on behavior using small rodents or children. They aspired to locate the 
ingrained links between people’s mental processes and repeatable behaviors.17   
Likert assumed that the behaviorist language of science and experimentation would 
appeal to the engineering students.  But early in his tenure at NYU, he was approached by Joseph 
Roe, the chairman of the department of industrial engineering, with some sobering words, which 
he remembered years: "'Ren, what you've got to do is forget teaching psychology to engineering 
students in terms of white rats.   They couldn't care less about a white rat.  You've got to teach 
them psychology in terms of human behavior."
18
  This sentiment—that psychology was a 
fundamentally human endeavor – informed Likert’s work for the rest of his career.    In rejecting 
the behaviorist language of cause and effect, Likert embraced the subjective, complicated, and 
even impressionistic aspects of his discipline. He spent the remainder of his time as a 
psychologist applying the methods of social science for what he imagined to be essentially 
“human” ends. 
Likert’s tenure at NYU also included his first foray into the study of industrial 
organizations—albeit through unconventional methods that he would never again employ in 
pursuit of organizational data.  When teaching an industrial engineering class for seniors at 
NYU, Likert and his students started wondering if the systematic methods used to study attitudes 
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could be used to measure morale, which “had never been measured in a quantitative way.” 19  
They decided to conduct interviews with workers, who would respond to statements about their 
morale using the 1-5 measurement of the Likert Scale.  There was only one catch, Likert later 
explained: “I tried hard to get firms in the NY area to let us make a study of their employees and 
none of them wanted to.”  So Likert and his students resorted to covert tactics.  The class of ten 
students picked a firm about which they already had some information, then gathered outside the 
gates of that firm during lunch hour.  As employees came and went, the students would 
administer their surveys on morale.  In some cases, they “even made appointments with some of 
the girls who worked in the plant to take them to movies, and interviewed them at some 
length.”20 Having collected this data, Likert and his class analyzed the data and drew the 
appropriate conclusions about the morale of workers at this particular plant. 
Though Likert had been interested in the broad dissection of attitudes he conducted with 
Gardner Murphy at Columbia, it was the more specific study of morale that persisted in the work 
he pursued thereafter, permeating his work in corporations, governmental bodies, and non-profit 
organizations.  The study of morale offered an opportunity for Likert’s ideal social-scientific 
intervention: He could measure the morale at a given institution; tweak factors related to 
communication and leadership; then return to measure any changes that had resulted from his 
efforts.  Likert’s early exposure to organizational research helped catalyze his enthusiasm for 
organizational psychology and the nascent field of human relations, and ultimately fueled his 
commitment to the social scientific study of corporate management. 
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 In 1935, Likert left NYU to become a researcher at the Psychological Corporation  -- a 
relatively brief stint that offered him critical initiation into the world of market research and 
corporate-sponsored social science.  The Psychological Corporation, which started out in the 
early 1920s designing aptitude tests and employee personality surveys, had transformed by the 
mid-1930s into one of the most prolific producers of market research data in the country.  
Through his work at the Corporation, where Likert studied the effects of advertising on milk 
consumption and cigarette smoking, he entered a community of social science researchers who 
had found similar application for their research skills—namely Paul Lazarsfeld and George 
Gallup.  The Psychological Corporation’s relentless gathering of research data reinforced 
Likert’s pre-existing interest in cataloguing the motivations that fuel human behavior.  The 
Corporation also showed Likert the ways in which psychologists could control or manipulate 
consumers through meticulously gathered research, and attached impressive dollar signs to that 
work.  By the time Likert left the Psychological Corporation in the mid-1930s, he understood the 
intimate relationship between business and psychology that came to define mid-century 
management theory. 
The Psychological Corporation was established in 1922 by a group of 20 psychologists 
who hoped “to make…psychological research earn its own way.”21  The officers of the 
corporation  -- J. McKeen Cattell (Columbia University), Walter Dil Scott (Northwestern), 
Edward Thorndike (Teachers College), James Angell (Yale) and others – came together with a 
mission: to persuade businessmen of psychology’s utility in economic life.   Thanks to the 
prominence of psychology in World War I military operations, Cattell explained in a press 
release, “‘psychology has become a word to conjure with” and “scientific control of conduct may 
                                                 





become of greater economic importance than the uses of electricity or steel.”22  The 
psychologists who organized the corporation insisted that they did not do so for personal 
economic gain, but rather to enhance their discipline: Most of the money they earned through 
business consulting would generate additional psychological research, and this research would 
further legitimate their field.
23
   
The founders of the Psychological Corporation belonged to a larger pursuit known as 
Applied Psychology, whose practitioners insisted that psychology was a tool to be used in 
everyday life; that their work advanced fundamentally pragmatic aims, even as it tackled 
nebulous matters of the mind.  A 1922 New York Times article endorsed the pursuit: “The 
behavior of the mind” is “really vital to every business,” the article explained, “and the larger 
this human factor, the more practical the psychologist’s part becomes.”  The psychologist 
stockholders behind the corporation were, in conclusion, “pragmatic people, not business 
mystics” who “aim to be brought in as appraisers and not as prophets.”24   
By the end of 1922, 166 psychologists owned the shares of the Psychology Corporation 
and the Corporation had branches in most states.
25
  It had earned a reputation for producing 
intelligence and aptitude tests like the ones used in the military in World War I.  (According to 
the Corporation, psychologists had administered such tests to nearly 2,000,000 recruits in the 
War).
26
  The Corporation’s psychologists confidently assigned monetary value to their work, 
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promising that “it would be possible to increase by $70,000,000,000 the national wealth each 
year by properly fitting every man, woman, and child to the kind of work each could best 
perform.”27  The psychologists’ tests epitomized the late Progressive Era’s emphasis on efficient 
social engineering. If workers’ strengths and weaknesses could be ascertained before being hired, 
employers could maximize productivity and profit.  The Corporation’s motto said it all: “Meet 
our price and we’ll fix you up!”28 
Throughout the 1920s and ‘30s, the Psychological Corporation designed aptitude tests for 
a wide range of jobs and skills.  A test designed for an aspiring typist measured her “general 
intelligence and special training” by having her type a business letter, copy and correct her own 
handwriting, and sort things alphabetically.
29
  Another designed to ascertain the “social instinct” 
of train conductors measured mens’ abilities to remember faces.30    In 1925, taxi cab companies 
in Pittsburgh and Chicago began administering tests that measured prospective chauffeurs’ 
alertness, reaction time, and ability to complete a written maze.
31
  Perhaps most famously, 
Corporation Psychologist C.E. Seashore designed a test to determine the innate aptitude of 
musicians.  “[T]here is the a whole world of aspiring people who think they may be noted 
musicians some day, “ President Cattell explained,  so the corporation had developed  “a sure 
preventative to keep them from the disappointment which so often comes after years of hope and 
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struggle.  ‘We can determine in one hour,’ he said, ‘whether people can detect one tune and pitch 
from another…[T]here are so many who think they can, who can’t.”32   
In addition to helping business avoid the “loss of time and wasteful experience” that 
resulted from poorly equipped employees, the Psychological Corporation promised the more 
abstract rewards of social harmony and self-awareness.
 33
  As the New York Times explained in 
1922, the “heaven sprung message of the olden time” of “‘Know thyself’ … is now becoming 
not only the adage of the life insurance companies, of the life-prolonging institutions and of the 
schools, colleges, and universities, but also the motto of business.  Intelligence tests are the order 
of the day.”34  In one 1924 speech, the Corporation’s president Cattell celebrated the potential of 
psychological progress in the modern era.  He explained that the 19
th
 century had witnessed the 
flourishing of scientific advancement, the rise of universal education, and the spread of 
democracy; science had, by the early decades of the 20
th
 century, quadrupled the wealth that each 
man could produce, and doubled the length of each life.  Having accomplished those goals, 
Cattell suggested, it was time to advance toward “a true social and political democracy.  Cattell 
promised that psychology would increase the productivity of labor; would “double or quadruple 
the part of the life of each that is spent worthily and happily”; and would even “teach Americans 
how to distribute wealth wisely.”35  
By the time Rensis Likert arrived at the Psychological Corporation in the early 1930s, its 
methodology had evolved dramatically.  Whereas the Corporation had indentified itself primarily 
with intelligence and aptitude tests in the 1920s, it had expanded by the 1930s into an 
                                                 
32
 Jackson A3. 
 
33
 ”A Psychological Corporation.” 
 
34
 ”A Psychological Corporation.” 
 
35





increasingly profitable realm for social scientists: market research.  By this period, corporations 
and advertisers had begun to rely heavily on studies that gauged the reactions of consumers to 
both products and advertisements.  If the advertising of the early 20
th
 century had focused on 
informational and educational appeals to consumers, the interwar period was marked by 
increasingly emotional tactics – advertisements that appealed to consumers’ sentimentality, 
fantasies, or fears.
36
  Marketers began to conceive of their job as a fundamentally psychological 
effort, in which they assigned emotional values to commodities that lifted them out of the 
material world and into the realm of fantasy.  But to successfully make meaning, advertisers and 
marketers needed to understand the hearts and minds of consumers themselves.  The 
Psychological Corporation met their gaping need with hundreds of pages recounting consumer 
reactions to products and advertisements—from cigarettes to cold medicine to a car insurance 
and milk. 
Social scientist Paul Lazarsfeld was one of the researchers who most famously applied 
social science techniques to market research in the first half of the 20
th
 century.  Lazarsfeld, who 
was born in Vienna in 1901 and immigrated to the US in the 1930s, applied his pioneering 
sociological research techniques to a complex circuit of non-profit and corporate agencies.  He 
conducted research for the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, the National Youth 
Administration, and Columbia University’s Bureau of Applied Social Research (which he 
founded), in addition to his aforementioned work for the Psychological Corporation (where a 
number of his proposed projects were rejected for being insufficiently commercial).   When 
Lazarsfeld first arrived in the US in 1933, he found an “extremely small” community of social 
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scientists working on surveys.
37
  He developed strong ties early on with George Gallup, one of 
the fathers of the modern survey, as well as with Robert Lynd, co-author of the landmark 
sociological study Middletown. Gallup took Lazarsfeld under his wing and invited him to 
participate in a monthly meeting of surveyors that would eventually evolve into the Market 
Research Council.
38
  Lazarsfeld transformed the field of market research with what he later 
labeled his “anti-behaviorist” approach, as encapsulated in his 1935 treatise “The Art of Asking 
Why.”39  Here, he argued that effective market research plumbed consumers’ motivations as 
opposed to their behaviors: “’Don’t ask people what they buy, ask them why they buy.’”40   
According to Gallup and Lazarsfeld, this anti-behaviorism set the tone of the 
Psychological Corporation’s research in the 1930s.  Likert’s friend Henry Link (also a member 
of Gallup’s Market Research Council) had helped redefine the function of the Psychological 
Corporation’s surveys—encouraging the Corporation’s psychologists to shift their emphasis 
from workers’ existing attitudes and aptitudes to the more elusive realm of motivation, 
association, and desire.  Joining the Corporation in the early 1930s, Likert fit right in, having 
experienced a similar evolution in his own interests.   
By the time Likert joined the staff of the Corporation, it had evolved (according to its 
promotional literature) into “the largest organization exclusively of professional and scientific 
research men in the field of marketing.”  The Corporation boasted that it could complete 50,000 
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interviews in 250 cities and towns in three weeks, with over 1000 interviewers working under the 
supervision of 100 psychologists.
41
  It had worked with companies including Metropolitan Life 
Insurance, the National Broadcasting Corporation, and Colgate-Palmolive-Peet.  Since 1931, the 
Corporation had even run a “Psychological Brand Barometer” subscription service: Interviewers 
hired by the organization visited 4,000 homes in 47 cities every two months to survey trends 
related to hundreds of brands; company subscribers could request that they be mailed these bi-
monthly reports related to particular industries like beverages, food, automobiles, etc. The 
organization had expanded to include 300 psychologists, and had earned several grants from the 
Carnegie Foundation (which Link cited as the ultimate emblem of non-profit legitimacy).
42
 
Henry Link recruited Likert to join the Psychological Corporation’s market research 
division soon after he established it, in the early 1930s.
43
  Link had worked as the vice president 
of Gimbel’s Department store in the early thirties, until the Depression left him unemployed. 
Because he was interested in marketing, he approached Paul Achilles at the Psychological 
Corporation and persuaded him to let him set up a market research division.   Link built his 
reputation on a technique that tested consumers’ associations with heavily advertised brands.  
Likert later remembered that Link would test advertising effectiveness by asking, “What product 
advertises…’Maybe your best friend won’t tell you’” or “’Good to the last drop.’”44  Link 
recruited psychologists from across the country to administer interviews for pay.   
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Likert, then teaching at NYU, was one of the psychologists Link hired to do interviewing 
in New York. Likert, in turn, found that “it was great for training students in interviewing skills” 
and enlisted his graduate students in the effort.  Unfortunately, his students became a little too 
boisterous about their work for the Psychological Corporation.  A group of four graduate 
students rallied a team of undergrads to spend a weekend interviewing 1,000 New Yorkers about 
their attitudes toward the Soldiers’ Bonus Plan (formally called the World War Adjusted 
Compensation Act), and then sent the results off to Washington, DC.  The chairman of the 
department got wind of their extracurricular adventures and “issued a memorandum saying that 
no student can work with any member of the faculty on any project without written permission of 
the chairman of the department in advance.”  Likert rightfully interpreted the memo as a personal 
affront, but refused to bend.  Soon after, he started looking for another job.
45
 
Likert’s largest research endeavor for the Psychological Corporation was sponsored by 
the Milk Research Council, which had grown concerned about the declining rates of milk 
consumption among American adults.  Working as one of two directors of Field Studies [Check] 
for the “Study of Psychological Factors Influencing Milk Drinking” (along with Paul Lazarsfeld 
on “Special Counsel”), Likert helped gather hundreds of pages of data on the how’s and why’s of 
adult milk consumption.  For this study, 75 interviewers in the greater New York area 
interviewed more than 2000 adults, gathering qualitative data as well as punch cards whose 
responses could be tabulated by machine (a process that the research committee deemed 
"absolutely essential"). 
46
    They were instructed that the purpose of the study was to “discover 
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basic psychological factors in habits, knowledge, and feelings or beliefs about milk as a beverage 
among adults.”  Interviewers visited families in their homes, recording the answers of no more 
than one member per household, and gathering data along very specific demographic lines: For 
every ten interviews, six subjects would be women and ten would be men; half should be aged 
20-30 and the other half should be 30-50.  Interviewers were instructed to read their questions 
“word for word” because “the change of a single word or phrase may alter the meaning of a 
question.”47 
The resulting study comprised a veritable tome on American milk consumption.   The 
interviewers targeted a demographically diverse pool of interviewees spanning gender, age, and 
educational level and plowed the milk-drinking landscape for every nugget of variation.
 
 The 
survey began with straight-forward questions about consumption: How many glasses of plain 
milk did the subject drink per day or per week, and with what meals did he/she drink it?  For 
those adults who had stopped drinking milk, the interviewed asked when and why they had made 
this transition.  For others, the survey asked what snacks or foods milk drinking accompanied 
and inquired about the motivations behind milk-drinking (“Why do you drink it?  If answer is 
‘Because it’s nourishing, perfect food, or I like it,’ ask: In what particular way or why?  How do 
you know this?”)  The interview also included questions about the taste of milk, the health 
benefits of milk, and the impact of milk advertisements (“What milk advertisements have you 
noticed recently?”).48  Its methodology bridged Likert’s early work in attitude surveys (in which 
respondents checked off a single number correlating with their stances) and his later work in 
what was termed “in-depth interviewing.”  Interviewers gathered raw data and checked off 
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boxes, but they also plumbed respondents for the more qualitative components of their milk-
drinking: their impressions, motivations, and reactions. 
 The Psychological Corporation’s final report on milk consumption concluded that 
“Adults already have a high regard for milk and its many good properties,” and that the solution 
to increasing milk consumption “is not simply one of telling them how good milk is but of 
making them aware of specific possibilities and stimulating them to action."
49
  The report 
concluded that 57% of people drank plain milk every day; that men drank more than women; that 
education played a strong role in increasing the consumption of milk; that advertisements for 
milk had less impact than ads for “products of less importance.”50  The motivations behind milk 
drinking proved difficult to assess: “it is not a habit to be explained in a sentence or in a 
paragraph.  Indeed, it represents such a complex set of influences, most of which have long ago 
passed from the conscious into the unconscious realms of the mind.”51   
 The Milk report ultimately affirmed Lazarsfeld’s conviction about the “why’s” of market 
research: that questions about consumer motivation invited a stream of post-consumption 
rationalizations, simplified and superficial reductions of complex subconscious desires.
52
 The 
report from the Psychological Corporation’s report thus reflected a critical moment in the history 
of market research, when psychologists made the transition from studying people's habits and 
behaviors to studying subconscious impulses and desires.  The Corporation report concluded that 
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taste was itself a psychological construct-- not a physical quality-- to be manipulated by 
advertisers.   
The Psychological Corporation’s profit-oriented mission did not sit well with all 
members of the professional social science community.  At the 1933 meeting of the American 
Psychological Association, psychologists from a cadre of respected universities challenged the 
legitimacy of a so-called independent research body funded almost entirely by private enterprise.  
Dr. A. W. Kornhauser of the University of Chicago wondered aloud  “whether the psychologists, 
by aiding business firms . . . to sell their wares were not thus aiding them to exploit the public.”  
“It all seems to me,” he explained, “to be in the service of the businessman.  Nothing we do is in 
the service of the consumer or in larger terms of social implication.” Henry Link framed his 
defense in the terms of market democracy: “Fifteen years ago the question was how to overcome 
sales resistance, or how to sell someone something he or she didn’t want.  Today the reverse is 
true.  We first try to figure out what the consumer wants and then give it to him.”53 Throughout 
the late 1930s, in the years after Rensis Likert’s departure, the tension surrounding the 
Corporation only intensified.
54
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Though Rensis  Likert’s tenure at the Psychological Corporation was relatively brief—he 
worked there for less than two years while teaching at NYU – the organization left a profound 
imprint on his identity as a social scientist.  First of all, the Corporation exposed Likert to the 
symbiotic bonds that could exist between commerce and social science.  He would recreate some 
semblance of this arrangement through his work for the Life Insurance Sales Research Bureau, 
his endeavors as a management consultant, and, most notably, through the Institute for Social 
Research, which derived much of its funding from corporately commissioned studies.  As Sarah 
Igo has pointed out, such intimate public-private ties were extremely common in the social 
science community of the early 20
th
 century, and the field of industrial psychology emerged from 
the close collaboration between private funders and scientists eager for financing and 
experimental playgrounds.
 55
     
The surveys Likert conducted for the Psychological Corporation also helped shape the 
methodologies he would employ from that point forward.  Unlike the attitude surveys he 
administered during his work with Gardner Murphy, which respondents could complete with pen 
and paper while alone in a room, members of the Psychological Corporation insisted on the 
importance of the in-depth, one-on-one interview.
56
  Paul Lazarsfeld had suggested in “The Art 
of Asking Why” that the best interviews probed subjects about their motivations by asking 
                                                                                                                                                             
Benefits,” New York Times, December 15, 1948, 53; “Big Business Held No Cause For Fear,” New York Times, 
October 3, 1949,  25. 
 
55
 Igo, The Averaged American. See also Loren Baritz, The Servants of Power; a History of the Use of Social 
Science in American Industry (Middletown, Conn: Wesleyan University Press, 1960); Walter A. Friedman,  Birth of 
a Salesman: The Transformation of Selling in America (Harvard University Press, 2005). 
. 
56
 Note that not everyone in the Psychological Corporation agreed about the best method of interviewing.  See Henry 
Link, ”An Experiment in Depth Interviewing on the Issue of Internationalism vs. Isolationism” by Henry Link, 
Director of Social and Market Surveys, The Psychological Corporation, May 16, 1943, folder “The Psychological 
Corporation Methodology Papers,” box 21, Likert papers, Bentley Library. In this report, Link suggested that there 
was no reason to believe that “Depth Interviewing” elicited “truer” responses from people than so-called superficial 






strings of follow-up questions and asking them to clarify and complicate their answers.  By 
pushing a subject to flesh out his answers, he suggested, the interviewer could access the 
subconscious.  The technique could take hours as opposed to minutes, he conceded, but produced 
far more useful data.
57
   
In-depth interviewing became a trademark of Likert’s work for the rest of his career.  
Lazarsfeld himself later explained in an oral history that Likert had joined him in his “anti-
behaviorist stand” (“'Don't ask people what they buy, ask them why they buy'”) but alleged that 
Likert had adopted his technique without offering proper credit.  As Lazarsfeld explained in his 
interview,  “The idea of the open-ended interviews became very much a battlecry of the Likert 
crowd....But Likert (this is a bit characteristic of Michigan) never referred back to that -- to the 
fact that staff had originated from his association with me.  It was quite interesting, because I 
started this extreme tradition of open-ended interviews."
58
 Likert himself refuted this charge 
(writing in the margins of his copy of Lazarsfeld’s oral history, “NO.”) and most vocally credited 
his methodological inspiration to the humanistic psychologist Carl Rogers, whose role will be 
addressed later in this chapter.  Regardless of who “fathered” the open-ended, one-on-one 
interviewing style employed by researchers at the Psychological Corporation, its emergence and 
popularity marked a pivotal turn in social science surveys—from quantitative collections of data 
to qualitative relationships between interviewer and interviewee.     
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 Likert’s stints at the Psychological Corporation and NYU ended in the winter of 1935; in 
March of that year, he began a brief tenure at the Newell-Emmett advertising agency, where he 
helped set up a division of market research and worked on their Texaco account.
59
  In a 1935 
letter to Newell, Likert applauded the company’s “economic research, analysis of markets, and 
research into behavior,” but criticized its failure to analyze consumers’ “buying motives” or to 
effectively test the success of advertising.
60
  Likert proposed a $12,000 -$15,000 research 
program in which trained interviewers would “determine the actual motives of consumers” 
through in-depth conversations about buying behaviors, impressions of ads, and experiences with 
different brands.  Likert’s pitch was successful: Newell hired him to work in the Texaco team’s 
market research division.  He worked on the project for just a few months before the project lost 
its funding, at which point Likert started teaching at Sarah Lawrence.   
 Likert had taught at Sarah Lawrence for just one semester when he was recruited to 
establish and head the Research Division of the Life Insurance Salesmen Research Bureau 
(LISRB) in Hartford Connecticut.  Over the course of almost four years as head of the Research 
Division, Likert established a new identity for himself within the field of human relations.  
Whereas his previous work had centered around personality, attitude, and aptitude testing, his 
research into life insurance selling brought his attention to a different aspect of work 
performance: management.  His research at the LISRB awakened him to the ways in which 
leadership shaped the attitudes and morale of workers he had been studying since his surveying 
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days at NYU, persuading him that employees could not be analyzed in isolation from the 
foundational relationships in their work lives.  Likert’s work at the LISRB provided a foundation 
for the decades of management training and theorizing that came to define his career.   
The LISRB (later called the Life Insurance Management Association) was founded in the 
early 1920s to study the problems of insurance distribution and competition between companies.  
By the mid-1930s, two primary factors inspired expanded research on insurance salesmen and 
their managers.  First, the rapidly growing fields of human relations and industrial psychology 
seemed to promise new possibilities for revitalized sales.  Walter Friedman has chronicled the 
early-20
th
-century attempt to make salesmanship “scientific” in his history of modern sales 
training.
61
  Walter Dill Scott was one of the first applied psychologists to encourage a 
psychological approach to both consumers and salesmen, recognizing that successful selling 
depended on the application of psychological principles.  He argued that that buying was an 
emotional activity, not a rational one, and thus required agents fluent in the emotional vocabulary 
of persuasion.
62
   
Second, the Great Depression of the 1930s marked a lull in sales of life insurance and a 
decline in the stature of salesmen themselves.  According to Friedman, salesmen in this period 
came to be viewed as hucksters or (in the case of Eudora Welty’s “Death of a Traveling 
Salesman” and Sinclair Lewis’s “Babbitt”) tragic figures—emblems of a bloated, wasteful 
distribution system.  Salesmanship entered a crossroads: it needed to be “sold” to the public as a 
decent occupation with decent aims.  Having made salesmanship “scientific,” its proponents had 
                                                 
61




 Scott’s Bureau of Salesmanship Research studied what successful salesmen were made of and what criteria should 
be used in hiring them.  He advocated the use of psychological tests and emphasized the link between salesmen’s 
self-esteem, enthusiasm, and their efficiency on the job.  “With the right incentives and encouragement,” he argued, 





to retreat and make it “human.”63  Companies like Equitable, Aetna, and Metropolitan Life 
enlisted contemporary social scientists whom they hoped could help them improve not only their 
profits, but their public images.
64
 
 The Life Insurance Salesman Research Bureau’s newly established Research Division 
reflected both of these developments in the industry’s genesis.  In a 1935 letter to insurance 
managers in 1935, the LISRB’s W.W. Jaeger reported that he had recently attended a meeting 
with representatives from thirty different insurance companies.  For the first time in the 
industry’s history, he explained, these representatives agreed that they could benefit from a 
research bureau dedicated to the study of effective selling.
65
   Three months later, the executive 
committee of the Life Insurance Sales Research Bureau met and agreed to expand their research 
program with Likert at the helm.  His work there would be funded by 44 life insurance 
companies, which would collectively provide $34,000 in the first year, for the study of “the 
selection, training, and compensation both of managers and agents.”66  A memo from the year of 
Likert’s arrival suggests the range of difficulties that plagued life insurance companies in the 
mid-1930s: Providence Mutual, one of the companies participating in the LISRB’s work, issued 
a list of ten goals that they hoped would be addressed in the research: to lower rates of agent 
turnover; improve training of agents; increase sales; and make advertising more effective.
67
  The 
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LISRB concerned itself with both employee and consumer morale.  A frustrated, despondent 
salesman might fail to communicate enthusiasm about the product he hocked, or a string of 
disinterested customers might extinguish the optimism of an otherwise motivated door-to-door 
salesman.  The researchers at the LISRB envisioned a science of selling that would prevent both 
occurrences. 
The LISRB continued to administer attitude and aptitude tests to salesmen, as had been 
its tradition since the early 1920s.  In 1935, Likert enticed Albert Kurtz to leave his post at 
Procter & Gamble and develop procedures for administering tests to salesmen at the LISRB.  
The aptitude tests would be used by managers before hiring people, to “decrease the probability 
of failure because at that time they were hiring an awful lot of people who didn’t succeed.”68  
One of the resulting tests bore striking semblance to the Meyers-Briggs personality tests that 
gained popularity after World War II, with questions designed to gauge candidates’ levels of 
extroversion, work habits, and problem-solving techniques.
69
  The 1938 Aptitude Index for Life 
Insurance Salesmen asked respondents, “Do you enjoy being in a crowd? . . . Are you frequently 
bored? . . . Do you like to have people look you straight in the eye when they are talking to you? 
. . . Do you often daydream? . . . Do you often point out people’s faults to them?”  While Kurtz 
focused on the survey, Likert devoted himself to a pioneering management study. 
 Likert later referred to his LISRB research as “the first real substantial study of 
management that I did.”70  Beginning in 1936, he rounded up ten of the most successful life 
insurance agencies and ten of the most “mediocre” (“not the poorest,” because “the poorest were 
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so poor there was nothing to study”).71  Likert earned the trusting cooperation of life insurance 
agencies that hungered for more scientific knowledge of their work, a far cry from the covert 
tactics he had resorted to during his days of industrial research at NYU.  He refined his 
methodology in the first four agencies and then introduced it to all twenty.  He first administered 
written questionnaires to the employees of an agency about their work, and then initiated a large-
scale interviewing process that involved agency managers, supervisors, and salesmen.
 72
  The 
interviews themselves became a model for the methods Likert later employed at the Department 
of Agriculture.  He referred to them as “fixed question, free answer” – a model in which 
interviewers would start by asking fixed but open-ended questions, and would move from 
general to specific follow-up questions based on a respondent’s answer.73 The results of Likert’s 
study read now like standard dictum of 20
th
-century human relations.  He concluded from 
hundreds of interviews that there was a “sizeable relationship” between a manager’s leadership 
style and his sales agents’ attitudes, which in turn had a profound impact on the productivity of a 
firm.
74
   
Laurence Morrison summarized the results of Likert’s study in a 1939 address to the 
Association of Life Insurance Agency Officers in Chicago, entitled “Morale – The Priceless 
Ingredient.”75  Morrison began his address by contrasting the poor morale of the Egyptian 
Pyramid builders –slaves driven by brute force—with the much superior morale of the builders 
                                                 
71
 “Oral History 12/70,” Session 2.   
 
72
 “Oral History 12/70,” Session 2.   
 
73
 "Truox Interview with Likert” (undated, author unknown),  folder “Transcripts of Oral History Interviews,” box 1, 
Likert papers, Bentley Library, 5-6. 
 
74
 “Oral History 12/70.”  
 
75
 See also Laurence S. Morrison, “Selling Methods in Life Insurance,” Journal of the American Association of 






of the European cathedrals, independent artisans driven by "the ideal to express" and "impelled 
by some inner urge."  "They had enthusiasm,” Morrison explained, and  “the joy of creation -- 
they had morale.”76  Morrison cited Marshal Foch’s definition of morale: "that which makes men 
want to carry out the wishes of their superiors,” explaining that as organizational morale 
declines, there is "first passive resistance, then active resistance, and even deliberate sabotage."  
He distinguished between the work required of life insurance salesmen and those in other trades.  
A man with poor morale, he explained, could passably run an adding machine without grave 
impact on his productivity, for “it is a routine task which requires no particular initiative or 
enthusiasm.”   He continued, “There are many other such routine jobs, but selling life insurance 
is not one of them . . . Initiative and enthusiasm are the agent's stock in trade, for the “agent's 
mission is to transmit enthusiasm -- and how can a man transmit what he does not have?"
77
  
Having established the function of morale in selling life insurance, Morrison emphasized 
the critical role of the manager as it had emerged from Likert’s research.78 The manager’s job 
was a distinctly psychological one: to make his men feel that they were working towards 
objectives, and to guarantee that their individual objectives were in harmony with the agency’s 
larger goals.  He would ensure the success of the agency by supporting the internal needs of his 
salesmen, anticipating their concerns and motivations.  The best executives and managers 
functioned like teachers, helping underlings attain objectives and communicating investment in 
their success.   
                                                 
76
 Laurence Morrison, “Life Insurance Sales Bureau Memo: ‘Morale: The Priceless Ingredient,’” 1 November 1939, 
folder “Life Insurance Sales Research Bureau,” box 21, Likert papers, Bentley Library. 
 
77
 Morrison, “Morale: The Priceless Ingredient,” 2. 
 
78





 Morrison explained that, according to Likert’s study, the morale of salesmen did not 
correlate with managers’ attitudes about their salesman’s welfare, but rather with the agents’ 
accounts of their own morale.  In Likert’s research, the five best managers (i.e. those with the 
most productive workforces) consistently underestimated the morale of their men, while the five 
worst managers dramatically overestimated the contentment of their workforces.   And in survey 
after survey, agents had reported that their managers’ attitudes toward them affected their morale 
far more than other factors like their material conditions or sense of “vocational competence.”  
They reported that the most desirable quality in a manager was his "[interest] in Agents' 
Welfare"; the second most important quality was a manager’s approachability.  "The more one 
considers the meaning of these results,” Morrison concluded, “the more one feels convinced that 
the qualities which make the greatest contribution to morale are qualities of the heart rather than 
the head: generosity, sympathy, willingness to cooperate, fairness and sincerity." A business 
whose profits depended on the sale of “contentment and security” could not rely on sales force of 
“unhappy and discontented men to whom, in their own lives, security is a stranger."79   
Morrison's 1939 address to the Association of Life Insurance Agency Officers helped 
establish Likert as a leader in the evolving field of management studies.  It was followed by the 
publication of seven LISRB booklets between 1939 and 1940, entitled Morale and Agency 
Management, which summarized Likert’s research findings in more detail and presented them to 
a broader audience.
80
  On the one hand, Likert’s studies reinforced the findings of Mayo and 
Roethlisberger’s Hawthorne studies, which had also insisted on a relationship between a 
                                                 
79
 Morrison, “Morale: The Priceless Ingredient,” 6. 
 
80
 Morale and Agency Management, A Research Bureau Series, vol. 1: “Morale- the Mainspring of Management”, 
from Life Insurance Sales Research Bureau, c. 1940 [presumably authored by Likert], folder “Morale and Agency 
Management” – A Research Bureau Series, vol. 1. “Morale- the Mainspring of Management”, from Life Insurance 






manager’s mode of supervision and the morale of his underlings, arguing for a greater attention 
to the psychic well-beings of underlings.  But whereas Mayo and Roethlisberger had promoted a 
style of caring management—a  heightened level of attentiveness to workers’ performance—
Likert’s study signaled a transition to an increasingly humanistic approach to workers’ interior 
lives.  Reflecting years later on his work at the LISRB, Likert explained, "All I did then was to 
see that the more managers behaved in ways which at that time I said met an agent's desire for 
ego recognition (later on they called it personal worth) . . . , the higher the morale and the more 
successful the agency was.  The more the manager and his behavior deflated the agent’s ego, the 
poorer the agent’s morale and the poorer the productivity was."81  
 Likert’s work for the LISRB marked his segue from the world of market research to that 
of human relations.   Though he was hired because of his expertise in survey-making, he thrived 
because of his openness to new theories of management.  It was at LISRB that Likert became 
interested in theories of leadership and motivation and committed to the link between high 
morale and successful organizations.  Whereas his earlier work had focused on the attitudes and 
behavioral patterns of individuals, his organizational studies examined the interpersonal 
dynamics established in the workplace.  Work, he concluded, was not just about the personality 
of workers and their fitness or unfitness for a given job; it was also about relationships and social 
systems, the manager and the managed.  Though Likert did not at this point identify with the 
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cohort that included Mayo, Roethlisberger, or Lewin, the LISRB offered him initiation into the 
field of interwar human relations. His work of this era provided a bridge between his celebrated 
work as a market researcher and his later legacy as a management consultant.  It taught him that 









“A Psychology for the Peace Table”:  
Abraham Maslow, Douglas McGregor, and the Hierarchy of Needs 
 
 
In 1954, 46-year old psychologist Abraham Maslow published a landmark treatise 
entitled Motivation and Personality, in which he famously argued that all people are motivated 
by a “hierarchy of needs.”  Having satisfied basic physiological requirements like food and 
shelter, he explained, they pursue the needs to feel safe, to be loved, and—ultimately—to be 
“self-actualized.”1  Self-actualization marked the moment at which a person reached such heights 
of creativity and self-expression that he became connected harmoniously to the people and 
environments around him.  The term has since become a kind of shorthand for the goals of 
humanistic psychology, a subfield devoted to positive human emotions like growth, hope, 
creativity, and love, in contrast to the Freudian fixation on mental illness and neurosis. 
Less than ten years after introducing the concept of self-actualization to the American 
public, Maslow published a meditation on the “hierarchy of needs” in industry.  Eupsychian 
Management assembled the journal entries Maslow had produced during his time as a visiting 
fellow at Non-Linear Systems in Del Mar, California in 1962 and marked his first attempt to 
apply his psychological theories to the world of work.  In the book, he announced his conviction 
that “the industrial situation may serve as the new laboratory for the study of the pseudo-
dynamics, of high human development, of the ideal ecology for the human being.”2  Given the 
primacy of work in the lives of most human beings, Maslow explained, “proper management of 
the work lives of human beings, of the way in which they can earn a living, can improve them 
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and improve their world and in this sense can be a utopian or revolutionary technique.”3  Citing 
the limits of other modern therapeutic interventions, Maslow suggested that organizational 
reform was the most promising avenue for sweeping social change.
4
  By the mid-1960s, he had 
concluded that large organizations would be the next frontier of human potential, and managers 
the most effective catalysts of change.   
Maslow’s writings on the “ideal ecology for the human being” might strike contemporary 
readers as a lofty relic of the Affluent Society, produced by a theorist who resided outside the 
boundaries of corporate or industrial America.  Maslow was, after all, a man who mingled with 
hippies, delivered seminars at “personal growth” centers, and exuded a passionate optimism 
about human nature.  But it would be a mistake to dismiss Maslow’s theories about the corporate 
environment as optimistic reverie, for few thinkers influenced management theory more in the 
1950s and 1960s than Abraham Maslow.  Maslow supplied a wave of postwar management 
theorists with the terminology they sought to articulate a powerful conviction: that corporate 
culture (itself a new concept) would be central to the realization of human potential in 
civilization writ large.  According to this group of “Maslowian” management theorists, better 
management could propel all of society into an era of psychological fulfillment. 
For decades after World War II, Maslow’s popularized terms “self-actualization” and the 
“hierarchy of needs” persisted as a buzzwords in management theory, inspiring torrents of 
enthusiasm and controversy.  Maslow’s theories influenced major management thinkers like 
Chris Argyris, Rensis Likert, Frederick Herzberg, and, most famously, Douglas McGregor—
whose landmark treatise The Human Side of Enterprise endorsed the Maslowian management 
style with its central concept, Theory Y.  Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, many of the 
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management theorists who celebrated “participative” and “democratic” management cited 
Maslow’s theories as a central inspiration, making the psychologist’s name a buzzword in 
business schools and corporations across America.   
This chapter introduces Abraham Maslow’s development of what he called “third force 
psychology” and examines his early impact one fellow psychologist in particular: Douglas 
McGregor.  McGregor, whose work in industrial relations was profoundly affected by Maslow’s 
idea of the “hierarchy of needs,” eventually inspired Maslow himself to study the industrial 
sphere.  Teaching at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology while Maslow taught at Brandeis, 
McGregor infused the field of industrial relations with a humanistic perspective that guided 
academic management theory for decades.  His Theory Y urged managers to assume 
fundamentally optimistic attitudes about workers’ nature and the capacities of human beings, to 
offer underlings opportunities for creativity and challenge as an alternative to stultifying 
Tayloristic tasks.  Maslow and McGregor shared a conviction that modern work could and 
should be meaningful, that American workers could achieve fulfillment through their jobs as 
opposed to their leisure time, and that every human being contained the potential for creative 
self-expression on the job.   
Critics and historians of business often cite Maslow and McGregor as the faces of 
“rebellious” management theory in the 1960s.  Andrea Gabor included them on her list of 
paradigm-shifting “capitalist philosophers,” and Art Kleiner championed them as two of 
management theory’s most influential “heretics.”5 In The Conquest of Cool, Thomas Frank 
saluted them for forging an alliance with the counterculture of the 1950s and ‘60s, when they 
(along with a broader legion of management thinkers) “went through their own version of the 
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mass society critique…embracing all manner of individualism-promoting, bureaucracy-
smashing, and anti-hierarchical schemes.” According to Frank, the writings of McGregor and his 
comrades reflected an “[i]nfatuation with youthful cultural insurgency” which “came almost as 
naturally for them as it did for Charles Reich and Theodore Roszak.” 6   
While Frank is right to recognize the surprising and oft-overlooked ideological parallels 
between the management writings of McGregor and some of his countercultural contemporaries, 
he offers a misleading interpretation of his intellectual genesis.  McGregor, who died in 1964 at 
the age of 58, began citing Maslow’s principles of human potential and humanistic needs in the 
1940s.  His commitment to participation grew out of his early exposure to the Social Gospel, 
progressive education, labor-management negotiations, and interwar social science.  Maslow 
similarly emerged from a pre-WWII tradition of anti-fascist Jewish intellectuals and a revolt 
against Freudian psychotherapy.  By the time of World War II, both men had developed 
powerful commitments to the promise of humanistic psychology for individuals and capitalist, 
democratic society writ large.  It would be a mistake to trace their intellectual origins to the 
postwar Organization Man critique or the inspiration of 1960s radicalism—especially 
considering that Maslow remained ambivalent toward the actions of the new left and 
counterculture until his death in 1970.   
This chapter examines Maslow and McGregor—born two years apart, in 1908 and 1906, 
respectively—as intellectual pioneers who, having lived through the atrocities of both World 
Wars, political upheaval abroad, and labor strife at home, helped forge new modes of 
psychological and organizational inquiry dedicated to humanistic concerns.  Maslow, greatly 
influenced by the Jewish Socialist activists of his day, originally dubbed his interests 
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“psychology for the peace table.” He hoped his revelations would help combat prejudice by 
celebrating human beings’ common capacity for good.  Never devoted primarily to the health of 
individuals, he identified psychological health with greater social purpose and insisted that 
fulfilled individuals could combat the authoritarian dynamics of everyday social relations.  
Douglas McGregor, emerging from roots in the Social Gospel movement and holding a deep 
commitment to labor-management cooperation, applied Maslow’s principles to his own vision of 
democratic participation in large organizations.  The early careers of these two men marked a 
synthesis of humanistic psychology, labor-management relations, and participative philosophy 
from the interwar years into the 1940s.   
 
 Abraham Maslow was born in April, 1908, in the Greenpoint section of Brooklyn, New 
York.  His parents were uneducated Russian Jewish immigrants; his father ran a cooperage 
business in Brooklyn and was what Maslow described as a “barrel man.”7  Maslow later 
remembered himself as a “slum boy,” raised by parents who were just barely getting by, who 
managed to put food on the table but could not provide much else.
8
  It is, in fact, difficult to 
reconcile the image of Maslow the adult – vivacious, joyful, optimistic—with the image of his 
childhood self.  The young Maslow (oldest of seven children) found himself in an unhappy 
family, with parents who frequently fought and a father often absent.  He later expressed open 
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contempt for his father’s cruel demeanor and his mother’s ignorant, Old World, superstitious 
ways.
9
  His parents represented many of the characteristics against which Maslow would later 
align himself.   
 Growing up as a Jew in the “immigrant jungle that was Brooklyn” in the years following 
World War I, Maslow experienced “awful,” pervasive anti-Semitism and was the perpetual 
outsider in his neighborhood. His peers mocked him and his teachers, responding to his Judaism 
and his preternatural intelligence, persecuted him as well.   From the age of four, Maslow later 
remembered, he expressed the inquisitiveness and skepticism of a scientist: “I’ve been bucking 
the establishment since I was a kid,” he explained in a 1968 documentary.10  His mother, true to 
her old-world superstitions, would caution him that he would go blind if he crawled through a 
particular window; Maslow, ever the anti-authoritarian, would crawl through said window and 
emerge unblinded to demonstrate the emptiness of her theories.
11
  He exhibited a similar 
tendency in the classroom, continually questioning received wisdom, not believing his teachers’ 
lessons until he could prove them on his own terms.   
As a high school student, Maslow was introduced to the novels of Upton Sinclair—a 
moment in which his social conscience was “first pricked”12—and through those works, became 
a democratic socialist “committed from that point on to making a better world.”13  At the time, 
the quest for social justice and pervasive spirit of “possibility and hope” were critical 
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components of the Jewish political experience.
14
  Maslow later remembered, “There was always 
the hope…It was never considered unrealistic to work for a better world…and my father and 
uncle and everybody went along with it.  Of course there would be a better world.”15  The 
idealism of secularized Jewish social activism shaped his political and academic pursuits for the 
rest of his life.  Maslow emerged from the slums of Brooklyn determined to build a more just 
society. 
 In 1926, Maslow earned a scholarship to attend Cornell University.  Though Cornell was 
one of the few Ivy League universities accepting Jews at the time, he encountered so much anti-
Semitism that he returned home to New York City within the year.  Enrolling in the City College 
of New York with a major in psychology, Maslow experienced his first academic epiphany:  A 
psychology professor introduced him to the work of John B. Watson.
16
  Watson was the founder 
of behavioral psychology – the subfield dedicated to the idea that all human behaviors are rooted 
in environmental conditioning-- and had been responsible for propelling behaviorism to the 
forefront of the field in the early 20
th
 century.  At Johns Hopkins, he had famously 
institutionalized the “lab rat in a maze” experiment, with its inquiries into issues of stimulus, 
response, and habit formation.  His work effectively made psychology a matter of the body as 
opposed to the soul.
17
  Though Maslow rejected many tenets of behavioral psychology, he was 
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drawn to Watson’s commitment to social change: Watson employed behaviorist techniques to 
understand and combat ethnic discrimination, racial prejudice, and the corporal punishment of 
children.
18
  Maslow later remembered “dancing down Fifth Avenue with exuberance” after his 
first exposure to Watson’s work, which struck him as beautiful:  “I was confident that here was a 
real road to travel: solving one problem after another and changing the world.”19 
 Though City College had exposed Maslow to that critical connection between 
psychology and social change, he did not remain enrolled there for long.  City College proved to 
be too close to his home (and his dysfunctional family) and too close to the love of his life: his 
first cousin, Bertha Goodman.  Maslow and Goodman had met and fallen in love when they were 
16 and 15 years old, to the consternation of family and friends, and Maslow decided they should 
have a cooling off period before making the decision to marry (which they did, four years later.  
The two remained married until Maslow’s untimely death in 1970.)20  Having reached his 
verdict, Maslow left New York City in for the University of Wisconsin in Madison, where he 
entered the program in psychology, “off to…save the world.”21  He completed his Bachelor’s 
there and went on to earn his PhD in 1934. 
 The University of Wisconsin proved to be a vital, energizing intellectual home for 
Maslow.  Thanks in part to the earlier influence of Wisconsin governor Robert La Follette, 
whose progressive agenda had shaped the state’s educational system, the University had become 
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widely known as a bastion of academic freedom and the cultivation of knowledge for the public 
good.  It was also, according to writer Andrea Gabor, a “hotbed of leftist radicalism.”22  No 
environment could have better suited Maslow at this formative stage of his professional 
development.  Though the Psychology Department at the school was dedicated to largely 
pragmatic and behaviorist pursuits, discouraging Maslow’s interest in more qualitative studies 
like the aesthetics of music appreciation
23
, Maslow located mentors and peers who encouraged 
his voracious appetite for psychological knowledge.  He worked closely with Harry Harlow, the 
psychologist known as “Monkey Man” because of his revolutionary work in primate learning 
and behavior.   
 First serving as Harlow’s research assistant and then as his PhD student, Maslow 
ultimately spent two years at Madison’s Vilas Park Zoo, producing prolific research on  primate 
mating rituals, eating habits, and dominance behaviors. Watching these monkeys, Maslow 
became particularly drawn to one behavioral phenomenon: After monkeys’ appetites had been 
sated through regular meals, they continued to crave and demand snacks like peanuts and 
chocolate.  To Maslow, this suggested something significant: that there was a substantial 
difference between “hunger” and “appetite”—or, in other words, between need and want.  The 
monkeys’ endless appetites for sugary, salty snacks inspired Maslow’s lifelong study of 
motivation.  Once our raw, physiological needs have been satisfied, he asked perpetually in his 
research, what do we want?  How do we express and satisfy those desires?   
 Unfortunately, the Wisconsin faculty did not prove receptive to Maslow’s interests in 
human wants and needs, which they deemed to be fundamentally philosophical concerns.   They 
also dismissed the group of psychologists to whom Maslow was drawn in the early 1930s: 
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Sigmund Freud (who emphasized the role of subconscious sexual desires), and émigrés like 
Alfred Adler (who studied humans’ quest for power), and Gestalt psychologist Max Wertheimer.  
All of these men diverged markedly from the behaviorist path.
24
   
 Having earned his PhD in 1934, Maslow returned to New York City in search of a job. 
He entered a entering a miserable, Depression-era job market, searching fruitlessly for work until 
he stumbled upon the educational psychologist Edward Thorndike.  Thorndike, a professor at 
Teachers’ College at Columbia University, had also served as one of the founding members of 
the Psychological Corporation (discussed in detail in Chapter 2).
25
  Thorndike had received a 
$100,000 grant from the Carnegie Corporate to develop scientifically rooted social policies for 
problems like poverty, illiteracy, and crime.
26
 He brought Maslow on board to study the extent to 
which certain behaviors were rooted in either environmental or hereditary factors.  In spite of his 
sympathies for the premise of the study, Maslow soon grew bored with his work for Thorndike.  
The young psychologist grew convinced that their work rested on a fundamentally false 
dichotomy between environmental and hereditary influences.  All behaviors were rooted in both 
kinds of factors, Maslow argued, and it was futile to try to categorize particular traits as either 
one or the other.  Thorndike released Maslow from the work, recognizing the incompatibility of 
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the young man’s interests with his Carnegie-funded endeavor, but a lifelong relationship 
developed between the two men.
27
   
 In New York, Maslow fortuitously found himself amidst many of the radical 
psychologists he had once admired from afar, who had recently emigrated from repressive 
European regimes.  While working at Columbia, Maslow began to pursue face-to-face 
relationships with his intellectual heroes, a cadre of Jewish, European psychologists who were 
actively redefining their field. “My teachers were the best in the world,” he later explained, and 
“I sought them out: Erich Fromm, Karen Horney, Ruth Benedict, Max Wethertheimer, Alfred 
Adler…”28  These scholars’ experimental orientations and commitments to social change 
inspired Maslow to eventually branch off from the two hegemonic strands of psychology that 
dominated the field before World War II: Behaviorism and Freudianism. Whereas many other 
psychologists of the period focused on the mental health of individuals—the logic of individual 
behavior; the roots of individual pathology—a group of these émigrés focused on the mental 
health of society.  For them, the study of individuals mattered because of their union in a larger 
whole.
29
   
 In the early 1930s, the psychologist Max Wertheimer had emigrated to New York City 
and joined the faculty of the New School’s University in Exile, where he and Maslow first met.  
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The University in Exile had been established by New School President Alvin Johnson in 1934, 
envisioned as an intellectual haven for social researchers fleeing oppressive European regimes.  
Its community of refugee scholars —which eventually included Hannah Arendt, Wilhelm Reich, 
and Bronislaw Malinowski, among 180 others-- joined a faculty of American researchers already 
committed to social justice and academic freedom.
30
  Wertheimer and his comrades rejected the 
traditional boundaries between self and society, and between intellectuals and the public interest.   
 As the founder of Gestalt psychology, Wertheimer represented a dramatic departure from 
both Freudian psychotherapy and behaviorist research: He believed that “[r]ather than learning 
from trial and error, as the behaviorists insisted, humans achieved true leaps of understanding 
when they have what [he] called an ‘Aha!’ experience.”31  He believed in the holistic and often 
transcendent nature of the human brain, and became famous for his notion that “the whole is 
always bigger than the sum of its parts”—meaning that mathematical and scientific breakdowns 
of neurological processes will always, necessarily neglect the spontaneity and mystery of human 
experience.
32
  Wertheimer became renowned for his eccentric pedantic behaviors, leaping on his 
desk to emphasize points and urging his students to “learn from the ‘unmotivated’ qualities of 
playfulness, wonder, and aesthetic enjoyment” as opposed to psychology’s typical focus on 
“goal-seeking behavior.”33  He also insisted to his students that “most people possess an essential 
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goodness and decency,” and that social scientists had a duty to study and nurture these 
tendencies.
34
  Wertheimer’s helped inspire Maslow to study what he would later call the “Farther 
Reaches of Human Nature,” and he became one of Maslow’s examples of a genuinely “self-
actualized” human being.35  
 After Maslow arrived in New York City, he also sought out a relationship with the 
Austrian psychologist Alfred Adler.  Maslow had first learned about Adler during his days at 
Wisconsin, and soon after his arrival in New York, Adler immigrated to New York from Austria.  
Adler had begun his career in Austria as a colleague of Sigmund Freud’s, working with him as a 
core member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society.  But he eventually branched off from 
Freud’s own brand of psychoanalysis, favoring a more holistic and optimistic approach to 
personality development—most famously developing theories about “inferiority complexes,” 
self-esteem, and the importance of “democratic” family life on early childhood development.36   
By the time Maslow met Adler in the mid-1930s, the Austrian psychologist had established an 
open-house class that met every Friday night at the Gramercy Hotel.  Maslow was one of Adler’s 
first students at the open-house classes, and was drawn to one of Adler’s key principles: that 
environmental factors have a major impact on the development of human behavior (especially 
low and high expectations placed on children in their youth) and that, by extension, the reform of 
social institutions could improve the mental health and performance of individuals in society.     
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 At the same time that Maslow was attending Adler’s open weekly classes, he also 
attended free weekly lectures that German psychologist Erich Fromm was delivering at 
Columbia’s Institute for Social Research.  (Fromm had joined the Frankfurt Institute for Social 
Research in 1930 and emigrated to New York in 1934.)  Fromm, author of the classic treatise 
Escape from Freedom, celebrated the possibilities of individual autonomy in the face of 
authoritarian coercion; he also emphasized the importance of love and creativity in interpersonal 
relationships.
37
  Fromm eventually developed a list of eight basic psychological needs—
revolving around relationships, creativity, and love—that resonated with Maslow’s own 
conception of personal fulfillment. 
 In 1937, after working for two years at Columbia University, Maslow began teaching at 
the newly established Brooklyn College.  Around the same time, his friend and Columbia 
colleague Ruth Benedict—another scholar who eventually earned a spot on his list of “self-
actualized” people – nurtured his interest in anthropology and urged him to try his hand at 
fieldwork.  With the help of a grant from the Social Science Research Council, Maslow spent the 
summer of 1938 on the Blackfoot Indian Reservation in Alberta, Canada.
38
  Originally interested 
in studying the Blackfoots’ patterns of “dominance and emotional security,” Maslow soon 
became struck by their rich traditions of generosity and what Benedict would call “synergy”: the 
phenomenon that exists when individuals’ needs are perfectly aligned with the needs of their 
society, and when an action on behalf of the part necessarily benefits the  whole.
39
  According to 
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Maslow (and the works of Benedict that he helped publish), the theory of synergy suggested that 
“it’s possible to set up social institutions that merge selfishness and unselfishness, so that you 
can’t benefit from yourself without benefitting others.  And the reverse.”40 The Blackfoots’ 
culture inspired Maslow to develop his own broad theory of human nature, for his observations 
of their “innate need to experience meaning and a sense of purpose in life” fell outside the 
purview of either Freudian psychoanalysis or economic theory.
41
  The Blackfoots were 
(according to Maslow) fundamentally decent and innately cooperative.  Maslow craved an 
explanation of human nature that could accommodate such qualities.
42
   
 After researching the Blackfoots, Maslow returned to New York City to teach at 
Brooklyn College, where he remained until leaving for Brandeis University in 1951.  It was 
during his early tenure at Brooklyn College that Maslow experienced his “epiphany moment”: 
the moment that later inspired him to develop his famous hierarchy of needs and provided the 
foundations for Third Force, or Humanistic, psychology.  According to Maslow, it “happened 
very suddenly”: 
One day just after Pearl Harbor, I was driving home and my car was stopped by a 
poor, pathetic parade.  Boy Scouts and old uniforms and a flag and someone 
playing a flute off-key.  As I watched, the tears began to run down my face.  I felt 
we didn’t understand—not Hitler, nor the Germans, not Stalin, nor the 
Communists.  We didn’t understand any of them.  I felt that if we could 
understand, then we could make progress.  I had a vision of a peace table, with 
people sitting around it, talking about human nature and hatred, war and peace, 
brotherhood.  I was too old for the army.  It was at that moment that I realized the 
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rest of my life must be devoted to discovering a psychology for the peace table.  
That moment changed my whole life…I wanted to prove that humans are capable 
of something grander than war, prejudice, and hatred.  I wanted to make science 




This epiphany – the idea that there could be such a thing as a psychology for the ”peace table,” 
and the conviction that science could uncover the common goodness of mankind—propelled 
Maslow’s work for the rest of his career, as he narrated the story.  The humble, costumed boy 
scouts convinced Maslow that psychologists had spent too much time researching the 
pathological, the exceptional; and that in so doing, they had neglected the beauty of the 
mundane.   
 Maslow grew determined to develop a “comprehensive theory of human motivation” that 
could encapsulate the wide range of human experience, and to locate the shared facets of 
humanity across cultures.
44
  He had already started thinking much more critically about the 
negative tendencies of Freudian psychology.  When Bela Mittelmen had solicited contributions 
for his 1940 volume Principles of Abnormal Psychology, Maslow insisted on writing his own 
chapter on normal personalities with an emphasis on healthy traits: self-esteem, self-knowledge, 
the ability to love, and the ability to question social conventions.  Approaching this topic, he was 
dismayed to find the near total lack of research on healthy individuals in his field.
45
  As he later 
described it, he recognized a “huge, big, gaping hole” in the field of psychology: “Where was the 
goodness?  Where was the nobility?  …And where was loyalty…and courage?” Behaviorists 
could not offer insights into these arenas, he concluded, because “you don’t find these things in 
rats.” As for Freud, he was a “disappointed and unhappy man.”  Maslow insisted that without a 
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concept of goodness, psychology “didn’t gel; it was wrong.” 46 He set about establishing 
principles and research questions that could propel the study of healthy human beings. 
 
 In 1943, Maslow published the first definitive text of Third Force Psychology.   
Appearing in Psychological Review, “A Theory of Human Motivation” presented his concepts of 
the “hierarchy of needs” and “self-actualization,” which appeared in his work throughout the rest 
of his career.
47
  In “A Theory of Human Motivation,” Maslow explained that psychologists 
needed a “human-centered” theory of motivation, as opposed to the “animal-centered” studies of 
behaviorists like Watson and Skinner. 
48
  He also insisted that it was time to develop a 
specifically positive theory of human motivation drawing from the works off people like William 
James, John Dewey, Max Wertheimer, Kurt Goldstein, and Alfred Adler – scholars who 
approached human subjects as fundamentally good and capable of growth. 
49
  In contrast to those 
psychologists who viewed people as relatively static products of the securities or traumas of 
early childhood (like Freud), or as predictable reactors to external stimuli (like the behaviorists), 
Maslow argued that all people are propelled by inner forces of need and satisfaction.  “Man is a 
perpetually wanting animal,”50 he explained, and his restless desires can guide him towards 
transcendent states of being.   
                                                 
46
 Being Abraham Maslow.  Maslow also reflected in this film that fatherhood fundamentally changed his attitudes 
toward the behaviorists and the psychoanalysts: “When he had our babies,” he explained, they “destroyed” Watson 
and Freud.  Maslow was particularly fascinated by the deep differences between his children, which dated back to 
their time in the womb (one was very active, and the other very passive).  He believed that these differences offered 
a significant challenge to the idea that environmental conditioning and childhood trauma were primarily responsible 
for children’s behavioral outcomes. 
 
47
 Abraham Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” Psychological Review 50 (1943):  370-396. 
 
48
 Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” 371. 
 
49
 At the end of this article, Maslow referenced Adler, Freud, Fromm, Kurt Goldstein, Karen Horney, and Max 
Wertheimer, among others. 
50





 According to Maslow, all people begin with basic physiological needs (the bottom rung 
of his famous hierarchy).  They are hungry; they are thirsty; they crave nutrition, sleep, warmth, 
and sex.   In order to keep their bodies in states of healthy homeostasis, they try to consume 
appropriate amounts of salt, sugar, protein, fat, calcium, oxygen, warmth.  These needs, Maslow 
explained, are the most “prepotent,” for in “the human being who is missing everything in life in 
an extreme fashion, it is most likely that the major motivation would be the physiological needs 
rather than the others.”51  “For the man who is extremely and dangerously hungry,” he 
postulated, “no other interests exist but food.  He dreams food, he remembers food, he thinks 
about food, he emotes only about food, he perceives only food and he wants only food.”52  For 
this man, his pressing physiological needs might dictate an entire “philosophy of the future,” in 
which “Utopia can be defied very simply as a place where there is plenty of food.”53  This man 
assumes that, should his hunger be sated, he should never want for anything ever again. 
 But, Maslow wondered, what happens to this hungry man once “there is plenty of bread 
and when his belly is chronically filled?”54  What become of his needs and wants?  Can he settle 
for his new Utopia of satisfied hunger?  According to Maslow, absolutely not.  For once the 
lowly physiological needs are satisfied, “other (and ‘higher’) needs emerge, and 
these…dominate the organism”55  —until the man has moved all the way up a hierarchy of need 
and desire.   Needs serve as organizing principles of human behavior, Maslow explained, only 
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when they are left unsatisfied; once satisfied, the former need becomes seamlessly woven into 
the “current dynamics of the individual.”56   
 Maslow thus charted the four rungs of the hierarchy above physiological needs, in 
ascending order.  Above physiological needs, he located “safety” needs —best exemplified by 
the young child who cries whenever removed from the nurturing arms of her mother, or who 
feels terror upon developing an illness.  The child craves stability, routine, and order because the 
alternative is chaos and danger; it is the job of parents to shield him/her from harm.
57
  Similarly, 
a peaceful and well-ordered society “makes its members feel safe enough from wild animals, 
extremes of temperature, criminals, assault, murder, tyranny, etc.”58  According to Maslow, the 
neurotic individual is one who was deprived of safety and security early in childhood, and spends 
the rest of his life grasping for stability; the unhealthy social group is that which clings to a 
totalitarian dictator out of a desperate craving for security and routine.
59
 
 Once basic needs for safety have been satisfied, the individual pursues his “love needs”: 
needs for affection and belongingness expressed through both the giving and receiving of love.  
Having satisfied his hunger and achieved a sense of security, “the person will feel keenly, as 
never before, the absence of friends, or a sweetheart, or a wife, or children.  He will hunger for 
affectionate relations with people in general, namely, for a place in his group, and he will strive 
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with great intensity to achieve his goal.”60  Having satisfied these needs, he will move on to 
pursuing his “esteem needs.”  Maslow defined esteem needs as those that lead us to crave self-
respect, achievement, prestige, recognition, and importance—those feelings associated with a job 
well done or of being generally “useful and necessary in the world.”  All people, he explained, 
“have a need or desire for a stable, firmly based, (usually) high evaluation of themselves, for 
self-respect, or self-esteem, and for the esteem of others.”61   
 Having established these first four basic needs (physiological, safety, love, and esteem) 
Maslow explained that the hierarchy itself was not fundamentally rigid or fixed.  A person might 
fulfill one of these needs out of the order he presented, or fulfill multiple needs partially without 
satisfying any all the way.  In some people, the needs might exist in different proportions: the 
ambitious go-getter might prize esteem over love, and the passionately committed painter might 
forsake food for his art.  Furthermore, it could be difficult to attach motivating needs to discrete 
behaviors, as in the person who eats not because she is hungry but because she seeks comfort.  
The basic needs might appear in a variety of mutating manifestations. 
 If there was some flexibility in the bottom four levels of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, 
however, its peak remained unshakeable.  At the fifth and uppermost echelon of the hierarchy 
was a concept first introduced by the neurologist Kurt Goldstein: “Self-actualization.”62 
According to Maslow, self-actualization “refers to the desire for self-fulfillment, namely, the 
tendency for him to become self-actualized in what he is potentially.” He elaborated, “This 
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tendency might be phrased as the desire to become more and more what one is, to become 
everything that one is capable of becoming.”63  
 Maslow eventually became identified with the pleasure-seeking counterculture of the 
1960s (an identification about which he felt deep ambivalence
64
), and his conception of self-
actualization became shorthand for the individualistic hedonism and narcissistic self-exploration 
of the baby-boom generation.  But Maslow’s original conception of self-actualization was 
distinctly rooted in his own commitment to social justice and community.  Self-actualization 
occurs, he argued, when an individual locates his or her place in society and finds a way to be 
useful.    Maslow explained that even if the first four levels of his hierarchy were satisfied, “a 
new discontent and restlessness will develop, unless the individual is doing what he is fitted for.  
A musician must make music, an artist must paint, a poet must write, if he is to be ultimately 
happy.  What a man can be, he must be.”65  One might find security, love, respect and safety 
while toiling away at a soulless job, but true happiness could only arrive upon locating one’s 
calling in the world.  Maslow’s idea of self-actualization, far from representing a retreat into the 
individual psyche, represented a reassertion of Jewish activist ethic and its insistence on the 
individual’s obligations to the world around him.66 
 Maslow’s first article on the hierarchy of needs was greeted with little fanfare and 
“attracted only modest attention.”67  But in this landmark piece, Maslow had established the 
central ideas of humanistic psychology.  What he proposed was nothing less than a re-
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envisioning of the modern self.  Whereas the behaviorists’ human subjects had been rooted in a 
set of predictable stimuli and responses, and Freud’s subjects had been shackled to childhood 
traumas and adult neuroses, Maslow’s subjects were capable of perpetual growth.  Maslow 
assumed that all people held the potential for self-actualization; that existence was necessarily a 
work in progress, characterized by the quest for self-knowledge and psychological evolution. 
There was something sacred and unique about each self, Maslow suggested, something worthy 
of cultivation and exploration.  In his early 20-page article, with its modest claims of laying out a 
“new theory of human motivation,” Maslow established a new paradigm for selfhood in 
mainstream psychology.   
 A decade after the publication of his landmark Psychological Review article, Maslow 
introduced his ideas to a much broader audience.  The 1954 book Motivation and Personality 
established Maslow as a critical figure not just in the social sciences or his own field of 
psychology, but in the broader landscape of American culture.
68
  The book did not introduce 
much new material, but rather assembled Maslow’s previous writings on the hierarchy of needs 
with new evidence on self-actualized people.   In Motivation and Personality, he reiterated his 
protests against Freudianism -- because “the study of cripples, stunted, and unhealthy specimens 
can yield only a cripple psychology and a cripple philosophy” – and behavioristic 
reductionism.
69
 “’The science of psychology,’ he explained,  
‘has been far more successful on the negative than on the positive side.  It has 
revealed to us much about man’s shortcomings, his illnesses, his sins, but little 
about his potentialities, his virtues, his achievable aspirations, or his 
psychological health.  It is as if psychology had voluntarily restricted itself to only 
half its rightful jurisdiction…We must find out what psychology…might be, if it 
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could free itself from the stultifying effects of limited, pessimistic and stingy 
preoccupations with human nature.’70 
 
In Motivation and Personality, Maslow outlined the hierarchy of needs, expanded on the 
principles he’d published in earlier articles, and elaborated on the notion of self-actualization.  
Self-actualization emerged  here as an all-encompassing state of human fulfillment – one that 
involved acceptance of self and the world, social compassion, spontaneity, independence, artistic 
appreciation, and some aspects of religious experience.   
 Maslow built on his generalizations about self-actualization with a set of sixteen people, 
living and historical, whom he deemed self-actualized, including: Thomas Jefferson, Albert 
Einstein, Albert Schweitzer, Abraham Lincoln, Jane Addams, William James, Eleanor 
Roosevelt, Aldus Huxley, and Spinoza. He also located nineteen specific characteristics of their 
self-actualization, including clarity of perception, problem-solving orientation, solitude seeking, 
ethics, and senses of humor.   
  Maslow’s book met a positive reception in the psychological community and beyond.  
According to Maslow’s biographer, whereas his 1943 article had penetrated just a small segment 
of the psychological community, this new work “catapulted Maslow to national prominence” and 
was “widely acknowledged as a major psychological achievement of the 1950s.”71  But the book 
also met its fair share of skeptics.  One reviewer applauded Maslow’s “essentially joyous and 
optimistic” vision of human personality, which he found to be a “relieving complement to the 
dreary accounts of human conflict, frustration, and misery which constitute so much of the 
substance of traditional and especially Freudian lore.”  But he cited critics who contended that 
Maslow’s theories were “better argued than proved,” and that “much of what he says is poetry 
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rather than science.”72  Like the humanistic management theorists inspired by his writings, 
Maslow would repeatedly encounter criticisms along these lines: that his work expressed a 
philosophy of human nature—or even a religion—as opposed to empirical, scientifically rooted 
evidence. 
 
 In 1944, Maslow received a letter in response to papers he had written on concepts of 
leadership and motivation from Douglas McGregor, then a professor of Industrial Relations at 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
73
  Expressing admiration for the seminal article on 
motivation Maslow had published the year before,
74
 McGregor explained that he was also 
“delighted” with Maslow’s recent article on the “authoritarian character structure” and offered, 
“I could pick for you a number of rather striking examples from among my industrial 
acquaintances.”75  As early as the mid-1940s, McGregor had seized on the potential applications 
of Maslow’s psychological theories within the industrial arena and begun to espouse them within 
the hallowed halls of MIT.    
 Douglas McGregor’s biography, like Maslow’s, spans a range of 20th-century intellectual 
traditions and institutions.  A trained social psychologist, McGregor traveled the vital social-
science circuits of the early- and mid-20
th
 century with a broad commitment to economic and 
political democracy.  He hobnobbed with many of the period’s most influential organizational 
reformers in a time of great anxiety about the future of the country’s powerful institutions, and 
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with them articulated a particular vision of capitalist evolution.  According to McGregor, 
capitalism could only survive and prosper if its advocates created avenues for genuine 
communication and – critically, in his mind—participation.  McGregor was a staunch supporter 
of unionization and effective labor/management negotiations; he pushed for democratic decision-
making and equitable settlements.  As president of Antioch, where he presided for six years 
(1948-54) between two stints at MIT’s Sloan School of Management, he also advocated for 
progressive education and democratic governance.   
 More than perhaps any other figure in the sphere of humanistic management, McGregor 
moved between organizational environments with a consistent and impassioned commitment to 
his ideals.  He sensed crisis in the proliferation of large-scale bureaucracies and the persistence 
of Taylorism, spending much of his career decrying scientific management and fighting for 
“humanized” work places.  Ultimately, he made little distinction between different kinds of 
institutions—be they educational, industrial, social, or political—but consistently and urgently 
pressed for increased participation in American organizational life.  
 Douglas McGregor was born in Detroit in 1906, two years before Abraham Maslow was 
born in Brooklyn.  His great grandfather, John Murray McGregor, was a Scotch Presbyterian 
minister who had “set a standard for the McGregors” with his proselytizing ways.76  His 
grandfather, Thomas, began his career as a piano and livestock salesman, but grew restless in 
those pursuits and decided to start a mission for transient workers and homeless men—many of 
them American-Americans—providing them with shelter, food, and opportunities for salvation. 
Thomas contracted pneumonia after digging the foundations of the mission (which later became 
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Detroit’s McGregor Institute) and soon died, bequeathing the holy work of the mission to his 
oldest son (and Douglas’s uncle), Tracy, who went on to start other philanthropies in the area.77   
 In 1915, Douglas’s father, Murray, became a lay preacher and Director of the Institute.  
Douglas’s wife, Caroline, later recounted the impact of the Institute and its work on her late 
husband: 
’Doug’s father became Director of the McGregor Institute in 1915.  Family life 
revolved around his work—a chapel service every evening as well as the feeding 
and housing of as many as 700 men who were low on the totem pole of human 
dignity.  Dad conducted the service, played the organ, and Doug sometimes 
accompanied him on the piano…Both Doug and his brother worked in the office 
and at the desk out of school hours.  Many of the staff were rehabilitated homeless 
men.  Mother often had groups of the men for social evenings at the house.  Dad 
had strong religious beliefs, was a zealous Bible scholar and a lay preacher in his 
own right.  As I look back on my first contacts with Doug’s family, I am 
impressed with the deep concern for mankind, which Doug shared, and an equally 
deep pessimism in respect to man’s potential goodness and strength, which Doug 
continued to challenge in his work and writings.’78 
 
The intersection of faith and doubt appears often in analyses of McGregor’s early years.  One 
account has noted that while he played piano and sang gospel songs as a boy at work, he listened 
to the “fire-and-brimstone lectures of his father, who was ‘weighed down by the social pathology 
of the men he sought to save,’ convinced of their core sinfulness.”79  McGregor inherited his 
father’s “compassion for the lost souls of the mission,” but rebelled against Murray’s “pessimism 
about human nature,” developing instead “a firm conviction in the essential goodness and 
strength of each individual.”80  His management treatises would eventually play these two 
models of human nature off of each other.   
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 Just as Abraham Maslow found inspiration among exiled Jews who fused their religion 
with the ideals of democratic socialism, McGregor emerged from a distinctly reformist brand of 
Protestantism.
81
  According to McGregor’s former student and friend, Warren Bennis, the 
earliest stage of McGregor’s upbringing established “the dominant chords in Doug’s intellectual 
origins: religion, the search for meaning, music, and the firmly embedded idea that through 
productive work man will find his salvation.”82  His family’s mission epitomized the work of the 
Social Gospel, the turn-of-the-century Christian movement that advocated salvation through 
service to others and pressed members to suppress their personal needs on behalf of the larger 
good.  But if this liberal expression of Protestantism made an impact on McGregor, he seems to 
have been equally impressed by the more traditional Protestant work ethic articulated by Max 
Weber: a “moral code stressing hard work, asceticism, and the rational organization of one’s life 
in the service of God”;  the idea that one could achieve salvation through the dutiful performing 
of one’s vocational calling.83  McGregor remained, throughout his life, committed to the 
conviction that a meaningful life requires meaningful work; that American culture’s increasing 
emphasis on leisure deprived men of their most certain prospects for self-actualization and 
transcendence. 
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 In 1926, McGregor earned a Bachelor’s degree from the City College of Detroit (later 
known as Wayne State)—having left for a semester at Oberlin College when he considered 
becoming a minister.  After a few years of working for the Buffalo Grey Auto Stations as a 
district manager, he married and moved back home to work nights for the McGregor Institute in 
Detroit.
84
  He left the family business in 1932 to pursue a PhD in Social Psychology at Harvard 
University, completing his PhD in 1935 and teaching as an instructor there for two years.
 
While 
McGregor’s Harvard dissertation (The Sensitivity of the Eye to the Saturation of Colors85) 
offered little reflection of his interests or professional identity, he began in this time to build a 
network of colleagues in the young field of social psychology.  Most notably, he befriended the 
esteemed social psychologist Gordon Allport, with whom he remained in contact throughout his 
career.
 86
  Allport, like McGregor and Maslow, rejected Freudian and behaviorist theories of the 
human personality, arguing that present social contexts predict personality traits better than past 
histories or physiological conditions.
87
 
 In 1937, McGregor was hired as an instructor at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, where he helped found the Industrial Relations Department as the first full-time 
psychologist on the school’s faculty.  He remained at MIT—save his six-year presidency of 
Antioch College—for the rest of his life.  McGregor’s presence at MIT helped critically define 
the program’s identity from the 1930s through the 1960s, both because of McGregor’s 
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convictions and pedagogical style (he was known for being a warm, casual teacher who sat back 
and thrust his feet upon the desk in front of him while he taught
88
), and because of the faculty 
whom McGregor actively recruited.  “Under McGregor’s gentle guidance,” Andrea Gabor has 
written, “the Sloan School of Management’s Industrial Relations section became a lightning rod 
for important new ideas in human motivation and leadership that were percolating among both 
psychologists and management experts.”89 McGregor actively recruited men like Kurt Lewin, 
Joseph Scanlon, and Edgar Schein, whose wide range of perspectives and priorities helped shape 
the experimental atmosphere of the program throughout McGregor’s tenure.  McGregor did not 
publish prolifically—his written legacy consists of several articles and his popular book—but he 
served a critical function in helping to establish a sort of “brains trust” at MIT, assembling a 
cohort of peers with whom to ponder the future of American capitalism.   
 When McGregor helped establish the Industrial Relations section of MIT, industrial 
social science was a nascent sub-discipline.  McGregor reflected in 1959, “The social scientist in 
industry is a relatively recent arrival.  Eleven years ago, when I joined the staff of the newly 
founded Industrial Relations Department at MIT, I found evidence of the efforts of a mere 
handful who had preceded me.”90  Psychology flourished in the interwar period, he remembered, 
but “few social psychologists [were] interested in industrial problems” – and those who were 
tended to focus their organizational work on public opinion polls, which largely neglected the 
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dynamics of interpersonal relationships in organizations.
91
  McGregor located “some notable 
case studies” but encountered “literally no unified theories of the why of organized human 
effort” aside from those of economists, which he found unsatisfactory.92  According to 
McGregor, the work of Elton Mayo and Fritz Roethlisberger at Harvard Business School served 
as an important springboard for the MIT faculty’s efforts to “make theoretical sense of the vast 
complex of human relations.” But he yearned for a systematic theory that could transcend the 
Hawthorne Studies, for “[t]he collection of unrelated hunches, hypotheses, and rules of thumb 
which cluttered the literature provided little practical help in dealing with the problems we were 
called upon to solve.”93   
 In spite of his commitment to the development of management concepts and theories, 
McGregor later framed the MIT Industrial Relation section’s mission in distinctly pragmatic, 
terms.  “We think of ourselves chiefly as ‘plumbers,’” he explained, “mending leaky pipes in 
human relations plumbing”—and attending to real-world organizational dilemmas, sometimes at 
the expense of scholarly production.  Twelve years after arriving at MIT, he conceded that his 
group had “not contributed our fair share of publications to the ‘pool,’” suggesting that “we have 
been too preoccupied with the everyday problems which we met in the factory” and “too busy 
trying to communicated our ideas in the classroom and to the union and management people in 
our industrial laboratories.”94 The strife that characterized American labor relations between 
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1935 and 1950, as unions and management competed vigorously for worker loyalty, initially 
overshadowed McGregor’s utopian mission of large-scale organizational reform.95 
 From his early days at MIT, McGregor struggled to establish a field of industrial science 
rooted in cutting-edge psychological theory while also counteracting “the conviction of many 
people in industry that psychologists were impractical dreamers.”96  The remainder of his career 
found him torn between two factions: hard-nosed industrial realists and idealistic, humanistic 
theorists.  It is a testament to his charisma and resourcefulness that he managed throughout his 
career to forge alliances with both groups.  McGregor emerged as a rare scholar-practitioner who 
wrote the period’s most influential management treatise and spent much of his career consulting 
with both labor unions and corporations, including the United Steel Workers and General Mills. 
 In 1942, McGregor published his first major article attempting to bridge the concrete 
realm of union-management relationships with more abstractly psychological concerns.  In 
“Union-Management Cooperation: A Psychological Analysis,” McGregor reflected on his 
experiences with successful labor/management committees he had overseen during his days at 
the War Production Board (WPB).
97
  The WPB had been established by Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt in January 1942 with the purpose of converting peacetime industries into wartime 
producers, overseeing both rationing and the allocation of scarce materials to wartime 
production.  Its work necessitated forging cooperative ties between labor and management.  
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Though many plants had experimented with labor-management committees in the first half of the 
20
th
 century and entertained the idea that “cooperation between management and union might be 
a powerful force to increase productive efficiency,” the WPB was the first agency to attempt 
these negotiations on a large scale.  McGregor had emerged from his time with the WPB with a 
new appreciation for the potential of such cooperation, but also for the common pitfalls in 
communication between managers and union leaders. Having witnessed the possibilities of 
successful negotiations between unions and management, he evaluated the psychological 
conditions that had made them work.   
 Too often, McGregor explained, managers approached union leaders with resentment and 
bitterness as opposed to openness and respect.  If both sides could understand and appreciate the 
nuances of relationships, behavior, attitudes, and personality, they could make strides toward 
successful negotiations, striking deals that would simultaneously boost productivity and increase 
workers’ senses of security and prestige.  To transcend habits of pettiness and resentment, both 
managers and labor leaders would need to assume a new approach to their dealings: they would 
need to conceive of labor-management relations as “a process of psychological growth.”98  
Employing an analogy that persisted in his management writings for the rest of his career, he 
argued that it was helpful to conceive of union-management relations as “a process of 
psychological growth and development similar to that experienced by the individual as he passes 
from infancy through childhood and adolescence to maturity.”99  As with any childhood 
development, the pace could be “slow and arduous” and could be arrested at any time: “Real 
emotional maturity is rare among individuals,” and regression is common, so it is “not surprising 
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that only a small proportion of union-management combinations have succeeded in reaching a 
fair degree of emotional maturity.”100   
 This early article thus established one of the two recurring metaphors of McGregor’s 
management theory.  On the one hand, much of his management theory drew an analogy 
between management and parenting—equating the worker with the child who must be 
stimulated, loved, and given structure, and the boss with the parent who must be caring while 
also firm and strategic in the nurturing of his child’s needs.  This analogy would alternate in 
McGregor’s writing with a grander metaphor in which he compared the act of managing to that 
of governance, with the boss emerging as a political leader and his workers as citizens of his 
state.  Both analogies reflect the extent to which the entire notion of “authority” was being 
questioned and reconsidered in the 1940s: Where do we draw the line between the father or 
leader who is firm, and he who is authoritarian?  How can we reconcile obedience with the active 
development of children and citizens?
101
 
 According to McGregor, union leaders and management should discard the model of 
“collective bargaining” in favor of “cooperation.”  Whereas the former suggested a fundamental 
competition for resources and lack of shared objectives, the latter implied that both sides could 
benefit from their negotiations.  McGregor explained that cooperation was the more “mature” 
model—and could be applied to such realms as production, internal wage structures, incentives, 
and grievance systems.  Rather than dwelling on the ins and outs of these procedural matters, he 
focused on the emotional tone with which they should be carried out.  First, it was critical that 
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management treat both union leader and workers as equals and with “genuine and evident 
respect,” recognizing that workers possess “highly specific knowledge” about their work, and 
that union leaders are elected democratically by those who trust them to represent their voices.  
Only then could he at the bottom of the industrial hierarchy “feel free to respect himself”—a 
critical step towards emotional maturity.
102
  Second, it was critical that the union leader curb his 
own instincts to rebel against authority, acting with quiet confidence rather than feistiness or 
even violence.   He must strive to understand the manager’s perspective and dilemmas, resisting 
the impulse to view negotiations as a zero-sum game.  Only then could both sides of the equation 
reach their ultimate goal: to share equitably in the gains from their cooperation—not as 
acquisitive individuals, but as cohesive groups.
103
 
 In this 1942 article, McGregor constructed a preliminary bridge between industrial and 
humanistic psychology, incorporating the most central principles of the new sub-discipline being 
espoused by the movement’s pioneers, Abraham Maslow and Carl Rogers.  McGregor not only 
framed labor-management negotiations as a process of psychological growth—with “emotional 
maturity” and independence as aims—but also presented emotional expression as one of the 
most effective tools of the trade.   Two years before Maslow published his seminal article on the 
hierarchy of needs, McGregor nodded to its principles: “Unless management understands the 
workers’ desires for security, social satisfactions, prestige, and the recognition of personal worth, 
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union-management cooperation will appear to be a utopian idea entirely outside the realm of 
practicality...” and unless the union strives for a “genuine understanding” of management needs 
and motivations, it will be left constantly viewing management with suspicion.
104
  This 
understanding could not transpire through a mere rational processing of information.  Rather, it 
depended upon the critical skill of empathy that Carl Rogers actively promoted in the 1940s 
[through his client-centered therapy—in which a therapist’s ultimate goal was to understand the 
perspective and feelings of his patient.   Labor-management meetings “are often carried on in an 
atmosphere of ‘being logical’ or ‘sticking to the hard facts’”—and “[w]hen this atmosphere 
exists, a a barrier is raised against the expression of feelings and emotions.”  McGregor 
expounded, “Whether or not you ‘understand’ in this case depends not upon a mere knowledge 
of facts but upon your ability to put yourself in the other fellow’s shoes emotionally.”105   
 McGregor concluded his article with a promise to union leaders and management leaders 
alike:  
If they have the patience to accept the inevitable slowness of psychological 
growth, if each side has enough self-confidence to permit a belief in the ability 
and honesty of the other, and if they have a real understanding not only of the 
factual but also of the emotional problems involved, they will, over the next few 
years, make the transition to a relationship whose potentialities have been only 




With this declaration, Douglas McGregor united the humanistic psychologists’ greatest 
concerns—human potential, authentic communication, and emotional expression—with the 
labor/management agenda of the 1940s.
107
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 Two years later, McGregor reiterated some of these principles in a widely read article 
aimed more broadly at the state of industrial organizations, and more explicitly articulated 
Maslow’s influence on his thinking.  In “Conditions of Effective Leadership in the Industrial 
Organization” (1944), McGregor pondered the principles of successful relationships between 
superiors and subordinates, returning to the ideas he had expressed about labor/management 
relations and injecting more explicit evidence from the writings of Maslow.
108
  It is clear that by 
1944, McGregor had firmly integrated the “hierarchy of needs” into his own management 
thinking—a move that laid intellectual foundations for his 1960 management classic, the Human 
Side of Enterprise.   
 In this 1944 article, McGregor set out to analyze “some of the important forces and 
events in the work situation which air or hinder the individual as he strives to satisfy his 
needs”—examining not only the “easily observed actions of others,” but also the “subtle, fleeting 
manifestations of attitude and emotion to which the individual reacts almost unconsciously.”109  
He framed his analysis in terms of what he called “dynamic psychology,” focusing specifically 
on the interpersonal dynamics that tend to develop between subordinates and their superiors—
regardless of the context of unionization.”The outstanding characteristic of the relationship 
between the subordinate and his superiors,” he explained “is his dependence upon them for the 
satisfaction of his needs.”  Invoking Maslow, he continued: 
Industry in our civilization is organized along authoritative lines.  In a 
fundamental and pervasive sense, the subordinate is dependent upon his superiors 
for his job, for the continuity of his employment, for promotion with its 
accompanying satisfactions in the form of increased pay, responsibility, and 
prestige, and for a host of other personal and social satisfactions to be obtained in 
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Recognizing the fundamental dependence that characterizes the superior/subordinate 
relationship, McGregor argued, would be a critical step toward transforming the power dynamics 
of the workplace.  
 According to McGregor, management in the US had already focused a good deal on 
establishing financial security for workers: offering them retirement plans, health and accident 
insurance, guaranteed annual wages, and employee credit unions.  But they had neglected the 
more subtle cravings that workers have for psychological security—and this omission 
necessitated a new wave of reforms.  Managers should foster atmospheres characterized by a 
“genuine attitude of approval,” without which “subordinates are threatened, fearful, and 
insecure.”111  He endorsed relatively permissive punishments, noting that “the behavior of the 
people in the occupied countries of Europe today provides a convincing demonstration” of what 
happens when severe discipline is administered in an “atmosphere of disapproval.”112 
 After establishing conditions of psychological security, McGregor wrote, the manager 
could foster his subordinate’s “necessity for self-realization.”113  Here, the theorist shifted his 
attention from discipline and rewards to the transcendent ideal at the peak of Maslow’s 
hierarchy. He explained that having internalized a sense of security in the workplace, the 
“subordinate seeks to develop himself”; to locate “ways of utilizing more fully his capacities and 
skills, and of achieving through his own efforts a larger degree of satisfaction from his work.”114  
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And how might a superior encourage a subordinate to maximize his own capacities?  For 
McGregor, the answer was clear: he needed to offer his underlings increased responsibility and 
opportunities for participation.   
 Echoing the calls for democracy issued from many social scientists in the 1940s, 
McGregor insisted that “[o]ne of the most important conditions of the subordinate’s growth and 
development centers around his opportunities to express his ideas and to contribute his 
suggestions before his superiors take action on matters which involve him.”  He assured 
skeptical readers, “The genuine collaboration among all the members of an industrial 
organization which is eulogized by ‘impractical idealists’ is actually quite possible.”115  
McGregor would continue to insist on this principle throughout the remainder of his career: that 
workers are capable of assuming far more responsibility than managers expect, and that 
subordinates thrive when offered opportunities for participative decision-making.   
 
 On October 24, 1944, McGregor wrote to thank Abraham Maslow for his “good word 
about my leadership paper,” thus cementing an intellectual bond that shaped McGregor’s work 
for the remainder of his life and career.
116
  Though the two men did not meet face to face until 
the 1960s, the convergence of their worldviews had become clear by the mid-1940s.  Maslow’s 
hierarchy of needs had become a centerpiece of McGregor’s organizational psychology, which 
anticipated a rising wave of participative management theorists and practitioners in the postwar 
era.  McGregor’s writings would, in turn, have a profound effect on Maslow’s own industrial 
excursions in the 1960s.
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Kurt Lewin’s Wartime Democracy and the  
Rise of Group Dynamics 
 
 Dwight Sanderson, the president of the American Sociological Review, wrote a rousing 
presidential address to be delivered at the 37
th
 Annual Meeting of the American Sociological 
Society in December 1942.  He intended his speech to mobilize his sociologist comrades, waking 
them to duties of wartime while also asserting the primacy of sociology in a volatile global 
context.  When World War II caused the cancelation of the December meeting, however, 
Sanderson was left with a quieter platform: the publication of his piece, entitled “Sociology[:] A 
Means to Democracy,” in the February 1943 issue off the American Sociological Review.1 The 
fact that he could not deliver his impassioned plea to a crowd of listeners might have easily 
reinforced a sense that he and many of his colleagues in social science had grown peripheral to 
the project of wartime mobilization. According to Sanderson, this needed to change. 
 Sanderson’s published address acknowledged the yearning of his colleagues to play a 
stronger role in wartime.  “In these days of tragedy,” he wrote, “many of us often feel ill at ease 
in not being actively engaged in work to win the war.”  He insisted that his fellow social 
scientists could greatly expand their role in the war effort: 
 [I]f we take the longer view we become aware that physical victory cannot be 
forced into the hearts of men.  A better understanding of the nature and processes 
of society, including those human values which make for survival, is essential to 
enable men to desire real democracy.  We must bring men to appreciate that, 
although force is necessary to police society, only the ideals which rule men’s 
hearts can ever ensure a permanent peace.  In this conviction that our work is 
necessary toward a durable peace may we renew our faith in the responsibility of 
our profession for discovering and proclaiming those truths concerning social 
organization which are necessary for creating a wider and truer democracy.
2
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Sanderson suggested that sociologists could serve a range of roles in the war effort.  Their work 
would entail not just influencing the “hearts of men,” but also reevaluating the very nature of 
democracy through social-scientific methods. 
 Due to events unfolding on the world stage, Sanderson wrote, a legion of American social 
scientists had begun to reconsider the meaning of democracy already.
3
  Rather than view 
democracy primarily as a political system – a rejection of feudalism rooted in universal suffrage 
and parliamentary representation – his colleagues were defining democracy as a multifaceted 
social process that operated churches, factories, schools, and families.  Most importantly, social 
scientists were starting to locate its principles in the very psyches of American citizens, as what 
he labeled a “sentiment of personality.” Democracy, Sanderson wrote, “rests primarily upon our 
attitudes toward others … “essentially a philosophy of life.” 4  He went so far as to suggest that 
democracy was “essentially a religious faith” distinctly rooted in Christian ethics and values, “a 
spiritual power or product of the people.”5   
 For Sanderson, part of the work that lay ahead for sociologists (whom he addressed 
interchangeably with social psychologists
6
) was to define democracy in positive terms, not as a 
set of freedoms but as a set of responsibilities “for one’s self, for the good of the neighbor, for 
the welfare of the Demos.” Until “every citizen” felt this responsibility as “an inescapable 
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personal obligation” democracy would not be “complete.” 7  An incomplete democracy would 
imperil not just the nation’s fight against the axis in World War II, but the survival of its most 
vital institutions after the war.  And here, Sanderson explained emphatically, was where 
American social scientists came in.  If democracy was a psychological and sociological process, 
social psychologists could play a pivotal role in promoting its spread.  Their task would be 
threefold: to develop a clear nomenclature for the study of democratic processes; to establish 
strong networks and funding sources for the research of those processes; and to apply their 
research to “existing situations” in the real world.  Sanderson acknowledged that a community of 
social scientists (including Kurt Lewin, the subject of this chapter) were already working in the 
field of “applied sociology” and addressing their research explicitly to pressing social problems. 
He urged them to go deeper.
8
 
 Two years after the publication of Sanderson’s address, near war’s end, celebrated 
Harvard psychologist (and friend of Douglas McGregor) Gordon Allport celebrated those 
psychologists already committed to the war effort. He cited the Office of Psychological 
Personnel’s estimation that  25% of 4500 psychologists listed in its personnel were in the armed 
forces –numbers not including those who were linked through unreported community work or 
“personal sacrifice.” 9  In “The Psychology of Participation,” an address to the Society for the 
Psychological Study of Social Issues, he explained that “[w]hat the war has done for the majority 
of social psychologists … is to provide them with a direction for future work.”  Allport listed 
                                                 
7
 Sanderson 2. 
 
8
 Sanderson cited existing work on “the social self,” social status, race, social order, population, and what he called 
“the cultural lag.”  He also cited the increasing popularity of group work and group therapy as vehicles of applied 
social science.  
 
9
 Gordon Allport, “The Psychology of Participation,” 1944, Chairman’s address delivered at Society for the 






new techniques of polling, group decision-making, leadership training, and “devices for 
alleviating minority tensions” as some of the many constructive techniques addressing the 
“psychology of participation” during wartime.10  He endorsed psychological research that 
addressed the participation of everyday citizens – be they industrial workers, school children, or 
German citizens—in the shaping of their fates. “[U]nless he [your average citizen] is in some 
areas ego-engaged and participant,” Allport explained, “his life is crippled and his existence a 
blemish on democracy.”11 American psychologists could help citizens understand that 
democratic action demanded active engagement, not merely voting. 
 
 Some social psychologists gained employment during World War II working directly for 
the government’s wartime agencies, while others found ways to address their nation’s needs 
more philosophically.  Kurt Lewin did both.  From 1942 until his death in 1947, while the 
Harwood Studies continued under French and Bavelas’s leadership, Lewin contributed his 
expertise to wartime agencies while also cultivating a vibrant subfield of social psychology 
devoted to training democratic leaders.  He lent his services as a social researcher to the 
Department of Agriculture and the Office of Strategic Services, where he conducted studies on 
food consumption and psychological warfare.  At the same time, he worked tirelessly to build 
two new research organizations committed to introducing democratic principles to everyday life.  
The American Jewish Congress’s Committee for Community Interrelations and MIT’s Research 
Center for Group Dynamics both exemplified Lewin’s ideal of “action research.” Launched 
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immediately after World War II, he envisioned these agencies as hubs for socially useful 
research on small groups, particularly concerning issues of prejudice, leadership, and social 
change.  In establishing these organizations, Lewin launched two major hubs of democratic, 
activist research that would persist in the postwar era, long after his death.  Both groups helped 
formalize the new subfield of Group Dynamics (of which Lewin is widely heralded as the 
“father”) and represented Lewin’s conviction that social science could change the world. 
 Lewin’s first work with a government agency came about at the outbreak of World War 
II, while he was still working at the Iowa Child Welfare Research Station.
12
  Lewin had by 1942 
developed an affectionate friendship with the anthropologist Margaret Mead, who belonged to a 
discussion group he had started on the psychological concept of “Topology.” Mead had been 
asked by ML Wilson, the Director of Extension in the US Department of Agriculture, to serve as 
the secretary for the Committee on Food Habits of the National Research Council.
 13
  (Wilson 
recruited many prominent social scientists to serve his agency during this time.  See the 
following chapter for his relationship with Rensis Likert.)  Soon after, Mead introduced Wilson 
to Lewin, about whom Wilson was “enthusiastic,” and the two men discussed various problems 
facing Mead’s Committee on Food Habits.  Mead later explained: 
Our committee had been requested to study and advise governmental agencies 
how to alter habits and tastes so that they would embody the findings of the new 
science of nutrition and also, during the war time emergency, maintain the health 
of the American people, in spite of shortages and necessary shifts in types of food.  
As anthropologists, we came to the conclusion that our first task was to find out 
what American food habits were, what was the cultural setting within which 
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different groups of Americans…selected, prepared, ate, and enjoyed foods that 




Lewin, ever the empiricist, designed a laboratory experiment to test psychological approaches to 
changing food consumption habits.   
 Combining his psychological, more individual-based approach with Mead’s cultural-
anthropological approach, the two social scientists arrived at some preliminary conclusions about 
the “’maternal and paternal moral roles in the local Iowa version of American culture.’” Their 
final report the data that “’Father presided over meat and butter, Mother over green vegetables 
and fruit juices, while desserts and soft drinks were wholly delightful and approved by no parent 
at all.’”15  Mead and Lewin compiled this information, along with that from additional studies on 
the family dynamics of meat consumption, into a larger report on “how housewives could learn 
to eat and serve so-called ‘variety meats.’”16  They went on to study the consumption of whole-
wheat bread and turnips (though Mead later quipped that her “’high approval of turnips’” 
expressed in the studies “’had no effect at all’”17).   
 The lasting lessons of these experiments related less to meats or vegetables than to the 
burgeoning field of group dynamics.  Having worked closely with groups of  fathers, mothers, 
and even “fraternity students” and observed their approaches to behavioral change, Mead and 
Lewin concluded that groups of people “’do a thing better when they themselves decide upon it, 
and…they themselves can elect to reduce the gap between their attitudes and actions.’”18  Their 
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studies affirmed the fundamental lessons of Lewin’s research at Harwood and anticipated his 
later work in community relations. 
 Over the course of World War II, Lewin also traveled regularly to Washington to conduct 
work for the Office of Strategic Services.  Though records of his work there are limited, we 
know that he “took the major initiative” in establishing a school for workers in psychological 
warfare who were about to launch campaigns in the Far East.
19
  According to his student and 
friend Ronald Lippitt, “In this activity he developed a strong interest and made a major 
contribution to . . . psychological warfare campaigns,” and “was particularly active and creative 
in working on the problems of definition of a specific target population and the planning of a 
step-wise attitude change campaign through various channels of communication.”20  
 The OSS work suited Lewin well because it linked social science to pressing problems, 
and because it involved work in changing people’s behavior.  Marrow writes that the questions 
most interesting to Lewin were, “What techniques of psychological warfare would most 
effectively weaken the enemy’s will to resist?  What type of leadership in military units was 
likely to be the most successful?  How could more such leaders be found and trained?”21  While 
working for the OSS, Lewin was also invited by John MacMillan of the Office of Naval 
Research (ONR) to review proposal drafts and discuss ONR policy.  In this group, he worked 
closely with the social scientist Rensis Likert, who later lauded Lewin’s ability to “’identify the 
major problems on which research was needed’” and devise appropriate problem-solving 
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  In Lewin’s work with the ONR, too, the concreteness of the research 
problems appealed to him immensely. 
 In 1944, during the last year of the War and what was to be his last year working with the 
Iowa Child Welfare Research Station, Lewin articulated his increasing commitment to the 
systematic study of  leadership in an article entitled  “A Research Approach to Leadership 
Problems.”23  He explained in the article that the war had, on the one hand, seriously increased 
Americans’ interest in leaders like Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, Winston Churchill, and Franklin 
Roosevelt, making them potently conscious of the “tremendous consequences toward good or 
evil that seem to stem from the goals and ideals, the realism and dreams” of political leaders.24  
But many people remained confused about what the nature of leadership in a democratic society 
should be, and also conflicted, for those very leaders “have made us love and, at the same time, 
hate leadership more.”25  On the one hand, Americans worshipped heroes and cherished the idea 
that “great leaders are born, not made”; on the other hand, they saluted the role and independence 
of the common man.  They remained ambivalent about whether leaders should be strong and in 
control or more indirect and mediating.  Americans also tended to overlook the ways in which  
different situations called for different forms of leadership.   
 These issues, Lewin explained, were more important in 1944 than ever, and the stakes of 
addressing them had grown unprecedentedly high.   The social science community was therefore 
faced with a pivotal task.  Psychologists and their ilk needed to start figuring out what 
democratic leadership consisted of and how it operated most effectively.  They needed to clarify 
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and define multiple forms of democracy, along with the functions of direct and indirect 
leadership within a democracy.   Finally, they needed to conceive of group life as a “process of 
interaction between people” as opposed to a stationary thing.  “The success of the war should 
strengthen the belief in the priority of the democratic form of leadership,” Lewin wrote, while 
also making evident the pressing need to understand its multiple forms and functions.  He 
warned of “[t]he danger that in politics, in education, and in industry after the war fascistic 
leadership forms will be propagandized under the name of democratic discipline is by no means 
past.”26  It was time, he concluded, to bring leadership “from the realm of myths” down to the 
“level of everyday happenings.”27   
 Lewin’s invigorated commitment to the study of democratic leadership had a profound 
effect on the next stage of his career.  In 1944, having spent nearly a decade working at the Iowa 
Child Welfare Research Station, he decided to seek an institutional home even more amenable to 
action research and democratic leadership training.  The result was the founding of two groups 
that had a profound effect on Lewin’s legacy and the field of Group Dynamics in general, 
although they existed for only two years before his death.  The Committee on Community 
Interrelations, a subgroup of the American Jewish Congress, became a pioneer in the application 
of human-relations techniques to local problems of discrimination and prejudice.  The Research 
Center for Group Dynamics at MIT not only helped institutionalize Group Dynamics as a major 
field of inquiry in American social science, but spawned the National Training Laboratories and 
assumed a prominent role in the University of Michigan’s Institute for Social Research.  Through 
his short-lived leadership of these two organizations, Lewin was able to direct a prolific number 
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of research projects that both bolstered and memorialized his commitment to the reeducation of 
American leaders and citizens. 
 In the mid-1940s, the American Jewish Congress was one of three major American 
Jewish organizations dedicated to the eradication of both anti-Semitism and non-Jewish group 
discrimination.  Historian Stuart Svonkin has examined the ways in which the Congress, along 
with the American Jewish Committee and the Anti-Defamation League, worked tirelessly with 
social scientists in the years surrounding World War II to combat all social expressions of 




   
The American Jewish Congress (AJCong
29
) was born in late 1918 in Philadelphia, when leaders 
Rabbi Stephen S. Wise and Louis D. Brandeis (a prominent Supreme Court Justice as of 1916) 
decided to “provide American Jews with a vehicle for aiding the war-torn communities of 
Eastern Europe.”30   
 In contrast to the comparative elitism of the American Jewish Committee, the AJCong 
built a democratically elected, inclusive committee to further this agenda.  The group disbanded 
in 1920 (after sending delegates to the peace conference in Europe), but was soon reestablished 
under Wise’s leadership.  It remained a tiny organization until the late 1930s, when a marked 
increase in anti-Semitism reinvigorated their efforts.  Svonkin attributes this surge to Nazism, 
pro-fascist organizations in the US, economic tensions related to the Great Depression, and 
backlash against New Deal liberalism.  The “scores, if not hundreds” of anti-Semitic 
organizations in existence by the early 1940s intensified Jewish groups’ commitment to self-
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defense and civil rights.   Groups like the AJCong erected massive propaganda campaigns, 
infiltrated anti-Semitic groups, launched anti-discrimination legal battles, and initiated large 
survey projects of American attitudes.  Most significantly, they joined forces with leading social 
scientists to research the causes, effects, and potential cures of discrimination in America. 
 The efforts of the American Jewish Congress belonged to a larger movement that 
Svonkin alternately calls “human relations” (a usage distinct from that usually applied to Mayo’s 
work in the Hawthorne Studies) and the “intergroup movement.”  The “big three” Jewish groups 
viewed prejudice through a distinctly psychological lens, conceiving of discrimination as a social 
pathology to be cured through attitude modification.  Society could, they believed, be 
“immunized” against discrimination of social scientists could design the right tools.  (Svonkin 
notes that this disease model sometimes prevented leading activists from seeing the ways in 
which prejudice enlarged the economic power of some social groups at the expense of others.)  
The AJCong and other leading groups grew convinced that the group was the best unit through 
which to understand society as a whole.  While they found much to disagree about (the best 
methods of research, the prospect of cooperation with non-Jewish groups, secular v. religious 
orientation), all three sponsored social research related to a central set of questions: Does 
discrimination lead to prejudiced attitudes, or does prejudice fuel discriminatory action?  
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 The AJCong, the AJC, and the ADL shared a broad commitment to building “an America 
of daily democracy for all citizens.”32 They argued that intergroup conflict impeded America’s 
victory in WWII, shattering harmony on the home front and contributing ammunition to enemies 
abroad—especially in the aftermath of racially and ethnically charged wartime riots in Detroit, 
New York City, and Los Angeles.
33
  Looking into the future, they argued that discrimination and 
prejudice threatened the longterm health of democracy.  In this way, Svonkin argues, the Jewish 
intergroup movement contributed to a postwar consensus ideal of a harmonious nation, with its 
assumption that conflict was anathema to the American way.   
 The movement delicately navigated the language of identity, melding an emphasis on 
“Jewishness” (and many members’ support of Zionism) with larger emphases on the “American 
tradition” and its attendant cultural pluralism.  From the earliest days of the “Big 3,” the Jewish 
civil liberties groups expanded their focus on anti-Semitism to support and fund the NAACP, the 
National Urban League, and other liberal causes.  By the postwar period, they had come to assert 
what John Higham (cited by Svonkin) called the “unitary character of prejudice”: the idea that 
anti-Semitism, white racism and other forms of bigotry were inextricably related and were 
“inseparable parts of the same phenomenon.”34  By 1944, American Jewish groups like the 
AJCong had achieved broad support and earned the commitment of many prominent social 
scientists in the US who believed that improved intergroup relations would improve the lot of 
minority groups in America, thus solidifying the long-term prospects of American democracy. 
 Everything about the American Jewish Congress made it appeal to Kurt Lewin as a 
potential source of support when he began looking for a new institutional home in 1944.  A 
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German Jewish refugee , he had lost his mother to the Holocaust and watched many of his 
friends and family members try to flee the Nazi regime in terror.  A committed Zionist, he had 
tried for many years (ultimately without success) to build a Psychological Institute at the 
University of Jerusalem.  Yet his commitment to distinctly Jewish causes never eclipsed his 
fierce advocacy of American democracy and rights for all underprivileged minority groups.  In 
the AJCong, he found a group that represented his ideological commitments, his personal 
history, and his zealous dedication to social science methods.   
 In 1944, Lewin began  building a partnership with the American Jewish Congress, whose 
president, Rabbi Stephen Wise, had (unbeknownst to Lewin) already envisioned a social-science 
research center aimed at the eradication of group prejudice.  Alfred Marrow, a longterm 
supporter of the American Jewish Congress, helped engineer a meeting between the two men, 
and Wise “saw in Lewin the kind of scientist such a project would need.” The AJCong 
tentatively offered Lewin $1 million for the funding of a new research center.
35
  Marrow 
cautioned Lewin that the Congress would likely want a “quick payoff” for their investment, but 
Lewin forged ahead—writing to Marrow soon thereafter, “’The idea of doing pioneer work in 
‘action research’ that hopefully might provide an example big enough to revolutionize certain 
aspect of social life…is too attractive to be delayed.  The stake is so high and so difficult that its 
attainment is more important than any other consideration.”36  
 Lewin worked with Wise and the other members of the American Jewish Congress to 
develop plans for a group dedicated exclusively to the study of intergroup relations.  The result 
of their labors opened in February 1945 under the moniker of the Commission for Community 
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Interrelations (CCI).  From the beginning, Lewin insisted on the intercultural bent of the 
Commission.  He wrote to Rabbi Wise:  
We Jews will have to fight for ourselves and we will do so strongly and with good 
conscience.  We also know that the fight of the Jews is part of the fight of all 
minorities for democratic equality of rights and opportunities, and that the 
liberation of the minorities will in fact be the greatest liberation of the majority.  If 
we establish a Commission on Community Interrelations we do so with the 
knowledge that the Jews cannot win their fight without the active help of those 
groups within the majority which are of good will.  It wants to work hand in hand 
with these groups.  It will not try to use non-Jewish friends as a front to spare 
Jews from doing any of the fighting they themselves should do; but it will try to 





Lewin attended many months of planning sessions for the creation of the CCI in Cambridge, 
Washington D.C., and New York City, circulating constantly locations and his home base in 
Iowa (while also building the Research Center for Group Dynamics, to be discussed below).   
 In meetings with Wise and others, Lewin helped identify a set of guiding research 
questions that would shape the research agenda of the CCI: How can intergroup relations be 
improved in the longterm, rather than in a “shot-in-the-arm” kind of way?  What kinds of 
training and education help minority groups makes adjustments to social change?  What 
problems develop in a community when minority members arrive? Lewin boiled the key themes 
down to four simple terms: “Tension, conflict, crisis, change.”38 As always, Lewin emphasized 
the importance of action research and work with “real-life situations.”39  The CCI would work to 
advance Lewin’s philosophy that discrimination is group-based (rather than the product of 
antagonistic individuals); that the suffering of a minority harms the democratic majority; that 
Jews are not alone in discrimination; and that research must be fundamentally community-based 
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and participatory.   The American Jewish Congress announced in late 1944 that it had organized 
the CCI to “take social science techniques out of the academic field and use them as part of the 
fight against racial prejudice.”40 
 Lewin and Wise recruited Charles Hendry, the former director of the Boy Scouts of 
America, to be CCI’s Coordinator of Research, and a man named Harry Epstein to be in charge 
of operations.  These two men told the New York Times in late 1945 that  “the scientific aspect” 
of CCI’s program “was comparable to modern research in preventative medicine,” with an 
“accent was on ‘immunizing’ whole communities against the virus of race disturbances.”41 
Marrow, then president of the Harwood Company, was appointed finance chairman.  The small 
advisory council of the CCI included Rensis Likert, whom Lewin had encountered through his 
wartime work in governmental social science, and the social psychologist Douglas McGregor.  
Lewin recruited his former students and colleagues Alex Bavelas (of the Harwood Studies), 
Dorwin Cartwright (soon to be of the RCGD), and Ronald Lippitt (of the Autocracy/Democracy 
studies) to become part-time members of the staff.   
 CCI’s staff members and advisory council agreed to a research agenda emphasizing 
leadership training, intergroup integration, the social adjustment of minority groups, and the 
relationship between discrimination and progress.  Lewin proposed that the group assume as a 
motto a quotation from the Hebrew sage, Hillel: 
“If I am not for myself, who will be for me? 
If I am for myself alone, what am I? 
And if not now, when?” 
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The motto encapsulated the inclusiveness of the CCI’s mission and Lewin’s assertion that “[t]he 
Commission means action, and action now.”42 Marrow later articulated the mission of the CCI in 
more counter-apocalyptic terms, explaining that his group had “’sounded a warning that the road 
of democracy and the path of free science were inextricably woven together and must live or 
perish together.’” If scientists could not learn to “’fight shoulder to shoulder with the common,’” 
he warned, then “’in the years to come there may be neither common man nor scientist.’”43 
 By late 1945, less than a year after its official establishment, CCI had set up regional 
offices in Boston and Chicago, and sent workers to Detroit and Baltimore.  From these offices, 
along with its headquarters in New York City, the CCI executed a range of action research 
projects.  A 1945 report from the CCI’s Midwest Regional Office in Chicago reported that the 
group had already initiated a number of case studies with both Jewish and non-Jewish groups, 
forming partnerships with the Mexican Civic Community (which was working with a group of 
Mexican-Americans on self-help projects in Chicago’s west-side Mexican-American “colony”); 
a Japanese-American self-help/social welfare project; and an “Inter-racial Camping 
Experiment.”44   
 Most notably, CCI’s social scientists in Chicago had become intimately involved with the 
Gary School Strike, outside of Chicago.  In response to the Gary school district’s policy of 
segregated schooling (with the exception for Froebel High, which was bi-racial), the CCI 
prepared a 60-page report on the underlying causes of the strike, urging Gary’s school 
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superintendent to desegregate all  schools and sponsor only desegregated social activities.  This 
action had fueled a broader, community-wide protest against segregated schools.  The 
involvement of local citizens validated CCI’s position that the problems of minority groups 
“cannot be solved by agencies or by a few experts” alone, for “These are problems of the people 
which can only be solved by the people.” The Midwestern branch of the CCI endeavored 
“wherever possible to stimulate and encourage citizen participation in the effort to solve the 
problem.” 45 
 Demand for CCI’s services quickly increased as the Committee’s efforts drew popular 
acclaim.  For Lewin, the popularity of the group was not uncomplicated: he grew concerned that 
the agency was being used as a “firefighter,” brought in to deal with immediate problems rather 
than problems of more longterm and structural concern.
46
  All told, the CCI committed to fifty 
projects in the first five years of its existence.  Early efforts at CCI headquarters in New York 
City included an evaluation of the intercultural program at Horace Mann School and a lawsuit 
against Columbia Medical School for maintaining “Jewish quotas.”  The group’s social scientists 
also embarked on two particularly fruitful research projects.  One, a study of the integration of 
African-American sales clerks into store staffs, found that customers were far more accepting of 
African-American sales staff than managers expected them to be—which suggested that many 
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managers’ policy of hiring only white sales staff was unfounded.47  In a second study, CCI 
researchers studied integrated and segregated housing projects, conducting lengthy interviews 
with residents of both that revealed a sharp contrast: Residents of segregated housing projects 
possessed far more negative attitudes about other racial and ethnic groups than those who lived 
in integrated housing.
48
   In combination with the research on “Negro Sales Clerks,” this study 
confirmed an extension of Lewin’s “field force” theory: discriminatory practices produced 
prejudiced attitudes, and not the other way around.  More importantly, if environments shaped 
prejudicial attitudes, social reform could transform bigots into open-minded and accepting 
neighbors. 
 The CCI gained the most public attention in its early years for a project that it embarked 
on in Coney Island, Brooklyn, after a group of Catholic teenagers disrupted a Jewish service at 
the Young Israel Synagogue on Yom Kippur.
49
  Four boys identified with the event were taken 
under supervision by the local priest and the Catholic Big Brothers, but the Brooklyn 
Commission to Combat Anti-Semitism was dissatisfied with the police’s handling of the matter.  
The Commission asked the CCI to meet with the Mayor’s Committee on Unity, and together 
they devised a plan.  They assembled an internal task force of Jews, Catholics, Protestants, and 
African-Americans from within the community and sent this team to canvas the attitudes of as 
many local citizens as possible.  In speaking to Coney Island residents, they found that a clear 
pattern emerged.  Many citizens were frustrated and disappointed with the failure of the 
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community to meet their needs for housing, recreation, transportation, and social gatherings. 
These chronic tensions had, the CCI concluded, fueled interfaith and interracial hostilities.   
 The CCI submitted a Coney Island Improvement proposal to the Mayor’s Committee on 
Unity, which promptly acted on the proposal’s suggestions.  Continuing the CCI’s emphasis on 
community participation and leadership, the Mayor’s Committee recruited a number of adults 
and young people from the community to act as agents of change, and sent them to workshops 
for community leadership.  The youth leaders helped establish a community center called “Youth 
Town,” where young people of all races and faiths could gather recreationally.50  Other members 
of the task force researched the development of low-cost housing development, better housing 
for African-Americans, and the opening of public school recreation facilities on weekends.  The 
New York Times reported in November 1945 that these efforts had brought about “striking 
improvements” in community relations, and that some of the  boys who disrupted the Yom 
Kippur services were “now among the commission’s most active workers.”51  The Coney Island 
project had confirmed, in short, that the very act of mingling people from different groups could 
promote the development of accepting attitudes and harmonious behaviors.  
 The CCI later used the Coney Island project as a template for the creation of the 
“Community Self-Survey,” a printed survey and “index of discrimination” that enabled 
concerned communities to assess their own levels of discrimination.  The self-survey, which was 
ultimately used in seventeen communities, built on the CCI’s principles of self-education and 
community participation while also reducing the pressure being put on CCI’s limited resources.52    
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It is worth noting that the CCI later spread its methods to universities, as well.  In February 1950, 
the assistant to Antioch College president Douglas McGregor wrote a letter to Stuart Cook of the 
CCI to thank the group for leading a conference on the workshop method in race relations, 
noting that the techniques had proven “extremely valuable.” 53  (McGregor had been close 
friends with Lewin during their time together at MIT, and approached Antioch College as a site 
of democratic experimentation of the type that both men celebrated; see Chapter 6.)  As a part of 
the CCI, Lewin had fulfilled his dreams of translating his theories into real-world practice, and of 
demonstrating the possibilities of participatory, democratic change through social-scientific 
methods.  
 
 In the last two and a half years of his life, Lewin was absorbed by his work for the 
American Jewish Congress and the group’s tireless quest to end intergroup conflict.  But the 
group that became the most strongly linked to his name after his death was the Research Center 
for Group Dynamics (RCGD) at MIT, which he helped establish at the same time that he was 
launching the CCI.  The RCGD employed Lewinian theories as the platform for decades of 
action research, and served as a critical hub for mid-century behavioral scientists committed to 
the study of group dynamics. After Lewin’s death, its circuitry of behavioral scientists scattered 
to a number of related organizations which, together, unified and legitimized the field of Group 
of Dynamics. 
 During Lewin’s search for funding in the mid-1940s, he had approached Maxwell Hahn, 
the director of the Field Foundation, as a prospective patron.  Hahn was impressed by Lewin and 
                                                 
53 See Letter, Assistant to Antioch College President McGregor (Mrs. Jessie C. Treichler) to Cook and Wolff, 7 







his group’s social science work at Iowa, especially after witnessing an action-research 
experiment that Alex Bavelas was conducting on worker morale at a factory near the university.  
In their first meeting, Hahn later remembered, “’Lewin outlined convincingly his ideas for an 
institute to help democracy learn how to handle its group problems more efficiently and less 
prejudicially.”’54  He pledged a grant of $30,000 to Lewin, to be paid in two annual installments, 
toward the establishment of a new research center aimed at “changing the world while 
simultaneously contributing to the advancement of scientific knowledge.”55   
In seeking a home for his hypothetical research center, Lewin envisioned a large 
university setting, “preferably in a city troubled by the variety of vexing industrial, community, 
racial, and leadership problems” that could provide research fodder for his social scientists.56  He 
hoped that the center would have autonomy in pursuing its research aims, but also envisioned 
inter-disciplinary relationships with the university’s social science departments.  Lewin soon 
focused in on two choices: the University of California, Berkeley, and the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology.  He was particularly excited about the West Coast alternative, having 
spent time in the Bay area throughout the 1930s, but Douglas McGregor and his colleagues 
intervened.   
In August 1944, the prominent social psychologist Rensis Likert (then employed by the 
Department of Agriculture) arranged a dinner between McGregor and Kurt Lewin at Washington 
DC’s Cosmos Club.  McGregor was, in the mid-1940s, a professor of Management at the MIT 
Sloan School of Management. He and Lewin exchanged ideas about the “action research” 
agenda of the proposed center, and left their dinner feeling mutually excited.  McGregor returned 
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to Boston determined to persuade MIT’s president, Carl Compton, to offer Lewin a home at the 
school, and was successful.  Meanwhile, the president of UC Berkeley, Edward Sproulat, 
wavered and dragged his feet on the matter—reluctant to propose the plan to California’s Board 
of Regents.  By the time Lewin decided that he needed to leave Iowa (a result, in part, of his 
colleagues’ knowledge of his newly proposed venture), he contacted both universities for a final 
verdict.  MIT’s president Compton offered Lewin a formal invitation.  By the time Sproulat had 
decided to do the same, it was too late.  Lewin had accepted the offer at MIT. 
Lewin spent much of 1944 establishing the RCGD in Cambridge while also laying the 
foundation for the American Jewish Congress’s CCI in New York.  He moved his family to 
Washington, DC to complete his work for the OSS from September 1944 through January 1945, 
and was ready to open the doors of the RCGD in fall of 1945.  Upon its establishment, the 
RCGD resided in MIT’s departments of Economics and Social Science, offering the school’s 
first PhD in Group Psychology, and joining a graduate school program that already combined 
economics, sociology, and psychology.  Lewin and McGregor plotted collaborations between the 
RCGD and MIT’s Industrial Relations program, which was exploring the “human side of 
enterprise” (as McGregor would label the field in his bestselling 1960 treatise).   The Center’s 
early staff was small, but it featured five of the most prominent intellects from Lewin’s past: 
John Arsenian, Dorwin Cartwright, Leon Festinger, Charles Hendry, Ronald Lippitt, Marion 
Radke, and Lewin himself.
57
  In addition to MIT’s support, it relied on funding from the National 
Institute of Mental Health, the United States Air Force, the Rockefeller and Carnegie 
Foundations, and the aforementioned Field Foundation.
58
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  The ideological foundations of the Research Center for Group Dynamics were clear 
from the beginning.  In an early proposal for the establishment of the Center, Lewin explained:  
Totalitarian fascism has been quick to study empirically … socio-psychological 
forces and to apply them for their purpose.  Democracy can hope to survive and to 
grow only if it applies its traditional rational approach also to its own form of 
living, if it learns in an empirical down-to-earth fashion to understand itself and to 




Harmonious group life was central to the successful functioning of a democracy, so social 
scientists needed to understand how groups worked.  Yet democracy could not function through 
groups alone; it needed leaders who understood “the real dynamics of the face-to-face group” 
and could use their knowledge to help their groups move toward maximum harmony and 
effectiveness.
60
     
 In his pronouncement of the RCGD’s mission in Sociometry in May 1945, Lewin 
established the grand scale of this endeavor with a quote from Franklin Delano Roosevelt: 
‘But, my friends, the period of social pioneering is only at its beginning.  And 
make no mistake about it—the same qualities of heroism and faith an vision that 
were required to bring the forces of Nature into subjection will be required—in 
even greater measure—to bring under proper control the forces of modern 
society.’61 
 
Lewin went on to explain that although World War II had highlighted modern man’s “ability to 
handle physical forces,” and the war “most impressively document[ed] the supreme power of 
man over nature,” it had also revealed “our lack of skill in handling social life, and our lack of 
scientific understanding of social dynamics.”62  The RCGD would serve as one of many agencies 
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that could help American scientists’ understanding of social relations catch up to their 
understanding of hydrogen atoms or mass production.
63
  
 Lewin established the immediate agenda for the RCGD as two-fold.  First, the RCGD 
would propel a much-needed integration of the social sciences.  Lewin was particularly 
interested in uniting methods of experimental psychology, cultural anthropology, and sociology, 
three fields that examined the psychological and social factors of modern life but did not 
frequently benefit from interdisciplinary conversations.
64
  Through the melding of these fields’ 
research techniques, Lewin and his comrades could build a new scientific vocabulary of “group 
dynamics.”  The very notion of this subdiscipline was revolutionary for its time.65   Alfred 
Marrow has suggested that group dynamics was an outgrowth of Lewin’s earlier “field theory,” 
which assumed that group behavior was determined by the psyches of individuals in interaction 
with their social settings.  Field theory dictated that any group has its own distinct psychology, 
goals, and pressures—and that one could not alter these components by dealing with individuals 
alone.    To spur change in a family, work group, or religious community, one needed to 
recognize the powerful influence exerted on individuals by their group affiliations, and approach 
the group as a cohesive whole.
66
  The RCGD’s research would, ideally, generate an entirely new 
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set of theories about group life and group identity, through the fusion of ideas and methods from 
different social science disciplines. 
 Of course, Lewin was never content to generate theories alone.  He insisted in early 
mission statements that the RCGD would be a hotbed of urgent “action research,” producing 
practical knowledge about a wide variety of settings, from industry and government to 
communities plagued by problems of discrimination.  In keeping with the larger identity of the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Lewin framed this action research as a branch of 
engineering.  Whereas the purpose of traditional engineering was the “setting free human 
energies and enhancing man’s power of dealing with nature” through the “development of 
machines,” Lewin and his comrades set out to explore “the link between engineering and the 
total culture of a people.”67   Whereas engineers might commonly research the running of a 
factory through the study of production lines, Lewin and his associates would examine the 
impact of group leadership problems on morale and productivity.  They could then apply these 
principles to the training of leaders in troubled communities, or to the engineering of harmony 
between antagonistic ethnic groups.   Lewin broke the larger mission of action research into six 
distinct areas of study: group productivity; communication and the spread of influence; 
perception of social roles; intergroup relations; group membership and self-esteem; and the 
training of leaders.  Every component of the RCGD’s research agenda was oriented toward a 
single goal: social change. 
 Within a year of its opening, MIT’s undergraduate publication, Tech Engineering News, 
celebrated the RCGD as “something entirely new and unique,” praising the Center’s efforts to 
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“turn the whole field of group knowledge into a science according to the same standards by 
which physics or chemistry is considered a science.”  In contrast to engineering’s tendency to 
“treat man mechanically,” the article explained, the researchers at the RCGD acknowledged that 
“engineering does not operate in a social vacuum” and can in fact have “a great deal of influence 
on human culture.”68  Yet the article also acknowledged one of the potentially troubling 
contradictions of the RCGD’s mission.  “People have a justified dread of group manipulation,” 
the author explained, “because it denies the fundamental dignity of man.” Yet “management in 
industry” and in “all other fields is quite legitimate and necessary to the smooth function of 
society.”  Within the framework of the RCGD, in other words, management provided a form of 
“wise leadership” with great utility to group and leader alike—not the kind of authoritarian social 
direction one would find among the United States’ ideological opponents.69  The potentially 
delicate distinction between democratic engineering and its less ideologically palatable 
alternatives would plague the field of group dynamics for decades to come. 
 The first year of the RCGD’s existence—like that of the CCI—produced a remarkable 
number of innovative studies and projects.  Lippitt, Cartwright, French and Festinger wrote a 
range of studies on productivity and efficiency at work.  Kurt Back, Festinger, and Cartwright 
studied patterns of communication and influence in a housing project for married veterans at 
MIT.  Lewin, Lippitt and Radke published articles about the origins of prejudice, while Lewin 
researched the development of low self-esteem in Jews.
 70
    Other scientists in the group 
researched the spread of rumor, social perceptions in education, and the process of introducing 
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change.  Lewin found MIT to be an “ideal institutional setting” for the range of projects he and 
his colleagues embarked on, and he built relationships with other institutions interested in his 
work—from Harvard University’s social psychology department to the Tavistock Institute, a 
British organization dedicated to the study of group relations.  Lewin and Eric Trist, the head of 
Tavistock, decided to launch a professional journal, Human Relations, as a joint publication of 
their respective institutions, and Lewin was invited to Tavistock for a fellowship in 1947-48 (a 
fellowship halted by his untimely death).
71
   
 
 No experiment proved more significant for Lewin’s legacy than one conducted at the 
behest of the Connecticut State Interracial Commission in the summer of 1946. Lewin, preceded 
by an increasingly prominent reputation for action research with both the CCI and the RCGD, 
was summoned by the Commission to conduct a study of community relations in light of a recent 
spate of intergroup conflicts.
72
  He recruited three men to be part of his project team: Kenneth 
Benne, Leland Bradford, and Ronald Lippitt.  These three men had traveled the circuits of adult 
education and social psychology in the prewar period and emerged with a collective 
determination to design a method of adult leadership training that would teach individuals how to 
be “agents of change.”73  
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 Kenneth Benne, strongly influenced by John Dewey, had researched experimental adult 
education at Columbia University’s Teachers College and collaborated with Leland Bradford on 
postwar planning research.
74
  Ronald Lippitt had worked with Kurt Lewin at Iowa and MIT, 
taught courses at the New School of Social Research in the early 1940s, and taken a job at the 
Office of Strategic Services in 1943.
75
  Leland Bradford, who came from a background in 
educational psychology, joined the WPA’s payroll in 1937, traveling through Illinois observing 
the condition of adult education.  He later developed a training program for the Federal Security 
Administration, recruited Lippitt to work for the FSA, and became the Director of the new 
Division of Adult Services with the National Education Association.
76
  In 1945, when Kenneth 
Benne was stationed in Washington, Lippitt introduced him to Bradford.  By the time Lewin 
recruited the three men to work with him in Connecticut, they already comprised some 
semblance of a “team.” 77 
Lewin, Bradford, Benne, and Lippitt gathered with a larger research staff of educators, 
social scientists, and educators at the State Teachers College in New Britain in the summer of 
1946, determined to diagnose the extent to which small groups could be used as vehicles of both 
personal and social change in a community plagued by “burning social problems.78  They 
divided 45 people from the same community into two work groups and established a series of 
group meetings, both with and without trainers present, assigning observers to record raw data 
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about group behavior and leadership. Each night, the research staff gathered to discuss the 
findings of the day. 
 An epiphany arrived one night when three “delegates” from the training groups 
approached Lewin’s team of researchers, trainers, and observers, and asked if they could listen to 
the discussion of their daily happenings.  Lewin surprised everyone by saying yes.  As the 
trainees listened to the observers’ and trainers’ accounts and offered their own differing 
perspectives, “the meeting became quite lively.”79  Various members and observers of the 
groups, it turned out, had widely divergent interpretations of what had transpired during their 
daily groups.  According to Ronald Lippitt, 
Lewin got quite excited about the additional data and put it on the board to 
theorize it, and later in the evening the same thing happened in relation to one of 
the other two…the three at the end of the evening asked if they could come back 




The next night, all 45 trainees came to hear the proceedings about their group interactions and 
offer their own input, and they continued to do so for the remainder of the workshop.   
One night over coffee, Benne, Bradford, and Lippitt discussed what they had gleaned 
from the large nightly meetings.  Feedback, it seemed, opened up a whole new set of possibilities 
for the study of group dynamics.
81
  Listening to participants’ interpretations of their own group 
interactions provided a far greater range of data than simply listening to observers’ analyses of 
their behavior.  The three men wondered “whether this method of feedback for learning might 
not work on a national level and with a more heterogeneous group of adult leaders,” and they 
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returned to Lewin with their idea.
82
  What “they didn’t realize at the time,” according to one 
historian, was “that what they had done was shift the focus from the ‘there and then,’ the 
situations people dealt with back in their communities and then talked about in the group, to the 
group itself”; the group “became the laboratory [for] working out interpersonal conflicts and 
communication breakdowns.”83  The group also emerged as a site of increased self-awareness, in 
which participants learned about themselves by listening to others’ perceptions.84  
 After witnessing the success of what they decided to call the “Basic Skills Training 
Group” (later called the “T-group”), Benne, Bradford, Lippitt, and Lewin agreed that the method 
deserved an institutional platform, and so developed the proposal for an organization called the 
National Training Laboratories for Group Development.  After stumbling upon a remote 
location—the Gould Academy, a preparatory school in Bethel, Maine, which agreed to rent out 
its facilities for summer sessions—Bradford secured funding from the National Education 
Association, along with an endowment from the US Office of Naval Research.
85
  He and his co-
founders then recruited staff from centers for the study of behavioral science at MIT and 
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 The T-group marked both a departure from and continuation of preexisting methods of group study.  The New 
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Harvard, men whose interests ranged from rational, scientific research to more experimental 
methods of social change.
86
  They developed a daily training itinerary centered on the Basic 
Skills Training Group and planned their first three-week training session for the summer of 1947.  
(The decades of work that followed at will be explored in Chapter 8). 
 
 Unfortunately, Lewin (whom Bradford later christened as the “father of NTL” 87) did not 
live to see the first session of the National Training Laboratories, nor did he survive to see more 
than two years of the RCGD or CCI’s work towards his grand mission of socially useful action 
research.  He died of a heart attack in February, 1947, at the age of 57. By Marrow’s account, 
Lewin had by that time taken on so many projects with such feverish intensity that he was 
overexerted and exhausted.  Colleagues noted his troubling physical condition in the months 
before his death, yet he could not suppress his manic commitment to his array of action research 
projects.    
 In spite of the abbreviated tenures of his post-Iowa endeavors, Lewin bequeathed to 
American social science a remarkable number of innovations by the time of his death.  He laid 
the foundations of the new field of group dynamics, legitimized activist social research, helped 
develop a groundbreaking method of experiential group dynamics training (the Basic Skills 
Training Group), and established three significant research institutions (CCI, RCGD, and 
NTLGD).  The organizations he left behind became trailblazers in the application of group 
dynamics research to modern social institutions, particularly industry, in the second half of the 
20
th
 century.  Though Lewin did not live to see it, the Basic Skills Training Group in particular 
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emerged as the mid-20
th
 century’s most promising tool of humanistic management and 
enlightened corporate order.  With Lewin’s intellectual and moral inspiration, the National 
Training Laboratories went on to redefine the nature of human relations training in education, 
government, and increasingly industry.   His foundational  principle—that social science could 
be used for the advancement of democratic principles and leadership—shaped decades of 
organizational psychology that followed and inspired heated debates about the potential for true 








Likert Goes to Washington and Michigan:  
Survey Administration in the New Deal, World War II, and Beyond 
 
 
 Like Kurt Lewin, Rensis Likert discovered in the years surrounding World War II that 
government service offered unprecedented opportunities to study and shape democratic 
institutions on a large scale.  Though Likert had by the late 1930s established himself as a 
formidable administrator of social science surveys, his work in the field had focused largely on 
general attitudes and consumer goods.  And though his work at the Life Insurance Sales 
Research Bureau (LISRB) had demonstrated his prowess within the field of human relations, his 
research for the group had reached a relatively small audience.  It took the bureaucratic 
machinery of New Deal liberalism and the emergency conditions of World War II to propel him 
to the next stage of his career. 
 Likert’s professional trajectory changed dramatically when he was recruited from the 
LISRB in 1939 to do conduct surveys for the federal government.  From his New Deal work in 
the Department of Agriculture to his later surveys for the Office of War Information, he 
transformed from a little-known market researcher and vocational surveyor into one of the 
country’s leading theorists and practitioners of mass surveying.  In so doing, he transcended the 
pragmatic motives that guided much of his earlier work (higher rates of productivity in firms; 
improved sales of consumer goods) and issued an ideological, even dogmatic endorsement of 
survey research.  Large-scale, open-ended surveys, he increasingly insisted, would help the US 
government engineer a truly democratic national order rooted in participation, communication, 
and efficiency.  They would also help the nation combat fascism abroad.    
 Likert’s work for US government introduced him to a vital network of social scientists 





him the professional clout necessary to establish a major research institute after war’s end: 
Having witnessed the tremendous power of social research, he launched the Survey Research 
Center at the University of Michigan in 1946.  This institute later joined with Kurt Lewin’s 
Research Center for Group Dynamics under the umbrella of the Institute for Social Research and 
served as a hub for the nation’s most experimental research in both group dynamics and mass 
polling.   
 This chapter examines Likert’s work in Washington, DC and his early years in Michigan.  
In the years surrounding World War II, Likert celebrated surveys for their ability to 
democratically connect leaders with the dispersed needs of a constituency.  He increasingly 
advocated for a participative model of survey administration itself, endorsing the humanistic 
psychologist Carl Roger’s open-ended, empathic methodology, which challenged the authority of 
the interviewer and privileged the art of listening.  The values and methods of Likert’s 
government surveying experience traveled with him to Michigan and to every site of survey 
research that followed, ultimately shaping the collection of data that guided his seminal 
participative management treatise.   
 
 Rensis Likert joined the Department of Agriculture after the department had experienced 
nearly two decades of attempted reforms.  In the early 1920s, President Warren Harding’s 
Secretary of Agriculture, Henry C. Wallace, established the Bureau of Agricultural Economics in 
response to an agricultural recession.  In spite of the decade’s widespread prosperity, farmers 
who had increased production during World War I (in order to help the United States’ 
domestically and feed a war-ravaged Europe) suddenly found themselves swimming in 





keep themselves afloat, and their flailing made Secretary Wallace wonder: What if the 
government could train farmers to be better businessmen?  The first two decades of the century 
had, after all, witnessed monumental strides in techniques of management and production, from 
which many farmers had remained isolated.  Wallace’s brainchild, the Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics (BAE), was intended to bridge the worlds of business and agriculture and thus train 
farmers to manage their production more effectively.  Unfortunately, by the time Wallace died 
unexpectedly in 1924, many of his ideas had “[fallen] on deaf ears” and inspired outright 
opposition from President Calvin Coolidge.
1
 
 About ten years later, Henry C. Wallace’s son, Henry A. Wallace, reclaimed his father’s 
mantle and established a home for systematic research within the Department of Agriculture.  
The younger Wallace– an analytical man interested in the intersections of math, science, and 
agriculture (as epitomized by his commitment to “hybrid corn”) – joined President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt’s cabinet as the Secretary of Agriculture in 1933.  Like his father, he poured 
tremendous energy into the BAE and insisted that scientific research would be a necessary 
corollary to agricultural advancements in the US.  In contrast to father’s efforts, however, his 
were generally greeted with enthusiasm, or at least tolerance, because of the dramatic expansion 
of agricultural programs during the New Deal and its spirit of bureaucratic experimentation.   
In the wake of a series of public relations disasters in 1936, the chief economist for the 
Agricultural Adjustment Association, M.L. Wilson, suggested to Wallace that the BAE start a 
“grassroots operation” to “find out first-hand what was on farmers’ minds” and stay in touch 
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with the needs of their constituency.
2
  Wallace enthusiastically obliged, hiring a team of six men 
to operate as “scout interviewers.” The BAE’s scout interviewers roamed farm areas and 
interviewed farmers about the effectiveness of New Deal programs.  They rapped on doors, 
appeared on front porches, and generally gathered as many interview subjects as they could find, 
wherever they could find them.  In contrast to the burgeoning realm of survey science, their 
efforts struck observers as markedly amateur:  Likert later commented that “the interviewing was 
relatively free and casual, the sampling rather unscientific, and little qualitative analysis of the 
comments was attempted."
3
  The BAE also tried sending written questionnaires to farmers 
through the rural post, but the distribution and collection of these surveys remained 
unsystematic. 
 The BAE’s lax approach to agricultural surveying changed dramatically in 1939, when 
the Department of Agriculture hired Rensis Likert to establish its Division of Program Surveys 
(DPS) – a Division whose staff of professional interviewers would grow from seven to 200 by 
the end of World War II.
4
  The DPS was established to scientifically survey farmers’ problems 
and needs, and to monitor their reactions to federal programs.  A departmental memo from 1945 
later reflected, "For many years the Department of Agriculture has felt it necessary to maintain a 
clear channel of communication between itself and the nation's farmers, not only so that it could 
transmit to farmers the many items of information with which they are concerned but also so that 
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farmers could make their own needs and attitudes known to the department."
5
  Division literature 
situated the DPS as a watchdog of democracy, bureaucratic efficiency, and agricultural morale.    
 By the time of Likert’s hiring, the BAE had been “majorly reorganized” by Henry A. 
Wallace, evolving into “the central planning unit of the Department of Agriculture.”6  The idea 
for the Division of Program Surveys had come from ML Wilson, by then the Under-Secretary of 
Agriculture and one of the major leaders of agricultural adjustment in the New Deal order.  
According to Likert, Wilson had been “impressed by the Gallup Poll and other polls that showed 
you could interview relatively small samples of people and obtain information that gave you 
reasonably accurate insights into how people felt, what their motivations were, what their 
behavior would likely be under given circumstances, and so on."
7
  Wilson thus worked with 
Howard Tolley, the head of the BAE, to build the informal legacy of the BAE’s “scout” 
interviewers with a more formal system for coding and sampling the attitudes of farmers.   
 When social scientist Robert Lynd learned that the BAE wanted to start up a survey 
division, he informed a man named William Gold, who was then working with Likert at the Life 
Insurance Sales Bureau.  Gold told Likert about the new survey division, so Likert contacted 
Tolley to schedule an interview.
8
 Tolley hired Likert soon thereafter, establishing him as the 
head of the new Division of Program Surveys and urging him to “set it up on a more scientific 
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basis" than it had been during more informal times.
9
   Likert recognized that the BAE’s 
interviews had been subjective and impressionistic. He pledged to build the DPS on a foundation 
of social science and structure, and to incorporate techniques he had refined in his days at the 
Psychological Corporation and the LISRB.
10
    
 Likert assumed his position as Director of the new Division on Sept 1, 1939, which "just 
so happened" to be the day war broke out in Europe. The outbreak of World War II shifted the 
mission of the DPS dramatically.  On the one hand, the Department of Agriculture shifted its 
attention from trying to restrict agricultural production to trying to increase it, so as to send 
supplies to Europe.  At the same time, survey research swept across the US government at an 
unprecedented rate.  Within six years, the DPS evolved into the “central attitude-measurement 
agency of the government."
11
  Likert was in exactly the right place at the right time. 
 Reflecting on six years of survey use in 1945, a memo on attitude surveying from the 
Department of Agriculture celebrated specific instances of increased effectiveness and efficiency 
that had resulted from the collection of survey data.
12
  A survey of dairy farmers in the early 
1940s had found that farmers were reluctant to increase milk production at the beginning of the 
war because they were nervous about unstable milk prices. In formulating and publicizing 
legislation from that point on, the Department emphasized price supports and stability for 
farmers connected to milk production.   
 Other surveys of farmers regarding peacetime production helped the Department of 
Agriculture understand their expectations for price controls, agricultural policy, and production 
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adjustment programs.  The consensus from California and the Corn Belt, for instance, was that 
farmers wanted the government to continue some degree of planning of the agricultural economy 
after the war was over.  A report on this survey was given to the Secretary of Agriculture, who 
helped distribute hundreds of copies within assorted government agencies.  The Office of 
Information also presented the survey results within an illustrated pamphlet, which was then 
given to hundreds of rural radio stations.  Over the course of its 7-year history, the Division of 
Program Surveys would produce hundreds of equivalent agricultural surveys on topics such as, 
“Farmers' Views on Postwar Wheat Problems,” “Attitudes of Rural People Towards Radio 
Service,” and a slew of highly specific, regional reports:“Farmers’ Attitudes Toward the Labor 
Situation in Copiah County, Mississippi” and “Farmers’ Views on Production Plans of Soybeans, 
Peanuts, and Flax for 1943.”  
 During Likert’s tenure, DPS publications celebrated surveying as a tool of increased 
efficiency and democracy, the twin stars of New Deal governance.  In a 1940 article entitled 
"Straw Polls and Public Administration," Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace lamented 
that the executive branch determined so much of its public policy without having any idea of its 
impact on the public.  Governmental officials, he explained, made gestures towards the public 
will: they met with interest groups and other popular organizations; they read letters from their 
constituencies and newspaper editorials on hot-button issues.  But the information they received 
from these sources were often biased, impressionistic, and – worst of all – distanced from the 
voices of “unrepresented citizens."13  As a result, the government risked losing touch with the 
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public’s actual reception of its policies, an ignorance which could lead to ineffective, wasteful, 
and poorly executed programs on the ground.   
Wallace offered an example of the government’s recent foray into food stamps.  When 
members of his department first contemplated distributing federal food stamps rather than 
issuing aid through individual grocery stores across the US, they had no problem learning the 
perspectives of grocers and program officials, who gladly volunteered their feedback.  But 
thanks to the newly established Division of Program Surveys, the Department of Agriculture was 
also able to gather the attitudes of everyday citizens at whom the program would be aimed.    The 
survey revealed that consumers on relief would indeed buy food stamps if they were made 
available.  With this boost of attitudinal data, Wallace gave the program the green light and the 
program was a success.  
In an age of unprecedented bureaucratic complexity and experimentation, Wallace 
argued, "the understanding and opinion of citizens concerned with administrative policies is just 
as much an essential part of the administrative process as budgeting or personnel or 
organization.”  For that reason, the “systematic effort to make programs conform to the public 
will is close to the heart of efficiency in democratic administration."
14
 Farmers emerged in 
departmental literature as the equivalent of consumers who could make or break the success of a 
new product. “Just as business organizations find that market research is necessary to their 
effective operation, “ one memo explained, “government offices also require the services of an 
agency which can systematically report the state and trend of public attitudes and information.”  
                                                 
14






The need for such services was “at least as great for government researchers as it is for 
businessmen."
15
   
 According to Wallace and other proponents of survey technology, mass surveys 
guaranteed more than just savings in money and time.  They also assured a democratic two-way 
stream of communication between the government and is people.  Wallace argued that “[W]hen 
continuous communication between government and the affected public does not exist, the 
people fail to enjoy the benefits of direct representation in the formation of policy within the 
executive branch of government."
16
  Rensis Likert reinforced Wallace’s convictions in an article 
from the Department of Agriculture’s 1940 Yearbook.  In “Democracy in Agriculture — Why 
and How?”  he explained that the “newest servants of agriculture” were psychologists expert at 
"sampling the experiences and attitudes of people,” in order to help administrators “make local 
adjustments in programs more democratically." 
17
  Surveys provided an unprecedented outlet for 
the expression of the needs and difficulties of those affected by countless government programs.  
Reflecting decades later in an oral history, Likert explained that surveys for the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration, the Soil Conservation Program, and the Farm Security program 
operated at the “grassroots” to counter the “long administrative chain” that otherwise plagued 
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 Likert’s work at the DPS signaled a methodological shift taking place within some 
sectors of American survey science.  The interview method that Likert ended up championing in 
the Department of Agriculture (and for decades to follow) was the antithesis of that which had 
made him famous in his early graduate school career.  Working with Gardner Murphy in the 
1920s, he had developed the previously mentioned “Likert Scale,” a simple 5-point measurement 
scale that allowed respondents to to assign quantitative values to their attitudes when filling out 
attitudinal surveys.  During his tenure at the Life Insurance Sales Research Bureau, however, he 
started to glean the limitations of the quantitative method.  His studies of morale among 
salesmen and managers increasingly involved interviews with both parties.  Through free-
flowing conversations, he found that he could gain a more comprehensive portrait of salesmen’s 
morale and motivation.  He also found that he encountered a greater degree of candor when 
approaching interviewees as partners in a conversation, rather than as subjects of a scientific 
experiment.  It was often the information gleaned in follow-up questions – the “how’s” and the 
“why’s” –that shed the most light on interviewees’ true opinions.  By the time of Likert’s hiring 
in 1939, he had determined that he didn’t want to just survey people statistically – he wanted to 
“[approach] the farmers as people,” allowing them to talk at length and help direct the course of 
the informal conversations.
19
   
Though generations of social science scholars have identified Likert with the 
championing of “open-ended” interviews, Likert himself dismissed this terminology.  He 
preferred the phrase “fixed question, free answer,” which distanced his DPS surveyors from the 
more haphazard methods that had characterized the “scout interviewers” who preceded them in 
the BAE.  Whereas the scouts had randomly approached farmers and struck up informal 
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conversations to find out their experiences of governmental programs, Likert’s methods were 
more systematic.  His interviewers at the DPS, whose open-ended methods evolved steadily from 
1939-42, approached their work with a clear set of guidelines in mind, and the questions asked in 
the surveys were often consistent from one interviewer to the next.  The so-called “openness” of 
the technique applied to the way in which the interviewers formed their questions – their 
avoidance of yes/no inquiries in favor of those that provoked subjective, longer responses – and 
the responsive way in which they listened and replied to their respondents’ answers.   
In Likert’s early days at DPS, a member of his staff named Waldemar Nielsen heard 
about the work that psychologist Carl Rogers was doing at Ohio State, and visited Rogers to 
observe his therapeutic training in action.
20
  Rogers himself was then just gaining attention for 
his pioneering work in “client-centered therapy.”  Born near Chicago in 1902, he received a 
doctorate in psychology from Columbia University’s Teachers College in 1931 and taught at the 
University of Rochester until 1940, when he became a professor of Clinical Psychology at Ohio 
State University.  By the time his work came to Nielsen’s attention, Rogers had not published 
any of his famous theoretical works, but he had started to articulate the therapeutic approach that 
he advocated for the rest of this life.   
Client-centered therapy, also known as non-directive counseling, offered an alternative to 
the intrusive psychotherapeutic practices of the early 20
th
 century.  According to Rogers and his 
disciples, the therapist’s role was to create a comfortable and non-judgmental environment in 
which his clients could grow.  The therapist should think of himself as a sort of facilitator, 
guiding patients towards discoveries and revelations with minimal intrusion.  His role was to 
encourage the client’s own analysis and reflection by listening attentively and repeating back key 
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phrases and themes.  Rogers urged his students to communicate unconditional acceptance of 
their clients, which would in turn create the level of trust and vulnerability necessary for personal 
growth.  Central goals of his approach were “empathic understanding” and active listening.  
Rogers refined his client-centered approach through the 1940s and ‘50s, publishing his theories 
in widely read treatises like Client-Centered Therapy (1951), Psychotherapy and Personality 
Change (1954), and – most famously -- On Becoming a Person (1961).21   
 Rogers had just recently arrived at Ohio State University when the DPS’s Waldemar 
Nielson visited him to observe his training technique in action, learning techniques like “putting 
a microphone in the lampshade to record the interview.”22  Returning to Likert in Washington, 
DC, Nielson proposed that the DPS hire a man named Charles “Charlie” Cannell, who had 
earned his doctorate working with Carl Rogers, to train the Division’s surveyors in “non-
directive probes."
23
  Likert eagerly obliged and approved a program for training his staff in an 
adaptation of Rogers’ non-directive techniques, believing that the “'non-directive' approach, in 
which the interviewer is trained to develop techniques which release emotionalized attitudes . . . 
seemed particularly applicable to the survey task of getting attitudes, and reasons and factors 
underlying those attitudes. “24  He enlisted another “Rogers protégé” named Victor Raimy and 
sent 42 trainers to Columbus for training, each group staying a week.
25
  The trainers attended 
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conference seminars and participated in supervised field experiences, which often involved 
listening to phonographic recordings of counseling sessions.   
Cannell and Raimy emphasized the critical role of feedback in any clinical setting.  
Trainees would go into field to do practice interviews in the presence of recorders (the 
phonograph then considered a "highly effective new device”26), then play tapes for the group and 
receive constructive criticisms from Cannell.  For many of the participants, "this recording was 
regarded by all as one of the most genuinely educational experiences of the program."
27
 Cannell 
and Raimy also trained their DPS charges in creating rapports with interviewees, structuring 
interviews, and “releasing attitudes” through non-directive interviews.   Soon thereafter, Likert 
offered Cannell a position as head of the DPS interviewing staff, which he accepted – marking 
the beginning of a long collaboration between the two men.   
Reflecting on this period of “Rogerian” training, Likert later described the non-directive 
approach as one in which “you state the general question and then listen to what the respondent 
said and encourage the respondent to elaborate it without encouraging any more content 
stimulation by using non-directive probes like 'that's interesting,' 'tell me more,' 'uha' and a whole 
variety of things.”28  Institute of Social Research fellow Jean Converse has supplied a more 
reductive explanation of the method.  According to Converse, the “open” technique of 
interviewing, deigned to be "as close as possible to a natural conversation," was characterized by 
five major tenets.
29
  First, as explained above, the interviewer should suggest no possible 
answers to his own questions.  Second, the interviewer should aim to produce a verbatim 
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transcription of the interview, or as close to verbatim as he could possibly get.  Third, the 
interviewer should probe for detail and clarification -- "the most artful feature of the 
technique"—by asking sensitive and knowledgeable follow-up questions to respondents’ 
statements.  Fourth, the interviewer should be well trained in the technique and generally well 
educated, holding professional degrees.  Fifth, though the interview format opened space for 
lengthy subjective responses, the interview transcripts themselves should be coded and tabulated 
so as to be useful for social scientists gathering data.  Likert later recalled that though the process 
of interviewing could be “pretty unstructured” and “impressionistic,” the process of coding the 
data was rigorous and often “harrowing.”30According to Converse, the application of these “non-
directive” guidelines to surveying  was “novel” because “it assumed a complex psychology 
operating in the interview setting and institutionalized more training to handle it than market 
researchers or pollsters had, whose training programs were typically minimal and conducted by 
mail."
31
   
Non-directive interviewing supplied a methodology whose foundational principles 
matched the very democratic system it was designed to enhance.  Likert could champion 
democracy within the DPS not just because of the communicative bridge surveys created 
between the federal government and the American public, but because the methods of those 
surveys adhered to a participative, democratic model in which the interviewer possessed little 
ultimate authority over his subject.
32
  A publication from the DPS argued that the open-ended 
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interview could celebrate the individuality of American citizens who wanted their voices heard: 
“The objective is to secure more than stereotyped opinions on arbitrarily-stated issues, not only 
to get a picture of overall attitudes, such as 'favorable' or 'unfavorable,' but also the reasons and 
underlying motives behind such attitudes, the reservations and qualifications, and the context in 
which the problems are viewed."
33
  Like the theories of human relations that were gaining 
momentum by the late 1930s, non-directive interviewing aimed to “humanize” and 
“emotionalize” a field previously characterized by mathematics and bureaucracy. 
 Of course, open-ended interviews required far more intensive labor than their quantitative 
alternatives.   Whereas an administrator of closed-ended surveys could simply distribute forms or 
record subjects’ responses on a scale of one to five, non-directive surveyors needed to be trained 
in the “art” of interviewing, steeped in Rogerian theory and knowledgeable enough to ask 
appropriate follow-up questions.  The interviews themselves could take hours, to say nothing of 
the time required for lengthy transcriptions and meticulous coding.  After data was collected and 
sent to Washington, DC, it was regularly subjected to two rounds of analysis, quantitative and 
qualitative. Coders measured survey transcripts for statistics and demographics while also 
reading for more subjective insights into respondents’ psychology and motivations.34  Interview 
studies of minimum length could be completed in two to four weeks, but most, involving 500 or 
more interviews, would regularly take six to twelve.
35
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The DPS developed two strategies to counteract its labor-intensive interviewing process.  
First, it placed limits on the number of surveys that would receive the full open-ended treatment.  
According to a departmental memo, surveyors used their Rogerian techniques only "when the 
objectives of the survey bear on complex attitudinal problems," resorting at other times to the 
Likert-scale model or simple yes/no responses.
36
  Second, Likert and his colleagues refined their 
methods of populations sampling, developing a technique in which interviews with a small 
number of people could generate accurate responses for the population as a whole.  Before the 
early 1940s, the standard method of sampling was called “quota” sampling: Surveyors would go 
to an area, find a pre-determined number of people who fit their criteria, and interview them until 
they reached their quota.  Likert recognized the potential inefficiency of this technique—that it 
required conducting a large number of interviews with people who had not been pre-sorted to 
reflect the attitudes of the population at large.   
With funding from the US Census Bureau, Likert and his DPS colleagues generated an 
innovative model called the “Master Sample of Agriculture,” which was based on probability 
sampling rather than quota sampling.  Probability sampling entailed “dividing the whole 
population into mutually exclusive strata and then selecting units randomly,” thus making the 
choice of subjects more scientific, and less vulnerable to whim of surveyor.
37
  The DPS produced 
the first Master Sample in April 1943, breaking the US into 5,000 farm samples using a highway 
map of the US.  The number of farm samples soon grew to 25,000, and reached 300,000 by the 
end of the war.  This system proved so effective that its use continued for many years after the 
dissolution of the DPS within the Department of Agriculture.   In a famous feud with George 
Gallup, Likert would later argue for the superiority of his method over quota sampling: Gallup, a 
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devotee of the quota method, inaccurately (and infamously) predicted the winner of the 1948 
presidential election, choosing Thomas Dewey, while Likert’s probability sampling predicted 
Harry Truman as the clear winner.
38
 
The methodological clash between Likert and Gallup became a recurring theme in 
governmental surveying during World War II, when the government’s embrace of social science 
reached an all-time high.   After the bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the DPS, 
which had operated primarily on behalf of the Department of Agriculture since its establishment 
in 1939, found itself suddenly desired by military officials hungry for data about American 
morale at home and abroad.  Most notably, the Office of War Information (which later became 
known as the Office of Strategic Services and eventually morphed into the CIA) siphoned off 
surveyors from the Department of Agriculture and offered new funding for expanded personnel.  
At the same time, pollsters like George Gallup entered state agencies with rival techniques and 
vied for institutional dominance.   
During this period of intense fervor for the social sciences within the US government, the 
democratic implications of Likert’s techniques reached new heights.  Likert had previously 
defended the democratic principles of mass surveying because surveys created a link between the 
rulers and the ruled; he also championed the democratic implications of the open-ended 
interview technique.  In wartime, open-ended surveying itself became something more: what he 
called in one article a “New Weapon of War” as the US military fought fascism abroad. 39  The 
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studies that the DPS conducted from 1941-1943 were designed to target the attitudes and 
behaviors that would help the US win, from boosting civilian morale to selling war bonds.   
 A 1944 article by Donald Marquis noted the rapid rise of social psychologists in National 
War Agencies, at a time when the discipline was gaining legitimacy within the academy and 
society at large.
40
  Psychology in wartime was, he explained, nothing new. The US military in 
World War I had employed psychologists, but their function was limited to tests of intelligence 
and aptitude that determined whether or not soldiers were ready for battle.  In the twenty years 
between the two world wars, the field of psychology had evolved dramatically.  Rensis Likert 
was a perfect example of the new breed of social psychologist attuned to the more nebulous 
realms of attitude, morale, and motivation.  The Office of War Information (previously known as 
the Office of Facts and Figures) and the Department of Agriculture were just two of the agencies 
employing large numbers of social psychologists during World War II.  Others included the 
Office of Price Administration (OPA), Forest Services, the US Census, Morale Services, and the 
Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (for analysis of foreign intelligence).  During the early 
1940s, the US government also turned to outside agencies for research assistance, including 
Gallup's American Institute of Public Opinion and the National Opinion Research Center. 
 Likert’s DPS joined forces with the Office of War Information almost immediately after 
the bombing of Pearl Harbor, when Washington officials embraced polls and surveys as tools for 
navigating the "bureaucratic forest" of wartime—in particular, to help them communicate 
information about the American people to government and military.
41
   Col. William Donovan, 
wartime head of the OSS committed to "global information-gathering duties," began to make 
arrangements with George Gallup and Elmo Roper to establish a National Polling Division.  At 
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the same time, Archibald MacLeish, then working for the War Department, was planning to use 
a surveying division that already existed in the Department of Agriculture. President Roosevelt 
endorsed MacLeish's plan, appointing him as the head of a new agency called the Office of Facts 
and Figures, which was later absorbed by the Office of War Information (OWI), a center of 
American wartime propaganda. 
42
 
 The DPS expanded dramatically after the US entered the war.  With additional funding 
from the OWI, Likert was able to hire a cohort of highly respected social scientists: people like 
Angus Campbell, Charles Cannell (the Rogerian trainer), and Dorwin “Doc” Cartwright, whom 
Likert first met through Kurt Lewin after a meeting at Penn State.
43
  Many of these researchers 
would go on to work with Likert at the Institute of Social Research in Michigan, after the war 
ended and government funds for social psychology dried up.  Though the DPS technically 
remained a division of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, the Division moved freely 
between the BAE and the OWI and benefitted from a more-than-doubling of its pre-war budget.   
The DPS also continued to pick up work and additional funds from outside agencies like 
the Treasury Department and the Office of Price Administration, who paid for studies on a case-
by-case basis.  In 1942 alone, the DPS produced studies on a wide-range of topics:  "Pro-
Japanese Attitude Developing Among Some Negroes"; "Anti-British Feeling in the US"; 
"Attitudes of Women Toward the War"; and "Impending Walkout of South Portland Shipyard 
Workers."  Later studies ranged from the local (“Negroes and the War: A Study in Baltimore and 
Cincinatti”) to the broadly national (“The Grievance Pattern: Elements of Disunity in America”; 
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“Readiness for Sacrifice”) and the industrial (“Reactions to the Rubber Situation.”)44  Each 
consisting of hundreds of pages of data, these reports now provide a snapshot of the US 
government’s panic about morale and social unity during wartime—particularly its concerns 
about inter-racial relations, the economic restrictions of wartime, changing labor patterns, the 
nascent Civil Rights movement, and dramatically changing rural and urban landscapes.  The 
Office of War Information placed tremendous faith in the ability of data to bridge the US’s 
widening rifts in morale and social relations and to keep the country united through war’s end. 
 Likert noted a fundamental continuity between his work for the Office of War 
Information and his previous activities in market research.  His 1944 article, “Research: New 
Weapon of War” was published not in a social science journal or government publication, but in 
Tide: The Newsmagazine of Advertising and Marketing.
45
  Here, he announced that "From the 
Army Services Forces to the Office of Civilian Requirements, the government is using opinion 
research and research techniques on an enormous scale” and “has suddenly become the greatest 
user of research in the country."   Recognizing that the size and scope of the war demanded new 
techniques of information-gathering, government officials consciously drew inspiration from the 
world of business, in which market research had become routine by the early 1940s.    From that 
point on, Likert explained, research on behalf of the state had evolved into a "full-fledged 
weapon" to formulate and test domestic strategies, and to "help maintain army morale on the 
fighting fronts."
46
  He explained that the Survey Division had thus far tackled surveys on the 
Treasury's new 1040 A tax form, the role of smaller manufacturing plants in war production, war 
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workers' reactions to absenteeism, radio listeners' reactions to the government’s war message, the 
public's understanding of inflation, and women's attitudes toward price controls and rationing.
47
 
 In discussing the connections between public opinion research and morale, Likert drew 
implicit connections to his work on human relations at the Life Insurance Sales Research Bureau.   
One of the fundamental functions of wartime research, he explained, was “to find out what 
makes the average soldier tick as a means of keeping his morale as high as possible.”  He cited a 
primary example as the Army Service Forces which had, in the Fall of 1941, set up a research 
division in its morale branch to start surveying soldiers the day after Pearl Harbor; three years 
later, having been overhauled twice, this division persisted as the Morale Services Division.  
This Division had worked under the guidance of Samuel A. Stouffer, a sociologist from the 
University of Chicago, to draw up a composite portrait of the American soldier that could be 
useful in maintaining his spirits.  Soldiers checked off answers on anonymous questionnaires 
about their experience in the army, the answers of which were tabulated my machine and then 
submitted to experts trained in locating the "source of gripes." 
48
   One survey measured soldiers’ 
dissatisfaction with army food, while others measured the effectiveness of their physical training 
and the government’s dissemination of information.   
 Surveys on the domestic front had proven equally useful, according to Likert.  The War 
Production Board’s Office of Civilian Requirements gauged civilian reactions to economic 
impositions, viewing surveys as their “link[s] with the consumer, complementing its industry tie-
ups.”49  In another instance, the Dayton Chamber of Commerce paid the bill for a National 
Opinion Research Center poll of citizens’ attitudes towards and education about the war.  They 
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found that 87% of people did not know the size of the US army or its component parts, and that 
80% were complacent about the progress of the war.    Determining that ignorance and 
complacency went hand in hand, the Dayton Chamber of Commerce demanded more public 
education and information about the war.   
 Government research agencies themselves did not comprise a united front during the 
heyday of state-run research initiatives.  Open-ended and closed-ended research advocates 
clashed so thoroughly that their battle would leave a gash in the survey research community for 
decades to come. We can trace this gulf back to early 1942 when Macleish and Col. Donovan 
proposed two different surveying divisions for wartime research.  Though MacLeish earned 
FDR’s support and hired Likert’s DPS to work on behalf of the Office of War Information, 
Donovan had already made plans with Elmo Roper, George Gallup – the reigning kings of 
quantitative opinion polling-- and ML Wilson to establish a Polling Division.  FDR conceded 
that the Polling Division could persist within another department.  From that point on, the 
Department of Program Surveys and the Polling Division developed a fierce rivalry and 
competed for a limited amount of federal funds and contracts.
50
    
One of the most striking examples of tension between the two survey divisions had tragic 
implications.  In 1942, the Office of War Information contracted both the Polling Division and 
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the Division of Program Surveys to conduct research on the attitudes of American citizens 
toward Japanese, German, and Italian “aliens.”  The polls that were returned by Gallup reported 
strikingly negative results across the board, which contributed fueled FDR’s decision to establish 
Japanese internment camps.  Likert’s results, however, came back with far more ambiguous 
results.
51
  In a later interview, he explained that the “fixed answers” format – which the 
government had an incentive to use because it produced more answers in a shorter period of time 
–tended to skew respondents’ answers in a particular direction by giving them little room to 
explain the complexities of their positions.   For example, he explained, “If you asked people 
what should be done with German and Italian aliens on the east coast, they would say, ‘Lock 
them up!’   But if you asked them to elaborate on that, they would say the government ought to 
keep its eye on particularly suspicious characters, which is what the government was already 
doing."
52
  Through the end of his days, Likert insisted that if the OWI had relied on his west-
coast data rather than Gallup’s, the Japanese would never have been have been imprisoned in 
internment camps, because it "wasn't warranted on that basis."
53
 
 According to Converse, the rivalry between Gallup and Likert camps came to a head in 
1942, after less than a year of open hostilities and competition.  Paul Lazarsfeld, a good friend of 
Gallup’s and one-time collaborator with Likert, was commissioned to broker a peace between the 
Division of Program Surveys and the Polling Division.  In "The Controversy over Detailed 
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Interviews -- An Offer for Negotiation" (published in 1944, but based on reports written in 
1942), Lazarsfeld determined “that in the great majority of cases, the two divisions were simply 
duplicating each other, rather than collaborating and capitalizing on their unique capabilities.”54  
He proposed that the rival outfits divide their labor in all surveys from that point forward: 
Likert’s DPS would gather open-ended survey information on 300 cases at the beginning and end 
of the survey process (to serve as pretests and “aids in analysis”), but the majority of work would 
be conducted by the Polling Division in the time in between, conducting 3,500 polls using closed 
questions.  Likert and his associates bristled at this proposal, arguing that it relegated their 
agency to "junior" status, and they resisted the plan’s implementation.55  The DPS’s services 
were thus eliminated from the OWI in November 1942, at which point Likert et. al. returned to 
the USDA and continued doing survey work for a range of other wartime agencies.  In 1946, the 
Polling Division itself was eliminated from the OWI after two years of struggling to maintain 
Congressional funding.  From 1942 through 1946, funding for the DPS fluctuated and came from 
a variety of state agencies.
56
   
 The end of Likert’s career in Washington, DC involved two particularly substantial 
studies.  One, a study of US War Bonds, was commissioned by the US Treasury Department to 
determine  how the government could persuade Americans to buy war bonds with payroll 
savings, so as to stave off inflation.
57
 The other was a study for the US Srtategic Bombing 
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Survey, for which Likert set up operations in Germany and Japan to measure the impact of mass 
bombing on those countries’ economies and social systems.  By the end of the decade, his staff 
had gathered thousands of pages of findings from in-depth interviews with hundreds of Japanese 
and German civilians who described the impact of the bombing in grizzly detail.   
 In 1949’s “Human Relations at Work,” Likert concluded that according to the results of 
the Strategic Bombing Survey, Germany’s biggest problem was that the people at the top of their 
government did not take criticism from the people below, and that residents of both countries 
were not allowed to participate in policy making.
58
  He cited a physicist named Merle Tuve, 
inventor of the proximity fuse, who had “recently stated that the biggest discovery to come out of 
the last war was not radar, the atomic bomb, jet propulsion, or the proximity fuse: the biggest 
discovery to come out of the war...is the discovery of the efficiency of the democratic 
principle."
59
  Likert ended his tenure in the federal government reinforcing the same rhetoric that 
had drawn him to the work in the first place.  Surveys—whether of struggling farmers, 
disillusioned ex-patriots, or African-American urban migrants—were a democratic tool for 
solidifying relationships between the American government, the military, and civilians at home 
and abroad. 
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 The DPS experienced a rapid decline after the conclusion of Stategic Bombing Study and 
its other large-scale, postwar endeavor on behalf of the Federal Reserve.  It was officially 
dissolved in August 1946, replaced with a smaller organization and a far more circumscribed 
research agenda: studies of consumer attitudes about agricultural products.
60
 On September 14, 
1946, the Washington Post lamented that the DPS was the "latest casualty in the exodus of high-
ranking public servants from the Government." "Inter-agency cooperation in the survey field has 
been curtailed to such an extent,” the article explained, “that their work in government will no 
longer have the scope they feel it should have.” 61  The article offered two main reasons for the 
government’s gradual withdrawal from social science research.  First, the War Powers Act made 
it difficult for agencies other than the Department of Agricultural to employ the DPS, for fear of 
congressional disapproval.  Second, funding had likely been curtailed due to “the suspicion with 
which Congress has viewed opinion research and its reluctance to grant money for anything 
smacking of social or cultural surveys."  
 By the end of the war, Jean Converse has explained, “certain members of Congress had 
made perfectly clear that they were displeased with government opinion research.”62  Some of 
the more conservative members of Congress viewed surveys as an extension of the Department 
of Agriculture’s controversial liberalism and objected to what they viewed as “racial meddling” 
in some of the DPS’s social surveys in the South.63  Many of the agencies that had once provided 
an abundance of funds for social-science during wartime found themselves disinterested by war’s 
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   Likert, committed more strongly than ever to the mission of survey research, decided to 
leave the government in order to build a social science empire of his own. On the same day that 
the DPS officially closed its doors, August 1, 1946, the University of Michigan’s Survey 
Research Center was born. 
 
 Likert’s wartime service had made an incredible impact on his development as a social 
scientist.   A man who had spent much of his prior professional career conducting surveys of 
milk consumers and life insurance salesmen now found himself located in the American 
surveying elite.  The Division of Program Surveys had solidified the role of surveys in the minds 
of the mass public (as Sarah Igo notes, we can view them as being responsible for the very 
making of that mass public
65
) and popularized an open-ended methodology that many would 
have deemed radical just five years earlier.  Work for the DPS had propelled Likert into realms 
of urban change, interracial relations, soldier morale, and industrial and agricultural production. 
It had sent him around the world, to Germany and Japan, in pursuit of other nations’ wartime 
attitudes and morale.  Perhaps most importantly, federal work connected Likert to the social 
science colleagues with whom he would work for the rest of his life: Charles Cannell, Dorwin 
Cartwright, Ronald Lippitt, Leslie Kish, and Angus Campbell, among others.  When the erosion 
of the DPS sent Likert looking elsewhere for an institutional home, he did so as part of an 
idealistic cadre with lofty ideas about the future of surveys in American society. 
 In the summer of 1946, Likert started sketching plans for an institute of survey research.  
Instead of finding a pre-existing agency for which to conduct research – another Psychological 
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Corporation or Life Insurance Sales Research Bureau – he imagined an organization that could 
independently administer surveys, develop survey methodology, and train a new generation of 
academics in the techniques he and his colleagues had developed.
66
  At the time, he lamented, 
there was “no single institution teaching survey methodology” in the United States, and no 
academic base for the continued refinement of existing techniques.
67
 Likert and his colleagues 
agreed that their endeavor should take place in a university rather than a business or government 
agency, which would leave them less “vulnerable to corruption.”68  In a 1946 proposal for a new 
research center along these lines, Likert explained that “the rapid progress made by the social 
science during the war, both quantitatively and theoretically, suggest the need of encouraging 
and assisting social scientists in universities to expand the scope of their research.”69  
Likert and four researchers from the staff of the Department of Agriculture – Cannell, 
Campbell, George Katona, and Eleanor Macoby– decided to locate an academic base for their 
experiment that could offer “greater freedom in the conduct of research, greater effectiveness 
through association with a teaching faculty in the social sciences, and greater opportunities for 
contributions to the social sciences through teaching and publication of search results.”70  Having 
spent years conducting research for projects imagined and ordered by government operatives, 
Likert and his colleagues dreamed of a setting in which they could dictate the scope and aims of 
their own survey work.  
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 Likert submitted his proposal for a new research center to multiple universities across the 
United States, earning serious interest from Cornell University and the University of Chicago.  
He and his colleagues were most enticed by the offer from the University of Michigan in Ann 
Arbor.  Michigan satisfied Likert’s criteria on multiple counts: it was large; it had a substantial 
and well-respected social science department (in which Likert had received his early training) 
with a commitment to social reform 
71
; its location made it easy to travel to and from New York 
City and Washington DC for the arrangement of contracts and grants; and it was an appealing 
place for the researchers to raise families.
72
  Perhaps most importantly, the University’s board of 
regents proposed an unusual institutional relationship between the soon-to-be Survey Research 
Center (SRC) and the University as a whole: the SRC would be “entirely self-supporting through 
grants and contracts.”73  SRC staff could teach in other departments on one-year appointments 
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74, with no promise of tenure, and the “’experimental’ arrangement could be terminated at 
any time.”75  The University of Michigan would, in other words, provide an institutional 
affiliation and space on campus (which proved to be marginal and almost ramshackle for the first 
years of the SRC’s existence).   
These ostensibly meager terms appealed to the founders of the SRC.  Institutional 
independence meant that they would be accountable to no one, dependent on no higher-ups for 
funding or approval of their studies.  The Center would function financially like a center of the 
physical sciences, whose scientists relied on grants for their research, rather than a social science 
department beset by departmental politics and the pressures of a university-endorsed, collectively 
established mission. Coming from a network of federal government agencies, Likert and his 
colleagues had much experience scrambling for funds and submitting proposals for their 
projects.  This early financial independence would prove critical in the development of the SRC.  
It pushed the team of surveyors to be continually, unflinchingly entrepreneurial in their pursuit of 
funds and allowed for a wide diversity of projects, guaranteeing that the money they earned 
through research grants would be theirs alone. 
 Officially opening its doors in August 1946, the SRC experienced a trickle of its new 
staff to Ann Arbor until early 1947.  Likert joined the Michigan staff on a quarter-basis in July 
1946, moving from Washington DC and starting full-time work the following October.
76
  
Campbell, Cannell, Katona, and Leslie Kish were the first to move to Michigan; they were 
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followed in the next two years by Robert Kahn, Daniel Katz, John Lansing, James Morgan, and 
Stephen Withey.
77
 Many of these staff members had worked with Likert in the Department of 
Agriculture.  Several had also worked with social scientist Kurt Lewin at the University of Iowa, 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, or in governmental agencies.   
 Staffers’ previous experience in realms of government, commerce, and non-profit 
organizations led to an unprecedentedly diverse set of research aims.  Likert’s early proposals for 
the Center focused on its commitments to refining and teaching survey methodology.  But the 
SRC would prove to be a central source of social, political, and industrial data in the second half 
of the 20
th
 century.  Like the social science pioneers who had preceded them at Michigan 
(namely John Dewey, Charles Cooley, and members of the Settlement House movement), the 
SRC staff built their organization upon the assumption that there was an inextricable link 
between social data and social change.  In a nation reeling from the monumental effects of World 
War II—grappling with rapid economic expansion, military casualties, international political 
upheaval, and unprecedented reshuffling of the American population – social surveys promised 
the possibility of creating order out of chaos.  
The SRC staff arrived in Michigan with a hefty grant from the Federal Reserve Board, 
with whom many of the staff had worked during their days in government agencies, to conduct a 
study of economic behavior and consumer sentiment.
78
  In the months that followed they 
contemplated survey projects for the Carnegie Corporation and the American Library 
Association on the use of libraries, an investigation of opinion polling work for the SSRC, and 
interviews for the Veterans Administration.  They turned down two projects for corporate 
initiatives whose backers refused to make the results of their research public: the American 
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Pharmaceutical Corporation (in March 1947) and the Ford Motor Company (in May 1947).  
According to an internal history of the Center, “Proposals that were limited to a narrow 
commercial purpose and did not tie into a program of significant research were not supported.”79  
An early SRC progress report explained that the Center would conduct work on behalf of 
“’businesses, foundations, governmental, and other agencies for conducting surveys on all kinds 
of economic, social, and business problems.”  It qualified that “[i]n doing work for business 
organizations, the Center is limiting itself to problems of social importance and publishing the 
findings of each study.’”80  Though the SRC was to draw a large percentage of its funds from 
work on behalf of corporations—a development to be addressed in Chapter 7 – it never openly 
surrendered its commitment to the public nature of that research.   
 Less than two years after the establishment of the Survey Research Center, which had 
committed itself to a program of attitude surveying and probability sampling, the mission of 
social science research at the University of Michigan expanded dramatically.  On February 12, 
1947, as chronicled in the previous chapter, social science pioneer Kurt Lewin died suddenly, 
leaving in his wake the Research Center for Group Dynamics at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology.  From his ground-breaking work with Ronald Lippitt on autocracy at the University 
of Iowa, to the Connecticut experiment in interracial relations that inspired the development of 
the National Training Laboratories, Lewin had established himself in the interwar period as the 
figurehead of Group Dynamics. His method of “action research” had come to epitomize social 
research at its best: Lewin’s work incorporated ground-breaking research methodology for 
explicit cultural and social aims.   
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Lewin had crossed paths with Likert’s posse of surveyors during World War II. While 
Likert et. al. were advocating for “democratic” communication within the Department of 
Agriculture and the Office of War Information, Lewin was working with the Office of Strategic 
Services and conducting research for the Office of Naval Research (ONR) on topics like 
psychological warfare and the public's food consumption.
81
 Lewin and Likert worked together 
during the War on a panel of social scientists that the ONR assembled to analyze its research 
proposals and policies. Lewin, Likert later recalled, was “’an invaluable member’” thanks to his 
ability to “’identify the major problems on which research was needed.’”82   
In late 1944, when Likert was recruiting staff for the United States Strategic Bombing 
Survey, he wrote a letter to one Lieutenant Richard B.Fisher explaining that “the recruiting of 
personnel has been a tough job” because “All the really competent people tend to be in the 
middle of important projects.” He explained that he was “anxious to tap the full experience of 
some very able people here in planning our research program,” adding that “Kurt Lewin is a 
brilliant person on research in this general area and he knows Germany thoroughly.”  Likert went 
on to express hope that “we can keep [Lewin] in active touch with our work throughout our 
entire research program.”83  The same day, Likert wrote a letter to his Michigan colleague, 
sociologist Ted Newcomb, lamenting that he was having trouble recruiting Kurt Lewin’s MIT 
friend and colleague Douglas McGregor for the project because of McGregor’s own  schedule 
conflicts.
84
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This personal and institutional circuitry sheds important light on the union that would 
later take place at the University of Michigan between Lewin’s brainchild, the Research Center 
for Group Dynamics, and Likert’s Survey Research Center.  On the one hand, Likert and Lewin 
had made names for themselves in two different realms of social science – Likert in the more 
quantitative and conservative realm of attitude surveying, and Lewin in the world of experiential, 
experimental group dynamics.  But during this fertile period of growth in social science and 
human relations, the two camps established important lines of communication that would have 
implications for organizational research for decades to come.  
 When Kurt Lewin died suddenly in February of 1947, Dorwin Cartwright inherited a 
Research Center that, in spite of being just two years old, carried a clearly articulated mission, 
methodology, and array of projects.  Cartwright was left with a heavy burden: deciding what to 
do next and who should be in charge.  Daunted by the loss of the institute’s intellectual and 
administrative patriarch, Cartwright nonetheless remained determined to continue Lewin’s 
mission and fulfill the objectives of RCGD’s hefty research grants.85  In the immediate aftermath 
of Lewin’s death, MIT’s administration remained supportive of the continuation of Lewin’s 
Center, encouraging the RCGD to “continue its program at full momentum under its own 
leadership for at least the next year and a half,” and to slowly build relationships with “outside 
advisors” who could help guide it past the summer of 1948.  But the President of MIT also made 
clear that he wanted to start putting less emphasis on the social sciences.
86
  The three-man 
interim committee overseeing the RCGD would include Cartwright as executive director along 
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with Douglas McGregor (of MIT’s Department of Economics and Social Science) and Ronald 
Lippitt (who had just recently helped to establish the National Training Laboratories for Group 
Development).  These men would continue to oversee the RCGD’s research for the American 
Jewish Congress, the Office of Naval Research, and the Field Foundation; they would also 
continue to teach classes and coordinate the graduate program for the fourteen RCGD graduate 
students at MIT.  
 Cartwright and his colleagues determined that they needed a new institutional setting in 
which to conduct their research, ideally one with “strong departments in the social sciences” and 
a more vibrant community of scholars in their interdisciplinary fields.
87
  In late 1947, they 
embarked on a national tour of potential university sites.  Cartwright was committed to moving 
RCGD and the core team of researchers as a whole,  six full-time faculty members and their 
cadre of graduate students.   They were met with interest from Cornell, the University of 
Minnesota, University of California in Berkeley, Washington University, Western Reserve, and 
Harvard Business School.
88
  Their decision came down to the University of Minnesota and the 
University of Michigan—both of which had vibrant, promising social science programs – but 
Minnesota was unable to accommodate the RCGD as a self-contained entity, proposing to break 
up its members between departments.
89
    
 The University of Michigan emerged as the clear front-runner in the bid for the RCGD. 
In a report on the RCGD’s first half of 1948, Cartwright announced that it was “the unanimous 
consensus of the staff that the University of Michigan can provide the best opportunity for the 
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development of the Center” for two main reasons.  First of all, the University of Michigan had 
offered attractive financial and institutional incentives: a yearly contribution of $22,500; space 
and facilities for the transported center; and, as in the case of the SRC, institutional autonomy.  
Second and “perhaps most important,” the University of Michigan had displayed a strong 
commitment to the social sciences. It was home to one of the first doctoral programs in Social 
Psychology; it encouraged inter-disciplinary collaboration between anthropologists, sociologists, 
and psychologists; and it had proven to be a supportive and viable home for Likert’s Survey 
Research Center.
90
  “There can be no doubt,” Cartwright insisted, “that in coming years Ann 
Arbor will be the scene of some of the most important developments in social science.”91  
 The appeal of Michigan to Cartwright also stemmed from a deep familiarity with the 
personnel of the Survey Research Center.  Cartwright, Likert, Campbell and others had all 
worked closely in the Department of Agriculture, the Office of War Information, and the US 
Strategic Bombing Survey during World War II, when they had established had strong 
foundations of admiration and cooperation.  According to Cartwright, “We worked as a close 
team in those days…Angus [Campbell] and I had both had previous contacts as graduate 
students with Kurt Lewin…and Ren had gotten acquainted with Kurt, and so we all had that 
contact with that particular man who was kind of an inspirational person.”92 After the War, in 
fact, Likert had tried to persuade Cartwright to become part of his team at Michigan, but 
Cartwright had already committed to working with his former Lewin, his former professor, at 
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MIT.  Cartwright remembered, “Ren kept asking me couldn’t I do this or that, and…couldn’t I 
postpone my [move] to Cambridge for a few weeks or a month or so...so I was involved in the 
survey methods and had participated in some of their designs.”93   
 Cartwright later recalled the powerful impression Likert had made on him when they 
worked together for the government.  Cartwright had been assigned to be the head of the 
Treasury Department’s study of war bonds before the end of the war (“I don’t know why I got 
assigned to it other than that I was available that day”94), and had accumulated a massive amount 
of information by war’s end.  After the official conclusion of the study, Cartwright mentioned to 
Likert that he had great amounts of left-over data about people’s spending and saving habits, and 
the ways in which they intended to deal with their war bonds.  Likert suggested that the Federal 
Reserve Board was the “best place to get a sponsor,” so the two men headed to the Board’s 
offices to make their pitch.  It worked, and the Federal Reserve funds ended up being critical for 
the start-up costs of the SRC in 1946.  Cartwright later explained, “I had all that kind of 
background, and so the working relations with Ren and seeing how he would take these ideas 
and take off with them.”95 Likert was “intrinsically a salesman” who “would have sold 
something no matter what his occupation was,” and his force of personality was such that 
probability sampling and intensive interviews “became something you sort of had to believe in if 
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you were working for Likert.”96  By the time Cartwright and his team arrived in Michigan, in 
other words, they had already fallen sway to Likert’s messianic advocacy of survey research. 
Cartwright informed Michigan’s Provost Adams of the RCGD’s verdict on March 1, 1948.97 
 Cartwright’s enthusiasms were mutual.  An internal memo circulated among University 
of Michigan administrators in 1947 indicated that the acquisition of the RCGD would mark a 
serious advancement in their building of a world-class social science empire.
98
 Professors Robert 
Angell and Donald Marquis explained to their colleagues that “the University has taken steps 
already which have established it as one of the leading institutions for research and training in 
social psych and human relations,” and that its “foundations of this prestige” had been built by 
the interdisciplinary work of departments like Social Psychology and the young Survey Research 
Center.  “To bring the RCGD to Michigan,” they argued, “would represent a further 
strengthening of Michigan’s leadership in research and teaching in the field of human 
relations….particularly strengthening the work in techniques of democratic leadership.”  
 Angell and Marquis proposed that the administration could unite the SRC and the RCGD 
under the umbrella of a Human Relations Research Center, directed by Likert, with Campbell 
and Cartwright in charge of subgroups.
99
 After meeting with SRC’s Executive Committee in 
Novermber 1947 and then the University’s Division of the Social Sciences and Provost Adams, 
the heads of the RCGD received an offer to relocate to Michigan with terms very similar to that 
which Likert had received in 1946.  Confident in their funding from the American Jewish 
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Congress, the Office of Naval Research,  and the Field Foundation (which had made a three-year 
commitment of $15,000 a year), RCGD’s directors made the move to Ann Arbor.100.  In July 
1948, RCGD officially became part of the University of Michigan, with Cartwright as Director.  
He was soon joined by John French, Leon Festinger, Ronald Lippitt, and Alvin Zander.
101
 
 The RCGD and the SRC differed openly in their methods from the very beginning: 
Likert’s team was committed to rigorous statistical analysis (in addition to its non-directive 
interview methods), while Cartwright’s crew built on the more experimental, even playful, 
laboratory experiments of  Lewin.
102
  Cartwright attributed the difference to the fact that Lewin 
was “more of a theorist”— “He was a European professor!”—who tended to start with big 
questions about the nature of culture and society, while Likert began with more concrete 
hypotheses and systematic procedures.
 103
  Cartwright and others have made clear, however, that 
though these two camps were “different in the details…the spirit was the same.”104  In spite of 
“certain differences in our emphasis,” Cartwright explained, the visionaries behind the SRC and 
the RCGD, “were remarkably similar people”: 
                                                 
100
 See ISR History, 22.  Also see contents of file “ISR-RCGD Directors’ files, Field Foundation, 1943-8,” box 25, 
ISR papers, Bentley Library. 
 
101
 Note that of the original MIT staff, only one social scientist, Dr. Radke, stayed behind, along with nine of the 
graduate students in the RCGD program.  Four graduate students relocated to Michigan, and one transferred to the 
University of California (see Directors’ Correspondence, 1947-8). Harold Kelley and Alvin Zander  were the two 
social scientists who did not originate in MIT’s RCGD, but were rather added to the staff upon its arrival in 
Michigan.  See letter from Zander to Cartwright on June 27, 1948, upon joining staff of the RCGD: “Kurt told me a 
number of times: ‘You and Doc should work together on some kind of socially useful science.’ I am glad we are 
going to have a chance to do just that.”  Of the early Michigan RCGD staff, only Festinger left Ann Arbor after a 
short while.  He went to the University Minnesota and then to Stanford.  See Cartwright Oral History, 4.   
 
102
 Note that the dominant methodology of the Survey Research Center continued to change and evolve.  See 
Converse, “Strong Arguments and Weak Evidence.” Converse writes that by the 1960s and 1970s, methods of the 
SRC had changed dramatically. The  SRC had embarked on some huge studies -- i.e. the Survey of Consumers and 
the National Election Study -- in which 75-80% of interviews relied on the “closed” style of interviewing.  People 
like Cartwright and Campbell had encouraged a compromise between the methods.   
 
103
 Cartwright Oral History, 9. 
 
104





You wouldn’t think so looking at them or talking to them, I mean just their style 
or whatnot.  Lewin was a clear German immigrant.  When you talked to him he 
had a German accent, and Ren [Likert] was from the farm, the Midwest. . . but 
they were both convinced that the social sciences were going to save the world if 
you just did it right.  Doing it right meant roughly the same things to them, but 
once you got it down to the details, that’s where some of the differences in 




Inspired by their intellectual patriarchs, The RCGD and the SRC were united by a fundamental 
conviction that the social sciences would deliver political, economic, and social harmony and 
abundance in the postwar period.
106
   
 In February 1949, a year and a half after the RCGD arrived in Ann Arbor, it was united 
with the SRC under the umbrella of the Institute for Social Research (ISR).  Like the 
hypothetical Human Relations Research Center proposed by Angell and Marquis in 1948, the 
ISR would provide an organizational infrastructure for the two centers, allowing them to remain 
autonomous and self-contained while also providing administrative overhead and creating more 
opportunities for dialogue between the two centers (though they would not be located in the 
same building until 1966).  Likert, previously the head of the Survey Research Center, became 
Director of the ISR; his former job went to Angus Campbell, while Cartwright remained Director 
of the Research Center for Group Dynamics.   
 By 1950, the collective enterprise was “off to a strong start,” bringing in enough external 
contracts to sustain itself financially.
107
  In the first year of the ISR’s existence, research 
contracts totaled $244,000, and in the second, $346,000.  The pressure to be self-sustaining 
                                                 
105
 Cartwright Oral History, 9. 
 
106
 Cartwright himself shared this conviction and relayed his optimism to his friend, fellow social scientist Robert 
Kahn, in March 1948: “Mrs. Snyder conveyed to me your congratulations on the arrival of my son.  Thank you very 
much.  I trust that by the time he becomes a man we social scientists will have made a significant start in the task of 
establishing the kind of world we should have.”  Letter, Dorwin Cartwright to Robert Kahn, 5 March 1948, file 
“ISR-RCGD Directors’ Files, Field Foundation, 1943-8, box 25, ISR papers, Bentley Library.  
 
107





“pushed researchers to constantly reassess areas of research and encouraged cross-disciplinary 
research in ways that the central financing of research might have not,” and they found great 
support in the University administration, whose Provost Adams supported their flexibility and 
autonomy.    The ISR was admitted to the Division of the Social Sciences at Michigan in 1951, 
which made its presence in the community more official, and the university began paying the 




 In spite of their institutional and intellectual cooperation, the SRC and RCGD pursued 
largely separate projects in the early 1950s.  The RCGD continued to focus on the concept of 
group membership, focusing particularly on how group membership could have an impact on a 
person’s “behavior, attitudes, feelings, and motivation.”109  Early work of the RCGD included a 
Project for the Dodge Local of the United Automobile Workers, which aimed to provide 
“objective” evaluation of minority groups’ acceptance within the union.  Alvin Zander, who had 
been working on a study of employee morale, job satisfaction, and productivity at Michigan Bell 
Telephone Company, continued his work there.  Another study examined women working in a 
large public utility company, focusing on the amount of emotional support available to them and 
the extent to which their “aspirations were being met.”  Additional studies addressed 
interpersonal relations between staff members at a social welfare agency, communication in a 
housing project, social power in the interactions of children at Michigan’s Fresh Air Camp, and 
the attitudes of fraternity members toward minority groups.
110
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 The SRC, which has remained the largest branch of research in the ISR throughout its 
history, launched a number of new divisions with different foci in the late 1940s and early 1950s.  
George Katona’s Economic Behavior Program analyzed “consumer motives, attitudes, and 
expectations” in order to understand the psychological motivations behind economic behavior, in 
studies like “Four Families Discuss Their Financial Position” (June 1948).111  The Political 
Behavior Program conducted research on American attitudes towards foreign relations and US 
foreign policy (e.g. “Five Americans Discuss Our Relations with the USSR” [1947] and “Citizen 
Participation in Problems of World Affairs” [1948]), some of which was later presented to the 
Department of State and the Council of Foreign Relations.
112
  After successfully predicting the 
winner of the 1948 presidential election, SRC’s Public Affairs Program launched a large study, 
led by Angus Campbell and Warren Miller, on the behavior of the national electorate during 
election periods, focusing on psychological factors such as “self-confidence and sense of 
obligation in the role of the citizen.”113  This Program also initiated studies of American attitudes 
toward economic aid to Europe, a survey of American attitudes toward big business (sponsored 
by General Motors
114
), and attitudes toward atomic energy.   
 In the early 1950s, the SRC also made forays into the realm of psychological health.  It 
launched a program funded by the National Institute of Mental Health that traced the public’s 
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understanding of public health problems, followed in 1957 by broad surveys of the public’s 
“adjustment problems” and “well-being.”115  In addition to these surveys, the SRC continued to 
administer the type of  local, social surveys that many of its researchers had conducted for the 
Department of Agriculture in the early 1940s—studies like “The Social Integration of Columbus, 
OH” (1947), which was part of  a larger project called “The Moral Integration of Large 
American Cities.”116  
  By the middle of the 1950s, the ISR had established itself as one of the country’s 
foremost producers of social surveys and group-dynamics data. What remained to be determined 
was what the ISR would actually do with that data upon its gathering.  Whose interests would the 
ISR be aligned with, and to what extent did its research serve to bolster the power of the 
organizations sponsoring it?  Likert and Lewin had envisioned their respective institutions as 
action-oriented, pragmatic sites of lofty social change.  But in the decades that followed the 
establishment of the ISR, as it became increasingly dedicated to organizational research, the 
umbrella organizational found itself straddling sometimes contradictory aims of private benefit 
and public good.  Likert would eventually reconcile these aims through his work as a 
participative management theorist, which bridged the mission of social science with that of 
humanistic psychology.  In the 1950s and 1960s, he would find himself increasingly aligned with 
humanistic management theorists like Douglas McGregor and, by extension, Abraham Maslow.
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Humanizing Enterprise:  
Douglas McGregor’s Theory Y in Theory and Practice 
 
 
 When Douglas McGregor’s The Human Side of Enterprise was published in 1960, it 
introduced McGregor’s participative philosophy to a large audience of managers and 
executives.
1
 It was, according to historian Thomas Frank, “one of the most popular business 
books of the era” and “enormously influential . . . spawning dozens of spinoffs and winning 
disciples across the corporate spectrum.”2  Published in 1960, the book urged managers to 
promote their subordinates’ personal growth and self-actualization, linking Maslow’s hierarchy 
of needs with a broader tradition of human relations.  It quickly became recognized as a 
landmark management text—not because McGregor was necessarily the first management 
thinker to apply Maslow’s ideas to industrial settings, but because “he was the first to ‘name’ 
it.”3   
 McGregor died in 1964, but his Theory Y guided management theory for decades after 
his death.  A 1974 New York Times article entitled “The Businessmen Who Read Business 
Books” cited “overwhelming evidence that successful businessmen (like successful politicians) 
don’t read books”—but located ten volumes that mid-1970s businessmen did report reading in 
large numbers.  McGregor’s The Human Side of Enterprise made it onto the list at number nine, 
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three notches below William Whyte’s The Organization Man and one below John Kenneth 
Galbraith’s The Affluent Society.4 
 Reflecting on McGregor’s mainstream success as a management theorist, it would be 
logical to assume that he had generated his seminal work from experiences in traditional 
corporate contexts.  But the reality was quite the opposite.  McGregor developed the principles 
of The Human Side of Enterprise while working within two progressive, non-profit mid-century 
institutions.  As part of MIT’s Industrial Relations Group, he collaborated with both Kurt Lewin, 
the father of “action research,” and Joseph Scanlon, a staunch defender of labor unions.  (He 
later remembered them as being two of the “three remarkable men” he had known in his 
lifetime.
5
)   Lewin and Scanlon came from markedly different worlds, but they both offered 
McGregor analytical and practical models of leadership that profoundly influenced his 
humanistic management theory of the 1940s and 1950s.  Lewin introduced McGregor to the 
young, vital field of group dynamics.  Scanlon, who had come of age working in the steel 
industry, inspired McGregor to re-envision his approach to labor/management communication 
and cooperation.  Through collaborations with these two men in their respective fields, 
McGregor refined his own conception of democracy in the workplace—and reconceived of 
industrial leadership as a participative endeavor.  If Maslow had provided McGregor with a 
model of individual psychological growth, Lewin and Scanlon provided him with more systemic 
conceptions of social conflict and democratic relationships.  
 McGregor’s postwar intellectual genesis was also shaped by his role as president of 
Antioch College, a liberal institution that privileged close cooperation between students and 
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faculty, relationships between the academy and the outside world, and anti-hierarchical 
institutional governance.  At Antioch, McGregor honed his ideas about leadership in a non-
industrial context and witnessed the lived reality of previously abstract ideals.  Antioch became a 
utopian model for the democratic change McGregor hoped to see in the US’s major industrial 
organizations.  If democratic governance was possible at a liberal arts college, he concluded, 
why couldn’t it be possible in corporations?  The school exposed him to the challenges of 
leadership and the necessity for constant communication between members of an organization.  
 This chapter explores McGregor’s formulation of his famous management theory through 
the intersection of his influences at the RCGD and Antioch College.  Theory Y, as he called it, 
emerged from McGregor’s exposure to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, Lewin’s emphasis on 
group dynamics, Scanlon’s approach to labor-management cooperation, and Antioch’s 
progressive organizational structure.  McGregor’s famous management treatise, which became a 
landmark publication in the field of humanistic management, encapsulated a diverse array of 
intellectual forces advocating for democratic participation in the years following World War II.  
The application of Theory Y in American corporations, also a subject of this chapter, reveals the 
extent to which McGregor’s ideas permeated corporate culture by the mid-1960s, but also the 
limits of his utopianism within corporate contexts. 
 
 Douglas McGregor first met Kurt Lewin in the mid-1940s, when Lewin was seeking an 
institutional base for his research, as has been chronicled in Chapter 4.  Lewin had decided 
during World War II that he wanted to establish an institute that would “help democracy learn 
how to handle its group problems more efficiently and less prejudicially.”6  McGregor played a 
key role in persuading MIT President Carl Compton to offer Lewin’s group a home at the 
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university, and after Lewin arrived at MIT in 1945, the two men continued to work closely with 
one another at MIT and beyond.  Lewin recruited McGregor to serve on the Advisory Council of 
the Commission on Community Interrelations, a division of the American Jewish Congress, 
along with people like Rensis Likert, Gordon Allport, and Margaret Mead, and introduced him to 
the other founders of the National Training Laboratories for Group Development.  Thanks to 
Lewin, McGregor developed relationships with a faction of social scientists outside of the 
industrial realm who were passionately committed to understanding relationships between people 
in groups.  Lewin’s emphasis on just and equitable social relationships helped inspire 
McGregor’s own take on human relations, and his sense that relationships at work could be made 
more fundamentally democratic through the right kind of experimentation.  According to 
McGregor’s friend and admirer Marvin Weisbord, from 1945 on, McGregor “built upon Lewin 
at every turn.”7 
 In 1996, an MIT alum named Harold Leavitt published an article reflecting on the brief 
and glorious days at MIT when both Lewin and McGregor served on the faculty.
8
  He noted that, 
on the one hand, Lewin and McGregor’s groups constituted two different social science factions.  
Lewin’s RCGD staff addressed social conflict through the lens of social psychology, while 
McGregor’s Industrial Relations group at the Management School focused more specifically on 
the issue of morale at the workplace.  The graduate students of the two  
groups played against each other in MIT intramural football games, but their rivalry ended there.  
For according to Leavitt (who was in McGregor’s group), the two factions recognized their 
shared outsider status: 
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The McGregor group wanted to show the hard-nosed business types down on the 
first floor that we deserved respect.  We felt we were on the cutting edge, while 
they were Neanderthals who still thought one could run an organization with a 
whip.  Lewin's Research Center, with its new, foreign (literally) social 
psychology, had its own bêtes noires.  Members of that group felt they were 




Yet Lewin and McGregors’ “teams” ultimately transcended their outsider status. “During its 
glory years,” Leavitt wrote, “the McGregor team probably had more influence on the human side 
of business practice than any other school in the world,” and “Lewin and company certainly 
changed the face of American social psychology.”   
 Leavitt has traced an entire generation of  “major American social psychologists and 
organizational social scientists” to their roots at MIT during the 1940s, citing researchers like 
Hal Kelley, Kurt Back, Herb Shepard, Mason Haire, Alex Bavelas, Leon Festinger, Jack French, 
Ronald Lippitt, and Dorwin Cartwright.
10
  The relationship between Lewin and McGregor 
signaled a larger integration taking place in American social science between social-action-
oriented social scientists and  human relations advisors in industry.  The two men, 
simultaneously horrified by mid-century global events and idealistic about the human condition, 
agreed that social scientists could engineer a new brand of leadership built on principles of 
democratic participation and social reform. 
Though little record of the lived relationship between McGregor and Lewin has survived, 
the two men’s names became synonymous with liberal social science of the 1940s, and they 
shared many of the same admirers.  McGregor ultimately joined the staff of the RCGD  and 
became intimately involved with the National Training Laboratories.  By the mid-1950s, he had 
emerged as a champion of T-groups and one of the chief architects of NTL’s Management 
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Development Workshop (to be discussed at length in Chapter 7), which had been designed “[t]o 
increase the awareness of managerial persons of the larger contributions that individuals can 
make to the workplace situation” and—most notably—“to increase managers’ awareness of the 
human potential.”11 McGregor’s famous tome, The Human Side of Enterprise, would ultimately 
invoke many of the themes with which Lewin had energetically grappled in the 1930s and ‘40s.  
In formulating his archetypes of Theory X and Theory Y—also known as the authoritarian boss 
and the democratic leader – McGregor would summon the spirit of Lewin, who had spent his 
career as a social scientist trying to decipher the nature of democratic rule.  The ideal leader, both 
men agreed, was capable of great strength, but also of a fundamental respect for the abilities of 
his subordinates.   
 
  McGregor’s other great contribution to MIT’s postwar personnel came in the form of 
Joseph Scanlon, a steel-worker-cum-labor organizer whom McGregor recruited to MIT in 1946 – 
less than a year after Lewin’s arrival.  While Lewin had helped reinforce McGregor’s 
commitment to the lofty realm of activist social science, Scanlon emphasized the more pragmatic 
realm of labor-management negotiations.  Within a decade of being hired at MIT, Time magazine 
was calling Scanlon the “most sought-after labor-relations adviser in the US,” and his 
eponymous Scanlon Plan was a trademark of 60 plants across the country.
12
  But when he and 
McGregor first encountered each other in the early 1940s, Scanlon was still formulating his 
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trademark approach to labor/management negotiations—one that relied on a collective setting of 
productivity norms among management and workers, along with an egalitarian sharing of profits.   
 The two men were superficially very different: Scanlon was short, squat, gruff, with a 
background in manual labor; McGregor was tall, articulate, professorial, and marked by a 
distinctly gentle sensibility.  Yet the two men shared zealous commitments to participation and 
the idea that managers occupied a central role in the creation of positive morale at work. After 
working together on an industrial case study and as colleagues at MIT, McGregor became a 
fierce advocate of the Scanlon Plan and devoted a chapter to its virtues in his 1960 Human Side 
of Enterprise.  Scanlon helped direct McGregor’s style of human relations away from Mayo-
brand morale-building, which tended to emphasize positive styles of management and 
communication over the material sharing of resources. McGregor, under Scanlon’s influence, 
concluded that caring communication meant little if not paired with both a genuine respect for 
workers’ ideas and a willingness to share the wealth. 
 Joseph P. Scanlon, the son of Irish immigrants, was born in Ohio in 1899.  He completed 
his service in the Navy in the early 1920s, was hired as a cost accountant at Empire Steel, and 
started prize-fighting for money on the side.
13
  When a boss at Empire told him that he had to 
choose between prizefighting and accounting—because the former conflicted with the 
appearance and behaviors of a white-collar worker—he switched jobs to become an open hearth 
tender.  Remaining at Empire Steel through the 1930s, he found himself in a turbulent steel 
economy, due to competition between the AFL/CIO and the reorganization of the steel trade.  In 
the middle of the decade (1936), CIO president John L. Lewis named Phillip Murray to be 
president of the United Mine Workers of the Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC), and 
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Murray appointed Clinton Golden, a labor organizer influenced by liberal labor reformers in the 
1920s, to be Regional Director of the UMW for the Pittsburgh area.
 14
  These two men proved 
pivotal for the transformation of Scanlon’s own career.  
  Scanlon was elected president of Lodge 169 of the SWOC in 1937, just as Empire Steel 
hit particularly hard times. Production and employment had dropped off substantially, and 
Empire was in such trouble that all employees agreed to a 25% pay cut.   Management 
announced to him that “if the plant could not do better, it would be shut down,”15 so in June of 
the following year, Scanlon traveled with two company executives to Pittsburgh to call upon 
Clinton Golden’s expertise.  With the cooperation of Golden and the executives in town, Scanlon 
established a Joint Research Committee, staffed by members of both management and union, 
which solicited workers’ suggestions for increased productivity and decreased waste. In one 
instance, a workers’ productivity committee recommended the purchase of a piece of new 
equipment that cost $8,000 but saved the company $150,000 in one year.  According to one 
account, this productivity scheme “not only rescued the plant but put it on a more profitable 
basis,” skirting bankruptcy and restoring wages, and effectively laid the foundations for what 
later became known as the Scanlon Plan—though unlike Scanlon’s later experiments, the 
workers did not receive a share of the gains.
16
 
 Clinton Golden was impressed by Scanlon’s efforts to enlist employee feedback for 
industrial reform, and wanted to find a way for Scanlon to develop participation programs at 
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  During World War II, he recruited Scanlon to be the head of 
Industrial Engineering Department at the CIO’s Pittsburgh headquarters, as part of the 
commission dedicated to investigating equal pay for equal work, incentive payment plans, and 
grievance cases.  (His role there was limited by the National War Labor Board and the War 
Production Board, which enforced President Roosevelt’s wage stabilization program and his 
1943 executive order against wage increases and incentive pay
18
).  Scanlon and Golden also both 
became members of a joint US Steel-USWA Commission, which tried to make gains for workers 
in spite of restrictive federal legislation.
19
  During this period, Scanlon encountered significant 
obstacles to the goals of management/worker cooperation they were trying to achieve, but 
Scanlon was able to experiment with techniques on an unprecedented scale.  He gained access to 
a wide range of companies experiencing labor discord who had turned to the US Steel/USWA 
Commission for assistance, and used them as training grounds for his evolving principles of 
cooperative production. Between 1940 and 1946, he helped establish labor-management 
committees at more than 40 companies.  According to Andrea Gabor, “union-management 
collaboration flourished at US Steel between the late 1930s and the end of World War II.”20  
 McGregor first gained exposure to Joseph Scanlon during World War II.  McGregor 
spent two summers during World War II observing Scanlon’s work in Pittsburgh, where he was 
attempting to mediate a “historic agreement” between the management of US Steel, struggling to 
increase production during World War II, and Philip Murray,” who possessed a “deep suspicion 
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of management that penetrated his being” thanks to his experience as a 10-year-old worker in 
Scottish coal mines.
21
  McGregor noted Scanlon’s adherence to the participative principles he 
cherished.  He then watched with great curiosity when, in 1945, Scanlon initiated the experiment 
that introduced the key tenets of his Scanlon Plan at the Adamson Company of East Palestine, 
Ohio.   
 The Adamson Company, a maker of welded tanks, experienced typical labor-
management conflict during the war and brought in Scanlon to mediate.  Under Scanlon’s 
guidance, the company appointed a union-management committee to determine a “normal” cost 
of labor per unit, and then established a system to split 50-50 the savings workers made by 
producing more efficiently than the normal rate.  According to an account in Time, the new plan 
was “flooded with workers’ suggestions” for labor-saving measures: “Welders who had stood 
around waiting for materials began helping to unload.  Workers formerly indifferent to 
substandard work turned out by slackers began raising Cain: it cut down their bonus.”22  By 
1945, production efficiency had increased by 54%, and worker bonuses averaged 41% of 
monthly earnings.  Adamson became the first poster child for what would later be called the 
Scanlon plan, which, in spite of wartime restrictions, had shown its promise.
23
   
 During the era of Scanlon’s experimentations at the Adamson Company, McGregor 
started bringing him to MIT for seminars and lectures in the Industrial Relations department.  
McGregor later recalled:  
In our visits to industrial centers we became acquainted with the union-
management cooperation plans sponsored by the the United Steelworkers and 
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with Clinton Golden and Joseph Scanlon who had initiated and godfathered many 
of them.  Once more we discovered with a welcome shock that our own 
theoretical conclusions dovetailed in many basic respects with the practical 




Soon, a window of opportunity opened at MIT.  Clinton Golden resigned from the USW in July 
1946, and Scanlon grew increasingly frustrated with his union work: Cooperative efforts within 
the steel industry fell apart after the war, as industry refused to lift wages of employees, and 
Murray withheld his support of labor/management cooperation.
25
  Scanlon was left without his 
most powerful ally, facing a climate hostile to his participative efforts, and Douglas McGregor 
recognized an opportunity. In 1946, he offered Scanlon a position on MIT’s Industrial Relations 
Faculty.  Scanlon, who has been called “one of McGregor’s most unlikely recruits,” remained at 
MIT until his death in 1956.  Among a faculty of social scientists and experts in human relations, 
Scanlon contributed a shop-floor perspective on how to increase productivity while increasing 
rank-and-file participation in management decisions. 
 During his tenure at MIT, Scanlon never stopped consulting with companies, and 
continued to refine his Scanlon plan.  His first big coup took place at the Lapointe Tool 
Company of Hudson, Massachusetts—where he established the official 3-tiered system that 
characterized the Scanlon Plan.  Finding the company’s workers on the verge of a strike, Scanlon 
first calculated “normal” labor costs as he had at Adamson; then established a joint management-
labor production committee to review employees’ cost-sharing suggestions; and finally built a 
profit-sharing program for all employees.
26
  Within twenty months of establishing the program, 
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production had increased by 61% and, according to a National Planning Association report, “’An 
outsider had difficulty distinguishing management from union.’”27  
 McGregor and Scanlon, buoyed by these results, collaborated on their first labor-relations 
case study in the late 1940s, as part of a National Planning Association series on “The Causes of 
Industrial Peace.”28  Before Scanlon was recruited to MIT, during World War II, McGregor had 
served as a temporary labor relations manager at the Dewey and Almy Chemical Company.  The 
“progressive firm” was founded in 1919 “on a bedrock of benevolent paternalism," and 
employed 1500 people in two plants near MIT by 1948.
29
  Its president accepted his employees’ 
vote for unionization in 1939 because he trusted the regional director of the AFL, but according 
to Weisbord, “the paternalism continued, as the president personally handled contracts and 
grievances.”30  When he left for wartime service in Washington, he appointed Douglas 
McGregor, who had been consulting with the firm, as the manager of labor relations.
31
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 McGregor decided to co-write a case study on his experience there with Joseph 
Scanlon.
32
  At that time, the two men also served as members of the Committee on the Casuses 
of Industrial Peace under Collective Bargaining, and were particularly interested in the 
relationship between Dewey and Almy and the International Chemical Workers Union.  In their 
case study, Scanlon and McGregor argued that Dewey and Almy had “progressed from the 
policies of its paternalistic founders” and made strides in its relationship with the union by 
initiating collective bargaining.  But the authors also argued that, to progress further, the 
company must “’move into the third—cooperative—stage …[and] recognize the possibilities of 
union participation on problems of production efficiency and cost reduction.’”33   
 The two authors urged the company to distribute decision-making power equally across 
corporate lines, including middle management.  When the company had adopted a wartime 
strategy of no work stoppages, they noticed, middle management and supervisors who had been 
left out of the decision interpreted it as the company’s decision to “give the union whatever it 
wants,” and responded resentfully.34  This observation reinforced Scanlon and McGregor’s 
conviction that middle managers, like blue-collar workers, needed to be involved in negotiating 
and carrying out labor contracts, lest they feel excluded from labor relations.  At the two men’s 
behest, foremen and supervisors started participating in human relations training that had 
previously been issued exclusively to the company’s personnel department, and began attending 
weekly meetings to review management policy and union relations. Together with union 
representatives, they produced “a looseleaf labor policy manual based on joint discussions and 
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union consultation on non-bargaining issues like job evaluations and promotions”—granting to 
the Dewey and Almy employees what Weisbord has called “enormous strides toward dignity, 
meaning, and community.”35  According to a New York Times report on the experiment, the 
entire project “demonstrates the falsity of the belief that warfare and strife between union and 
management are inevitable.”36   
 When Time Magazine published a laudatory article about Scanlon in 1955, it quoted the 
president of an Illinois company asserting, “As far I’m concerned, Joe has the answer to the 
future of American free-enterprise capitalism.”37  McGregor’s praise for Joseph was no less 
hyperbolic.  In a series of works written in the 1950s, McGregor celebrated Scanlon as a sage of 
management theory and the embodiment of his leadership ideal later known as Theory Y.  
Scanlon’s ideas, he explained, comprised an entire philosophy and “new way of life” consistent 
with all of the best modern social-science research on human organizations.
38
  His emphasis on 
“broad centralization and genuine delegation, clear to the bottom of the organization,” reinforced 
McGregor’s own humanistic conclusions about human nature at work: the conviction that “by 
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and large, subordinates are capable of self-direction, self-discipline, and self-control, in contrast 
to a century of management literature targeting workers’ unruly natures.39  When McGregor 
wrote The Human Side of Enterprise at the end of the 1950s, he devoted an entire chapter to the 
Scanlon Plan as an example of “’management by integration and self-control” and nothing less 
than a new “way of industrial life.”40  If Taylorism had treated the worker as a “glorified 
machine tool,” the Scanlon Plan treated him as a man of skills, promise, and insight that could be 
unleashed under the right set of circumstances.
41
 
 McGregor celebrated the Scanlon Plan on the level of both the individual and the 
organization.  Within the organization, its emphasis on collaboration and participation reinforced 
the democratic ideals of industrial citizenship that McGregor advocated throughout his career.  
Within the psyche of the individual, the Scanlon Plan promised nothing short of Maslowian 
revolution.  “Underlying Joseph Scanlon’s efforts,” McGregor explained, “was a deep and 
fundamental belief in the worth of the human individual, in his capacity for growth and learning, 
in his ability to contribute significantly ‘with his head as well as his hands; to the success of the 
company that employs him.”42  According to McGregor, the Scanlon Plan’s production 
committees and their accompanying expectations for management-employee relationships 
“provide ideal means for satisfying ego and self-actualization needs which are typically 
frustrated under the conditions of present-day industrial employment.”43   Though Scanlon (who 
died in 1956, four years before the publication of McGregor’s most famous treatise) would likely 
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not have connected his vision to the hierarchy of needs, McGregor saw little distinction between 
the humanistic goal of self-actualization and Scanlon’s ideal of labor-management democracy.  
The Scanlon Plan, he insisted, offered the blueprint for workplaces that could reconcile the needs 
of the organization with those of the individual, delivering high levels of profit, productivity, and 
self-actualization for all. 
 
 In 1948, the same year that McGregor published his monograph on Dewey and Almy 
with Joseph Scanlon, his career took an unexpected turn.  Thanks to his renown in human 
relations circles, McGregor was asked to recommend candidates for the presidency of Antioch 
College, a small, experimental, liberal college in Yellow Springs, Ohio originally founded by 
Horace Mann. He expressed so much enthusiasm for Antioch’s mission that he was offered the 
position himself and assumed the presidency of the school in September 1948.
44
  Yet 
McGregor’s six-year stint as college president did not mark the kind of professional departure 
that such a move might suggest.  In fact, the school offered an ideal climate in which to ponder 
the structure of democratic organizations, the principles of human relationships, and the nature of 
individual growth in group settings.  In an Antioch publication a year after his arrival, McGregor 
explained that he envisioned Antioch as a “learning laboratory” for “’a genuine program of 
research, with ourselves as subjects.”  His aim during his presidency was to “’discover why the 
things we try work, or why they fail to work.’”  Most famously, he also announced his 
determination to “’resolve the major paradox of our culture by making educational institutions a 
                                                 
44






democratic way of living, rather than a democratic way of talking.’”45  Antioch proved to be a 
fertile testing ground for McGregor’s most cherished principles of organizational life. 
 The Antioch College of the late 1940s and early 1950s represented a markedly different 
culture from that of MIT in the same period, and its liberalism matched the spirit of open-
mindedness in McGregor’s own work.  At Antioch, McGregor encountered a collegiate ethos 
that anticipated the student culture of the 1960s.  One of his most famous mentees, Warren 
Bennis, published an autobiographical essay in which he recalled his transition from the US 
Army to Yellow Springs in 1947: “I took the train to Antioch…As I neared my destination, my 
seatmate couldn’t resist asking me why I wanted to go to a ‘Commie school,’ with its ‘nigger-
lovers, pinkos, and people who believe in free love.’”46  The campus, he remembered was, “an 
ideal community” where “The campus heroes were intellectuals…People of color were 
celebrated, the Young Communist League and followers of Henry Wallace were taken seriously, 
and the talk was ferocious, utopian, and unending.”47  If intellectualism was held in high regard, 
so was the conscious integration of theory and practice. Antioch students were required to spend 
half of their time studying and half of their time working in real-world jobs.  According to 
Bennis, “Splicing classroom experience with real-world work” offered opportunities to explore 
that “exquisite tension between the idealistic tilting of windmills that went on on campus and the 
inevitable compromises of the workplace.”48  McGregor not only entered the school at a height 
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of its intellectual creativity, but propelled the school to new heights of experimentation during 
his tenure. 
 Bennis later recalled the six-year period in which his mentor “turned the school on its 
head,” upsetting the traditions of an already untraditional school.  In McGregor’s first school-
wide assembly address, “he announced, while our collective jaws dropped, that he valued his 
four years in analysis more than his four years as an undergraduate, that he hadn’t the faintest 
idea what the students or faculty wanted, and that maybe the campus should shut down for a 
week while we had some ‘goal discussions’ in small groups.”49  Soon thereafter, McGregor 
initiated these mandatory “goal discussions” at which not only faculty and students, but also 
janitors and secretaries
50
 “redefined our collective aspirations, focused our vision for our 
education, and constituted a superb example of how change is facilitated by involving those who 
will be most affected.”51   
 According to Marvin Weisbord, some faculty members were skeptical of what they 
labeled McGregor’s “Madison Avenue manipulations” and insisted that Antioch was already a 
“model democracy”—insomuch as it included student representatives on its admissions, 
discipline, and curriculum committees (a “great rarity” in the 1940s).52  But McGregor insisted 
that “representative democracy…was not enough”; that Antioch faculty and students needed to 
keep pushing the limits of its democratic practices.
53
  By the end of McGregor’s 6-year term, the 
school’s goal discussion groups had reached consensus about new fields of study, revised 
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curriculum, new teaching methods, and a more potent work/study program.  The skeptics had 
been won over. 
  
 During his second year at Antioch, McGregor delivered an address to the City Club of 
Cleveland that encapsulated his utopian vision of modern education, along with his worst fears 
about the future of American society.  In contrast to widespread postwar optimism about 
secondary schooling (and the unprecedented access Americans had to college due to the GI Bill), 
McGregor cautioned his audience that “[a] college degree is not a passport to Utopia, nor is it a 
union card assuring a more abundant life.”54  The American people’s “complacent attitude 
toward education,” he explained, had resulted in a sea of mediocre teachers and underachieving 
students. If American society was to truly benefit from its increased access to college education, 
schools and students would need to revise their collective mission.   
 Although “’There are more college graduates than ever before in our history,’” McGregor 
explained, and most Americans assume that college education produces wise and competent 
citizens, “we are failing to solve acute social problems.  Divorce, delinquency, ulcers and 
neuroses are rife and the economic conflict is intense in every phase of life.’”  The problem was 
clear: American educators were insufficiently experimental and not attuned to larger social 
needs.  The public needed to “encourage those few institutions which have broken with tradition 
and are boldly experimenting in higher education.”    For McGregor, the consequences of 
conservative educational techniques were not just detrimental, but downright dangerous.  
“Unless we demand that educators undertake bold experimentation to improve their methods in 
order to equip youth to live effective lives,” he warned, “our sleep will be rudely disturbed by the 
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turmoil of conflict, mental disintegration and ultimately devastating war.”55  Within just a year 
and a half of arriving at Antioch, McGregor had grown strongly identified with its experimental, 
activist mission and convinced of educational institutions’ potential for large scale social change. 
 In April 1950, McGregor delivered a speech that even more explicitly linked educational 
reform with the defense of democracy and Cold War anxieties.  Anticipating the arguments that 
he would eventually construct about the organization of industry, he charged that “Educational 
institutions are run on authoritarian lines and American youth will not learn to practice 
democracy until schools are run democratically.”56  McGregor lamented, “’We teach democracy 
by authoritarian methods…The classroom teacher can dictate what shall be taught and how, and 
can enforce his will through control of grading.”57  Students might learn how to give “lip 
service” to democracy in school, but what they actually learn is “how to survive a virtual 
dictatorship.”  And how might one combat some tendencies in modern education?   McGregor 
held up Antioch as a prime example of an authentically democratic institution.  He pointed to the 
fact that Antioch students served on the elective boards that ran the school, and celebrated the 
school’s famous work-study program that taught “responsible citizenship” through real-world 
employment.   
 By his second year at the school, McGregor had indeed encouraged some dramatic 
changes in the school’s operations.  Students began to manage their own club budgets, orient 
freshmen, pick their own newspaper editors, and even “[run] the fire company.”58  His home was 
open to students at all times, and their dormitories open to him; in student meetings, he was 
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“’likely to be found sitting on the floor as an alert listener and participant.’”59 By the third year 
of his presidency, he had proposed extending the school’s study-plus-work program to faculty in 
order to keep teachers connected to the outside world.
60
  Soon thereafter, he publicly reasserted 
the school’s commitment to free speech and inquiry in the face of charges that Antioch was a 
bastion of Communist sympathies.
61
   
 In spite of his heralded successes and popularity at Antioch, McGregor “grew weary of 
administration” after six years on the job.  According to Weisbord, “He especially disliked a role 
that put him at odds with other faculty” because “He wanted everyone to like him, impossible for 
an effective college president.”62  In an essay published in Antioch Notes during his last month of 
the presidency, McGregor expounded on his own difficult relationship with the nature of 
authority.  Before arriving at Antioch, he explained, he had believed that “a leader could operate 
successfully as a kind of advisor to the organization”—that he could, in other words, “avoid 
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being a ‘boss.’”63  He had hoped he could avoid making difficult decisions and mistakes.  But he 
soon learned how wrong he was, for “a leader cannot avoid the exercise of authority any more 
than he can avoid responsibility for what happens in his organization.”64  Good human relations, 
he concluded, derive from strength, not weakness.  It was the responsibility of the leader to 
resolve difficult decisions, and it was inevitable that some people would disapprove.   
 McGregor’s other revelation about leadership pertained to the Communist charges that 
plagued the faculty and student body under his watch.  From this experience, he had learned that 
“it is the business of colleges and universities to create a climate within which freedom of 
responsible inquiry and belief can flourish.  These institutions must be tough enough to win the 
fight against whatever forces seek to destroy this freedom.”65  In offering McGregor his first role 
as an organizational leader, Antioch had reinforced McGregor’s commitment to democratic 
leadership and participation.  One colleague later recalled, “’If there was anything he was trying 
to overcome or destroy…It was the institutional habit of talking about the virtues of democracy 
while running affairs autocratically.’”66   At the same time, McGregor’s tenure as college 
president made him keenly aware of leadership’s challenges, and the inherent difficulties in 
bridging democratic rhetoric with democratic action.   
 
 
 McGregor’s tenure at Antioch proved to be fertile ground for the cultivation of his 
humanistic management theories.   During his college presidency (from 1948 through 1954), 
McGregor refined his positions on free enterprise, industrial psychology, and human relations,  
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articulating some the central tenets of the Human Side of Enterprise and forging the outlines of 
his famous Theory Y.  He developed a vision of American institutions that integrated ideals of 
social democracy with the Maslowian goal of self-actualization.  For McGregor, these two goals 
were not only harmonious, but mutually dependent. Rather than constituting a hiatus from the 
realm of human relations, McGregor’s time at Antioch inspired him to articulate a new theory of 
participative, humanistic management. 
 The month he began his presidency of Antioch, McGregor announced the “world-
shattering significance” of his MIT colleagues’ work in human relations, in a publication 
dedicated to their collective findings.
67
  According to McGregor, the field of industrial 
psychology promised something much bigger than better productivity or interpersonal relations 
on the job. “[W]e are convinced,” he explained, “that a systematic understanding of organized 
human effort in industry will ultimately contribute not only to industrial peace but to the solution 
of some of the problems of international human relations which have brought the world today to 
the brink of disaster.”  According to McGregor, the “industrial plant is a microcosm in which we 
may well be able to find answers to some of the fundamental problems of modern society.”68  
The context of the Cold War, he suggested, offered unprecedented opportunities for a theorist of 
organizations to become a savior of free enterprise.  
 The late 1940s and early 1950s saw a flurry of conferences and seminars on the future of 
America’s industrial future.  In mid-1949, McGregor was summoned to a conference for 600 
regional leaders in the South on the causes of widespread labor unrest.
69
  The Antioch president 
chided the leaders for their “lack of unity of purpose” and blamed the state of industrial unrest on 
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industrial managers’ lack of consensus regarding the best practices of human relations.  When 
management fails to reach consensus on human relations policies, he explained, their 
subordinates begin to perceive their practices as arbitrary, inconsistent, and insincere.  Managers 
needed not only to reach a “common conception of their responsibility for good human 
relations,” but also recognize the central truths of modern, humanistic management practices: 
that “the deepest of all human longings is that of feeling needed, and that management should 
strive to help the worker to experience in his daily job the feeling of importance and dignity and 
common participation.”70  The antidote to industry’s suffering, in other words, could be found in 
the wisdom of Abraham Maslow. 
 Two months after the conference for Southern industrial leaders, McGregor appeared at 
the American Psychological Association’s annual meeting and offered an even more dire 
warning to American industrial leaders.  “If another major depression occurs and America’s free 
enterprise system fails,” he threatened, “one of the main reasons will be industry’s failure to 
solve ‘acute’ problems of human relations.”71  Industrial managers had failed in the interwar 
period to earn workers’ trust or even acknowledge labor’s interests, inadvertently causing 
workers to slack off or disobey company rules. “’If people genuinely expected the ‘best break 
possible’ from management,’” he asked, “’would restriction of output be so prevalent?...Would 
bitter strikes occur so frequently?...And would arbitration so often be required?’”72  McGregor 
rooted labor discontent in “‘a simple fact about human behavior’”: 
 That people work to satisfy such needs as food, shelter, power, prestige, social 
approval, knowledge, love, and achievement.  And they work or restrict output, 
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cooperate or fight, join unions or refuse to join them, obey rules of disobey them, 
invest money in the organization or withdraw it, and whatever else they 
do…because their perceptions are that by doing so they will best satisfy their 
needs.’”73 
 
The future of free enterprise rested on the shoulders of middle managers who associated 
organizational efforts with the satisfaction of personal needs and offered workers meaningful 
work rather than improved vacation plans or recreational facilities.
74
  
 McGregor linked these concerns to cold war anxieties at a 1951 Corning Glass Works 
conference on “the ‘puzzle’ of ‘how to make machine age Americans happier.’”75 Gathering with 
representatives from a variety of American organizations – including Voice of America and the 
American Council of Learned Societies—on the occasion of Corning’s centennial celebration, 
McGregor and his co-panelists pondered the fundamental contradictions of modern American 
society.  “What inner drive can this country give the worker,” one panelists asked “who does 
nothing but tighten a bolt 2000 times a day as an alternative to the devotion to a Communist 
fatherland that motivates a similar Soviet worker?”  How could industrial leaders and managers 
return drive and personality to workers operating in the machine age?  The panelists arrived at a 
fundamentally humanistic conclusion: “People cannot find happiness merely in activities that 
represent an escape from work,” and work must therefore be transformed from “an evil burden to 
be endured” to “a part of the good life.”76  Their most pressing question – Can America wage a 
war against Communism when many of its citizens are locked into lives of brainless tasks?—
highlighted the expanded agenda of human relations in the postwar period.   
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 McGregor returned to his professorship at MIT in Fall of 1954, at which point he became 
a Professor of Industrial Management (1954-1962) and later the Sloan Fellows Professor.  
During the second half of the 1950s, he actively refined his theories of humanistic management 
and prepared them for publication in his pièce de resistance at the end of the decade.   He also 
incorporated Abraham Maslow’s ideas more explicitly than ever.  In 1956, he wrote Maslow to 
inform him that he had “used your Motivation and Personality with a group of seventeen senior 
executives in a seminar here at MIT,” and “their response was genuinely enthusiastic.  We had a 
long discussion off the implications of your self-actualization concept and it was quite clear that 
the whole idea not only made sense but fired their imagination because of its implications in 
industry.”77  A year later he wrote to the psychologist: 
In a talk which I have here at MIT last spring I drew heavily on your ideas about 
motivation…I hope you will approve in general of the way I have used your 
thinking to strengthen some of my own.  The implications of your theory of 





From the late 1950s through McGregor’s death in 1964, no name was more heavily associated 
with his work than that of Abraham Maslow. 
 The talk to which McGregor referred in his 1957 letter anticipated the key themes of his 
bestselling book and also shared its title.  He first delivered “The Human Side of Enterprise” at 
MIT’s School of Industrial Management’s 5th Anniversary Management Convocation on April 9. 
1957.
79
  In this lecture, he established the two categories of management that henceforth became 
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synonymous with his name -- Theory X and Theory Y – and explicitly evoked humanistic 
psychology as his main inspiration.  McGregor began his talk with familiarly lofty praise for the 
social sciences.  “We are in a position in the social sciences today,” he announced, “like that of 
the physical sciences with respect to atomic energy in the thirties”: 
We know that past conceptions off the nature of man are inadequate and in many 
ways incorrect.  We are becoming quite certain that, under proper conditions, 





McGregor went on to outline the concept of the hierarchy of needs and its fundamental premise, 
that “man is a wanting animal” continually motivated by unsatisfied needs: first physiological, 
then safety, then social and egoistic—before the height, which McGregor renamed “self-
realization.” 
 According to McGregor, American managers had systematically thwarted all but the 
basest of these human needs in their employees.  Modern, technological society had reached a 
point of sophistication at which the safety and physiological needs of workers could be largely 
taken for granted.  American workers were, for the most part, well fed and housed.  But what of 
the less tangible needs?  To what extent had American industry accommodated fundamental 
cravings for belongingness, growth, and self-respect?  According to McGregor, decades of 
conventional management techniques had “tied men to limited jobs which do not utilize their 
                                                                                                                                                             
worth noting that McGregor also anticipated some of the themes of The Human Side of Enterprise in his 1954 talk 
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human behavior is directed toward the satisfaction of needs.  Life is a struggle for need satisfaction, extending from 
birth till death.  In fact, when we cease trying to satisfy our needs, we are dead.” 
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capabilities, have discouraged the acceptance of responsibility, have encouraged passivity, have 
eliminated meaning from work.”81 And no culprit proved more guilty than Frederick Winslow 
Taylor’s notion of scientific management, which McGregor rechristened as Theory X. 
 Theory X consisted of several sweeping assumptions about human nature and the innate 
impulses of workers, which McGregor enumerated in this early talk.  The Theory X manager 
believed that he was largely responsible for “organizing the elements of productive enterprise” – 
its people, products, and capital – in the service of “economic ends.”  Profit, not empathy or 
respect, drove his efforts.  He believed that the average worker “is by nature indolent” and wants 
to work as little as possible. He also believed that the average man “lacks ambition, dislikes 
responsibility, prefers to be led,” and “is inherently self-centered, different to organizational 
needs.”  The worker was, to the Theory X manager, “gullible, not very bright, the ready dupe of 
the charlatan and the demagogue.”82  Possessing such assumptions about the nature of his 
underlings, the Theory X manager assumed it was his job to wear down workers’ resistance – to 
direct, motivate, and ultimately “[modify] their behavior to fit the needs of the organization.”83  
The Theory X manager treated workers interchangeably with machines and assumed workers’ 
fundamental antagonism to the organization and the work ethic itself.   
 According to McGregor, the psychological consequences of Theory X management were 
profoundly damaging to both individuals and organizations.  First of all, Theory X disregarded 
the social needs of workers.  Whereas “[m]any studies have demonstrated that the tightly knit, 
cohesive work group may, under proper conditions, be far more effective than an equal number 
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of separate individuals,” most managers preferred to treat their workers as isolated individuals.  
Fearing group resistance, management commonly went to “considerable lengths to control and 
direct human efforts in ways that are inimical to the natural ‘groupiness’ of human beings.”84  
But their efforts to isolate workers often proved counterproductive and damaging to the 
organization, producing “antagonistic, uncooperative” workers with low rates of productivity.85 
 McGregor argued that Theory-X management was particularly detrimental to the 
satisfaction of “ego needs” in the workplace.  “If the practices of scientific management were 
deliberately calculated to thwart these needs,” he suggested, “they could hardly accomplish this 
purpose better than they do.”86  Particularly in mass production, managers ignored the presence 
of ego needs altogether.  Workers accustomed to “being directed, manipulated, controlled in 
industrial organizations” often surrendered hope of finding satisfaction for ego and social needs 
on the job, turning “away from the job” for fulfillment and becoming more insistent on increased 
material benefits from their work.
87
  Though McGregor never denied that appropriate wages 
factored into the fulfillment of ego needs at work, he looked askance at any industrial 
organization in which employees worked for money or leisure time alone.   The stakes of such 
narrow-mindedness were high: “[T]he man whose needs for safety, association, independence, or 
status are thwarted is sick just as surely as he who has rickets.  And his sickness will have 
behavioral consequences.”88   
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 McGregor’s grave diagnosis of American workers’ mental health was met with his 
equally optimistic prescription, an ethos that he called Theory Y.  According to McGregor, 
Theory Y did not pose any revolutionary threats to the functioning of American organizations, 
for it recognized that one of management’s main responsibilities to any organization was the 
achievement of “economic ends.”89  What Theory Y did represent was a new set of assumptions 
about the American worker—namely, that he was not fundamentally passive, resistant, or 
antagonistic to organizational objectives.  Rather, McGregor suggested, “The motivation, the 
potential for development, the capacity for assuming responsibility, the readiness to direct 
behavior toward organizational goals are all present in people.”  He reframed the conception of 
modern management in growth-oriented terms, explaining that “[i]t is the responsibility of 
management to make it possible for people to recognize and develop these human characteristics 
for themselves.”90  Management was the act of encouraging workers’ own habits of self-control, 
encouraging them to utilize their strengths, and giving them structured space for self-direction.
91
 
McGregor adamantly insisted that Theory Y did not constitute “soft” management, because it 
suggested no absence of strong leaders; if anything, it demanded more of its managers than had 
Taylorist precedents.   
 McGregor proposed a set of management techniques through which managers could 
encourage their underlings’ growth, and self-direction.  First, he advocated “decentralization and 
delegation” in industrial organizations: giving workers “a degree of freedom” to “direct their 
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own activities” and assume responsibilities.92  Second, he cited the “job enlargement” efforts 
“pioneered” by IBM and Detroit Edison, in which workers at the bottom of an organization were 
given increased levels of responsibility and opportunity.
93
  These techniques resembled what 
McGregor referred to as “Participation and Consultative Management,” in which people gain 
“some voice in the decisions that affect them” and are genuinely encouraged to express their 
creative problem-solving energies at work.  Of this approach, McGregor stated, “I need only 
mention the Scanlon Plan as the outstanding embodiment of these ideas in practice,” and 
cautioned against superficial applications of the theory: 
Participation becomes a farce when it is applied as a sales gimmick or a device for 
kidding people into thinking they are important. Only the management that has 
confidence in human capacities and is itself directed toward organizational 
objectives rather than toward the preservation of personal power can grasp the 




With this word of warning, McGregor forged a distinction between the human-relations 
approaches of the past and the Theory Y innovations of the future.  Though McGregor’s Theory 
Y soon thereafter became synonymous with exactly the sorts of “gimmicks” that McGregor 
denounced, his original articulation of the idea found him striving for some integration of 
psychological and material betterment.   
 McGregor ended his speech on “The Human Side of Enterprise” with a grand and 
optimistic pronouncement—one in the tradition of his own proselytizing relatives, and in the 
spirit of Maslow and Lewin’s lofty aspirations.  He urged: 
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The ingenuity and the perseverance of industrial management in the pursuit of 
economic ends have changed many scientific and technological dreams into 
commonplace realities.  It is now becoming clear that the application of these 
same talents to the human side of enterprise will not only enhance substantially 
these materialistic achievements but will bring us one step closer to ‘the good 
society.’ Shall we get on with the job?95 
 
McGregor thus equated Theory Y management not just with a new system of industrial relations, 
but with the development of “the good society.”  Tayloristic management, by implication, had 
inhibited the evolution of capitalist society at large.   
 McGregor soon repackaged many of these ideas in his 250-page managerial bible, The 
Human Side of Enterprise.  Published in 1960 (a year before Rensis Likert’s New Patterns of 
Management) and drawing from five years of industrial research funded by the Alfred P. Sloan 
Foundation, this work introduced an unprecedented number of industrial managers and 
strategists to the ideas of Abraham Maslow, Kurt Lewin, and Joseph Scanlon.
96
  McGregor 
began with the question of whether “successful managers are born or made.” 97  He surveyed the 
current field of organizational theory, examined the management development programs of a 
number of large companies, and denounced much of both as anachronistic bunk. His treatise 
called for a redefinition of management, from coercion to coaching, and a redefinition of work, 
from means to end. 
 In his tome, McGregor advocated a fundamental reframing of authority and control in 
industrial organizations.  “We live today in a world which only faintly resembles that of a half 
century ago,” McGregor observed, yet contemporary organizational theory remained firmly 
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-century assumptions: namely “that authority is the central, indispensable 
means of managerial control,” and that “the very structure of the organization is a hierarchy of 
authoritative relationships.”98 He contrasted this parochialism to a broad range of other anti-
authoritarian evolutions:  
In domestic politics authoritarianism is suspect; in child rearing we have made 
some wild swings, but exclusive reliance on authority is generally recognized 
today to create more problems than it solves; in religious organizations authority 
carries less force than it once did; husbands in our culture can no longer rely on 
authority to control the behavior of wives.
99
   
 
Why, then, did leaders of the industrial realm cling to conceptions of authority that had been 
discarded in these other arenas of political, personal, and religious life?  And how might 
industrial managers trade their attachment to “authority” for broader, more flexible conceptions 
of “influence?”  According to McGregor, the manager of the 1960s needed to strive for greater 
flexibility in his own self-conception, approaching his position by turns as boss, member of peer 
group, teacher, leader, consultant, and observer.
100
   
 McGregor offered broader historical context for the necessity of Theory Y.  In the past 
two or three decades, he explained, the “human side of enterprise” had become a major concern 
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of management thanks to a changing industrial landscape.
101
  The 1930s had marked a 
particularly volatile time in which the public grew antagonistic towards industry; mass 
production industries had been unionized; the New Deal offered pro-labor legislation; and the 
American public recoiled from authoritarianism abroad.  The early Human Relations movement 
had emerged as a proposed antidote to these ideological and tactical challenges, endorsing the 
“simple removal of control,” also known as “soft management,” and forsaking almost all 
managerial authority in order employee satisfaction and harmony.  According to McGregor, 
these early expressions of that movement were inadequate, for “[w]e recognize today that 
‘industrial democracy’ cannot consist in permitting everyone to decide everything, that industrial 
health does not flow automatically from the elimination of dissatisfaction, disagreement, or even 
open conflict.” 102  Instead of striving for peace through permissive policies and the surrender of 
authority, managers needed to conceive of authority in new ways.   
 McGregor ultimately celebrated organizational climates characterized by participation 
and what he called “integration”: “the creation of conditions such that the members of the 
organization can achieve their own goals best by directing their efforts toward the success of the 
enterprise.”103 McGregor reiterated the potential for such outcomes in his celebrations of the 
Scanlon Plan (which received its own chapter-long endorsement), participative management, 
self-appraisal, and group work – all approaches in which workers helped determine their 
organizational goals and took part in other branches of decision-making. He emphasized that 
participation—“one of the most misunderstood terms that have emerged from the field of human 
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relations”—was not a “magic formula” that would produce results for any manager, regardless of 
skill
.104 
 Participation did not constitute an abdication of authority to the whim of subordinates; 
nor should it be viewed as a “manipulative device for [managers] getting people to do what they 
want.”105  Participation best entailed, rather, a system in which all members of an organization 
shared responsibility for setting goals and determining “targets”; in which members collectively 
determined the structure and benefits of work; in which problem-solving became a collective 
endeavor with collective rewards.  
 In The Human Side of Enterprise, McGregor not only reiterated the principles of Theory 
X and Theory Y he had been refining for decades, but also offered pragmatic advice.  While the 
first half of his book championed the potential for workers’ self-actualization and outlined the 
Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, the second half of the book offered readers a practical 
approach to the cultivation of good managers.  Good managers were not born, he suggested, but 
neither were they simply “made”; rather, good managers had to be attentively and trained.  
Lewin’s field of group dynamics, McGregor suggested, offered the century’s most fertile ground 
for the transformation of managerial training and teamwork.  The guiding principles of the field 
could help forge a new generation of managers who communicated openly, sought constructive 
criticism, and thrived in groups without sacrificing their own individuality. 
 McGregor explained that best management education offered managers chances to absorb 
principles experientially, to benefit themselves from Theory-Y treatment from superiors, and to 
practice executing its principles with one another.  According to McGregor, management did not 
simply refer to two castes—management and worker—but also applied to the relationship 
between president and lower-level executives, or to the relationship between staff and line.  
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Managers themselves need to be treated with respect, led rather than coaxed.  Decades of 
management development programs had erred in approaching the task as one of “manufacturing” 
good managers:  
People have been assigned the engineering task if designing a program and 
building the necessary machinery, toward the end of producing the needed supply 
of managerial talent…We have managerial inventories, replacement charts with 
elaborate codes and colors, formal machinery for recruiting and selecting 
potential managerial talent, special indoctrination programs for the new recruits, 
appraisal programs, job rotation, and a welter of training activities.  The 




According to McGregor, managers needed to start playing active parts in their own development, 
in the same way that lower-level workers should have voices in the setting of production goals.  
Management training programs also needed to start recognizing that “each individual is unique 
in terms of his capacities, his interests and goals, his talents.”  He encouraged readers to ponder 
“[a]n alternative approach to management development … somewhat analogous to that of 
agriculture… concerned with ‘growing’ talent rather than manufacturing it.”  If the proper 
conditions were provided, each individual could reach his inherent potential.
107
  
 McGregor also celebrated the cultivation off the “Managerial Team.”  Managers did not 
function best as isolated individuals, he insisted, but as part of groups.  He staunchly defended 
this ideal against a recent rash of criticisms of America’s reliance on group-think and the “social 
ethos,” particularly William Whyte’s The Organization Man.108   Whyte had argued in his 
manifesto that groups inherently enforce conformity and squelch individualism among their 
members.  McGregor firmly retaliated that “[t]hese views deny the realities of organizational 
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life,” for most organizational problems need to be solved in groups, and an organization built on 
individual effort alone was doomed to fail.
109
  The pressing goal, he urged, was not the 
elimination of groups in organizations, but rather the issue of how to best “create the condition 
for individual growth and integrity in the group situation.”110  
 
 Upon its publication, The Human Side of Enterprise was greeted with almost 
unanimously positive reviews.   Reviewers celebrated its revelation that “rigid control from the 
top…is no longer necessary” in American organizations and decried the assembly-line mentality 
of Theory X.
 111
    Reverend Paul Marx of the American Catholic Sociological Review defended 
McGregor’s progressiveness, insisting that “if Theory Y seems socialistic, anarchistic, or even 
inconsistent with human nature to many of today’s managers or with formal textbook principles 
of classical organizational theory, the reason is that it flies in the face of ingrained habits of 
thought and action that no longer can be squared with the social science findings of the last 30 
years.”112  A reviewer from the American Journal of Psychology characterized McGregor’s work 
as a “devastating critique” of traditional management practices and praised it for transcending 
the conventional dullness of its genre.  “I could find a few points to criticize,” he explained, “but 
any such comments would be out of place because the overall gestalt of the book is so good.  I 
hope that teachers of industrial psychology and personnel administration will immediately start 
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requiring it of their students.”113  Their consensus was clear: Most American management 
techniques were a relic of outdated social principles, and it was time for a serious revolution in 
organizational theory. 
 Yet even the book’s glowing reviewers acknowledged aspects of its argument that would 
earn McGregor posthumous critiques in decades to come.  Namely, they questioned the 
empirical predictability of McGregor’s proposed techniques and wondered if his portrait of 
human nature was not simply a bit too rosy.  Frank Heller wrote that the “disconcerting fact 
about Theory Y is that the propellant which alone can make these weapons effective is a genuine 
love of people and belief in basic human potential and in the natural mechanism of growth 
toward goodness rather than evil.” He continued: “This is strong and yet intangible stuff.  It is 
strong because it is solidly rooted in the great philosophies and religions of the world; it is 
intangible because one cannot easily assemble the ingredients.”114 Rev. Marx questioned the 
book’s unabashed faith in the compatibility of people and organizational needs.  “Who will 
deny,” he asked, “that there is at least some inherent human tendency to avoid work?” 
McGregor’s idealism had the reviewer questioning whether the prospects for Theory Y were as 
grand in scope as McGregor loftily promised.   
 Howard Baumgartel, a champion of the Group Dynamics movement, viewed the book as 
being vulnerable to some of the criticisms that had plagued the field of human dynamics for 
decades – namely, that the field’s proponents tended to neglect “social and economic 
factors…and the ‘real’ conflict between labor and management.”  He wondered, “If a manager 
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sees the purpose of the organization as being the enhancement of the wealth and power of the 
owner-manager group, might he not find Theory X to be the most appropriate approach?”115  
 Though Baumgartel was right to identify McGregor’s inattention to any inherent conflict 
between labor and management, his point about owner-management incentives overlooked one 
of the most complicated aspects of McGregor’s work.  If, as one reviewer suggested, the “main 
theme” of The Human Side of Enterprise was “how to win people by influence rather than 
control,”116 the book could be read as a defense of traditional owner-management incentives in 
the workplace.  What McGregor advocated was not, after all, an abdication of the profit motive 
or corporate prowess, but rather a reorganization of the psychological relationships of the 
workplace.  Central to his work—and all humanistic management theory of the period—was that 
faith in human nature could boost profit and productivity in the industrial setting, benefitting 
employees at every level of the organization.  This equation was tested in management training 
programs across the world (see chapter 7) and in a range of American corporations beginning in 
the decade before the publication of McGregor’s tome.   
 
 
 The publication of The Human Side of Enterprise left a distinct imprint on the rhetoric 
and vernacular of management in the 1960s.  Across the United States, managers learned to 
incorporate the language of Theory Y and distance themselves from the blatantly authoritative 
style of Theory X.
117
  Yet as many critics of the time pointed out –whether sympathetic to 
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McGregor’s mission or critical of his loftiness – Theory Y did not always transcend spirit-of-the-
times lip service.  In some companies, Theory Y resulted in therapeutic parlance rather than 
tangible results, finding its way into corporate mission statements of management philosophy or 
occasional management development programs as opposed to reformed corporate practice.    
 Yet by the time of his death in 1964, McGregor had tested the practical applications of 
Theory Y through consulting relationships with a number of major corporations.  His clients 
included Standard Oil of NJ (1952-63), the Champion Paper and Fiber Company (1958-60), the 
Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania (1961-4), and Imperial Chemical Industries, Ldt. of 
Great Britain (1964).
118
  Two of the corporate experiments for which he is best remembered were 
Procter & Gamble, where he guided a fundamental reorganization of manual labor and industrial 
hierarchy, and Union Carbide (a chemical and polymers company), where he helped engineer a 
largescale corporate restructuring through a pioneering Organizational Development program. 
These two experiments demonstrated both the real-life potential of participative management and 
the limitations of translating an idealistic theory into a material context. 
 Procter and Gamble was the “predominant company in American marketing” in 1962.119  
Famous for its innovations in packaged soap, laundry detergent, and disposable diapers, P&G 
had doubled its sales every year since the company’s establishment in 1837.  It had also become 
known for its experiments in human relations – the philosophy that sought, in the words of the 
company’s historians, “to align and bind together the interests of the company and its 
employees” because “meeting employee needs is good for business.”120  Previous experiments in 
                                                 
118
 This list of consulting relationships comes from Leadership and Motivation.   
 
119
 Art Kleiner, The Age of Heretics: Heroes, Outlaws, and the Forerunners of Corporate Change (New York: 
Currency Doubleday, 1996), 66. 
 
120
 Davis Dyer, Rising Tide: Lessons from 165 Years of Brand Building at Procter & Gamble (Boston, Mass: 





human relations included the development of a profit-sharing program in 1887; employee stock 
purchase in 1892; and a guarantee of steady employment in the 1920s.
121
   
 By the early 1960s, however, many of Procter & Gamble’s twenty plants were reeling 
from labor strife and the formidable strength of independent unions.  While the demand for the 
company’s products steadily increased, corporate executives worried that a number of plants 
were failing to produce even close to capacity.  Douglas McGregor was recruited as a consultant 
in the early 1960s upon the opening of a plant in Augusta, Georgia.  The application of his ideas 
at that plant, from its architecture to its pay scales, reveals the mixed legacy and intent of Theory 
Y in practice.  Alternatively know as “self-management” and “team-based management,” Procter 
& Gamble’s incorporation of Theory Y through its “technician system” aimed simultaneously to 
shatter the most authoritarian legacies of Taylor’s scientific management and to undermine the 
strength of unions at Procter & Gamble plants across the country.   
 Management historian Art Kleiner has rooted Procter & Gamble’s Theory Y innovations 
in an organic process of self-discovery and lofty idealism among top executives.  In the early 
1960s, Kleiner observes, scientific management reigned supreme at the company: “Workers 
were rigorously measured, sometimes in hundredths of a minute, against the optimum time that 
the rule books said it should take to climb a ladder, walk a tank, or read a gauge.”122  This 
“tangle of rules” was so time-consuming and frustrating for managers to enforce that “a quiet 
group of rebels began to gather in the upper echelons of the manufacturing division.” Led by 
David Swanson, manufacturing manager of the paper division, the group was “determined to 
find a way out from under Procter & Gamble’s rigid constraints.”  According to Kleiner, the 
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“rebels” knew their mission would entail “fighting the P&G corporate hierarchy, whose 
members were deeply committed to scientific management.”123  A new humanistic, bottom-up 
philosophy was born from the impatient utopianism of youthful corporate reformers on the 
inside, who recognized in Douglas McGregor a kindred spirit. 
 There is something mythic and appealing about Kleiner’s tale of corporate cowboys and 
their recognition that, to coin a phrase, “the times they were a-changin’.”  Yet other sources 
suggest a messier origin of Procter & Gamble’s corporate reform in the 1960s.  According to 
company historians Dyer, Dalzell, and Olegario, the post-war period was a “time of trouble” for 
Procter & Gamble because of labor-management strife.  Immediately following World War II, 
P&G was plagued by labor disputes concerning “job rights and jurisdictions, performance 
evaluation, discipline, time bonus incentive, overtime distribution, and contracting-out of 
work.”124  The company found that unions became increasingly “vigorous in policing the 
contracts inside the plants” and, according to Dyer et. al. were “not interested in changing the 
status quo.” 125   
 P&G confronted the reality of this labor stalemate when it opened a Tide plant in 
Sacramento in 1953 to keep up with a rapid growth in demand for the detergent.  Having 
designed the plant with the “latest and best technology” and cherry-picked the best of their staff 
from plants across the company, upper-echelon managers were shocked to see the plant’s 
“disappointing results in cost, volume, and productivity” – which they attributed to the fact that 
employers from older plants had arrived with customary “contractual restrictions and adversarial 
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attitudes” and were not actually interested in achieving high rates of efficiency or productivity.   
Already on the verge of opening additional plants in laundry, food, and paper divisions, 
corporate executives concluded that they “needed to find a better way.”126 
 Business writer Robert Waterman presents an even more negative portrait of labor 
relations at Procter & Gamble after WWII, citing one unnamed Midwestern plant that “seemed 
to produce more charges of unfair labor practices, grievances, and arbitration proceedings than 
products.” At this plant, David Swanson later testified, “’the state of industrial relations there 
was measured by the number of fist-fights on the plant floor each week.’”127  Swanson 
remembered one of many strikes at the plant when managers were flown in to run the production 
lines but were stopped at the local airport by employees “with pick-up trucks and shotguns.’”  
The same day, the warehouse was firebombed; “’It was war.’”128 A 1961 film made in one P&G 
plant captured one worker describing his relationship with his job: “’We have to just be here and 
go home…We don’t have to really put out.  We don’t add any ideas or anything extra.  It’s a big 
company and I can get away with not doing much.’”129   Another worker complained about the 
typical fresh-faced manager, hired right out of college, who possessed little to know knowledge 
of plant operations and yet interpreted experienced workers’ suggestions as accusations.130  By 
the early 1960s, worker-management relations had reached an impasse. 
 David Swanson, who joined the company in 1953, led P&G’s so-called bottom-up 
revolution.  In Swanson, multiple historical forces converged.  He had emerged from the Korean 
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War disillusioned with military command; he had studied at MIT with Douglas McGregor (after 
earning an undergraduate degree from Yale); and he witnessed the labor strife of the 1950s 
firsthand.   Swanson himself has credited the Korean War and the military more generally with 
his first epiphany about self-management: He left the armed forces in 1956 determined to “leave 
behind the barked orders, the arbitrary constraints imposed by superior officers, and the rigid 
structure of military life.”131  He was one of a larger group of men who joined Procter & Gamble 
after military service, and he later described a common disillusionment in the transition: “’We 
were really surprised at the similarities between the structures and behaviors in the military 
service and what we found in industry.’”132  Swanson was particularly disappointed to see the 
extent to which policy manuals and rule books constrained workers.  In his new role as Manager 
of the Paper Division, Swanson was determined to address both the squelched psyches of 
corporate “soldiers” and the limited growth of corporate profits. 
 By the time Swanson hired Douglas McGregor to consult in the building of a new Tide 
plant in Augusta, Georgia in 1961, Procter & Gamble had begun to investigate the increasingly 
popular field of behavioral science.  In the late 1950s, Philip Willard, a manager in the 
company’s corporate engineering division, formed a small group devoted to organizational 
development.  This group, responsible for the design of new plants, began researching new 
industrial relations strategies coming out of the University of Michigan, Harvard Business 
School, and UCLA.  Plans to open the new plant in Augusta in 1963 afforded “an opportunity to 
put the new thinking to the test.”133  Swanson was by then a member of the Augusta design team.  
While pursuing his Masters degree in chemical engineering at MIT a few years earlier, he had 
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enrolled in one of McGregor’s courses in the Sloan School of Management and studied 
McGregor’s Theory Y.  Concluding that Procter & Gamble plants exercised the dreaded Theory 
X management style across the board, he recommended that the company bring on Douglas 
McGregor as a consultant.   According to Art Kleiner, McGregor’s visits to Augusta 
“represented the first time anyone in manufacturing at P&G had been allowed to ‘examine our 
navals,’ as one manager put it.”134  What followed was a ground-breaking experiment in plant 
organization. 
 Under McGregor’s leadership, Swanson designed the Augusta plant to operate along 
what the organizational development group christened the “technician system,” which adhered to 
the fundamental philosophy of Theory Y espoused in The Human Side of Enterprise.  Swanson 
and his colleagues noted that P&G, with its emphasis on highly regimented, deskilled, and 
monitored wage work, epitomized the “command-and-control” ethos of Theory X, and they 
pledged to abandon “some of P&G’s most cherished practices.”135  In designing the Augusta 
plant, they eliminated production quotas, job classifications, and the incentive pay scheme.  In 
contrast to the fundamental principles of scientific management, “There would be no more 
operators who ran the lines, mechanics who fixed them, electricians who handled the wiring, or 
machinists who tooled new parts.”136  In their place would be “technicians”: the name given to 
almost all employees who were not managers.  Procter & Gamble’s technicians would work on 
salary and receive training in a number of different skills—from operating equipment, to 
repairing it, to developing longterm company goals.  As the technicians gained increasing levels 
of expertise, they would guide the development of the plant and, ideally, propel their plant 
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toward higher rates of productivity and efficiency.  The idea was to “’build the technicians’ 
knowledge of the business right up to that of the managers.’”137  
 Swanson and McGregor instituted a number of key reforms as they developed the 
physical and managerial structure of the Augusta plant, which was nonunionized.  Swanson 
made sure that the building contained several conference rooms so that management and 
technicians “could meet in places other than the cafeteria and the parking lot” to exchange ideas 
and otherwise communicate; such meeting places would build regular, two-way communication 
into the fabric of the operation.
138
  (Swanson later characterized this ideal as an “open system,” 
then a relatively new idea, in which “communications would flow up, down, and sideways in a 
very easy, uninhibited way.”139)  They scheduled regular meetings for technicians in these 
conference rooms, both with and without the presence of managers, and made sure that all 
company employees would be kept abreast of company news—not just the rosy, vague economic 
reports of the past, but real economic data that helped technicians understand which problems 
that needed fixing.  Swanson scheduled shifts for work groups of about twelve people to form 
some sense of team identity, and made sure that there was always a thirty-minute overlap at the 
change of shifts so that technicians from different shifts could share information with one 
another.    
 These work groups would, in turn, be “largely self-managed” and in charge of a vastly 
expanded range of activities. They would play a part in scheduling production, hiring peers, 
evaluating managers, and strategizing necessary technological developments.  Within each work 
group, each technician would perform a variety of tasks; even managers were required to work 
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“online” for some percentage of their careers, so that they would never forget the reality of the 
production system.  Finally, Swanson’s team introduced a new pay scale that would be based on 
skill acquisition rather than seniority. A technician would move up the salary scale by learning to 
repair equipment if previously he had only operated it, or by training for discussions of corporate 
strategy. The goal, according to Swanson, was to “take away the rule book and substitute 
principle for mandate,” which would in turn encourage “people to reach for responsibility.”140   
 The Augusta plant turned out to be a remarkable success not just philosophically but 
financially, making it a real-world validation of McGregor’s Theory Y.  By the mid-1960s, just a 
couple of years after the plant’s opening in 1963, Augusta was performing 30% better than any 
other P&G plant in terms of productivity, and its absentee rates declined below industry 
averages.
141
  At the same time, demand for Procter & Gamble products soared to new heights.  
Having opened one plant roughly once a decade for the first 125 years of its existence, the 
company built ten plants new plants from 1963 to 1975, primarily to manufacture the laundry 
products like Tide detergent, Downy fabric softener, and Biz bleach.  The August plant had set 
such a successful precedent that in 1967 corporate headquarters mandated that every new P&G 
plant be operated under the technician system.
142
  That said, organizational development 
personnel found it far more difficult to impose the technician system on old “Theory X” and 
unionized plants where existing managers feared the loss of power, workers feared the pressure 
to learn new skills, and unions feared that they would become unnecessary.
143
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 In assessing P&G’s management experiments, we must be careful not to overstate their 
adherence to McGregor’s core principles, in spite of the extent to which participation and 
“bottom-up” communication infused their management structures.  In a move that would have 
devastated McGregor’s colleague and role model Joseph Scanlon, the development of the 
technician system went hand in hand with the deunionization at Procter & Gamble.  Instead of 
learning to communicate with the unions – to establish candid “two-way communication” with 
them, as the proponents of “open systems” would say—the P&G organizational development 
group devised a way to strip unions of their authority within the organization.  Swanson 
acknowledged this aim openly—stating that one of the seven main innovations of the Augusta 
plant was to “establish and maintain a work environment in which employees would conclude 
that it was in their own best interest to operate without a union.”  One of his other central goals 
was to “Encourage change and high productivity in the absence of monetary incentive.”144   
 It is difficult to deduce the extent to which workers derived material as opposed to 
psychological benefits from the technician system.  On the one hand, technicians began earning 
salaried wages in 1963, with greater opportunity for financial mobility, and according to 
                                                                                                                                                             
Robert Waterman reported that the Lima plant “puts all of the plant’s 350 people in a position of leadership” and 
noted giddily that after observing “every meeting” as a reporter, “I had to ask who the managers were!” (Waterman 
47).  The Lima plant was developed by Charles Krone, who came from an organizational development background 
and was a proponent of “open systems” corporate philosophy, as outlined above, and Robert Seitz. Like the Augusta 
plant, Lima was a nonunion facility that operated with “relatively autonomous work teams as the fundamental unit 
of organization,” and roles within each team would be based on mastery of skill (Dyer et al 164).  The teams would 
choose their own members, decide who would do which work, which kinds of training to employ, and which 
projects to take on.  Building on the legacy of the Augusta plant, they would also have the opportunity to choose 
their own managers, change leadership roles as necessary, and handle “their own disciplinary matters, a 
responsibility they took very seriously and with standards stricter than those in traditional plants.”(Dyer 165)  As 
much as possible, in other words, the Lima plant delegated “day-to-day decisions” to the technicians.  After 
beginning production in 1968, Lima quickly became the most efficient and productive plant in the Procter and 
Gamble system.   
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Waterman, the benefit packages of managers and technicians were “almost identical.”145  Yet 
workers also lost the benefits of overtime pay and union-based job protection.  Without full 
access to company records, it is unclear whether P&G’s effort to “[change] the psychology of 
work” benefitted individual workers to the same extent that it boosted production capabilities.   
What is certain is that Procter & Gamble successfully incorporated and benefitted from 
participative reconceptions of managerial authority.  By transforming management from an act 
of control into an act of “facilitation” and “coaching,” and by transforming a line operator from a 
“worker” into a “technician,” Procter & Gamble shifted labor discourse from power to 
participation. 
 
 The motivations for incorporating Douglas McGregor’s principles could vary 
dramatically from one company to another.  In the case of Procter & Gamble, executives and 
managers embraced Theory Y in the face of labor strife, specifically aiming to quell tension 
between workers and their managers.  The development of Theory Y practices at the Union 
Carbide Corporation in the 1950s and ‘60s reveals a different set of incentives for enlisting 
McGregor.  Whereas Procter & Gamble operated less than 20 plants in 1962, Union Carbide ran 
300.  A massive conglomerate, Union Carbide contained five major divisions – chemicals, 
plastics, carbons, metals, and consumer products – that rarely communicated with one another.  
With the rapid expansion of the chemical and plastics industries after World War II, 
communication across plants or divisions proved increasingly complex.  At the same time, the 
corporation experienced years of relative profit stagnation in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and 
its President, Birny Mason, Jr., was willing to experiment to revive its economic viability.  
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Whereas Procter & Gamble’s Swanson sought techniques through which to commit formerly 
unionized workers to the company mission, Mason sought ways to centralize and unify a large 
conglomerate vying for dominance in the postwar economy.   With the help of industrial 
relations guru John Paul Jones and Douglas McGregor, Union Carbide built one of the nation’s 
first departments dedicated exclusively to organizational development.  From 1959 to 1965, 
these men focused their efforts less on building morale than on engineering clear communication 
throughout the higher echelons of management. 
 Union Carbide’s organizational development efforts can best be understood in the context 
of the corporation’s longer history, from its formation as a multi-pronged conglomerate to the 
explosion of the chemicals and plastics markets in the postwar period.  Union Carbide & Carbon 
Corporation (renamed simply Union Carbide Corporation in 1957) was created from the union of 
five smaller companies in 1917, when they were joined by the Chicago utility heir Cornelius 
Kingsley Garrison Billings.
146
  By the late 1930s, the corporation had become a major 
conglomerate: “a huge business in many businesses, selling a wide and disparate line of 
products” and “notoriously hard to run from on high” because division managers conceived of 
themselves as competitors for corporate profits
147
 By the end of the 1940s, Union Carbide and 
Carbon Corporation’s top executives had surrendered trying to run its fifteen subsidiaries 
closely; they conceived of themselves as “a mere holding company.”  The operating companies 
had their own presidents and policies, and sometimes their own boards of directors. William 
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Burck of Fortune Magazine wrote that “jealousy, and duplication, not to say multiplication of 
effort, were the order of the day” among operating presidents whose only contact with corporate 
staff tended to involve legal or financial guidance.
148
 
 That said, Union Carbide’s loose structure functioned passably well in flush economic 
times, which persisted for the company through World War II.  It wasn’t until after the war that 
warning signs emerged, thanks to a tremendous spike in competition and an increasingly 
saturated market.  In the wartime drive to increase production, the US government had 
encouraged and sponsored the expansion of the chemical industry, which boomed for a time.  
But at war’s end, “a lot of newcomers stayed in chemicals” and began to cut prices 
“aggressively.”149  At the same time, the American consumer and industrial market for chemicals 
and plastics took off exponentially.  By the mid-1950s, Americans were consuming three billion 
pounds of plastic and spending roughly $2 billion dollars on plastic products each year.
 150
  In an 
article from June 1956, the New York Times reported that the “Mere Infant of Ten Years Ago” 
had become a massively profitable industry characterized by constant, rapid innovations and 
attendant competition.
151
    
 From 1955-1963, Union Carbide had little choice but to expand its operations 
dramatically in order to keep up with demand.
152
  In 1960, the Times reported that Union Carbide 
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(which operated 300 plants in 1955) had spent $471 million on building new facilities in the 
previous three years, and planned to spend $175 million per year in 1960 and 1961—largely for 
the production of chemicals, plastics, and industrial gases.
153
  Yet the same article explained that 
the company’s first quarter sales and earnings reflected a “general ‘leveling out’ in the economy” 
because of “upward pressures for costs” and “downward pressures for prices.”154  Union Carbide 
suffered from competition with fellow “mammoths” like Dow Chemical Company, E.L. Du Pont 
de Nemours & Co., Inc., and Allied Chemical.
155
  The corporation found it difficult to boost 
profits or gain returns on massive investments in new plant and product development.  
According to most sources, profits and stock prices stagnated or declined through the early 1960s 




 Douglas McGregor first met John Paul Jones, the industrial relations manager of Union 
Carbide, in 1959, and was hired as a consultant to the corporation from 1963-1964 – one of his 
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last stints before his death in 1965.
157
  Together, along with the support of Birny Mason Jr. 
(executive vice president from 1959 to 1963, when he became chief executive officer), the men 
designed what one author has called a “pioneer” Organizational Development (OD) program.158  
McGregor and Jones organized a small internal consulting group, steeped in contemporary 
behavioral science knowledge, to assist Union Carbide’s managers in communicating across 
divisions.  Their consulting jargon promoted ideas like “leveling,” “team management,” and 
“collaborative problem solving.”159  In practice, they established a number of committees that 
operated across corporate divisions, holding regular meetings in which they discussed emerging 
problems and strategized possible solutions.  These committees, in turn, reported their 
discussions to a top-level group made up of the president and his three executive vice presidents.   
 Union Carbide’s ultimate goal was to establish participative management through 
collaborative committees, with constant communication between these committees and their 
superiors.  McGregor and Jones convinced the company’s executives that groups reached better 
decisions than isolated individuals and that candid communication from the bottom up produced 
superior results than orders from a superior.  While the experiment reads now as a relatively 
tame expression of McGregor’s key principles – lacking the more humanistic rhetoric of self-
actualization that often accompanied Theory Y’s applications—Union Carbide’s internal 
organizational development caused a stir in its own time.  Reflecting back on the experiment a 
decade later, Management Today cited the experiment as one of “the most avant-garde 
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approaches in behavioral science applications.”160  By the time of McGregor’s death in 1965, 
Union Carbide had transformed from an unwieldy, economically stagnant conglomerate into a 
more profitable and functional corporation.   
 It is worth noting that Union Carbide was not new to the field of human relations before 
the 1960s.  In an October 1955 article entitled “Corporations Too Are Only Human”, the New 
York Times’ Richard Butter announced that “Union Carbide’s interest in people gives it a 
distinct identity,“ for “few large companies are more employee-conscious than Union 
Carbide.”161  He chronicled a range of activities that labor historian Elisabeth Fones-Wolf has 
termed the “selling of free enterprise.”162  Before establishing a plant in a new community, 
Union Carbide sent out scouts to research its needs and investigate the potential impact of a 
company plant on its surroundings.  Having diagnosed certain areas as lacking in cultural and 
social activities, for instance, Union Carbide had sponsored community theater groups, brought 
symphonies to play concerts, initiated lecture series, and built playgrounds.  They also donated 
money and supplies to local schools.  Inside the company, Union Carbide offered softball, golf, 
and bowling leagues; the Carbide Gun Club and its annual turkey shoot; a 66-acre corporate 
picnic ground and park available for free use to all employees; and an annual “Family Day.”  
Fifty-four company publications were published throughout the Union Carbide complex, 
including a weekly newsletter and a monthly magazine.  Newcomers to the corporation were 
told, “‘[T]ake part in plant activities…and you’ll soon have a feeling of belonging at Union 
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Carbide.’”163 But by the late 1950s, these human-relations strategies had failed to forge 
economic prowess out of belongingness.   
 Union Carbide’s foray into more experimental human-relations methods stemmed from 
the vision of corporate vice president Birny Mason, Jr., who operated with increasing 
organizational authority throughout the early 1960s.  Mason’s vice presidency coincided with the 
period in which, according to Fortune Magazine, Union Carbide was “languishing under a 
cloud.”  (“Investors who were clamoring to pay $150 a share for its stock in 1959,” this article 
reported, “were scrambling to rid themselves of it at $85 a share in 1962.”164)  Mason became a 
vocal proponent of corporate centralization, insisting that the company profits would not rise 
until its fifteen operating companies started acting like part of a larger whole, and he recognized 
a moment of opportunity in the corporation’s economic struggles of the late 1950s and early 
1960s.
165
  It was Mason who, in 1959, asked John Paul Jones (whom he knew from the corporate 
industrial relations staff) to “look into what was being done in the field of management 
motivation and to set up a small staff group to help Union Carbide’s managers.”166   
 According to Douglas McGregor, his first encounter with Union Carbide came in 1959. 
Early that year, John Paul Jones, then a member of the corporate personnel staff, attended a 
seminar sponsored by the Foundation for Research on Human Behavior in Ann Arbor, Michigan, 
devoted to organization theory and behavioral science research.
167
  Jones heard papers by 
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thinkers like Chris Argyris, Rensis Likert, and Dorwin Cartwright, and returned to Union 
Carbide with the spirit of experimentation in tow.
 168
  Soon thereafter, having communicated his 
enthusiasm about the conference’s ideas to Mason, he was put in charge of a small unit called 
“Organization Development,” which served as an internal consultancy service for management 
training and development and reported to the corporate vice president of industrial relations.
169
 
Though one article about the history of Organizational Development traces McGregor’s 
beginnings at Union Carbide to 1957, McGregor himself wrote that the he and Jones, both  the 
sons of ministers, met in 1959 after this conference.
170
  McGregor offered crucial help in 
developing the OD program at Union Carbide in the early 1960s and became an official in-house 
consultant in 1963, 
 In McGregor’s final book, The Professional Manager (published posthumously in 1967), 
he held up his work at Union Carbide as a prime example of “Team Building,” offering the work 
of its Organizational Development group as a successful case study.  McGregor and Jones began 
their major OD plan in 1963.  Eighteen months later, when McGregor assessed Union Carbide’s 
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ongoing experiments, he called the team “remarkably effective” in terms of commitment and 
enthusiasm, and compared the OD group’s effect to “a process of ‘infection’ with what I, as a 
behavioral scientist, conceive to be a benign disease.”171  The Organizational Development group 
consisted of six subordinates in addition to Jones and McGregor – a tiny number in the sea of 
Union Carbide’s thousands of employees.  In the spirit of self-reflective behavioral science, one 
of the first tasks of the group was what McGregor called a “self-development project”: to 
develop as a team through the rigorous discussion of the group’s own mission, goals, principles, 
and what their larger role in the company should be.  The group’s members determined that their 
role could be effective only if they were seen as part of larger, “genuine process of group 
planning” and if Union Carbide’s managers saw them as an optional resource for feedback rather 
than an imposed roadblock or source of judgment from above.
172
   
 The simple mission of the OD group at Union Carbide, which was sometimes obscured 
by the jargon of its communications (their stated aim, for instance, to “develop a composite 
sociotechnical system”173), was to help managers manage better through participation and 
communication, and  to spread knowledge from contemporary behavioral science.
174
  The 
consultants’ services would be available to all company managers upon request (the OD 
consultant “will not seek to interject such services where they are not wanted”) and the 
requesting manager could decide to withdraw from the program at any time if he did not find it 
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  Ideally, the manager would offer the consultant from the OD group a “free and 
complete internal exchange of data” about his own division, and would trustingly communicate 
the problems he encountered in his job; only through mutual trust and open communications 
could progress occur.  “The sharing of every conversation and problem is not an objective of 
Organizational Development,” the team insisted, but effective consulting required as candid 
communication as possible.
176
  Having explained the central problems he faced, the manager 
could turn to the OD consultant for feedback about his operations. 
 The Organizational Develop group hoped to model group problem-solving and decision-
making to the people around them.  McGregor later reported with relief:  
[T]he relationships of this group with line management throughout the company 
are remarkably constructive.  There is virtually none of the suspicion and 
antagonism on the part of the ‘field’ that is so commonly found toward 
headquarters staff.  On the contrary, the requests for help are growing at a rate 
that raises questions about the team’s appropriate size and the possibility of 
developing individual consultants like themselves within divisions.”177 
 
The program’s ambassadors encouraged managers to think not in terms of which higher-ups they 
reported to, how they could mobilize their teams to accomplish goals, and how they might 
communicate with people outside their own divisions to get their jobs done.  Ultimately, they 
hoped, the larger organization’s corporate policies and hierarchy would evolve into a 
participative management structure.
178
    
 Jones himself emphasized the role of what he called “leveling” within the Organizational 
development group, defined as “’doing away with the phoniness of what passes for 
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communication between people.’”  If a group could “level” with each other and really begin to 
discuss things honestly, he suggested, they could make progress.  He cited one example in which 
a group of four divisional managers went on a retreat to Kanawha Valley, West Virginia, to 
discuss the problems they faced.  “At first they took up trivial cases, such as improving telephone 
service,” he explained, but “gradually they got to the things that counted—breaking through 
division barriers and doing away with redundant jobs and duplicate facilities.”179 While Jones 
and others conceded that “the Organizational Development’s group programs offer no panacea” 
because “Everybody can’t be in on everything,” and some executives remained “indifferent or 
skeptical,” Fortune’s William Burck reported that “Practically everybody of consequence in the 
company is tolerably familiar with Jones’ ideas, and in a company sweating to develop unity of 
purpose by group decision making, that is all to the good.’” 180  
 The establishment of the Organizational Development group at Union Carbide put a 
number of other important changes into motion.  Mason was promoted to the presidency of the 
corporation in 1963, convinced that Union Carbide could not thrive unless it developed a more 
centralized operating structure.  There were many in the organization who resisted the idea of 
centralization, arguing that the corporation was “too inherently a conglomerate to be managed 
centrally,” or that divisions needed more independence rather than less.   Mason spent the first 
three years of his presidency gathering information to support his case.  He also formed a group 
of six executives whose sole purpose it was to formulate a plan for reorganization.  Having 
discussed the plan by committee, at length, they shared their ideas with divisional managers and 
solicited feedback.  The plan Mason developed with his colleagues reflected Theory Y principles 
in both content and practice. According to Burck, “By letting both staff and operating people 
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discuss the reorganization for years, he subtly achieved a broad if not wholly unanimous 
acceptance of his aims.”181   
 The end result of Mason’s efforts was a master plan called “The Scheme,” which he put 
into effect on September 9, 1964.  The Scheme achieved unprecedented corporate integration by 
arranging Union Carbide’s fifteen divisions into four cross-divisional groups and assigning each 
division’s president to a shared operating committee that would discuss how to run the affairs of 
this newly enlarged group.  Mason also established a “President’s office” staffed by himself and 
three executive vice presidents (all in equally lavish, 1000 square-foot corner offices
182
) with 
whom the smaller operating groups could communicate.  Fortune later reported: 
The corporation has adopted the principle, to a degree practically unique in US 
businesses, that management decisions can usually be made better by working 
groups with diverse views and experience than by individuals.  The President’s 
Office is the top working group is the top working group of a company that is 
being run on every important level—corporate, divisional, departmental, plant—




Mason did not just increase communication between executives, but encouraged managers to 
participate in making decisions that affected the corporation as a whole.
184
  Unlike Procter and 
Gamble, which struggled to identify lower level workers with its larger corporate mission, the 
Union Carbide endeavor targeted disconnected, overly self-reliant managers who had forgotten 
to act—or refused to act—as part of team. 
 By December 1965, “The Scheme” had achieved a reasonable amount of success 
according to internal assessors.  The operating committees had gained increased responsibility 
and were communicating regularly with higher-ups. They had also reached unprecedented 
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solidarity regarding the pricing of products, and decided collectively to reduce the total number 
of divisions.  One executive reported that the men in the President’s office knew more about 
what was going on throughout the company than ever, thanks to minutes of all operating 
committee meetings and the expectation of constant communication.  He explained, “There is 
comprehension of our over-all problems that never existed before.’”185   
 Central to many admirers’ celebrations of Union Carbide’s success was the idea that 
more people were working “in the corporate interest,” negotiating individualism and diversity to 
arrive at what was best for the common good.
186
  Burck quoted a number of executives who 
expressed reservations but ultimately lauded the organizational development progress, explain 
that “I hated the idea…but now I believe it.” or conceding, “Life is not easier….But decisions 
are better.”187  President Mason himself communicated some level of ambivalence, conceding 
that “the problem of running a huge conglomerate, from the Soviet economy on down, is never 
solved because there is no perfect solution short of developing a new race of men with the 
accurate memory and analytical capacity of computers and the intuitive judgment of the greatest 
of managers.”  But he saw promise in the larger acceptance of centralization at Union Carbide, 
and in the company’s culture of pro-active problem-solving.   
 It is difficult to assess the extent to which Union Carbide’s team management philosophy 
truly revolutionized corporate operations and results.  Burck reported enthusiastically that the 
company’s 1964 sales had increased by 13 percent after “years of lethargy,” and that the “1965 
earnings have been running about 25 per cent higher” – which would seem to suggest a 
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correlation between a great economic turnaround and the biggest reorganization program in the 
company’s history.  But we would do wrong to conclude that the single variable of Theory Y 
teamwork shaped the company’s destiny, for this progress coincided with “the biggest capital-
goods boom in history” and the military’s high demand for chemical products during the 
Vietnam War (as most infamously was the case for Dow Chemical).
188
  
 Union Carbide’s experimentation with Theory Y management offers more confirmation 
of McGregor’s philosophical impact on corporate America than of the economic benefits it 
delivered; it also reveals the extent to which Theory Y could be applied in service of 
conventional corporate aims.  Union Carbide’s Mason and Jones did not see participative 
management as a vehicle for individuals’ self-actualization, but rather as a technique for 
generating managers’ “uncoerced unity of purpose.”189  At this corporation, McGregor’s ideas 
promised to unite a dysfunctional conglomerate, not liberate the psyches of discontented 
managers or their subordinates.  At the same time that Union Carbide was experimenting with 
corporate reorganization, however, McGregor’s theories had found far more therapeutic 
applications within the realm of management training and development.  No one organization 
better represented those applications than the National Training Laboratories for Group 
Development.
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“Behind the Executive Mask”:  
NTL and the Rise of Postwar Corporate Sensitivity Training 
 
 
 For decades following Kurt Lewin’s death in 1947, his friend and biographer Alfred 
Marrow continued to celebrate his humanistic legacy.  Marrow, the pajama-factory impresario, 
had championed experimental management methods since the earliest days of role-playing and 
leadership training at the Harwood Corporation.  By the mid-1960s, he emerged as one of the 
most enthusiastic proselytizers of the “T-group,” the technique that Lewin developed with a 
small group of colleagues in Connecticut in the months before his death.  The T-group, short for 
“training group,” was originally named the “basic skills training group,” and was commonly 
referred to as “sensitivity training” in the decades that followed. Unlike contemporary sensitivity 
training for a multicultural workplace, the training of the 1950s and 1960s was dedicated to 
sensitivity as an end in and of itself.  The goals were the cultivation of an empathic sensibility, 
more sensitive methods of communication with others, and higher levels of self-awareness.
1
   
Marrow spent decades working with the National Training Laboratories, the nation’s foremost 
disseminator of sensitivity training, and emerged with a fierce conviction that T-groups could 
cure the woes of contemporary capitalism.   
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Marrow was not alone in his enthusiasms.  Between 1955 and 1975, thousands of 
American managers and executives —sometimes along with their wives and secretaries2-- 
participated in work-sponsored sensitivity training groups offered by more than 100 
organizations in the US and Canada.  In the decades following Lewin’s death, the structure of the 
T-group remained remarkably consistent: The T-group united a small group of participants, 
ideally in a remote location far from the corporate fray, for as long as three weeks in an intimate 
workshop environment with a leader who encouraged disclosure of feelings and open critique of 
others.  Its success depended on the non-directive approach of the group leader and the method 
of feedback: as members of the group analyzed themselves and the experience of the group itself, 
other members responded with assessments of the speaker’s behavioral and verbal tendencies.3  
Participants were encouraged to candidly assess their groupmates and solicit honest feedback in 
turn.   Proponents of T-groups believed that people who were aware of themselves as individuals 
would function better in groups and in organizations; that if managers, supervisors, and 
executives could learn how to communicate, to listen to others’ needs, to function in an 
environment of anti-authoritarian openness, they could usher in a new era of organizational 
harmony and increased productivity.   The ideal T-group participant emerged with a strong sense 
of self-awareness, able to manage through relationships rather than crude incentives, and through 
emotions as opposed to rationality.   
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 Alfred Marrow published his most widely read celebration of corporate T-groups, Behind 
the Executive Mask: Greater Managerial Competence through Deeper Self-Understanding, in 
1964.
4
  The treatise rested on a standard premise of mid-20
th-
century human relations theory: that 
the corporate world was in the midst of “tremendous change,” and that the greatest challenge 
confronting the “profit-conscious executive” was the handling of people.5   Marrow framed his 
endorsement in strikingly existential language.  He explained in his introduction:  
To some extent we are all strangers.  We are strangers in ourselves to the extent 
that we do not really understand our inner motives and feelings.  We are strangers 
to each other because the image we project to the world outside is different from 
the way we see ourselves.  We don’t really know what we are like until we take 
off the masks we wear….This is perhaps the greatest discovery a man makes in 
sensitivity training: in learning through feedback his impact on other people, he 




In the treatise that followed, Marrow chronicled the experiences of real participants in a weeks-
long sensitivity training session sponsored by the National Training Laboratories as they tried 
and failed to remove their “masks.”  
 Marrow’s pseudonymed protagonists, all participating in a T-group to improve their 
performance at work, described their experiences in therapeutic and even spiritual terms.  One 
man “found it a real thrill” to “admit your faults to yourself” and “to be aware of them,” 
elaborating that “the only way to do that is to study yourself, to know what your potential is and 
understand how to reach it.”7 Another announced proudly towards the end of his training, “I 
know I will have to wrestle with false fronts to find the true self buried deep within my psyche.  
But I feel confident I now have the courage and competence to know myself without distortion 
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or partiality.”8 Marrow explained in his treatise that the excavation of authentic selves depended 
on a level of candor and intimacy that few of his managers had been able to achieve on their 
own.   
 The T-group that emerged in Marrow’s account was not simply a site of therapeutic 
connection, but one in which participants combated each other’s claims to authenticity.  In one 
encounter, two men clashed over interpretations of openness: 
‘Ralph, you baffle me.  What’s this about the ‘compassion’ you say you feel?  
You haven’t really warmed up to anybody yet.  If you have these warm feelings, 
why do they have to be kept so deeply inside of you?  When the talk gets around 
to matters of emotion or feeling, you clam up or shift the conversation to a more 
general topic.  You do!  I’ve noticed it.  Why do you hide your inner man, Ralph?  
Why not reveal him?  What are you afraid of?’9 
 
In another instance, a man named Ed sunk his verbal teeth into a fellow group member named 
Henry: 
‘I sometimes wonder what you feel behind that poker face.  No one here knows 
who you really are…You repress all your emotions.  We came here to help one 
another.  How can anyone help you?  We can’t even get to know you.  Looking at 
you this very moment, I don’t know how you feel about what I’m saying.’10 
 
Through such dialogues, Marrow revealed a world in which candor and authenticity constituted 
forms of corporate currency.  In many ways, his book marked the success of humanistic 
management principles in American business.  Yet it also revealed the gulf that had developed 
between Lewin’s lofty social and scientific ideals and the principles of his successors.   
  
 This chapter explores the history of NTL and the evolution of corporate sensitivity 
training from Lewin’s death in 1947 through its triumph in the mid-1960s.  As NTL rapidly 
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expanded in this period, it spawned a group of kindred institutions across the country that 
incorporated developments in humanistic psychology as espoused by Carl Rogers and Abraham 
Maslow.  By the end of the 1960s, hundreds of corporations, including Exxon, American 
Airlines and IBM, had experimented with T-groups.  The technique had spread around the 
world—to human relations consultants in Australia and South America, for instance—becoming 
a staple of business school curricula, educational training programs, and even government 
agencies in the US and abroad.  According to a 1969 report from the National Industrial 
Conference Board, sensitivity training had emerged as “perhaps the most influential and 
widespread application of behavioral science research in education and in industry.”11   
 The story of NTL reveals the way in which Lewin’s “action research” gradually 
transformed into a style of corporate rhetoric and communication.  For in the 1950s and 1960s, 
as sensitivity training became a profitable service in the corporate landscape, organizations like 
the National Training Laboratories – organized originally on principles of democratic, anti-
prejudicial action—struggled to stay true to their original aims.   They found themselves 
straddling sometimes irreconcilable goals of financial and humanistic progress, individual and 
social growth, therapeutic and activist ambition.  The T-group, which had been designed as a 
“training” tool by social scientists committed to group dynamics research and democratic action, 
transformed throughout the 1950s and 1960s into a symbol of personal authenticity and 
therapeutic expression.  At the same time, leaders of the National Training Laboratories 
committed themselves increasingly to private, corporate organizations rather than the sites of 
community dynamics Lewin had originally envisioned.  Community relations receded from the 
                                                 
11
 Harold M. F Rush, Behavioral Science; Concepts and Management Application, Studies in Personnel Policy no. 





foreground as NTL found itself an international leader of management consulting, a field 
plagued by its own fierce debates about the benefits of self-actualization as organizational salve. 
 
 As chronicled in the previous chapter, the National Training Laboratories for Group 
Development (NTL) opened its doors in 1947 in Bethel, Maine as a training site for managers, 
educators, ministers, and government officials.
12
  NTL’s founders – Leland Bradford, Ronald 
Lippitt, and Kenneth Benne -- developed the T-group in service of a broad agenda.  Emerging 
from backgrounds spanning adult education and government administration, they dedicated 
themselves to the larger mission of “organizational effectiveness” in the postwar era.13  The US 
economy and society were going through rapid processes of intense change, and these men 
believed that possibilities for smooth transitions rested in the hands of the country’s leaders.  
They designed their workshops to help people from diverse occupational backgrounds lead better 
by learning to communicate openly within small groups.  
When NTL opened its doors the in the summer of 1947 under the leadership of Benne, 
Bradford, and Lippitt, the Basic Skills Training Group (the term “T-group” wouldn’t emerge 
until 1949) was to be the primary focus of training and research.    Ideally, the T-group provided 
“maximum possible opportunity for the individuals to expose their behavior, give and receive 
feedback, experiment with new behavior, and develop everlasting awareness and acceptance of 
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self and others.”14  The “crucial discovery,” according to Kurt Back, “was that these procedures 
could bring about intense emotional experiences among most participants” and produce a range 
of “subjective experiences” that previous group dynamics studies had failed to access.15  It is 
worth noting that the founders of NTL saw themselves not as therapists, but as educators and 
researchers posed to train a new generation of leaders with the necessary skills for postwar 
rebuilding.
16
  To the extent that they drew ideas from group psychotherapy work, they intended 
to do so in the service of social change and—in the words of Kenneth Benne—“democratic 
morality.”17   
 After witnessing the success of the first Basic Skills Training Group, Benne, Bradford, 
Lippitt, and Lewin agreed that the Basic Skills Training method deserved an institutional 
platform and developed the proposal for what was originally christened the National Training 
Laboratories for Group Development (before being shortened to the National Training 
Laboratories, and—in 1965—lengthened again to the NTL Institute for Applied Behavioral 
Sciences).  After stumbling upon a remote location—the Gould Academy, a preparatory school 
in Bethel, Maine, which agreed to rent out its facilities for summer sessions—Bradford secured 
funding from the National Education Association, along with an endowment from the US Office 
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  He and his co-founders then recruited staff from centers for the study of 
behavioral science at MIT and Harvard – men whose interests ranged from rational, scientific 
research to more experimental methods of social change.
19
  They developed a daily training 
schedule centered on the Basic Skills Training Group and held their first three-week training 
session in the summer of 1947.  This first session was, according to Bradford, a “tremendous 
success” filled with the “spirit of adventure and enthusiasm,” with discussion groups going late 
into the night and transforming into raucous bouts of drinking and singing.
20
  One of the qualities 
that made Bethel particularly successful, Bradford would explain on many occasions, was the 
town’s ability to serve as a “cultural island.”  Far from corporate or urban fray, it offered 
participants opportunities to sever themselves from their everyday lives and patterns.    It was an 
ideal site for the “unfreezing” and “refreezing” of group dynamics that Kurt Lewin had 




 In its early years, NTL proudly wore the banner of “group dynamics” and celebrated its 
mission as one fundamentally connected to the operation of groups within democratic society.  
An early memo entitled “Prospective for the National Training Laboratory for Group 
Development” (1949) framed the organization’s work in grave terms: 
The problems of modern society are primarily problems of human relations at all 
levels in our complex social organization.  We are threatened by world wars, 
national dictatorships, minority group tensions, labor-management frictions, 
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schisms within institutions, inefficiency in the functioning of small groups, and 
the disorganization of personality…Changing conditions demand new 
adjustments of individuals, of groups, of institutions, and of the larger social 
structure.
22
   
 
By extension, the memo continued, the “basic objective of NTL” would be to “provide an 
opportunity for the analysis and practice of democratically and scientifically based methodology 
for the solution of problems in human relations.”23  
  Both early NTL documentation and external press emphasized the “planning of change” 
in service of “democratic ethics.”24  By placing participants in small groups, and by allowing 
them to work in close collaboration with social scientists – those pivotal actors on the postwar 
stage—NTL staff would grant T-group members previously non-existent opportunities for 
experimentation and awareness in group relations.  At the same time, even NTL’s earliest 
literature suggested a precarious balance between the needs of the individual and the needs of the 
group.    In a pronouncement of the “democratic norms” espoused by the organization, one 
memo explained paradoxically that “the planning of change must be anti-individualistic yet 
provide for the establishment of appropriate areas of privacy and for the development of persons 
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as creative units of influence in our society.”25  This tension between individualistic and group 
goals would plague NTL tirelessly in decades to come, with many critics arguing that the two 
goals were mutually exclusive, while many advocates argued that they were symbiotic.   
 
 The period of NTL’s founding through the mid-fifties (what Kurt Back refers to as the 
“heroic period”) was one of both experimentation and stabilization.26  By 1954 (the year that the 
NTLGD was shorted to the NTL), its staff had grown to 200 and NTL had attracted a sizeable 
grant from the Carnegie Foundation.
27
  Meanwhile, NTL’s work began to spread around the 
country and the world.  In the early 1950s, one of the original staff members, Paul Sheats, left 
NTL for UCLA and started the Western Training Laboratory in Group Development, where he 
continued to use the T-group (in a more slightly more humanistic incarnation).  NTL’s methods 
also spread to the Midwest Workshop in Community Relations at the University of Chicago 
(1952) and to expanding regional labs in Boston, the San Juan Islands, and Colorado.
28
    
 Through the early 1950s, NTL’s clientele included representatives from realms of 
education, government, industry, ministry, and medicine.  In keeping with its broad ideological 
aims, early NTL Human Relations Laboratories tended to contain a diverse array of participants 
(whom the organization labeled “delegates”).  A 1950 summer laboratory roster included 
Captain Lot Ensey of the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode island; Margaret Adams, a 
professional advisor to the Girl Scouts of America; Charles Laing, a second vice president of the 
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Prudential Life Insurance Company; and Ruth Morgan, a faculty member of the School of Social 
Welfare of the University of California.  The 113 delegates at their session also included 
representatives from labor organizations, churches, health departments, social service, federal 
welfare agencies, the Air Corps, and educational associations.
29
  By the mid-1950s, 1000 people 
of diverse backgrounds were participating in summer human relations training laboratories held 
in Bethel or sponsored by NTL and held across the country, representing organizations like the 
Graduate Nurses Administration, the Baldwin (Long Island) Public School System, and the 
National Social Welfare Assembly Committee on Youth Services.
30
  
 In the first several years of its existence, NTL remained committed to the idea of 
“heterogeneous” labs: groups containing people from a variety of organizations who met for the 
first time within the structure of the T-group.  Through heterogeneous groups, the original 
strategists argued, participants would develop group dynamics anew.  They would not bring any 
pre-existing tensions or biases to the table, and they would not hesitate to communicate with the 
degree of candor that T-groups necessitated.
31
  In the mid-1950s, this approach became an object 
of debate.  A pivotal advisory committee proposed in November 1954 that NTL establish two-
week homogeneous labs for members of the same organization who were in search of better 
group dynamics.  The committee also proposed that NTL establish itself as an “extension 
service” that could be hired out to organizations on a consultancy basis and run in-house training 
programs.
32
   Though NTL continued to use heterogeneous formations in it summer human 
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relations laboratories, its foray into homogeneous organizational labs prompted a period of major 
growth within the organization.    
 Early organizational clients included the National Red Cross, whose internal 
Management Development Program worked with NTL throughout the 1950s; the American 
Cancer Society; and the National Security Agency, which developed a one-week Executive 
Development Program in consultation with NTL in 1955.
33
  The introduction of homogeneous 
(sometimes called “family”) laboratories opened up a new set of possibilities for NTL: Rather 
than working with diverse delegates toward abstract aims of democratic participation and 
awareness of group dynamics, NTL could help corporations, non-profits, and government 
agencies work toward the solution of distinct, organization-based problems.  T-groups could 
function as a salve within organizations struggling with any number of human relations concerns, 
targeting particular group dynamics dilemmas and curing bureaucratic woes.   
 With its shift toward organizational labs, NTL evolved into a leader of human relations 
and management training domestically and abroad.  At the same time, the shift inspired a range 
of questions about the core identity of the organization. Was NTL’s mission to improve 
interpersonal relationships and communication within America’s struggling communities, or was 
it to improve group dynamics at independent organizations?  Could it do both?  And could 
democratic aims be maintained when working with private firms? 
 Two of NTL’s first major forays into the field of industrial human relations did not take 
place in the United States, but in Europe—where funds from the US Marshall Plan, the European 
Productivity Agency, and the umbrella Organization for European Economic Co-operation 
sponsored exchanges between NTL social scientists and researchers and industrialists abroad. In 
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1953, NTL trainer Gordon Lippitt first traveled to Western Europe to introduce training 
laboratories as part of the Organization for European Economic Development.
34
   Then, in 
February 1954, NTL leaders Leland Bradford, Richard Beckhard, Robert Hood, and Elbert Burr 
participated in a more elaborate exchange with the Austrian Productivity Center (APC) as part of 
a larger “Training of Trainers” program. 35   
 The report from Bradford’s team articulated a familiarly lofty purpose: 
The past eight years have seen an impressive mobilization of American 
machinery and technical resources to aid the European economy to recover itself 
from war’s disaster.  An examination of the European economy clearly 
demonstrates, however, as experience and research in America have already 
proven, that machines and technical resources are not alone the key to increased 
industrial productivity.  It is more and more evident, both in the United States and 
in Europe, that individual human beings must work in close and satisfying 





The project’s training team had been recruited by the Productivity and Technical Assistance 
Office in Paris, with finances provided by the Productivity and Technical Assistance Section of 
the United States Operations Mission to Austria.  The trip marked what its team called the “first 
effort toward expanding training in human relations in industry in Europe,” and a novel 
introduction of the principle that “in training in human relations…people learn by doing.”37  
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See Bradford 94. 
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36









Their mission was to expose about 100 trainers and employees from Austrian industry (“top, 
middle, and line supervision”38), government, education, and labor to the experiential laboratory 
practices of NTL and contemporary theories of group dynamics, in the hopes that Austrian 
trainers would replicate and spread these methods and that the nation’s universities would begin 
collaborating with Austrian industry to produce further human relations research. 
 Bradford and his colleagues’ strategy in Austria was multi-pronged.  They offered two-
week workshops to top management and administrators, in which they led participants in a 
“conference-style,” small-group approach to problem solving—known to their American 
counterparts as “T-groups.”  They supplemented this experience with lectures, demonstrations, 
and films.  The team also offered shorter, one-week workshops to middle managers and union 
officials, and then another for foremen and shop stewards.  Throughout the program, Austrian 
assistants worked with the Americans to plan and evaluate the small groups and lead discussions 
about the experience.  A typical day involved over four hours of small group work.  In 
“Experience” groups, the Austrians evaluated the human relations or leadership dilemmas facing 
their group in the “here and now.”  They role-played and addressed the problems inhibiting their 
communication with one another.  In “Discussion groups,” participants reflected on their days’ 
work and had the opportunity to question their trainers.
39
  
 The Austrian participants initially noted rising levels of frustration on their daily 
evaluations, expressing concern with the lack of overt leadership within their groups, and with 
the lack of practical advice about exporting training methods to their respective organizations.
40
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But their trainers deemed the experiment a success.  They noted that “the men moved quickly 
from a passive group of ‘students’ to an active group of participants” who “share[d] 
responsibility” for both presenting material and thinking of ways to apply it to their own 
organizational situations.   After initially expressing the pessimistic attitude of “It can’t be done 
in Austria,’” Bradford and his team reported, the participants “changed to a point of view such as 
this: ‘How can I convince my boss even if he is on the negative side?’”41  Another member of the 
program, NTL Associate and Austria native “Doc” Lindner, reported in the organization’s 
newsletter, “‘Before we started it seemed like a big risk for our staff, but it turned out to be a full 
success.  Our delegates reacted exactly the same way Americans do, and so the universal value 
of this training for better mutual understanding was proven again.’”42 The US trainers 
recommended not only that the Austrian Productivity Council continue its human relations 
regime in Austria (with clearer communication and support from the US government, they 
specified), but that similar productivity programs be conducted across Europe.
43
 
 In the summer of 1954, The APC and the Foreign Operations Administration 
reciprocated by sending a team of Austrian trainers to the US to participate in three months of a 
“Training-of-Trainers” project.  The Austrians’ visit included stops at the country’s most 
prominent centers of Human Relations research, including the University of Michigan, the 
Boston University Human Relations Workshop, the University of Chicago, and the NTL 
                                                                                                                                                             
leaders, before deeming their own experiences successful.  Discomfort with insufficiently structured or pragmatic 
aims in e group work appears repeatedly in decades of T-group testimonies. 
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Laboratory in Bethel, Maine.
44
  “Doc” Lindner returned to Austria repeatedly in the years 
following, helping to lead workshops for the Austrian Productivity Center in Vienna, Graz, 
Innsbruck,, and Dorulira—ultimately leading twenty workshops by the beginning of 1957—and 
went on to conduct leadership training with the Institute of Social Research at the University of 
Vienna, before branching out to conduct seminars for the German Productivity Center.
45
  All 
incarnations of the training workshops involved the format of the T-group, and NTL held up 
their Austrian collaboration as a prime example of the technique’s fundamental transportability. 
 The year after NTL sent trainers to work with the Austrian Productivity Center, Leland 
Bradford began a more expansive collaboration with the European Productivity Agency, which 
fueled NTL’s relationships with industrial trainers in many European nations.  After the Marshall 
Plan officially stopped doling out American funds for European development in 1952, its “cult of 
productivity” continued under the auspices of the European Productivity Agency, a subgroup of 
the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation largely financed by the United States.  In 
the years that followed, over 3000 specialists and hundreds of farmers visited American farms, 
factories, and training centers to glean information and techniques that might improve their rates 
of productivity.
46
  NTL was one of many organizations enlisted in the effort, and its relationship 
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with the European Productivity Agency flourished in the second half of the 1950s, with the T-
group emerging as a major social science “export” of the era. 
 In April 1955, Roger Grégoire announced the mission of the European Productivity 
Agency, of which he was deputy director, in an address delivered at the Palazzo Vecchio in 
Florence, Italy.
47
  “The work we are undertaking,” he explained to an audience of social 
scientists, “is one of applied science.”   Gregoire celebrated the practicality of the social 
sciences—insisting that “some of the most flourishing schools of sociology have developed in 
proportion to the results it has been possible to derive from their work”—but also cautioned 
against the misuse of contemporary social theories.  He acknowledged that “our trade-union 
friends are afraid the science of human relations may lead to it being used as a kind of 
anaesthetic.”  While “[t]his is a fear that must be removed,” he conceded that the fear itself was 
not ungrounded.  Politicians, industrial leaders, and assorted professional groups had tried “to 
use this science for their own ends,” transforming idealistic theories into “a series of utilitarian 
formulas.”48  The task before the social scientists commissioned by the European Productivity 
Agency was to propagate social science theory and methods abroad in the service of economic 
cooperation and transatlantic progress—not on behalf of crass profit motives or the manipulation 
of workers.
49
    
                                                 
47
 “Human Relations in Industry, EPA Project No. 312, Part ‘A’—Florence Discussions,” folder “Human Relations 
in Industry,” box M1062, Bradford papers, AHAP. 
 
48
 “Human Relations in Industry, EPA Project No. 312, Part ‘A’—Florence Discussions,” 3. 
 
49
 For commentary on the flaws of the European Productivity Agency’s Vision, see Harold Leavitt, “On the Export 
of American Management Education,” The Journal of Business 30, no. 3 (July 1957): 153-61.  Here Leavitt suggests 
that while the US has made steps toward transferring management techniques to Europe through programs like the 
European Productivity Agency and the Ford Foundation, some fundamental flaws remain in the transfer—namely 
that American trainers tend to overlook critical differences between American and European contexts, and possess 
fundamentally different conceptions of “good society” and “good business.”  While Americans prioritize 
productivity in human relations training, Leavitt suggests, Europeans tend to associate human relations with social 
welfare, for they are more invested in social matters of family and class.  They believe the businessman has a “social 





 The esteemed social scientist Rensis Likert (of the University of Michigan’s Institute for 
Social Research) echoed these sentiments in a talk entitled, “The Contributions of Human 
Relations Research to Improved Productivity,” delivered in Florence to the same audience of 
scientists.
50
  Here, he critiqued the prevailing philosophy of management in the US and abroad, 
which he characterized as the assumption that “when an organisation buys an employee’s time it 
has the power and authority to control his behavior.”51  Traditional management theory 
suggested that to achieve maximum productivity, work should be broken into simple, de-skilled 
tasks; employees should be closely monitored by supervisors and disciplined for insufficient 
productivity; and supervisors should avoid wasting time by talking to underlings about personal 
problems, or by training them for promotions .  The best human relations practices, Likert 
argued, operated on exactly the opposite set of principles.  They advocated group work rather 
than close hierarchical supervision, advancement and challenge rather than deskilled 
specialization, and the introduction of “human” qualities to the supervisor/employee relationship.  
Citing studies of thousands of workers, Likert celebrated the potential of cutting-edge human 
relations research to dramatically increase productivity worldwide. 
 As a foremost advocate of participation and group collaboration and democratic decision 
making, NTL exemplified Likert’s celebrated mid-century human relations advances.  In 
February 1955, NTL Director Leland Bradford left for three months of consultation with the 
                                                                                                                                                             
human relations in terms of financial incentives.  Leavitt suggests that Europeans are also fundamentally less open 
to democratic dialogue between superiors and underlings because their power structures tend to be more autocratic.  
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European Productivity Agency, for which he was headquartered in Paris and charged to work 
with representatives of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom.
52
  In the summer of that year, the EPA sent twenty-eight Europeans from seven 
countries to the US for a ten-week training program under the supervision of the National 
Training Laboratories (with Lee Bradford, Gordon Lippitt, Bob Luke and Aieleen Waldie as 
project supervisors).  Their stay involved a visit to the Rutgers Labor-Management School, a 
discussion of human relations methods at the University of Boston’s Human Relations Center, a 
visit to the offices of the American Management Association, a tour of factories in Detroit, 
participation in a joint program sponsored by NTL and Michigan’s Institute for Social Research, 
and finally, participation in one of NTL’s T groups in Bethel, Maine.53   
 In December 1955, NTL recruited a team of four social scientists to spend a year in 
Europe working with the EPA to develop industrial training programs in human relations, with 
an emphasis on “the development of action research,” under the auspices of the International 
Cooperation Administration.
54
  The group began by holding its first workshop for 227 French 
trainees in Paris, and went on to conduct conferences and workshops in Belgium, Norway, 
Sweden, Turkey, England, Holland, and Italy.
55
  The NTL training team returned from after two 
months of work, immediately planning to return to Europe to conduct follow-up programs, and 
reporting “particularly successful” training activities in England and Holland.56   
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 Throughout the 1950s, outside of work with the European Productivity Agency, NTL 
continued to export T-groups and other brands of human relations training to a number of other 
nations.  Group dynamics work proved popular in India, where a member of the Ford Foundation 
(which sponsored many of NTL’s activities abroad), celebrated NTL’s “human relations 
insights” as “one of the most exportable commodities which the United States has developed.”57  
NTL affiliates also introduced the organization’s techniques in Venezuela58, Iran59, Puerto Rico, 
Japan,
60
 Germany, and Thailand, where NTL associate Fred Peterson became an advisor on 
executive development and training to the government in Bangkok.
61
 The National Training 
Laboratories had announced itself as an international leader in management training in the period 
directly before its establishment as a management development leader in the US. 
 
 In 1954, during the meeting at which the National Training Laboratories board members 
decided to move their emphasis from “heterogeneous” labs to “homogenous” groupings, the 
chairman of the Advisory Committee and the president of the Ansul Chemical Company, Robert 
Hood (who had been part of the Austrian Productivity team), “urged us to develop an industrial 
                                                 
57
 Human Relations Training News 1, no. 2(October 1954). 
 
58
 Fred Peterson of NTL took a permanent position with the Industrial Relations Department of the Creole Petroleum 
Corporation in Caracas, Venezuela.  See Human Relations Training News (September-November 1955). 
 
59
 NTL associates Eleanor and Arnold Lessard spent a year in Iran in 1957 to consult with the Iranian Oil Refining 
Company in Abadan.  See Human Relations Training News 2, no. 2 (January-February-March 1957). 
 
60
 See Human Relations Training News 2, no. 5 (November-December 1957): “Jyuji Misumi writes that ‘interest in 
‘Human Relations’ has been growing in Japanese Industries’ and that Kyushy University now has an Institute for 
Group Dynamics” – which will have two divisions, one emphasizing “basic research” and the other emphasizing 
“Action research”; they expect to set up a National Training Center as well. 
 
61
 See Human Relations Training News 3, no. 1 (January-February 1959) for the announcement of his postion, and a 
full article entitled “Human Relations Training in Thailand” in Human Relations Training News 4, no. 1 (April 
1960).  This article details Peterson’s work with governors, education officers, agricultural officers, and health 






lab for middle management.”62  NTL’s newly formed Industrial Committee met in mid-1955 to 
begin planning an “Industrial Laboratory” for managers and executives; the members of the 
committee included Elbert Burr of Mondanto Chemical Co.; Robert Hood of Ansul Chemical 
Co.; Edward Malott of the American Management Association; Robert Samptons of A.T, 
Cearney and Co.; Alexander Winn of the Aluminum Company of Canada; and Richard Beckhard 
of Conference Counselors.
63
  Their meeting ushered in a new phase of National Training Lab’s 
evolution and became responsible for the first period in which the institute became financially 
self-sustaining.   With the emergence of the Management Work Conference in Developing 
Human Resources in 1956 and the Key Executive Conference on Executive Behavior in 1957 ( a 
division that represented NTL’s concessions to corporate hierarchy), NTL established itself as 
one of the key forces of a new school of Human Relations that had emerged in the postwar 
period.  Over the coming decades, NTL would—to the disappointment of some of its original 
founders—become synonymous with the idea of managerial sensitivity training and corporate 
effectiveness.   
Two prominent postwar theorists of human relations affiliated with NTL in the early 
1950s were employed as consultants for its first Management Work Conference in 1956.  Chris 
Argyris and Douglas McGregor were two of the field’s best known advocates of participative 
management and self-actualization in the workplace.  These two major organizational theorists 
not only served on the original committee that developed the plan for the first Management 
Work Conference (originally called the “Laboratory for Industrialists”), but continued to act as 
staff members on Management Work Conferences at NTL for years to come.  Their influence 
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was evident in the rhetoric and aims surrounding the original Management Work Conference, 
which reflected the dominant themes of mid-century humanistic management theory. 
Douglas McGregor, who has been discussed at length in Chapters  3 and 6, promoted 
what he called “Theory Y”: the principle that most workers crave challenge, participation, and 
creativity in the workplace, and that managers should design their practices in accordance with 
these principles.  Yale professor Chris Argyris built a similar argument about the relationship 
between individuals, their superiors, and the organization at large in an oft-cited 1957 book 
entitled Personality and Organization.
 64
  Too often, he explained, human relations experts 
assumed that the best way to fuse an individual with the organization in which he worked was to 
pressure the individual to conform completely to the organization’s demands.65  In so doing, they 
lost sight of the employee as an individual with his own needs and emotions—as person going 
through a continual “personalizing process” with self-expression at its core.66   
In Personality and Organization, Argyris invoked theories of child development to drive 
his point home.  Consider the child’s path to maturity, he suggested, and the process of 
personality development. We are born into this world in a state of complete passivity, unaware of 
our surroundings; as we grow older, we become increasingly independent, active, and aware.  
We feel in charge of our environment.
67
  Organizations had made a grave mistake in neglecting 
this basic fact of personality development.  Too often, they addressed workers as children and 
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subscribed to several dominant assumptions about workers’ character: that they are lazy, 
apathetic, uninterested, money-crazy, and wasteful; that they need to be dependent on their 
superiors, because nothing would get accomplished otherwise.
68
  Argyris countered these 
dominant assumptions with Abraham Maslow’s theory of self-actualization, which had recently 
been published in his 1954 book Motivation and Personality.
69
  
 For Argyris, the ultimate solution to the problem of insufficiently actualized employees 
lay in the theory of participative management.
70
  Argyris asked, “How truly participative (i.e. 
spontaneous and free) can subordinates be if they are dependent on their leader?  How much 
democracy can we have if the power lies in the one who leads and not in the ones who are 
led?”71  He argued that modern employers needed to decrease workers’ passivity and dependence 
by giving them more control over their environments, more chances to participate in decision-
making, more opportunities for mobility, and more changes to express “pent-up feelings ranging 
from outright aggression and hostility to passive internalization of tensions” that restricted 
productivity in the workplace.
72
  
 NTL’s Management Work Conference in Developing Human Resources was designed to 
promote anti-authoritarian qualities in managers.  An October 1955 proposal for the workshop 
laid out two of its basic purposes: “To increase the awareness of managerial persons of the larger 
                                                 
68
 Argyris, Personality and Organization, 123. 
 
69
 See Maslow, Motivation and Personality, 1954.  The term “self-actualization” actually originated with the 
German neurologist Kurt Goldstein, but Maslow brought it to the attention of culture at large.  For more on 
Maslow’s theories and practices, see Chapters 3 and 9 of this dissertation. 
 
70
 Participative management was related to Peter Drucker’s theory of “management by objectives,” which he 
detailed in The Practice of Management (New York: Harper, 1954).  According to this theory, managers and their 
subordinates would jointly define working goals and divide responsibilities. 
 
71
 Argyris, “Organizational Leadership and Participative Management,” 2. 
 
72






contributions that individuals can make to the workplace situation” and—most notably—“to 
increase managers’ awareness of the human potential.”73  These principles could have been taken 
directly from the management principles advocated by Argyris, McGregor, and their humanistic 
human relations comrades.  The proposal also specified a focus on the group work that had 
become NTL’s trademark.  Over the course of one-to-two weeks of workshops, participants in 
the management lab would attend daily three-hour T-groups containing approximately fifteen 
participants.  In these groups, participants “would have the opportunity to learn through sharing 
their own knowledges and insights” and would learn to “diagnose the interpersonal relations of 
their discussion experience as a means of becoming more sensitive and diagnostic about human 
factors.” 74  The rest of each day’s itinerary would include presentations of current theories in 
industrial human relations; managerial skill practice sessions; case study discussions; and “Off-
the-Record Groups” in which small clusters of six to eight people would casually gather to 
discuss their experiences in the labs and compare insights.
75
 The proposal concluded by 
suggesting a range of staff members from institutions including MIT (where McGregor was 
serving as a professor); Yale University (where Chris Argyris was based); University of 
Michigan’s Institute for Social Research and Research Center for Group Dynamics76; and the 
Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration. 
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 NTL’s first Management Work Conference was held for two weeks in February 1956 at 
Columbia University’s Arden House, a conference center on a mountaintop west of the Hudson.  
Twenty-five delegates came to participate in the workshops and were greeted by an 
overabundance of staff —“as we had much anxiety about this first attempt in the industrial field 
we wanted to make sure of its success.”77  These participants represented companies like the 
Dow Chemical Company, Eli Lilly & Company, The Maytag Company, Prudential Insurance 
Company of America, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, Detroit Edison, US Steel 
Corporation, and J. Walter Thompson Company, and SC Johnson and Sons.
78
  Kenneth Benne 
and Herb Shepard oversaw the Conference’s T-groups, which were—as outlined in the original 
proposal—integrated with more structured, organizationally-oriented exercises.  In one role-
playing exercise, group members group were placed in charge of a hypothetical company named 
Arden Metal Products and instructed to figure out how to split up vacation time for their 
workers.
79
  While T-groups were the centerpiece of training in the conference, participants also 
emerged with a solid grounding in the humanistic human relations principles of their day. 
 Participants learned in their introduction to the Management Work Conference that “[t]he 
basic purpose of management development is to bring about personal leadership growth rather 
                                                                                                                                                             
working with a large industrial firm, for which the ISR’s Survey Research Center would be responsible for 
collecting survey research data, and NTL staff would be responsible for the “feeding back” of the research results to 
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than the mere acquisition of some techniques or manipulative gimmicks,” and that “[s]uch 
growth and development of the individual executive, manager, or staff leader calls for greater 
self-understanding, insight, increased awareness of the causes of the group’s behavior, more 
sensitivity to the feelings and purposes of others and increased skill in working effectively with 
others in team situations.”80  Kenneth Benne, one of NTL’s three original founders, delivered 
orientation remarks about the meaning of the conference, in which he contrasted what was about 
to ensue at Arden House to the past half a century’s management orthodoxy.  Taylor’s scientific 
management, with its privileging of rationalization and economic self-interest above all else, had 
failed to fully address the problems of modern industry, which were fundamentally social in 
nature.  Nor had the “’sweetness and light’ or ‘Dale Carnegie’” approach to human relations 
delivered satisfactory solutions for the successful management of people, with its brushing over 
of major communication dilemmas with mere niceties.
81
   
 The experience of participants at the Arden House, Benne promised, would counter the 
unsuccessful management techniques of the past with immersion in deep and experiential 
methods that would push them to reexamine their behavior and beliefs and emerge with the kind 
of self-knowledge that real human relation skills depended on.  Participants in the first 
Management Work Conference also heard remarks from Rensis Likert, by then one of the era’s 
leading advocates of participative management, who offered an overview of contemporary 
motivational research in multiple sessions over the course of the conference. 
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 Each day, after hearing an hour-long talk on the theme of organizational research, 
conference participants would retreat to their small T-groups for three hours of small-group 
discussion, upon which they would reflect for an hour at the end of each evening.  The groups 
included NTL staff trainers functioning in the “non-directive” style of psychologist Carl Rogers, 
who would minimally intervene and absolutely refrain from pointing the group’s discussion in 
any particular direction.  Early reports of the participants’ experiences of this non-directive 
leadership style revealed their ambivalence.  One group craved more leadership and 
interventions from its leader, while the members of another group “resent any and all of his 
interventions as somehow threatening the autonomy and freedom of the group.”82    Another 
report suggested that the “’power gap’ vacuum caused by the trainer retreating from the 
leadership role caused a feeling of insecurity and frustration” among group members, but when 
leadership was offered, “it was almost immediately discarded.”   
 In two groups, participants selected leaders from their own ranks to direct their activities: 
one was nominated by others, and another was self-appointed.
83
   In another group, the trainer 
noted the development of “Fight-flight” tendencies:  
At times a group acts as if it were in the presence of an enemy, either internal or 
external…Fight may take the form of interpersonal or inter-factional struggles, or 
may be directed into competition with other groups in the environment.  Flight 
may take the form of various kinds of efforts to get away from some part of the 
group’s reality which it is frightening to face…[which] may take the form of 
making lists on the blackboard, talking at length about problems that are not too 
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Others noted patterns included treating the presence of an authority figure in the group as one of 
“awful and magical power,” which could inspire either submitting to the authority figure or 
rebelling against it.  In other groups, members broke off into spontaneous “small subgroups” in 
which they would “[share] ‘secrets’ apart from the rest of group,” or displayed their “subgroup” 
membership through more subtly “’affectionate’” displays.85  After an early meeting of one T-
group, members expressed overall dissatisfaction—with the lack of purpose in their groups, and 
with the incomprehensible interpretations provided by trainers—and pledged to discuss these 
issues at a larger assembly of all the conference’s T-groups.   
 In spite of initial ambivalence among participants, the first Management Development 
Workshop was deemed a success by its staff.   NTL’s in-house newsletter celebrated it as 
“another step forward in pointing out the importance of human relations training in all fields,” 
and promised that the dates had already been set for a follow-up conference in the beginning of 
the next year.
86
  External feedback also proved encouraging: Business Week had sent a writer and 
photographer to do a story on the industrial labs which proved “very helpful” to NTL, and input 
from the first management lab produced “a greater sense of movement and success” among staff 
in Bethel.
87
  Because the Conference attracted participants from profit-making companies, the 
non-profit NTL charged fees greater than its usual and was able to break even on the pilot 
workshop.
 88
  By the time that the second Management Work Conference arrived in February 
1957, the positive word of mouth helped attract almost three times as many participants, and the 
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staff expanded to officially include Chris Argyris and Douglas McGregor (who had participated 
in the early planning process).
89
   
In late 1956, some of the staff of the Management Workshop met and to discuss their 
concerns that “such a lab was not enough for change in a hierarchical organization” because it 
addressed managers, not the higher-ups who would be responsible for largescale organizational 
reform.
90
  NTL’s Industrial Committee therefore produced a prototype for the Key Executive 
Conference on Executive Behavior, which would target vice-presidents and presidents of 
companies with a 10-day lab focused on T-groups and instructional sessions on executive 
behavior.
91
  The first Key Executive Conference, originally known as the “Conference on 
Executive Behavior and Organizational Effectiveness,” was held in Buck Hill Falls, 
Pennsylvania, from September 4 - 14, 1957.
92
  Approximately 30 executives attended (a number 
limited by the organizers’ attempt to keep the conference intimate), representing a range of 
companies and positions, from the presidents of small and mid-sized companies to the vice 
presidents and managers of larger companies.
93
 (In 1958, the roster of participants included the 
Director of Marketing and Director of Personnel from International Business Machines; the Vice 
President of the United Parcel Service; the chief engineer of the Boeing Airplane Company; the 
Vice President of Northwestern Bell Telephone Company; the President of Appleton Woolen 
Mills; the president of the National Citizens Council for Better Schools; and the Executive 
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Associate of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, among others.
94
)  The schedule for the Key 
Executive Conference, though shorter than that of the Management Work Conference, featured a 
nearly identical daily regimen: Each day began with presentations on leadership theory, followed 
by lengthy T-groups, followed by more presentations and Consultation groups—with a daily 
“cocktail hour” thrown in for good measure.95   
Over the next five years, the National Training Laboratories continued to experiment 
with laboratories for particular professions and populations, including recurring labs for 
Protestant Church Workers, Community Leaders, College Students, and Educational 
Professionals—but none of these annual offerings came close to the popularity swiftly achieved 
by the Management Work Conference and Key Executive Conference.  In late 1956, the 
organization noted an “increased interest in industrial organizations,” 45 of which had already 
submitted applications for the next year’s management work conference.  96  The second Annual 
Management Work Conference included 67 industrial delegates, more than twice the previous 
year’s turnout.  In 1959, NTL announced that “because of the overwhelming number of 
applications [approximately 100] to the fifth Management Work Conference, it has been 
necessary to schedule a second session of this laboratory for management,” to be held in January 
and February of 1960.
97
  In the same year, NTL began offering an Advanced Management 
Training Work Conference for alumni of previous Management Work Conferences who craved 
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more T-group experience—an option that NTL claimed had developed out of “persistent 
demands by conference participants” for follow-up training.98  By the spring of 1962, NTL was 
annually holding three sessions of the Key Executive Conferences and four sessions of the 
Management Work Conference.
99
  In 1963, the NTL board voted to expand the Management 
Training Program to include a one-week Management Team Laboratory, which would focus on 
training people within teams and reducing communication blocks, and a one-week 
Organizational Change Laboratory, which would further the knowledge of people who had 
participated in previous labs. 
At the same time, in the second half of the 1950s, NTL built partnerships with two of the 
country’s leading management associations: the Society for the Advancement of Management 
and the American Management Association (whose president had participated in the very first 
Management Work Conference).  The Society for the Advancement of Management began 
collaborating with NTL on a series of four workshops in 1959, conducting a seminar called 
“Human Relations Training for Middle Management” in Chicago, Lake Arrowhead, Ca, and 
Asheville, North Carolina, and another called “Workshop in Leadership Development” in 
Milwalkee.
100
  The two organizations continued to collaborate in coming years, offering roaming 
courses in management development that were simultaneously more compact and less 
inconvenient than the 2-week marathons at the Arden House.   
With the American Management Association (AMA), NTL developed an Executive 
Action Course: a three-day clinic first held in New York City in February 1957 for members of 
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the AMA, attracting the heads of small companies and the personnel managers of large ones.  
The first clinic, entitled “Communication Skill Clinic: Dynamics of Executive Behavior,” 
introduced participants to new theories of human relations, the practice of role playing, and the 
T-group experience.
101
  The participant roster included representatives from General Electric’s 
Jet Engine Department; the personnel director of Carter’s Ink Company; a project manager from 
International Business Machines Corp.; a manager from Gilette Safety Razor Company; and the 
General Superintendent of Halter’s Pretzels, Inc.102  Leland Bradford, director of NTL, was the 
speaker for the event, offering lectures on the period’s leading theories of group development 
and executive communication.   
The New York Times was on hand to cover the AMA’s Executive Action Course and 
produced a lengthy report that, while largely positive, would have struck NTL leaders as a 
misinterpretation of their core principles.  Entitled, “Psychotherapy for Executives,” the article’s 
author, Edith Efron, described “a vogue for what might be described as personality schools for 
bosses.”103  “Through play-acting, shutting them up and other unexpected devices,” she 
explained, “psychologists are showing bosses how to…draw more enthusiastic work out of their 
subordinates.”  Efron chronicled the AMA session’s lengthy role-playing exercises, the 
participants’ pleading for feedback, and the thick air of anxiety and “chronic uncertainty” in the 
room.  She rightly pointed to the workshop’s emphasis on participation, close listening, and 
psychologically based motivational techniques, and outlined a particular role-playing exercise in 
which a foreman gained greater understanding of a female worker he had pretended to be.  Yet 
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Efron made the mistake of calling the Management course “group therapy,” a label that NTL had 
spent its 10-year existence defining itself against.    She detailed the “emotional ‘confessions’” 
that often followed effective role-playing sessions, with one “aggressive, startlingly high-salaried 
man” bursting out with, “’Fellows, I came here for the same reason you did—to find out what 
was wrong with me.  I know a lot of my associates avoid me, my subordinates dislike me.  Why?  
Please tell me!’”  Her account made it difficult to infer whether the primary value of the 
workshop was organizational or deeply personal and therapeutic. 
Efron concluded that there was not yet sufficient evidence to determine the effectiveness 
of such seminars.  She pointed to critics who claimed that the work was “part of the 
‘psychological claptrap’ that has invaded American society” or “’cow psychology’ designed to 
make employees into calmer and happier ‘organization men’” and bring the nation’s workforce 
“one more step in the direction of conformity and the death of American individualism.”104  Yet 
she also pointed to convincing evidence suggesting that such methods of training helped people 
learn to better listen and understand another, surely important qualities for any manager to have.   
And she detailed the enthusiastic responses that many participants had to the experience—like 
the presidents of the New York Central and New York, New Haven, and Hartford Railroads, 
who had pledged to send “whole rosters of their top executives to take the course”; or the 
president and publisher of the Cincinnatti Enquirer who declared, ”’I’m going to send our 
executive editor, managing editor, city editor, Sunday editor, business and financial editors, 
advertising director, local advertising director…production manager and assistant production 
manager! It will make The Enquirer a happier place to work!’”105 Whether or not scientific 
                                                 
104
 Efron, 44. 
 
105






evidence could prove the effectiveness of what Efron skeptically labeled “permissive” or 
“laissez-faire” management training, its increasing popularity within corporate and industrial 
ranks was evident. 
In the mid-1950s, NTL also began providing in-house consulting to corporations. 
According to a 1961 newsletter, “about fifteen companies are moving strongly in the direction of 
installing T-group training,” and NTL staff members had begun collaborating with personnel 
directors of corporations to help them establish in-house programs.
106
  As early as 1954, Harry 
Kolb, the Manager of the Employee Relations Department at Esso Standard Oil and a veteran of 
one of NTL’s Human Relations laboratories, corresponded with NTL staff about the company’s 
attempt to “’reexamine its principles of human relations.’”107 What began as an exchange of 
literature—Kolb sent two books he had recently produced for the company, entitled “The Way to 
Work Together” and “What is Employee Participation?”—morphed into a relationship that lasted 
through the 1960s, with NTL’s Herb Shepard (a professor at Case Western) working closely with 
Esso Refineries on more than a decade of Organizational Development programs.
108
  By the 
summer of 1960, NTL staff members including Edward Schein and Warren Bennis were 
conducting two-week laboratories and follow-up workshops at Esso refineries across the 
country.
109
   
NTL’s work with General Mills also helped to legitimate its reputation within the 
corporate sphere.  The collaboration began after General Mills had already embraced the rhetoric 
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of the era’s humanistic management theorists.  General Mills’ Annual Management Conference 
in 1955-6 featured a lecture on “Bottom-Up Management,” which soon became General Mills’ 
central management slogan.  “The successful leader,” its corporate literature declared,  
needs to stimulate, motivate, and energize desirable action.  He needs to sell 
ideas, not merely tell people what to do.  The old authoritarian point of view of 
telling and commanding the individual assumed that subordinates owed it to the 
enterprise and their boss to do what they were told, when they were told.  The 
modern manager, on the hand, recognizes that individuals will be better motivated 
and do better work if they understand why as well as what to do.”   
 
According to General Mills’ managerial mission statement,  effective managers “recognize and 
deal with each person as a unique individual,” trying to understand each employee’s distinctive 
perspective, and that he employ participation in the form of  “group thinking, group feeling, and 
group action” to improve his enterprise.110  The entire management conference could have been 
interpreted as an endorsement of Douglas McGregor’s “Theory Y,” with its emphasis on 
democratic leadership and the development of subordinates through group participation.   
The next year, In September 1957, on a lake North of Minneapolis, NTL staff members 
including Leland Bradford, Warren Bennis, and Gordon Lippitt led the General Mills Inc. 
Management Development Conference Program.
111
  Their 10-day visit with the company 
combined human relations laboratory training with particular training in conference leadership 
and featured a synthesis of the NTL approach with General Mills’ preexisting commitment to 
participatory practices.
112
  (One of the stated aims of the training was to “clarify and practicality 
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and workability of the General Mills philosophy of Bottom-Up Management.”) 113  The training 
sessions reflected twin commitments to organizational and individual growth, promising 
managerial effectiveness along with the “increase of individual awareness of the need for and 
methods of self development.”114  The Conference featured sessions on organizational theory, 
analysis of day-to-day management planning at General Mills, T-groups, and workshop sessions 
on the more general problems and tasks facing managers.  It also required participants to read 
examples of democratic management theory, fill out worksheets summarizing their learning, and 
report on their learning to the larger group. 
 By the end of the 1950s, in sum, NTL had made a name for itself in the world of 
corporate management training.  In addition to work with Esso, General Mills, and management 
associations, NTL had worked closely in organizational consultation with the Champion Paper 
Company, Standard Oil of NJ, the Radio Corporation of America, the Ansul Chemical Company, 
and the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company.  NTL also began leading annual 
workshops for a group of executives under 45 called the Young Presidents Organization (YPO) 
beginning in 1957, and, in 1958, began leading workshops exclusively for YPO Wives who 
would “gather to look at their role problems in group and community life.” 115  
 The role of the corporate wife had become prominent in cultural discourse by the end of 
the 1950s.  Novels like The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit, and Revolutionary Road chronicled 
suburban marriages in which the wives of white-collar workers who toiled in domestic obscurity 
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  Iconic sociological treatises by William Whyte (The Organization Man) 
and David Riesman (The Lonely Crowd) depicted a new model of corporate man who gave all of 
himself to his work, leaving little personality for the domestic sphere.
117
  Six years before Betty 
Friedan published The Feminine Mystique, Vance Packard detailed the pressures that 
organizational life placed on corporate wives in The Hidden Persuaders.  He outlined a world in 
which a “man’s home life” could be “scrutinized to see if it conformed to the best interests of the 
‘team’ or company.”118  He elaborated, “Important men may not be recommended for higher 
priced jobs because the wives may be too flirtatious or she may not drink her cocktails too well, 
or she may be an incorrigible gossip.  Investigations in this respect are quite thorough.”119  The 
“sizing up” of wives in the hiring process was just the first step in their transformation into 
corporate accessories.  With her husband situated in his job, the wife was expected to 
accommodate the needs of his job above all else.  A Fortune article from 1951 stated that a wife 
should be “highly adapatable…highly gregarious,” and comfortable with the fact that “her 
husband belongs to the corporation.”120  A Harvard Business Review article of the same era 
suggested that the mid-century wife of an executive “’must not demand too much of her 
husband’s time or interest.’”121  NTL’s workshop for YPO wives addressed them simultaneously 
                                                 
116
 Sloan Wilson, The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit (New York: Arbor House, 1955); Richard Yates, Revolutionary 
Road, 2nd Vintage Contemporaries ed. (New York: Vintage Contemporaries, 2000). 
  
117
 David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd; a Study of the Changing American Character, Studies in National Policy 3 
(New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1955); William Hollingsworth Whyte, The Organization Man (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1956). 
 
118
 Vance Packard, The Hidden Persuaders (New York, D. McKay Co., 1957), 197. 
 
119
 Packard 198. 
 
120
 Packard citing Fortune Magazine, 198. 
 
121
 Packard quoting a Harvard Business Review study of 8300 executives made by Lloyd Warner and James 






as appendages of their executive husbands and as individuals with needs for expression and 
growth. 
 The YPO wives’ training in Minneapolis, like that of their “young president” husbands, 
included exposure to theories of leadership and participation, with increased attention to the 
function of “roles” in social groups (one paper read by the group was entitled “The Effect of 
Group Pressures Toward Uniformity”).122  The wives also participated in sensitivity training, 
which 30 of 37 women rated as “excellent” in their final evaluations.  One trainer later reflected:  
[The wives] have a good deal of intellectual curiosity and behave in accordance 
with a self-image of the highly moral middle-aged woman.  They seek others’ 
approval…These are normal, able women who are thrust into a role fraught with 
many difficulties.  Perhaps their most difficult common quest is to discover how 
to be themselves—how to become perceived as human beings, not as stereotypic 
‘woman,’ ‘executive’s wife,’ or ‘lady of the manor.’  The characteristic about 
them which encouraged me most was their willingness to look at themselves and 




A private letter from one of the seminar’s trainers described the participants as “ladies, with a 
high level of common assumptions about how ladies should behave.” The trainer voiced regrets 
that he was not able to “do too much pushing” in the three sessions he had with them, and that 
the session participants resisted engaging in the level of conflict typical of productive T-groups.  
That said, the level of personal disclosure the trainer witnessed convinced him that “beneath the 
polished surface of every president’s wife is a sensitive, frail human being who wants to be 
accepted and understood.  And I believe they emerged from the experience with a little more 
self-acceptance.”124  At the end of the experience, 49 of the workshop’s participants purchased 
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“owl charms” to commemorate the experience with NTL.   Their experience well represented the 
delicate balance that NTL tried to maintain between the therapeutic and the skills-based, the 
organizational and the personal, at the end of the 1950s. 
 
Management journals of the mid- to late-fifties took note of new opportunities in 
management training, which appeared as the logical tool for the implementation humanistic 
postwar management theories.  Though programs in managerial sensitivity training were still in 
their early stages, some observers predicted that they would generate a new brand of self-aware, 
emotionally expressive, and eminently communicative manager.
125
 A 1955 Harvard Business 
Review article about “Managers in Transition” (co-authored by a researcher affiliated with 
NTL’s west coast cousin, the Western Training Laboratories) presented a fictional reenactment 
of a T-group that displayed just how transformative managerial training could be.
126
 It chronicled 
the fictional proceedings of managers at the Comet Television Company, where an outside 
management consultant (“Marv”) has recently reported some “disturbing ‘interpersonal 
problems’ among the management group”—observations which he had made based on “few 
facts, only feelings…just some tenuous impressions about people not working well together.”127  
Mike, the plant superintendent, is incredulous upon first hearing Marv’s diagnosis, and resentful 
of his line of questioning: inquiries about the relationships between individual staff members, the 
group dynamic at staff meetings, and the one that “finally set him off…’Are you concerned with 
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how your people feel?’”128   Mike “barely suppressed a surge of violent anger” at Marv’s 
incomprehension of “the cold realities of the business world” and resentfully concludes that “He 
wanted to make a tea party out of a well-ordered business.”129  
What followed in the hypothetical T-group was a series of revelations.  Mike realizes that 
“[w]hen Bill manipulated Joe, Joe manipulated twenty people,” and “so it went in an endless, 
cumulative circle.”130  He ultimately agrees to Marv’s suggestion that he institute a sensitivity 
training in his plant, and the men begin to meet in T-groups.  Mike’s staff exhibits some 
reticence at first, but by the time of the fifth meeting, they’re ready to open up.  Rod explains that 
Mike has a habit of cutting off Bill and Art before they’re finished speaking.  As the men pour 
forth with additional examples, something starts to click into place: 
Mike was gradually becoming aware that he was having a negative impact on his 
staff, and that some people felt that he did not give them a chance to express their 
feelings.  But while intellectually willing to look at this, Mike wasn’t really 




Mike’s resistance gradually decreases as he watches his staff members communicate their 
feelings for the first time in his experience as supervisor (Rod: “Art, you really get me 
sometimes!  I’d like to know for once—how do you feel about our staff meetings.”  Art: “Gosh, 
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Rod, I didn’t mean to get you upset.  What I just said is how I really do feel about our staff 
meetings.”132). 
 By the time Comet has reached its sixth and final T-group gathering, it is clear to 
everyone that the process has had a profound effect on Mike and his sub-team of managers: 
The barriers were falling.  The men were learning to listen and talk to each 
other—not about things out in space, but about themselves, their aspirations, their 
fears and feelings for each other.  They were learning to be sensitive—to their 
own needs, and to the needs of others.  They were seeing each other 
differently…They were beginning to accept each other, not for what they would 
have liked each other to be, but for what they in fact were—with all their 
strengths and shortcomings…133 
 
In conclusion, the article’s authors explain, “There was a different spirit emerging … The top 
management at Comet was on its way to becoming a team.” 134   
 In a 1957 Harvard Business Review article entitled “Human Relations Skills Can Be 
Sharpened,” Robert L. Katz lamented the sorry state of human relations training programs and 
summed up their problematic approaches in four common models: the : the “tell-‘em, sell-‘em 
approach,” the “fire-fighter approach,” the “actor approach,” the “nice guy approach.”135 
Together, these models provided managers with information about human behavior and taught 
them how to act nice, but they failed to address the key elements of the new managerial 
consciousness: sensitivity and self-awareness, the ingredients of truly meaningful and effective 
communication.  Katz saluted the T-group method of managerial training for its ability to 
penetrate the emotional cores of its subjects.  The ideal instructor, he explained, understood that 
he should “neither tell the participants how they should feel, nor ridicule them for how they do 
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feel.  He must demonstrate by his behavior that he is genuinely trying to understand their 
feelings and to help them clarify those feelings.”136  He recognized a common skepticism toward 
sensitivity training techniques (“’What a waste of time!  We’re talking around in circles and not 
getting anywhere…’”) but reassured readers that “This kind of learning is never easy.  It is 
terribly upsetting for a man to find out that he is not as good as he thought he was.”137  Katz 
concluded his article with an assessment of the current state of sensitivity training. It was still in 
its early stages, he explained, and results on its effectiveness were not yet conclusive, but the 
programs had ultimately proved successful and were promising for the future of human relations 
training.  
 The first monograph on the T-group experience, Inside a Sensitivity Training Group, was 
distributed in 1958 as a product of the Human Relations Research Group at UCLA’s Institute of 
Industrial Relations (and republished for a wider audience in 1959).
138
  The book by Irving 
Weschler and Jerome Reisel, according to Leland Bradford, was “widely read, thereby adding 
greatly to public awareness of the field.”139  It presented the story of one training group—
eighteen men and six women—who began meeting in 1956 under Weschler’s leadership at 
UCLA, which was emerging as a West Coast hub of industrial sensitivity training.
140
  Most of 
the male participants were enrolled in the School of Business Administration at UCLA; most of 
the women were studying nursing, English, or Physical Education. Their experience was 
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documented using tape recordings of each session, Weschler’s post-session interviews, and a set 
of “trainee diaries.”  Over the course of thirty meetings in four months, the trainees recorded 
their reactions to their daily T-group experiences (which were themselves later analyzed by 
Weschler’s staff according to quantitative scales of “emotionality” and sensitivity).141   
 Though Weschler asserts early in the account that “our method of approach…is 
essentially clinical,” his report tells a different story.142  More than anything, it chronicles the 
moments of existential anomie, raw hostility, and therapeutic ecstasy that characterize the 
group’s quest for authentic expression.   Weschler explained at the outset of his monograph that 
the aim of sensitivity training was “to help the participants feel differently—and not merely think 
differently.”143 The T-group was a fundamentally emotional and “deeply personal” experience 
that “stirs and prods people into taking a good, close look at themselves and at their relations 
with others.”  The average sensitivity training session could result in “spasmodic peaks of 
excitement, even exhilaration… inevitably followed by long periods of apathy and frustration, 
characterized by expressions of futility, disgust, and anger.”144   
 Weschler’s account conveyed this array of emotions as embodied by two main camps 
that form within his group: the believers and the non-believers.  The T-group began on a note of 
disorder and frustration, due to Weschler’s determinedly non-participative presence.  (A 
participant named Frances reported, “My feelings during and immediately after the first hour of 
class period were confusion, misgiving, and depression”).145  As the sessions progressed, the 
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group fruitlessly turned to Weschler for guidance as he maintained his non-authoritarian stance.  
As they continued, however, things clicked into place for some participants.  “Could it be that I 
am shielding myself in the group in such a way that no one present can get to know me or 
understand me?,” a man named Pete asked himself.  “I think I will try to give more of myself to 
the group and see what effect it has on their getting to know me.”146 A few sessions later, Larry 
announced, “Today I finally expressed my true feelings” and Lew rejoiced, “At last, at last! 
…We are beginning to tell how we affect each other…Max told me that I sometimes go on and 
on, and bore him.  I can see his point.  I have not been as effective as I would like to be.  We are 
making progress…”147 
 At the same time, Weschler encountered his share of skeptics.   A group of men that he 
and other groupmates labeled “the blockers” refused to talk about their feelings in a productive 
way.  Duke reported, “I cringe whenever these psychological papers are being passed out…It 
seems to me you can’t even breathe without some idiot investigating why you do it.  I am rapidly 
developing a temper restraint in this group lest I smash a few people in an emotional 
outburst.”148 At some point, the collisions between the feelers and the non-feelers pushed Jean to 
the end of her rope: 
The hostility in the group has at times made me so uncomfortable that, with 
external pressures from work and home, I have felt a dread of coming to class.  It 
takes a certain amount of courage and intestinal fortitude to face a hostile 
group…It is any wonder that there are days when I feel a much needed rest in bed 
or at Palm Springs would be so much better than this badgering which gives no 
indication of anything, but ‘yacking’ to hear oneself ‘yack’!149 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
146
 Weschler and Reisel 35. 
 
147
 Weschler and Reisel 61; 87. 
 
148
 Weschler and Reisel 38. 
 
149







By the end of the group, while some members had joyously learned to express themselves and 
intuit others’ feelings, others—like Dick—surmise that “If an outsider had come in to observe us 
and had been told we had been meeting for the last fifteen weeks to study and learn about group 
dynamics, I’m afraid he’d have said that we hadn’t learned a thing.”150   
One of the participants in Weschler’s Inside a Senstivity Training Group, a man named 
Larry, offered a prescient lament. He bemoaned, “We still don’t have the feeling of ‘we-ness’ 
which is supposed to be present in groups.  Everyone is working toward his own individual goal 
and suppressing the group… even though we have many hypocrites who claim they are here to 
learn to solve group problems”151  This concern reflected a cultural shift taking place in NTL in 
the late 1950s and 1960s.  On the one hand, the 1960s were a period of great growth for NTL, 
and its management labs were a tremendous success, with dozens of industry journal articles and 
books to prove it.  On the other hand, the decade witnessed a divergence from some of the 
original ideals on which NTL was founded.  T-groups began to seem less concerned with 
Bradford, Benne, and Lippitt’s original emphasis on “democratic morality” and “we-ness,” and 
increasingly attached to the language of personal growth.  Within the management community, 
T-groups heightened their emphasis on the individual while ostensibly serving the needs of the 
organization. 
 
According to T-group historian Kurt Back, it became clear in the 1960s that “sensitivity 
training had arrived.”152  Over the course of the decade, NTL experienced unprecedented growth 
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and publicity; by 1967, 50,000 people had participated in its laboratories, and innumerable 
institutions had developed their own in-house programs of laboratory training.
153
  By the end of 
the sixties, NTL had established divisions in Washington, D.C.; Kansas City, Missouri; Portland, 
Oregon; Salt Lake City; Cedar City, Utah; and Lake Arrowhead, CA.
154
  In 1964, Bradford, 
Benne, and Jack Gibb published the first book describing the history and practices of NTL, T-
Group Theory and Laboratory Method, whose publisher hoped it would sell 2500 copies.  By 
1970, it had sold 25,000 copies and gone into multiple editions.
155
  From 1964-5, two of NTLs 
longtime staff members, Chirs Argyris and Alfred Marrow, participated in an extensive 
Organizational Development program (using T-groups) in the US State Department, a project 
that earned NTL deep institutional credibility in the mid-1960s.
156
 Around the same time, NTL’s 
advisory board discussed the possibility of publishing an institutional journal; the quarterly 
Journal of Applied Behavioral Science debuted on January 1, 1965 and became an oft-cited 
reference within the field.
157
   
NTL made one of its greatest leaps when, in 1966, it gained independence from the 
National Education Association, so that, while it continued to receive annual grants of $80,000, it 
was able to operate as an independent institute.
158
  A change of name indicated the transition 
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with its re-christening as the NTL Institute of Applied Behavioral Science in 1967 (the name has 
remained such till this day).   In the meantime, NTL’s techniques continued to spread throughout 
the world—including use by Israeli kibbutzim, Puerto Rican psychologists, Australian Human 
Relations experts, Colombian businessmen, and South American business schools in all 
countries except for Ecuador, Bolivia, and Paraguay. Le T-group even entered popular parlance 
in France, where the method was used in prisons.
 159
  By the end of the decade, nearly 500 
centers belonged to NTL’s network, and its number of professional staff members had nearly 
doubled from 1963.
160
   
The sixties specifically marked the heyday of corporate sensitivity training, in which 
NTL witnessed a “large explosion of consultation with industry” and watched its techniques 
spread to corporations around the country, used in consultation with NTL and also in in-house 
corporate programs.
161
  In fall of 1961, NTL introduced a program for specialists in what it 
called “Organizational Development,” the field of trainers who crafted management 
development training programs and helped organizations strategize long-term planning.   The 
program guaranteed that NTL would be a hub not just for the training of managers, but for the 
training of the people who trained managers, whether as independent consultants or in-house 
specialists.
162
  These forays into organizational work proved to be a major financial boon for 
NTL for much of the 1960s. Until NTL established its Presidents Labs for corporate leaders in 
1964, its annual budget had been $300,000.  Afterwards, thanks to the influx of corporate heads, 
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the budget increased tenfold.
163
  Its Key Executive labs and Management Workshops continued 
to attract greater and greater numbers of participants: by 1967, NTL was annually conducting 
two Presidents’ Labs, five Key Executive labs, and four Management Work Conferences.  The 
same year, its Midwest Laboratory for Executives attracted 100 delegates.
164
   
When Jane Howard wrote her book on the encounter movement at the end of the decade, 
she conceded that industry was “one of the most receptive and adventurous patrons of sensitivity 
techniques,” in spite of T-groups’ increasingly countercultural reputation.165 When Kurt Back 
published his own history of the encounter movement in 1970, he noted the T-group’s “particular 
appeal to the high echelons of management” and explained, “sensitivity programs have become 
so widespread that that the companies that have used them are too numerous to list.”166  Bradford 
reflected in his own history of NTL that “In this country, possibly in Canada, certainly in India 
and Japan, business and industry…have made greater systematic use of lab methods than perhaps 
any other segment of our society.”167  By the end of the 1960s, NTL had engaged in continued 
training work with Esso and the Hotel Corporation of America, and expanded its repertoire to 
include Dow Chemical, Detroit Edison, DCA Food Industries, Inc., Union Carbide, International 
Business Machines, TRW Systems, Inc.,
168
 and the Pillsbury Company.   
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  One of the companies that most famously experimented with T-groups was American 
Airlines, a corporation so committed to behavioral science training that it had developed an in-
house “Managerial Learning Laboratory.”169  The president who assumed leadership over the 
airline in 1968 deemed the organization too tightly structured and insufficiently flexible, so set 
about finding ways to create a “democratic” atmosphere that emphasized both participation in 
the work place and “satisfying experience” on an individual level.170  Having already participated 
in organizational development with a company called Managerial Grid (an offshoot of the 
National Training Laboratories run by Robert Mouton and Jane Blake
171
) in 1965, the new 
president of the company appreciated the benefits of sensitivity training but regretted the 
“minimal return” of offsite training.172    
The American Airlines Managerial Learning Laboratory would introduce the benefits of 
group laboratory learning to its own corridors, offering a week-long seminar run by the 
company’s director of training and development (along with seven in-house “organizational 
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development” specialists) to fifteen to twenty managers of equivalent rank at a time.173  The new 
program adopted the language of Kurt Lewin, promising to “’unfreeze’ old attitudes and 
behavior patterns…and ‘refreeze’” new ones, offering each participant “an increased sensitivity 
to his own behavior and the behavior of others.”174   
The literature surrounding the American Airlines Laboratory celebrated self-awareness, 
candor, collaboration, and group development.  It even replicated the NTL ideal of the “cultural 
island” by transporting participants to an unfamiliar location near corporate headquarters, so that 
they would not be distracted by usual work duties or commitments.  Many seminars began with 
the trainer’s announcement of an exercise called “non-verbal encounter”: “’You have ten 
minutes to get to know each other through any means you like, with one exception: you may not 
speak.’”175  Other exercises included the “Fishbowl” exercise, during which one group conducted 
its “group processes” while other teams observed in a circle around it, and then offered 
feedback.
176
  In another, the trainer schooled participants in Kurt Lewin’s theory of “force field 
analysis” and then had members answer questions to help them assess the various “force fields” 
in their own lives.
177
  By 1969, 500 middle managers had participated in American Airlines’ 
Managerial Learning Laboratory, and had “unanimously report[ed] improved work habits and 
interpersonal relationships.”  Their bosses, on the other hand, assessed the results of training in 
either “negative or lukewarm” terms, reporting minimal concrete improvements in job 
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  Still, as of 1969, the firm’s top executives remained committed to the practice 
of laboratory training because they insisted it raised hart-to-quantify levels of trust, candor, and 
participation in the organization. 
In addition to flourishing in the corporate sphere, sensitivity training began making more 
and more appearances in business school curricula in the 1960s.  One of the most successful 
experiments, which has been chronicled by Laura Kim Lee, took place at the University of 
California, Los Angeles Graduate School of Business Administration.
179
  As has been noted 
earlier in this chapter, NTL spawned a west-coast offshoot called the Western Training 
Laboratory in Group Development (WTL) in the early 1950s.  From the beginning of its 
existence in 1952, WTL eschewed the large-scale democratic and social visions of early NTL 
work, focusing more on “emotional growth as a workplace goal” before eventually promoting 
“emotional growth as a life goal,” and an end in itself.180  Its staff members tended to be 
psychologists oriented more toward the experiences of individuals than the dynamics of groups, 
and their work tended to resemble group therapy more than NTL’s early work on the east coast.  
For the first several years of its existence, WTL held its workshops in Idyllwild, a “small, artistic 
mountain community” 140 miles outside Los Angeles, near Palm Springs.181 
The first leader of WTL, a man named Paul Sheats (who had been a T-group trainer 
during NTL’s first Human Relations Training Laboratory), was a professor of Education and 
Associate Director of the Extension Division at UCLA, and he helped forge critical ties between 
NTL’s west-coast cousin and the university.  The UCLA campus soon spawned a network of 
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programs advocated by business-school academics.  T-groups became a mainstay of the 
undergraduate business school curriculum and of UCLA’s workshops for managers and assorted 
professionals.  These programs were largely sponsored by the university’s Institute for Industrial 
Relations and University Extension (its adult education program) and were later fortified by 
research by the Business School’s Human Relations Research Group.182  The professors of the 
Graduate School of Business Administration were particularly pivotal in the promotion of 
sensitivity training on UCLA’s campus, and in the advocacy of T-groups as a technique to be 
used for organizational rather than social change.
183
 
At the UCLA School of Business Administration, a man named Robert Tannenbaum, 
Professor of Personnel Management and Industrial Relations, became pioneer of sensitivity 
training in the business school context.
184
  In 1951, he received funding from the Office of Naval 
Research to conduct leadership research, and he used these funds to establish the Human 
Relations Research Group with Irving Weschler and Fred Massarisk (both NTL affiliates and 
UCLA professors) with whom he joined the fledgling staff of the Western Training Laboratory 
upon its opening in 1952.  These men forged a continuing dialogue between the socially oriented 
mission of early NTL, the more therapeutic orientation of the WTL, and the more pragmatic 
aims of UCLA’s business school curriculum.185 Tannenbaum first introduced themes of 
humanistic and democratic management during a Personnel Management and Industrial 
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Relations seminar series that he initiated at the school.
186
  In the mid-1950s, he and his 
colleagues began integrating T-group and experiential group work into UCLA’s curriculum, with 
the specific aim of training and developing managers.  “’It has been found,’” he wrote in a paper 
with Irving Weschler, “’that the supervisors who are more sensitive have more efficient working 
groups.  The key lies in being keenly sensitive, accepting and understanding of other people.  
These kinds of individuals are the really mature individuals.  They have worked through their 
own personal problems and are not threatened by others.’”187   
Along with industrial psychiatrist and WTL staff member Marvin Klemes, 
Tannenbaum’s colleague Irving Weschler soon began offering a workshop that they first entitled 
“Skill Practice for Supervisors,” renamed “Sensitivity Training for Managers” in 1955 or 
1956.
188
  According to Weschler, sensitivity could best be understood as “’the understanding of 
another (being empathetic) and predicting how a personal will act in a variety of 
circumstances.’”189  This program soon expanded within the larger offerings of the UCLA 
Extention Program, attracting increasing participants and profits and expanding its number of 
workshop locations exponentially.  In 1956, Klemes and Tannenbaum introduced new workshop 
called “Sensitivity Training for Top Executives” for presidents, vice presidents, and department 
heads.  At the same time, “Sensitivity Training for Managers” expanded to include other 
professional groups – such as architects, clergymen, dentists, lawyers-- under the moniker 
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“Sensitivity Training for the Professions.”190  Lee reports that between 1953 and 1962, the 
Extension sensitivity training programs involved over 1200 participants, attracting 250-300 
people annually, and constituting “’as many as sixteen to eighteen groups going on during a 
semester.’”191  The majority of participants were middle-class men, most between the ages of 
thirty and fifty-five, with gross incoles of $10,000-$20,000 or higher.  Roughly two-thirds of 




As UCLA Extension’s sensitivity workshops expanded and grew more popular, the 
training programs also moved “from the edges of the Business School to the heart of its 
program.”193  Tannenbaum chaired the Personnel and Industrial Relations field in the Business 
School from 1950-1963, and from 1963 to 1965 chaired the new Behavioral Science for 
Management sub-field that had branched off from the Personnel department.  During his tenure, 
sensitivity training courses became a common and even required component of coursework 
within the Business School, first emerging in a course entitled “Leadership Principles and 
Practice.”194  The course continued to be offered into the 1970s, attracting an increasingly large 
number of students from other parts of campus who had heard about the experimental group 
work in the curriculum.
195
  In the late 1950s, the course’s readings and techniques were 
incorporated into the new Behavioral Science Laboratory, which consisted of one large meeting 
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room surrounded on three sides by observation booths.  The Center was used not only for the 
conduct of sensitivity training, but for the training of new trainers to staff the rapidly 
proliferating niche.  By 1970, UCLA had emerged as one of the nation’s leading sites for the 
humanistic training of managers, executives, and the people who sensitized them. 
 
If UCLA evolved to become the academic capital of sensitivity training, its east coast 
equivalent emerged in an unpredictable location: the hallowed halls of Harvard University.  
More specifically, Harvard Business School’s Organizational Behavior Department became a 
hotbed of both research and practice in the behavioral sciences after its establishment in the late 
1950s.   Harvard Business School Professor Fritz Roethlisberger’s intellectual biography reveals 
the seeds of humanistic discourse among an older generation of human relations pioneers, and 
the ways in which the human relations research of the interwar era bled into the behavioral 
science research of the postwar period.   
Born in New York City in 1898, Roethlisberger was the son of immigrants: a Swiss-
French mother and Swiss-German father.  Having studied engineering at MIT, he was pursuing a 
PhD in Philosophy when Elton Mayo recruited him to join his industrial research team at 
Harvard Business School.  With Mayo, Roethlisberger made his name researching workers at the 
Western Electric Company Plant in Hawthorne, Illinois, from 1927 through 1936.  Mayo and 
Roethlisberger famously revised Frederick Winslow Taylor’s principle of scientific management.  
In their Hawthorne Studies, they found that workers were, in fact,  not machines but people 
whose rates of productivity depended on fundamentally social and subjective factors – such as 
their ability to work in sociable groups and the attention they were granted by supervisors.  





curriculum in the nascent field of Human Relations, in which he emphasized the importance of 
“warm, trusting, helping relationships” between managers and their underlings.  His classes 
never lost track of the bottom line: He described his Administrative Practices course as, “How to 
get things done through people.”196 
Roethlisberger never celebrated the notion of “self-actualization,” but he helped establish 
a critical bridge between the young fields of human relations and humanistic psychology.  In the 
1940s, he experimented with an open-ended counseling technique that he found very useful in 
dealing with industrial employees.  When confronted with a disgruntled worker, he spent 
extended periods of time listening to that worker’s frustrations and trying to understand his 
perspective.  In the early 1950s, he discovered that this technique resembled the method of “non-
directive counseling” practiced by the humanistic psychologist Carl Rogers.  (If Abraham 
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs was one pillar of humanistic psychology, Rogers’ non-directive 
counseling was the other.)  Roethlisberger made Rogers’ books a staple of his human relations 
courses for years to come.   
After serving on a conference panel together in the early 1950s, Roethlisberger and 
Rogers collaborated on a famous Harvard Business Review article entitled “Barriers and 
Gateways to Communication.”197 They broadly critiqued contemporary communication styles, 
charging that people often listened to each other in order to evaluate and judge, rather than to 
truly understand each other’s points of view.  Rogers outlined a method of reflective, empathic 
listening that could “deal with the insincerities, the defensive exaggerations, the ‘false fronts,’ 
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which characterize almost every failure in communication” and “which threaten the very 
existence of our modern world[.]”  In Roethlisberger’s portion of the article, he recommended a 
patient, understanding communication style to supervisors and suggested that empathy could 
quell labor discord for decades to come.  Perhaps thanks to his endorsement of Rogerian 
psychology, Roethlisberger found himself – three years later – as the only business school 
professor included in Abraham Maslow’s network of people interested in “Creativeness, Self, 
Being, and Growth.”  
In the late 1950s, Roethlisberger helped spearhead the development of an “organizational 
behavior” concentration at Harvard Business School, which was – according to his 
autobiography-- “committed to the twin values to which the label Human Relations referred: 
human for humanistic and relations for science.”198  The informal Organizational Behavior 
faculty group, some of whom had originally been Roethlisberger’s students, embodied a 
transitional moment between pre-war and post-war human relations.  According to 
Roethlisberger, the two generations were “astonishingly similar”: they both drew from 
humanistic psychologists like Maslow, Rogers, Erich Fromm, and Rollo May; they both drew 
ideas from behavioral science and social psychology; and they both emphasized the power of 
sentiment as opposed to rationality.
199
  But Roethlisberger also noticed significant differences 
between the two generations.  Whereas he had focused his efforts on one-on-one counseling with 
blue-collar workers, theorists like Argyris, McGregor, and McGregor’s protégé Warren Bennis 
shifted their attention to training managers in groups and placed “more emphasis on self-
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actualizing needs.”  This younger generation of humanistic management theorists was 
particularly concerned with building “authentic” relationships between people. 200   
By the late 1950s, Douglas McGregor The Human Side of Enterprise Harvard Business 
School’s management curriculum. Professor Paul Lawrence began assigning the article-length 
version of “The Human Side of Enterprise” within the school’s first-year required course in 
“Administrative Practices” in 1958.  “Our teaching group found the article most helpful,” 
Lawrence had assured McGregor, “ and would very much appreciate making it available for 
student use."
201
  Two year’s later, upon his book’s publication, McGregor found himself 
corresponding with the iconic Professor Fritz Roethlisberger—whom he had first encountered 
while serving on a labor arbitration committee in the mid-1940s.
202
  Roethlisberger reported that 
he had read the book while teaching in an Advanced Management Program in the Philippines.  
“As usual“ he wrote to McGregor, “I got a great kick out of it.” 203   
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 Letter, Roethlisberger to Douglas McGregor, 22 September 1960, folder M1, carton 2, Roethlisberger Papers, 
Baker Library.  In this letter Roethlisberger continued: “You are one of the few people left in the field whom I can 
read with profit and still without sweating and straining every minute with a new vocabulary and conceptual model.  
I think I understand what you are saying-- perhaps too easily.  Is this good or bad?  I don’t know but your writings as 
well as my own gives me that queer feeling of being sometimes too far ahead and sometimes too far being the pack.  






If Fritz Roethlisberger helped establish the intellectual foundations of the organization 
behavioral department, a man named Douglas Bunker helped cement the ties between Harvard 
Business School and the National Training Laboratories, which eventually led to the introduction 
of T-groups within Harvard Business School’s curriculum.  Bunker, who had served as one of 
NTL’s first social science interns, was a member of NTL’s staff when he joined the faculty of 
Harvard Business School’s Organizational Department in 1962.204  The following year, he 
published a short article in NTL’s Human Relations Training News in which he celebrated the 
possibilities of T-groups for society and culture at large.  In “Valid Communication and 
Understanding Between People, he lamented that “[w]e live in a culture in which freedom and 
autonomy are often equated with social isolation.  The myth us current and widely accepted that 
only the person who stands alone is truly free.”205   Our uber-competitive society and its anxiety-
producing organizations, he argued, persuaded people that the only endeavors worth pursuing 
were those with highly utilitarian, task-oriented ends.  T-groups would provide an antidote to 
these social conditions.  By breaking down the barriers to true communication between people, 
they would help citizens of all stripes build meaningful humanistic relationships in place of 
highly competitive and isolating ones.
206
 
As early as the mid-1950s, HBS’s first-year course in “Administrative Practices” (taught 
by Joseph Cannon Bailey) promised to offer students “an opportunity to develop, as far as he as 
an individual can, an attitude outlook, frame of mind, or way of thinking about human situations 
such that he will be a more useful and more responsible member of an organization”; it rested on 
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an expectation that “the student will broaden the groundwork for his future growth as a person 
and as an administrator in organizations in a free and democratic society.”207  The rhetoric of the 
course suggested a foundation in humanistic behavioral science theory that, within about five 
years, would become part of HBS practice within the Organizational Behavior department.  By 
1960, the school was offering a course from Abraham Zaleznik called “Human Relations II” 
with more explicit connections to NTL and its kindred institutions.  This course, the catalog 
promised, would integrate “frames of reference and concepts…from the growing body of 
research in the behavioral sciences,” and would offer students opportunities to “participate in 
group experiments and laboratory training” in order to understand the “objectives of the 
course.”208  
The next year, the language of “Human Relations” was replaced in all course materials 
with the title “Organizational Behavior,” including under its rubric course titles like “Two-
Person Relationships,” “The Individual in Groups,” and Douglas Bunker’s own “Seminar on the 
culture and Organization of Work,” which offered students “an inquiry into cultural patternings 
of organizational models and work behavior.”209  By the end of the decade, group dynamics 
work had entered Harvard’s MBA program as well, with one of the 1st-year courses for MBA 
being the required “Laboratory in Organizational Behavior” (which exposed students to both 
theory and practice of contemporary group dynamics) and courses like Zaleznik’s “Social 
Psychology of Management,” which emphasized “the emotional and symbolic meanings of work 
transactions in the light of crises of human development and the life cycle.”210  By the end of the 
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1960s, Harvard Business School had legitimated the role of laboratory learning and group 
dynamics research in conventional business education. 
 
 Throughout the 1960s, a slew of articles and books within the management and industrial 
psychology community communicated the growing enthusiasm surrounding corporate T-
groups.
211
  By 1967, one writer proposed that “By now, even the most hermit-like denizens of 
the business world must surely have heard of T-groups, sensitivity training, and laboratory 
training” and cited a “veritable torrent of discussion concerning its supposed merits and 
limitations.”212  A 1964 article in Factory (which followed up on the publication’s first coverage 
of NTL in July 1959) called T-groups “the most controversial development in the history of 
laboratory training,” and explained that thousands of executives had already attended NTL’s 
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two-week Management Work Conferences.
 213
  It even included a role-playing exercise that 
readers could do at home to gauge their own levels of sensitivity. 
 In the same year that Factory was teaching readers to turn their attention to their own 
perceptions of people and situations, Chris Argyris published a frequently cited article in the 
Harvard Business Review that celebrated the T-group as a solution to all modern managerial 
dilemmas.
214
  While Argyris had long been a supporter of T-group methods, “T-groups for 
Organizational Effectiveness” marked his most emphatic and explicit celebration of the T-group 
method to date.  Argyris asked, “Why do company executives become conformists as a company 
becomes older and bigger?  Why do they resist saying what they truly believe—even when it is 
in the best interests of the company?”  He suggested that T-groups were the ideal antidote to 
organizational conformity because they uprooted “pyramidal values” and a promoted a new 
corporate culture based on “authentic relationships”—a culture in which “an individual can 
behave in such a way as to increase his self-awareness and self-esteem and, at the same time, 
provide an opportunity for others to do the same.”215   
 Argyris strongly emphasized that T-groups were not therapy groups because they 
“assume a higher degree of health” and focused primarily on the “here-and now.”  Yet he 
presented the T-group in suspiciously therapeutic terms: “If one truly begins to accept oneself, he 
will be less inclined to condemn non-genuineness in others, but to see it for what is, a way of 
coping with a nongenuine world by a person who is (understandably) a nongenuine 
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individual.”216  The contradictions plaguing Argyris’s article reflected larger tensions plaguing 
the T-group movement as a whole (to be discussed in Chapter 10).  By the mid-1960s, Lewin’s 
rhetoric of action research and democratic leadership competed with more seductive promises of 
personal growth.  The participative philosophy espoused by the movement’s pioneers faded to 
the background as a goal of self-actualization for self-actualization’s sake came to the fore.
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“How Democratic Can Industry Be?”: 
Rensis Likert and the Study of Organizational Behavior 
 
 While the National Training Laboratories was emerging as the premier practitioner of 
humanistic management training on the east coast, Rensis Likert’s Institute for Social Research 
(ISR) was pioneering an alternative set of management experiments in the Midwest.  From the 
time of its establishment in the late 1940s through the mid-1960s, the ISR conducted a number of 
groundbreaking research projects in the new field of Organizational Behavior and ultimately 
inspired Likert to publish his own well regarded management treatise, New Patterns in 
Management, in 1961.  In this book, Likert articulated a participative theory of management 
called System 4, which shared Douglas McGregor’s emphasis on anti-hierarchical 
communication and decision-making within corporations.  Though rooted in more quantitative 
data than McGregor’s work, it nonetheless reflected the participative commitments that had 
characterized Likert’s intellectual agenda since his service in the New Deal, and the interest in 
morale that he had expressed in his 1930s studies of life insurance salesmen.   
 This chapter examines Likert’s foray into the realm of Organizational Behavior, a field in 
which he built his reputation as both theorist and practitioner.  Beginning with a series of 
pioneering studies for the Office of Naval Research in the 1950s, Likert and his colleagues 
demonstrated that survey research was perfectly compatible with the less quantitative aims of 
Lewin’s action research and Maslow’s humanistic psychology.  One major project for the utility 
company Detroit Edison, in particular, invited collaboration between Likert’s surveyors and the 
behavioral scientists working within the Research Center for Group Dynamics.  This work not 





him to build his own management consulting service.  For decades after World War II, ISR’s 
experiments in Organizational Behavior and Likert’s development of System 4 affirmed the 
humanistic potential of survey research and offered an alternative model of organizational 
growth from that fostered within T groups.  Likert emerged from decades of experimentation 
with a central conviction in tact: that capitalism was on the verge of perfectability, and that a 
rigorous application of social-science methods could ensure lasting social and economic 
harmony. 
 
 Beginning in the late 1940s, one organization was more influential than any other in 
shaping the course of the ISR’s development as a pioneer of organizational research.  The Office 
of Naval Research (ONR) had provided funds to the Research Center for Group Dynamics and 
the Survey Research Center as independent entities before they merged. In Michigan, the ONR 
launched a program of research in human relations and organizational behavior of such immense 
scope that, according to Likert, it became "the key grant in getting us started on the research in 
leadership and management."
1
  The ONR funded a wide range of ISR studies addressing issues 
of management, morale, conflict, group dynamics, and productivity within organizations.  
Launching off the theoretical groundwork of thinkers like Kurt Lewin and human-relations 
theorists like Elton Mayo, these studies were designed both to build theoretical knowledge about 
the social dynamics of organizations and to increase the productivity of organizations through 
improved methods of management.  The work funded by the ONR drew from each phase of 
Likert’s intellectual biography, integrating industrial human relations, attitude surveying, and 
principles of democratic administration into an overarching vision of institutional harmony.  
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  The ONR project at ISR, which became known the Organizational Behavior and Human 
Relations Program, had a profound effect on the future of the Institute in general and Likert’s 
career in particular.  It helped establish the ISR as a hotbed of research in the very young field of 
Organizational Behavior, which in turn attracted major grants from corporations and industries 
interested in the Institute’s services – ultimately complicating the “public” foundation upon 
which the ISR was built.
2
  It also helped launch Rensis Likert’s career as a management guru.  
Likert’s New Patterns of Management, published about ten years after securing the decade-long 
grant from the ONR, drew explicitly from research funded by the ONR grant.   
 The RCGD arrived in Ann Arbor in 1948 with an ONR grant in tow, thanks to Kurt 
Lewin’s active involvement with the Navy’s social science/group psychology division.3 Lewin 
had first encountered the ONR when John MacMillan, one of its staff, invited him to be on a 
wartime panel of social scientists –also including Rensis Likert—reviewing the ONR’s research 
proposals and policies.  He later obtained ONR grant money for the 1946 Connecticut leadership 
training workshop that spawned the National Training Laboratories.
4
  One month after Lewin’s 
death, Cartwright and Lippitt assured one of the RCGD’s other funders, the Field Foundation, 
that the grant money was still in place, and that the Center was developing a “new, more sharply 
focused research program” in large part thanks to grants from the ONR.  At that time, they 
explained, “one major focus” was group productivity and techniques off bringing about change 
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in group productivity.”5  They promised that the RCGD was continuing sponsored work in “the 
performance of leaders and trainers in industry, social agencies, government and labor groups” to 
be conducted in a laboratory workshop the following summer.
6
 
 A report on RCGD activities from 1947 sheds light on the broad scope of activities and 
research questions funded by ONR in the immediate postwar period.  The “Navy Research 
Project,” as it was then called, was designed generally to address “the way in which attitudes are 
knowledge are spread” – but it more accurately provided a body of research data that both 
challenged and elaborated on the earlier research assumptions of Elton Mayo and Fritz 
Roethlisberger’s Hawthorne Experiments.  The study rested on an assumption that the 
organizations of the postwar period were in trouble:  
Industrial management, facing the problems of communicating attitudes and basic 
company philosophy as well as the details of policy and procedure through 
increasingly large organizational units, is seriously concerned over these 
problems.  So are those charged with the responsibility of public education on 
such pressing matters as the economic facts essential to sound governmental 
policy, the considerations affecting governmental decisions on atomic power, the 
successful functioning of a democratic society demands a well informed public.  





The future of democracy depended on the abilities of leaders in industry, government, and 
education to establish systems effective communication.  As of August 1947, those systems were 
in trouble. 
 The RCGD embarked on a three-pronged study of the power, dynamics, and productivity 
of social groups as part of its work for the ONR.  The first project, an aforementioned study led 
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by Leon Festinger (another former Lewin student), examined attitudes of a housing project’s 
residents with a particular aim in mind: “to change the attitudes of the members of this 
community toward each other and toward the neighborhood itself,” and to counter the consensus 
among the very residents of housing projects that “only undesirable types of people live in the 
project.”8  By examining processes of communication and attitude change, Festinger hoped to 
aid those government officials and administrators trying to nurture a sense of community among 
residents.  The second study conducted under the Navy contract, spearheaded by Ron Lippitt and 
Jack French, revolved around a three-week conference for “top administrative and educational 
personnel.”9  The directors of this project spent three weeks studying the dynamics and 
productivity of a group of educators, administrators, government officials, and managers as they 
participated in training for effective leadership.  As with a T-group, the conference itself was 
designed to be the laboratory of change.
10
 
 It was the third major project conducted by the RCGD for the ONR in 1947 that set a 
powerful precedent for the direction of human relations research in years to come.  This research 
project, commandeered by Jack French with the assistance of two graduate students, was a 
preliminary study of the effects of group affiliations on productivity among industrial workers. 
The RCGD situated the work in historic terms:  
Ever since the famous Hawthorne studies of the Harvard Business School were 
published, it has been clear that group factors are important determinants of 
industrial morals and productivity.  Yet the Hawthorne studies did no more than 
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to break ground in this vital area.  Converging lines off evidence indicate that 
some of the most critical problems of industrial conflict will be solved only when 
we know a great deal more about the way in which individual behavior is 




The proposed study of industrial relations would take the face-to-face workgroup as an 
“important ‘microcosm’” to be studied intensively.  The researchers would focus on a particular 
industrial work group for evidence of group identification, seeking to understand “the conditions 
under which the identification may be broadened to include larger groups up to the plant as a 
whole.”  The RCGD promised potentially great gains for industrial leaders, reminding their 
funders that “hitherto unimagined levels of group loyalty and productivity are possible under 
proper conditions.”12  This RCGD project set an important precedent for work that would follow 
for decades to come.  The study of group dynamics, a fundamentally idealistic enterprise hitched 
to ideals of social harmony and democratic cohesion, was by no means limited to the public 
sphere.  Unleashed in the private realm—and following the precedent of Mayo and 
Roethlisberger – social scientists could forge new paths for effective communication and 
heightened productivity within the workplace.  When the RCGD moved to Michigan in 1948, the 




 At the same time that the ONR was funding group-dynamics research at MIT, Rensis 
Likert was building a relationship between the ONR and the recently established Survey 
Research in Michigan.  The collaboration began in 1946, during a conversation between Likert 
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and Merle Tuve, a physical scientist at the Carnegie Institute in Washington.  Tuve suggested 
that Likert get in touch with the Office of Naval Research because Likert sought funders, and 
Tuve’s friend in the ONR had told him about the Office’s interest in leadership research and the 
social sciences.
14
  His contacts encouraged Likert to submit a proposal, and a budding 
relationship was born.   
 In “A Proposed Program of Research on the Fundamental Problems of Organizing 
Human Behavior,” Likert articulated the urgent need for social research on organizations. He 
alerted the ONR:  
In terms of national well-being and national defense there is no more fundamental 
problem on which to do research than  on the dynamics of social organizations.  
The need for this research is especially acute at this time because of the rapid 
changes in human activity being brought about by results from research done in 
the physical sciences.  These results are compelling drastic changes in human 
relationships and yet so little research on the basic problems of social 
organizations has been done that we have few clear cut principles to apply.  As a 
consequence, we are groping and bungling in a costly fashion.  We need urgently 
to know the fundamental principle underlying group behavior so that we can deal 




In the era of totalitarian atrocities, the atomic bomb, and complex corporate capitalism, Likert 
suggested, it was necessary to increase knowledge of the complicated social systems that had 
produced them in the first place.  Likert acknowledged important precedents for such a project: 
the “excellent theoretical work” of Mary Parker Follett, the “important work” of Mayo and 
Roethlisberger, Lewin’s work on leadership and motivation, and his own Division of Program 
Survey’s research on “processes of management with particular emphasis on morale.”  The next 
stage of social science inquiry would build on past research with new questions about how and 
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why groups act the ways they do, which forms of leadership are most productive, and “why 
certain groups become belligerent and even pathologically destructive”—an issue with deep 
roots in studies of authoritarianism during World War II. 
16
   
 Likert offered a detailed plan of research on industry, government, and voluntary groups 
that would rely on both sample survey methods and “experimental techniques.”  In many ways, 
he explained, the work would echo that which he performed on behalf of the Life Insurance 
Salesman Research Bureau, because it would integrate “lengthy interview[s]” administered to all 
levels of employee—from plant laborer to supervisor to top manager—with shorter interviews 
and more quantitative surveys.  Likert also compared the proposed work to that he conducted for 
the US Strategic Bombing Survey.  That project, which also focused on issues of morale, 
involved a successful application of the “indirect approach”: Surveyors interviewed German and 
Japanese civilians on a broad range of topics so that they could glean an overall sense of 
respondents’ attitudes, rather than zeroing in on one or two pertinent questions.17 
The project’s surveys would be designed to broadly ascertain how people related to their 
jobs, to other individuals in their groups, and to other groups of workers.  They would also 
address worker satisfaction and subordinates’ views of their superiors.  The SRC would study a 
wide range of industries, from office and sales organizations to large industries and government 
agencies at the local and national levels.
18
  Likert’s ten-year proposal suggested ambitious multi-
tiered interview schedules targeting hundreds of workers in the same company, and multiple 
companies in each industry.  The proposal proved persuasive: The ONR signed off on a 10-year 
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funding plan, beginning with a first-year grant of $120,000, which was replicated in 1948 and 
1949.
19
   
In the decade after the ONR approved this early SRC proposal, Michigan’s program in 
human relations greatly expanded.  The RCGD arrived in 1948 with aforementioned ONR-
sponsored projects in tow, and for the SRC, Human Relations business was booming: In the first 
years of its ONR research, the SRC Human Relations Program conducted major research on 
leadership, productivity, and morale at Prudential Life Insurance, Caterpillar Tractor Company, 
Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company, Detroit Edison, Studebaker, and Maytag.
20
  
Researchers surveyed employees and managers on issues related to union activity, leadership 
practices, management processes. They grew particularly interested in organizations’ responses 
to change, and the roles of power and control in organizational structure.  Meanwhile, at the 
RCGD, French and Festinger continued their research on group productivity, communication, 
participation, and prestige through  group-dynamics laboratory techniques.
21
  The work of both 
groups attracted research grants from additional sources, as well. From April 1947 to December 
1950, industry and foundations contributed approximately $600,000 in additional funds to 
support research being conducted.
22
  
By 1951, it was clear to Likert—by then Director of the ISR, overseeing survey and 
group dynamics divisions—that it was time to expand.  In February 1951, he wrote to the 
Howard Page of ONR’s Human Relations Branch with a thorough account of the progress he and 
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his colleagues had made in the past three years.  Industries were enthusiastically cooperating, but 
Likert felt that the ISR could use a longer-term commitment and increased funding.  Likert  
enticed Page with recent results, claiming that “we are finding it possible to achieve substantial 
increases in productivity, and also have preliminary evidence of favorable morale changes” 
thanks to three years of research in human relations.
23
  The ONR ultimately nsigned on for a 
longer-term commitment ot funding ISR human relations research. 
After the ONR signed on, Likert contacted his friend Daniel Katz and asked him if he 
would be interested in leaving his tenured position at Brooklyn College to help him start up a 
more formal program to bridge ISR’s two centers working with Naval funding.  Katz, who had 
conducted research on the productivity of shipyards, acquiesced.
24
  Soon thereafter, the ISR’s 
Program in Human Relations and Social Organization (later called the Organizational Behavior 
and Human Relations Program) was born.  In the early years of the program, projects varied 
from the specifically industrial to the broadly attitudinal.  One of the major studies launched in 
1953 was a nationwide sample survey of the adult population about the function of work, and 
another investigated the nature of conformity (framed, along with dependence, as a product of 
the unsuccessful “reconciliation of organizational requirements with individual needs”).  In 
1957, another general population study examined “why people either liked or disliked their 
jobs.”25   
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The majority of studies conducted by the Organizational Behavior Program funded by the 
ONR grant addressed the problems of particular industries, and these industrial studies became a 
mainstay of ISR’s research agenda and revenue stream.  Between 1947 and 1961, researchers at 
ISR conducted more than 80 studies of large organizations –unions, factories, civic 
organizations, political organizations—and, according to Likert, "The bulk of money came from 
industrial organizations."  Through Likert’s retirement in 1970, industrial organizations 
contributed approximately $15 million to ISR’s program in organizational research.26   
 
In September 1950, Modern Industry announced that “An exciting two-purpose 
experiment—to open up management communication to get more democracy into the industrial 
organization—is under way among the 10,600 nonsupervisory and 1,350 supervisory employees 
off the Detroit Edison Company.”27  The experiment, co-sponsored by the Office of Naval 
Research and Detroit Edison itself, was the second major venture of Michigan’s ISR on behalf of 
the ONR-funded Human Relations program.
28
  Run by Likert, Floyd Mann, Donald Pelz, and 
Daniel Katz, the Detroit Edison project established the ISR as a pioneer in the nascent field of 
Organizational Development.  It also announced Likert et. al.’s commitment to an ambitious 
postwar mission: the project of making industry “democratic” through the application of survey 
research, managerial feedback, and human relations laboratory training.  As a case study, Detroit 
Edison’s massive human-relations endeavor revealed the extent to which participative 
management and group dynamics had filtered into mainstream industrial social science after 
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World War II.  It also reflected the increasingly blurry lines between Likert-brand organizational 
surveying and Lewinian group-dynamics techniques. 
The SRC first earned public acclaim in business circles with its 1948 ONR-funded study 
of the Prudential Insurance Company in Newark, NJ.  An SRC proposal for the work applied the 
language of modern human relations training: It would help Prudential’s managers of white-
collar workers make the transition from treating employees like “cogs in a machine” to treating 
them “like people.”29  The experiment was a success, ultimately spawning two published works 
that put the SRC on the industrial map: Katz, Maccoby, and Morse’s Productivity, Supervision, 
and Morale in an Office Situation and Morse’s Satisfactions in the White Collar Job, published 
in 1950 and 1953, respectively.
 30
 Both works presented the central finding of SRC’s work at 
Prudential: that high levels of worker productivity and satisfaction on the job stemmed not from 
intrinsic qualities of the work itself, but from effective leadership.  More specifically, supportive 
supervisors – supervisors who “are more positive toward their men, take a more personalized 
approach to them, and give more attention to the problems of motivation”—led more effective 
work teams than their less attentive peers.
 31
  Floyd Mann, a sociologist who joined the ranks of 
the SRC in 1946, visited the Prudential operation in Newark and called it “a revelation.”32 SRC’s 
Prudential work helped establish the the research organization as a nexus of human relations 
research and announced its legitimacy within the field.   
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According to Mann, two Detroit Edison personnel department representatives learned 
about SRC’s Prudential work “by the newspaper” and decided to “[come] over to see what this 
was about.”33  By late 1948, the SRC and Detroit Edison had agreed on the parameters of a 
research project.  A survey would be administered in some form to all of the employees of the 
Detroit Edison Power Company, supervised by Rensis Likert.  The project would take several 
months – the time necessary to interview roughly 12,000 superisory and non-supervisory 
employees by questionnaire and interviews – and cost Detroit Edison $50,000.34  The DE study, 
whose scope and budget exceeded the Prudential project, would introduce a promising new 
technique of “survey research feedback” to create networks of organizational communication 
and change rather than simply accumulating piles of data to be distributed among higher ups.  




The Detroit Edison study’s proposal outlined the vague and lofty objectives typical of 
postwar human relations research.  Its surveys would measure the differences in employee 
working morale in the various departments of the Edison organization; determine reasons for 
those differences; investigate “what constitutes good leadership in the working situation”; supply 
data that would “increase working effectiveness”; and contribute to the University’s larger 
project of accumulating a broad range of human relations data.
36
  This data would, ideally, help 
guide tangible changes within the company to increase DE workers’ morale and productivity.  
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Modern Industry framed the project in more utilitarian terms: “Because people’s attitudes must 
be changed, in supervision and in the workforce,…the experiment has a third purpose: to find the 
best ways of bringing about changes of attitudes at all levels of the organization.”37   
Preliminary interviews with Detroit Edison’s upper-level managers and council members 
suggest a more concrete set of motivations for the research.  Detroit Edison was, it seems, in 
decent shape at the end of the 1940s. Its rate of turnover, 15.2%, was considered low.
38
  Its 
workers had exhibited the “esprit de corps” necessary for emergency power line work, and 
profits were steady.  So why embark on $50,000 worth of research on worker productivity and 
morale?  Early interviews with higher-ups suggest that their most pressing concerns revolve 
around two issues: union membership and the high cost of labor. A.S. Albright, a company 
Comptroller (“probably in his sixties, a typical picture of a business executive,” according to his 
interviewer) explained in an early interview that he was “concerned with the general question of 
productivity and economical operation “ because “over 30% of the company’s costs are labor 
costs,” and “these are the only manageable costs the company has.”  Albright was “convinced 
that significantly more economical operation would be possible” if DE could address “the 
relatively poor attitude of employees, supervisors, and managers” prohibiting “more economical 
operation.”39    
Other executives expressed less concern about low rates of productivity, but shared 
Albright’s concern about “what makes people join unions, especially where the factors which 
cause it are the result of company failure.”  Mr. Green, the head of construction (with “very 
direct, clear and penetrating speech” and “relatively little regard for superficial niceties”) was the 
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company’s principal labor negotiator.  He expressed concern about DE’s “slow rate of 
promotion” and the fact that “management will never respect and care for the interests of the 
worker in the same way in which the union will.” A council member named HW Collins 
(described as “intelligent, kindly, unpretentious, fairly neutral with respect to unionization but 
leaning a little against”) noticed that many workers were dissatisfied with their shift schedules. 
He also suggested that “the productivity of maintenance crews has declined somewhat recently” 
and wondered “whether there is any relationship between this and the fact of union 
organization.”40  
W.W. Williams, the chief engineer of lines, expressed a different perspective.  On the one 
hand, according to his figures, “productivity on overhead lines, construction, and maintenance 
has dropped off by 30% in the past several years,” and construction workers had recently refused 
to do certain kinds of work in rainy weather.  But on the other hand, his men had been “strongly 
unionized for 35 years,” making unionization an unlikely source of declining productivity.”  His 
men’s allegiance to the union made him doubt the utility of a company-based human relations 
initiative: “Williams said that although it might be heresy, he was convinced that the linemen 
didn’t really work for Detroit Edison, that they worked for the union and the Detroit Edison 
contracted with the union for their services.  He felt consequently that the men were more 
concerned with their standing in union circles than they were with their standing with company 
superiors.”41 
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Union membership and alleged declining productivity, along with the “potential threat of 
public ownership,”42 clearly contributed to DE’s optimism that $50,000 worth of research could 
improve rates of efficiency and morale.  On December 1, 1947, DE’s President Parker sent a 
letter to company supervisors informing them that their employees would be receiving surveys at 
their home addresses.
43
  The surveys, he explained, would help supervisors determine “what 
factors contribute to good employee relations at the company” and which supervisory policies 
and behaviors “contribute to high morale and working efficiency.”44  Parker urged supervisors to 
be completely frank in their own survey responses (“there is no intent, nor would it be possible, 
to identify your interview”) and also tried to quell fears about company shake-ups (“I am sure 
that much of their findings will be commendatory of our policies and supervision”).  The next 
day, a similar letter went out to all non-supervisory employees.  “One of the big problems facing 
this or any large company,” Parker explained, “is that of knowing how employees feel about 
their company and the effect upon employees of its policies and management…and if we are to 
work together effectively, it is important that we understand one other’s problems and point of 
view.”45  The survey would offer entirely anonymous forums in which workers could 
communicate candid feelings about company relationships and working conditions. 
Studies of human relations in industrial settings were nothing new in 1948 – the most 
obvious precedent being Mayo’s studies of the Hawthorne Western Electric Plant (another utility 
company) approximately two decades earlier. The SRC’s study of Detroit Edison was path-
breaking because of the innovative ways in which Likert, Mann, Peltz, and Katz designed and 
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administered the study.  First, the survey incorporated a mix of open-ended and closed questions, 
blending the “Rogerian” techniques of the Division of Program Surveys with Likert’s earlier 
work on quantitative questionnaires.  The SRC started by administering a sample questionnaire 
to about 500 employees of different ages and sexes, and then tabulated the results to be sure 
they’d be useful.46  Thus assured, they designed five different versions of a questionnaire with 
150 to 175 questions to be distributed all of Detroit Edison’s 10,000 non-supervisory 
employees.
47
  All versions of the hour-long survey shared a core of 40 main questions on critical 
topics like supervision, wages, and working conditions.  The five different versions contained 
additional sets of varied questions, so that each subset would be answered by 1/5 of Detroit 
Edison’s employees.  These closed questionnaires offered statements that employees could agree 
or disagree with and other questions to be answered on a scale of one to five.  Questions 
included: “When you’re at work, does the time usually pass slow or fast?”  “Are you doing the 
kind of work you would really like to do?” How satisfied are you with your current wages?” 
“How much personal interest does [your supervisor] take in you and your problems?”48 
After non-supervisory employees had completed their surveys, SRC staff sat down for 
one-on-one, open-ended interviews with all 1000 members of DE’s supervisory staff, from the 
president of the organization to 3
rd
-line supervisors and foremen.  The interviews took between 
one and three hours per person, and more closely resembled the non-directive surveys used 
during Likert’s days at the DPS.  The pre-determined questions contained multiple-choice 
questions such as:   
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What are the toughest problems you have in your job?...How do you feel about 
the amount of authority you have?....Do you have discussions with your 
employees about how things are done?...Some supervisors think that it is a good 
idea for employees to make recommendations to their supervisors; others feel that 
it is generally a waste of time.  How do you feel about it?...How do you feel about 
the progress you have made in the company up to now?
49
   
 
The supervisory questionnaire addressed its subjects as both manager and managed, addressing 
issues of communication with subordinates and treatment from above.   When these interviews 
were complete and sent to the SRC headquarters for coding, the SRC chose 10% of the non-
supervisory employees (all of whom had filled out questionnaires) who were equally distributed 
across “organizational families,” to partake in a similar one-on-one interview process.  Staffers 
urged subjects to flesh out the answers they had provided on questionnaires, to give more 
detailed impressions of their experiences and relationships at work.  Having completed these 
thousands of questionnaires and interviews, SRC staff returned to their institutional home base 
for months of tabulation. 
The Detroit Edison project sparked a moment of synthesis between the quantitative work 
of the SRC and the more experiential work of the Research Center for Group Dynamics.  Mann 
later reflected:  
As soon as [the RCGD] found out … what I was doing with these small teams [in 
Detroit Edison] and they said, ‘Hey, what you need to know more about is group 
dynamics.’ So they trucked me off to a national center—a National Training 
Laboratory [sic] in Bethel, Maine.  And that’s where I ran into Lippitt and…Jack 
French…and Cartwight and Zander.50 
 
The process of group dynamics meshed with an experiment of Supervisory Conferences that the 
DE Personnel Planning Department had independently initiated, in which men of different 
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management levels would meet with supervisors to discuss concerns and brainstorm solutions.
51
  
These conferences, along with Mann’s commitment to survey feedback, incorporated the survey 
data into a larger experiential process of organizational development.  
 Mann incorporated the methods of the RCGD into his administration of survey results. 
Having emerged with a set of quantitative results and qualitative evaluations, Mann and his 
colleagues returned to Detroit Edison to conduct exercises in “survey feedback.”  It was 
important to Mann to consider the “correspondences and discrepancies between the perceptual 
world of the employed and the perceptual world of the supervisor.”52 How, in other words, did 
subordinates’ concerns and impressions differ from supervisors’ experiences of the same 
matters?  How often did an employee report feeling unheard by a supervisor who considered 
himself a good listener?  How many supervisors accurately predicted the rates of their 
subordinates’ satisfaction?  The SRC was particularly interested in the extent to which 
supervisors failed to accurately perceive their own behaviors.
53
  Mann later recalled that through 
the process of “bringing the findings from the bottom up to the top,” the DE Survey “developed 
into a laboratory.”54   
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Modern Industry later reported that the “Greatest novelty in the survey is the ‘feedback’ 
of results to all levels of management, supervision, and rank-and-file employees” because 
“everyone not only had his attitudes canvassed; everyone had the results presented to him in a 
matter which let him interpret them, called upon him to do something about whatever findings 
showed the need for a remedy, gave him the opportunity to do something.”55  Through the 
process of reporting back survey results to high-level managers, foremen, and workers alike, the 
survey became more than a tool for “disclosing the state of employee morale”; it became “a tool 
for improving morale” in and of itself.56  
 Mann later celebrated the survey feedback’s ability to “stimulate self-examination in the 
organization”57 and called the DE study the “first of the organizational development kind of 
efforts in that whole field.”58  Through the process of reporting survey data back to employees of 
DE, Mann found that “It’s the how—not the what” that mattered in organizational change.  The 
raw data became useful only when employees at all level of an organization engaged with and 
processed it.
59
  What worked so well about the process, he explained, was what he called its 
fundamentally “non-directive” nature: Instead of entering the offices of DE bigwigs with survey 
results in tow, ready to “tell them what they need to know,” Mann et al would present 
supervisors with results and ask, “What do you see here?  What’s relevant?...a lot of Carl Rogers 
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stuff.”60 The act of involving supervisors in the analysis of data and sparking their own self-
analysis seemed to promise far greater returns than an expert’s authoritative diagnosis. 
 Detroit Edison’s inclusive distribution of survey results thus reflected a larger ideological 
mission of the ISR: to promote democracy in the workplace.  The 1950 Modern Industry article 
about Detroit Edison, entitled, “How Democratic Can Industry Be?” was followed by the 
subheading, “Give people a voice in what they do and they’ll do it better, research men said.  
The company tried it, found it good.”61  Its author promised that the DE survey experiment “has 
long-range promise of buttressing employee faith in the system of democratic capitalism beyond 
the possibilities of current free enterprise campaigns.”62  The company and the SRC both 
designed and executed the project to bolster feelings of democratic communication. 
 The SRC infused its surveys from the beginning with the language of democracy, asking 
numerous questions about the extent of workers’ participation and brand of supervision.  
According to Pelz, “We had a number of questions that were derived from this concept of 
authoritarian vs. democratic or participative [management]…Likert was very much interested in 
this, and some his research in large business organizations had led him to feel that participatory 
styles of management were, in fact, more effective.”63  Questions on the survey targeted the 
extent to which workers felt included in decision making, the extent to which they felt 
supervisors respected their opinions, and the extent to which managers treated them “as people.” 
Conversely, questionnaires of supervisors contained multiple questions about the responsibility 
invested in underlings and attitudes toward feedback from subordinates. 
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 The democratic theme running through the survey questions reinforced a simultaneous 
training effort taking place at DE, which had initiated an independent “Human Relations in 
Supervision Program.”  This program offered a course for all management groups, all the way 
through the “line organization” and its assembly or “organizational families,” in modern theories 
and techniques of participative management.  Managers would attend a large talk with a 
Michigan-based psychologist named NormanMaier – who had “a flair for industrial talk rather 
than academic jargon” – and learn general principles of management which they would then 
break into small groups to discuss.  The training stressed one aim above all: the forging of 
democratic relationships.  Maier had worked with Lewin and Lippitt on their famous Iowa 
studies on the differences between autocratic, democratic, and laissez-faire leadership.
64
  His 
Detroit Edison sessions sprung from that research, which also influenced the company 
president’s spoken principles of leadership.  “Democratic work relations,” President Parker 
asserted, would be “a force that will provide workers with a real stake in the American industrial 
economy.”  While “no one at Detroit Edison votes on what his pay rate is to be” (because “that is 
a subject reserved to a different group”), the company had already embraced participatory 
rhetoric by the time SRC staffers arrived to conduct their surveys.
65
 
Mann and his colleagues were committed to sharing their findings with workers and 
management at all levels of the organization – even if it was only the bigwigs who had the power 
to change working conditions or pay rates.  For its part, DE issued a series of employee 
publications that almost compulsively updated employees on the status of the project. Its weekly 
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Supervisor News newsletter kept all levels of supervision abreast of the survey’s progress and 
recent developments.  For those below the level of supervisor, there was Synchroscope, the 
monthly magazine of the Detroit Edison company.  Synchroscope itself exemplified widespread 
corporate attempts of the late 1940s to earn worker loyalty back from unions and the federal 
government, as Elisabeth Fones-Wolfe has persuasively argued in Selling Free Enterprise.
66
  The 
magazine, a glossy, monthly publication with a full-color cover and lush photographs inside, 
communicated a fundamentally friendly, recreational company vibe.  It regularly featured photos 
of employees’ new babies, reports on DE golf and softball teams, news from employees’ recent 
vacations, and a cordial question/answer column with the plant’s executive vice president.   
By early 1948, the SRC’s human relations study was also a fixture of the magazine, with 
articles including abundant photographs of SRC staffers and explanations of the survey 
process—all clearly intended to communicate its fundamental trustworthiness.  An April 1948 
article on the survey offered the subheading, “Researchers from the University of Michigan 
doing Careful, Thorough, Confidential Job” alongside a photo of Likert (“in the privacy of his U 
of M office”) leisurely reclining in a chair and paging through results.67  The article explained 
that research for the study was half done and reviewed the three-step interview/questionnaire 
study design, before explaining the nitty-gritty details of the survey’s administration thus far.   
“The fine cooperation of every department and employee,” the article explained, “is making it 
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possible to conduct the survey with minimum difficulty.” That cooperation would ultimately 
help the company determine “what can be done to make the company a better place to work.”68 
When the study had come to a close and the December 1948 issue of Synchroscope 
reported the “Findings of the Employee Survey,” it was in the most accessible format possible.  
Each summary of survey data was illustrated with cheerful cartoon characters made of lighting 
bolts.  Two mascots—one smiling, one frowning—hovered around a chart illustrating the 
findings of  the question, “Taken as a whole, how satisfied are you?”  Twelve per cent of 
employees were so satisfied they wanted no changes; 44% satisfied but with some things they 
would like to see changed; 32% “quite satisfied but there’s lots to be changed”; and 8% “very 
satisfied.”  This chart was followed by a breakdown of those results by the type of work the 
respondents performed.  A significant 71% of the company’s professional workers expressed 
“overall satisfaction,” while only 40% of unskilled laborers felt the same (with clerical and 
skilled workers falling somewhere in between – at 59% and 52%, respectively).  The results got 
worse: Just 57% of employees thought working conditions were okay (43% did not) and only 
40% saw chances for future promotions.  Overall, the Detroit Edison mascots had plenty of 
disappointing results to relay, but they communicated the company’s commitment to 
transparency and the idea that, disappointing results or not, employees and their superiors were 
in this together. 
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A follow-up article the following September—almost a year later—featured photographs 
indicative of continued action among all ranks of DE employees.  The survey results had not 
simply inspired strategizing among the suits, it suggested, but had provoked a veritable torrent of 
brainstorming at all levels of the organization.  The opening of the article promised:  
There has been a lot of action on the employee survey since preliminary results 
were reported in Synchroscope last December. The pictures on these three pages 
show you the kind of meetings that have been taking place all over the 
company—quiet, friendly, constructive meetings where folks in each department 
can get together to talk over informally the local situation.  One of the helpful 
uses of the survey is that it is encouraging council members, department heads, 
supervisors and all of us to sit down together and talk things over.  Out of these 
meetings and conversations we are developing a fuller understanding—a mutual 
understanding—of what it takes to improve the teamwork of working together.69   
 
This “adventure in better understanding,” the article assured, “will continue in the months ahead, 
giving us all an opportunity to make our company an even better company…our selves happier 
in our work…our service to the people of southeastern Michigan an even better service.”70  
 The article featured photos of some of the usual suspects: President Parker discussing 
results with council members; the Sales Department and Assistant Treasurer discussing how to 
improve employee-supervisor understanding of the retirement plan.  But it also showed foreman 
eagerly leaning over piles of data, construction shop men discussing surveys while eating lunch 
at a table they had requested from supervisors, and motor transportation workers discussing 
“their current feelings about needed improvements.”  More than two years later, in December 
1951, Synchroscope announced more evidence of the survey’s impact.  In 1948, 61% of workers 
had expressed dissatisfaction with the retirement plan; by December 1951, after a series of 
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meetings with employees and the union, the retirement plan had been revamped.
71
   In 1948, 
68% of employees had wanted more information regarding company-wide job openings; by 
December 1951, there was a new “well liked” communication system in place.  The publication 
promised that Detroit Edison would continue to conduct informal sample methods for the 
indefinite future. 
 The Detroit Edison study marked a turning point for the ISR and, on a more individual 
level, Rensis Likert.  Having conducted a major study on organizational development, the ISR 
attracted many more corporate clients in the coming decades, conducting studies for Maytag, 
Studebaker, Caterpillar, General Motors, General Mills, Standard Oil, and Texas Instruments.  
Likert also corresponded with executives from AT&T, Seas, the Ford Motor Company, and 
Allied Chemical.  The ISR never ceased conducting studies of social and political problems, 
which remained significant parts of its institutional agenda, but these corporate experiments 
supplied the majority of funding and helped keep the ISR prosperous throughout the 1950s.  
 The DE study had also set a new methodological precedent for blending the interview 
and survey techniques of the Survey Research Center with the more experiential methods of the 
Research Center for Group Dynamics.  In this new model, surveys emerged as the centerpiece of 
a larger human relations project, providing data but also sparking so-called democratic 
communication within the workplace.  For the companies involved, ISR’s surveys seemed to 
promise a more satisfied and productive workplace that was, ideally, less likely to turn to unions 
for both material and psychological needs.  From the perspective of Likert and his comrades, 
evolving techniques of survey research promised to usher in a utopian era characterized by 
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democratic relationships, productive organizations, and an absence of conflict in social 
institutions.   
 
 The ISR’s work for the Office of Naval Research did more than solidify the institution’s 
reputation within the young field of Organizational Behavior.  It also propelled Rensis Likert’s 
rise as a prominent management theorist.  Overseeing studies of organizations like Detroit 
Edison, Maytag, and Prudential Life Insurance, Likert began to formulate concrete rules about 
the qualities of effective management.  His publications of the 1950 and 1960s argued that that 
the managers of the country’s most productive organizations operated according to a consistent 
set of principles: They treated their employees as people as opposed to machines; they afforded 
subordinates freedom as well as structured guidance; they communicated regularly with 
subordinates about work and personal concerns; they nurtured group loyalties.  Most 
importantly, as Likert asserted in treatise after treatise for nearly two and a half decades, 
effective supervisors encouraged their subordinates to participate in decision making.  This 
practice, which Likert later labeled “System 4,” was also referred to as participative or 
democratic management in the literature of his day.   
 According to Likert, participative management would serve as both organizational and 
social panacea.  It would nurture personal growth and ego recognition individuals, unforeseen 
levels of productivity in organizations, and generally harmonious relationships in postwar society 
at large.  With such pronouncements, Likert joined the ranks of humanistic management theorists 
like Douglas McGregor, Chris Argyris, and Abraham Maslow.  He remained a vehement 
proselytizer of participative management until his death in the early 1980s, by which point he 





graphs and statistics of survey research melded with the lofty psychological concerns of 
Maslowian psychology, with participation emerging as the ultimate antidote to both material and 
emotional dilemmas of postwar capitalism. 
 Likert worked on New Patterns of Management from 1952 – in the immediate aftermath 
of the Detroit Edison study—to 1959, writing on weekend and vacations during his long stint as 
director of the ISR.
72
  By that time, Likert had started integrating the ISR’s organizational 
findings with some of what he had gleaned during his days at the Life Insurance Sales Research 
Bureau and the Division of Program Surveys.  His magnum opus promised motivation, morale, 
productivity, and democracy through the use of quantitative and open-ended surveys, feedback 
sessions, and management training in group dynamics—the techniques he had developed and 
refined throughout his career as a social scientist.  In the early life insurance studies, Likert later 
reflected, "All I did … was to [show] that the more managers behaved in ways which at that time 
I said met an agent's desire for ego recognition (later on they called it personal worth) … the 
higher the morale and the more successful the agency was."
73
   By the 1950s, it had become clear 
to him that one could measure those behaviors through surveying, on a scale of “highly punitive 
to less punitive,” or from “exploitative authoritarian” to “participative.”  He had also determined 
that one could change managerial attitudes and behaviors with proper techniques of feedback 
and training.  New Patterns packaged 30 years of organizational and psychological research in a 
250-page manual.  
 In the book, Likert claimed that the particular conditions of the postwar era demanded a 
new breed of management theory.  Likert listed six “important forces” that accelerated the need 
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for new modes of leadership in all types of organizations—schools, hospitals, labor unions, 
corporations.
 74
   First, the US was experiencing increased competition from other industrially 
developed countries around the world. and “one way of holding a satisfactory share of the 
market, domestically and abroad, will be to increase the productivity of our enterprises.”75 
Second, Likert noted more abstract psychological changes taking place within the American 
populace as a whole.  ISR interviews with supervisors and managers, he explained, had revealed 
shifting attitudes toward authority:  
[P]eople are less willing to accept pressure and close supervisions than was the 
case a decade or two ago.  The trend in America, generally, in our schools, in our 
homes, and in our communities, is toward giving the individual greater freedom 
and initiative.  There are fewer direct, unexplained orders in schools and homes, 




He connected this mainstream anti-authoritarian impulse to a third postwar development: a 
substantial increase in the educational level of the work force.  Likert explained that in 1940, 
39.1% of workers had a high school or college education; by 1959, that number was 62%, and 
growing.  Education in turn increased workers’ high expectations for “the amount of 
responsibility, authority, and income they will receive.”77   
 Likert noted a number of additional distinct factors in the postwar landscape: the 
increasing cultural concern with the “growth of individuals into healthy, emotionally mature 
adults”; a growing “restless dissatisfaction” with current management theories and practices; and 
an increasing number of workers with training in specialized, complex technological skills (in 
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fields like plastics, electronics, and missiles) who needed to be managed in distinctly modern 
ways.  He notably did  not mention the ways in which any of these cultural trends—restlessness, 
dissatisfaction, increased education—translated into higher rates if unionization, turnover, or 
absenteeism across the industrial landscape. 
 Having established these premises, Likert offered a manifesto sprinkled with chart after 
chart relating data about managerial techniques and worker attitudes: bar graphs, flow charts, and 
grids communicating the results of a decade of ISR studies.  The quantitative and statistically 
derived charts were intended to transfer Likert’s general observations of management behavior 
into scientific fact – but the observations themselves often reinforced a more fundamentally 
emotional, humanistic worldview.  Likert argued that according to study after study, managers 
inspired the most productivity in their employees when they took a “employee-centered 
approach” rather than a “job-centered” one.  Taylorist management broke jobs down into simple 
tasks, hired people to do those simple tasks, and supervised them closely until the tasks were 
done.  Employee-centered management, on the other hand, focused on “the human aspects of 
subordinates’ problems” and aimed to build effective work groups with “high performance 
goals.”   
 Likert quoted one “high-production” manager from a 1952 study who had explained that 
he “[let] people do the job they want so long as they accomplish the objectives.”  “’I believe in 
letting them take time out from the monotony,’” he explained, and also in making employees feel 
that “they are something special…not just run of the mill.”78  He tended to shed corporate 
formalities in favor of trusting interpersonal relations, discussing problems with employees at 
their desks rather than in his office (“Sometimes I sit on a waste paper basket or lean on the 
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files”) and getting to know each individual well.79  According to Likert, this type of manager 
ultimately inspired higher rates of productivity per man hour, satisfaction, and motivation among 
employees.  He also registered lower rates ofturnover, absenteeism, and scrap loss.  Likert 
asserted that research in many industrial sectors (automobiles, chemicals, electronics, insurance) 
all drove the same point home.   
 Likert was adamant that the productivity-boosting manager offered his subordinates a 
very particular sort of freedom.  While this manager eschewed close, hovering supervision and 
punishments, he exuded a fundamental commitment to and investment in his employee’s work.  
It was one thing to give an employee “the freedom to do the job at his own pace, guided by his 
own ideas about how to do the job best”; it was another to exude a form of laissez-faire 
permissiveness that inspired organizational anarchy.  And while it was helpful to express interest 
in an employees’ personal life, too much emphasis on these concerns could trump productivity in 
the workplace.  The most successful supervisors treated employees like “human beings” while 
respecting the hierarchical organizational structure and offering structured leadership. They 
fostered group loyalties by holding frequent work meetings, communicating constantly with 
subordinates about job concerns, creating “cooperative” goals, and encouraging a sense of 
commitment to all other members of the larger organization.
80
   What emerged was a 
circumscribed brand of freedom in which the employee “knows and accepts what is expected of 
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him and often takes a major role in setting the goals himself.
81
  In Likert’s ideal organization, the 
individual who felt that his needs were being attended to by a superior would ultimately adopt 
the group’s goals as his own.82   
 Likert formalized these principles in what became the most famous chapter of his book.  
In “Comparative View of Organizations,” he laid out four different categories of organizations 
(which would, in his next book, come to be known as Systems 1 – 4).83  The first system, 
“exploitative authoritative” (i.e. System 1), capitalized on employees’ desire for status and 
security; its managers ruled by “fear, threats, punishment, and occasional rewards.”  The next, 
“benevolent authoritative” (System 2), fed on workers’ “economic and occasionally ego 
motives” and ruled through a system of rewards and punishment.  The next system was called 
“consultative” (System 3) for its blend of employee involvement with more traditional forms of 
punishment and rewards.  Finally, there was the pinnacle of organizational evolution: 
“Participative group" management, aka System 4.  Within this model, groups set their own goals, 
approved their own progress, and even agreed on their own compensation system.  System 4 
harnessed worker motivations—for money, status, and ego recognition – for the sake of the 
individual, the organization, and the group.  Likert assured readers that material rewards 
accompanied the systems in ascending order, contrasting System 1’s “mediocre” productivity 
with System 4’s “excellent” levels, and inverse levels of turnover or waste.    
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 New Patterns of Management was greeted with a largely favorable critical response.  One 
reviewer of the “important book” in the “Michigan tradition” applauded Likert for avoiding the 
“shrill, value-laden, emotional tone” common to human relations books, countering the genre’s 
standard subjectivity with “specification of findings” and “rich” data.  This reviewer also 
appreciated Likert’s acknowledgement of executive morale and motivations, as opposed to the 
usual focus on just workers and supervisors – a shift indicative, the reviewer said, of the field’s  
progress since the writings of Mayo and Lewin.
84
  Another reviewer heralded Likert’s book as 
“required reading” for those interested in human relations.  Though Likert defended his theories 
with “missionary enthusiasm” and could strike the casual reader as “tender-minded,” he deserved 
credit for his balance of emotional and material concerns: “All of the humanistic solutions given 
are heavily rationalized as leading to better performance in the long run, when all costs (human 
and material) are computed.”85  Likert’s “tough concern with getting the job done” and his 
commitment to “the service of a higher rationality” buffered him from some of the criticisms of 
his more touchy-feely peers (to be discussed in Chapter 11).  Harold Leavitt, a renowned 
behavioral scientist in his own right, celebrated Likert’s presentation of empirical data in contrast 
to McGregor’s The Human Side of Enterprise, which was more of a “think-type exposition.”86 
 That said, Likert’s reviewers all hinted at the brand off critique that would trail him 
throughout his career as a management theorist.  One reviewer praised Likert for his “departure 
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from the armchair tradition” of contemporary human relations work and applauded his use of 
empirical data, but questioned the accuracy of his conclusions: While the ISR data did indicate 
clearly that participative management encouraged “more favorable employee attitudes,” this 
reviewer found that “its advantages in terms of production and efficiency are by no means 
certain.”87  Thomas Lodahl similarly acknowledged that the entire social science of organizations 
was still in a “primitive state” and alleged that “management, like psychotherapy, is still largely 
an art,” though Likert’s book represented a move in the right direction.88  Harold Leavitt 
expressed his own lingering concerns about the causal relationship, “if any,” between 
productivity and morale and questioned Likert’s conclusions about the short-term nature of 
hierarchical management results.
89
  Like many of Likert’s future critics, these reviewers also 
expressed concern about the reductive nature of Likert’s work.  They cited his eagerness to apply 
his theories to all brands of organization (small and large, for-profit and voluntary), his static 
view of hierarchical management, and his categorical dismissals of certain brains of 
management, regardless of the circumstances.
90
 
 Six years after the publication of New Patterns of Management, Likert returned 
undaunted with an evangelistic endorsement of participative management.  In The Human 
Organization (1967), Likert reiterated many of the theories of New Patterns in a more user-
friendly format.
91
  This volume, filled with do-it-yourself questionnaires and charts, was aimed at 
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the manager who wanted to deduce his placement on the spectrum of Systems 1 through 4.  
Using these questionnaires, managers could check of boxes indicating the extent of their 
collaboration with underlings; the extent to which they knew about subordinates’ personal lives; 
and their openness to criticism.  These questions echoed some of those used back in the Life 
Insurance Sales Research Bureau studies of the 1930s, but now with more pointed implications.  
Having located himself on the scale of management styles, the manager in question would 
theoretically make moves towards achieving the participative ideal, by following Likert’s 
instructions for open communication, continuous group work, and feedback sessions.  Likert 
bolstered his reassertion of these principles with evidence from new organizational studies at 
ISR, including data from a study of the Weldon Company, which had been purchased by the 
Harwood Company and adopted a participative management program with ostensibly spectacular 
results.
92
   
 To such case studies of organizational change, Likert added his newly articulated system 
of “human asset accounting”—a process of “attaching dollar estimates to the value of a firm’s 
human organization and its customer good will.”93  Human asset accounting was designed to 
satisfy those executives who demanded dollar signs attached to their progress in human relations: 
it translated morale and worker satisfaction into dollar values that employees could total up with 
the rest of their assets.  According to Likert, these tangible assets were actually very significant 
indicators of an organization’s productivity and success.  The very premise of calculating such 
assets encapsulated Likert’s contributions to the field of postwar management theory: He had 
found a way to synthesize the quantitative approach of survey research with the more nebulous 
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concerns of humanistic psychology, emerging with a system that could appeal to both hardnosed 
industrial realists and lofty, reform-minded idealists. 
 
 In 1968, the Industrial Conference Board published a 175-page report entitled Behavioral 
Science: Concepts and Management Application about the “growing number of companies” 
turning to behavioral science like Likert’s for knowledge about worker motivation and morale.94 
According to this researched report, 80% of surveyed firms reported “some interest” in the 
behavioral sciences; and of the 302 surveyed firms, 88 said that Rensis Likert had influenced 
their management structure, making him the third most popularly cited theorist around.
95
  The 
report’s author, Harold Rush, profiled a number of corporations at which Likert’s techniques 
loomed large.  The Hotel Corporation of America (HCA), a 7,000-employee operation run by 
Roger Sonnabend, had launched an intensive program of survey feedback amongst all levels of 
management, which produced a large body of data about the company’s communication 
structures.  These data were used as springboard for a three-day, feedback-heavy conference held 
offsite, which in turn spawned a broad Organizational Development initiative focused on 
improving communication between second-level management and their superiors.   
 A former vice president of human resources later enumerated the pros and cons of HCA’s 
endeavor: On the one hand, he observed top management’s commitment to “a meaningful 
business philosophy” and the idea “that people are important,” along with “an extremely open 
and candid atmosphere at the top.”  But this former executive conceded that HCA still had room 
to grow or had, in some instances, gone too far.  Rush reported of the VP: “He feels that the 
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company’s strong insistence upon decentralization ‘has made control a dirty word,’” while at the 
same time, “central office ‘exerts more control than it admits,’ thereby blurring the whole 
concept of decentralization.”96  On the whole, HCA executives expressed optimism about their 
future as a “System 4” organization built on participation and open communication, but also 
recognized the continuing need for traditional controls in their management system.”97   
 The Conference Board report also related at least semi-successful experiments in System 
4 management at the Raymond Corporation (a producer of construction equipment in NY state); 
Steinburg’s Limited (a food wholesaler in Montreal); and TRW Systems Group (an aerospace 
technology company in California).  At these companies, System 4 served as a theoretical 
springboard for experiential work in group dynamics, such as sensitivity training and the 
managerial grid.   
 The influence of all of these techniques had, according to Rush, also spread outside the 
US.  The management committee of a Mexico City-based pharmaceutical company called the 
Syntex Corporation (which produced steroid hormones and oral contraceptives) met in the mid-
1960s and decided that they wanted an organizational system modeled on Likert’s System 4, 
with “decisions pushed down into the organization as far as possible.”98  In 1966, Syntex—
which had research centers in Palo Alto, Sweden, Spain, and other international locations—hired 
a behavioral scientist to help it implement a long-term organizational development program with 
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these objectives in mind
99
   By 1968, a vice president reported some changes in the organization: 
more “introspection and instantaneous feedback among managers,” a greater commitment to 
subordinates’ career paths, more involvement of rank and file employees, and lower rates of 
absenteeism.  At the same time, the VP recognized that “most analyses have been based on 
subjective evaluations rather than objective measurement,” and conceded that the large 
population of scientists at Syntex had expressed a demand for more quantitative data.
100
  Even 
the most enthusiastic supporters of System 4 and related training efforts, it seemed, grappled 
with the connection between psychological benefits and bottom-line results.  
 One of the most famous companies to experiment with participative management in the 
1960s was Texas Instruments, a Dallas-based corporation producing electronics and military 
products with a staff of 48,000 employees.
101
  Texas Instrument’s experiments in organizational 
development were the subject of the widely read articles and book by M. Scott Myers, TI’s 
Management Research Consultant and industrial psychologist.
 102
  TI had experienced a rapid 
spate of growth after 1952, when it expanded its petroleum contracting business and started 
making transistors.  For almost ten years, its staff and scope grew rapidly along with profits; but 
in the early 1960s, its increased production coincided with a faster decrease in the market’s 
prices for semi-conductors, and TI’s top management struggled to maintain a balance between its 
culture of family-style entrepreneurialism and a need for higher productivity and lower labor 
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  Its extensive behavioral science project was designed to increase individual motivation 
among employees and lift the company’s profits.   
 The Texas Instruments experiment, one of the most famous organizational development 
efforts of the 1960s and the subject of a series of articles in the Harvard Business Review, 
reinforced the legitimacy of System 4 management – providing what Myers called “cooberative 
evidence of the wastefulness of bureaucracy and the advantages of democracy.”104 .  Employees 
completed questionnaires on which they were asked to rate statements like: “Everyone helps set 
goals for his work group”; “Employees have plenty of freedom on the job to use their own 
judgment”; and “Supervisors feel a responsibility to help individuals develop and grow with the 
organization.”105  Company directives ordered that supervisors change their roles from 
“authority-oriented” to “goal-oriented” and urged supervisors to build work environments in 
which people could have “a sense of working for themselves.”106 According to Myers, these 
surveys and the intensive programs that followed had resulted in improvements for “such diverse 
criteria as reduced costs, higher yields, less scrap, accelerated learning time, fewer complaints 
and trips to the health center, reduced anxiety and improved attitudes and team efforts, and 
increased profits.”107  TI was gradually transforming work from “punishment” into “opportunity” 
by making it “meaningful” for employees at all levels and challenging the fundamental nature of 
the “authority-oriented foreman” and the “conformity-oriented operator.”  Myers concluded that 
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TI’s efforts had, by 1968, made significant progress toward shattering the “management-labor 
dichotomy” and making—as his book later promised—“every employee a manager.”108 
  
 By the end of the 1960s, experiments in participative management had proven to be at 
least initially successfully, and Likert was crowned as one of the reigning kings of behavioral 
science – with one admirer calling him the “Picasso of Organizational Research.”109  At the same 
time, according to one member of the field, “only a handful of companies have had the courage 
to apply Rensis Likert’s findings.”110  Likert thus stood at a crossroads: the coming decade would 
bring either the triumph of participative management and further validation of his logic, or his 
ideas would gradually fade from corporate consciousness.  In 1971, Likert decided to take a 
gamble.  He retired as director of the ISR and started up his own management consulting firm, 
called Rensis Likert Associates (RLA).  In the coming decade, he continued to consult frequently 
with ISR, but he focused much of his energy on propagating System 4 through his private 
consulting firm.  
 At RLA, Likert and his colleagues focused on working with corporations, but actively 
tried to extend System 4 management principles into the non-profit realm of governments, cities, 
and schools.  Likert envisioned an entire social fabric of free-flowing communication, open 
relations, and democratic supervision, An early RLA handbook for the “unique” consulting firm 
announced its dedication to “improving the productive capability of the human organization” but 
with an explicitly bottom-line goal: to “translate the learnings of behavioral science into practical 
                                                 
108
 Myers, “Who Are Your Motivated Workers?”18. 
 
109
 William F. Dowling, “Conversation with Rensis Likert,” Organizational Dynamics 2, no. 1 (1973): 33-49, 33.   
 
110
 Marvin Weisbord, "Management in Crisis: Must You Liquidate People?" from The Conference Board Record 






applications technology to benefit a wide variety of organizations in terms of improved 
productivity and performance.”111  RLA would deliver these end results through survey feedback 
sessions, as perfected at ISR, and Likert’s method of “Human Organization Assessment.”   
 In 1975, Rensis Likert Associates led a well-publicized organizational development 
program at a the General Motors Lakewood Plan near Atlanta, Georgia. This effort, which was 
chronicled in the journal Organizational Dynamics, pointed to System 4’s continuing promise 
and some of its damning ambiguities.
112
  In an article entitled “At General Motors: System 4 
Builds Performance and Profits,” reporter William Dowling quoted the retired president of GM 
raving about System 4, “The boys are spreading it as fast as they can”—and describing an 
unprecedented number of System 4 managers “moving into key positions at GM.”113  According 
to Dowling, System 4 management had transformed GM’s Lakewood plant from one of the 
company’s worst to one of its best, thanks to a personnel manager named Frank Schotters.  
Schotters entered the plant determined to convert its “System 2” management to System 4, 
implementing “more than 20,000 hours of training” for plant personnel during the first year of its 
project.  He made hourly employees aware of organizational changes, future products, and cost 
data—information previously kept tightly confidential—and gave hourly workers feedback about 
their own labor costs, compared to other plants.  Schotters also established new training 
programs for foremen and gave them “utility trainers” who could focus on the nitty-gritty of 
operations while they focused on managing people.
114
  Workers sat down with engineers who 
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helped them redesign their work areas, and operators got chances to give suggestions about the 
nature of their jobs.   
 In the first year of the program, Dowling explained, “human organization scores” 
increased rapidly while “productivity and cost deteriorated.”115  But two and three years into the 
experiment, the downward trend reversed and labor efficiency began to climb, creating a 
“substantial” overall improvement in plant efficiency between 1969 and 1972.  116  By 1975, 
Lakewood was “still one of the best-performing assembly plants at General Motors,” and the 
System 4 effect had been corroborated by comparing the human organization and efficiency 
scores to those of two other plants in Georgia and Michigan.
117
  Dowling acknowledged some 
necessary caveats – like the short-term nature of the study, the limited sample of plants, and the 
fact that not all of the decisions at Lakewood were ever made my consensus.  But he concluded 
that the Lakewood experience likely ranked “as the most impressive validation of Likert’s theory 
to appear in print to date.”118  He ended his story on an optimistic note: Perhaps these “’not-so-
brilliant times’” would inspire more companies to experiment with human resources, rather than 
lock into old-fashioned methods of organizational control.
119
   
 
 Likert never stopped insisting that System 4 was a capitalist science capable of delivering 
tangible improvements in profit, productivity, efficiency, and labor performance.  He pitched 
participative management using economic incentives first and foremost, and expressed a 
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consistent commitment to economic expansion.  Yet interviews with Likert from the later part of 
his career reflect a broader motivation for his endorsement of participation: For him, System 4 
administration could be an agent social evolution.  “I think there is a basic desire on the part of 
mankind,” he explained in 1970, “to develop more effective ways of learning to work with and in 
cooperation with rather than in conflict with his fellow man.  He can learn to live cooperatively – 
how to work together and coordinate human effort.”120  Likert acknowledged that the US had 
already experienced great stages in this “social evolution,” with occurrences like the American 
Revolution and the Civil Rights movement, but foresaw a phase of development that would 
make such conflict fundamentally obsolete.   He promised, “[W]e have reached a level of 
productivity today that we don’t need exploitation of human labor to live well.  So it is not 
necessary for people who want to live well to exploit the great masses.”121   
 Naïve as Likert’s convictions may strike us in retrospect – the very idea that American 
society could outgrow conflict and class strife—these sentiments offer some clarity regarding his 
own philosophical motivations.  From his earliest days of ISR research on behalf of the Office of 
Navy Research to his final tenure within his management consulting firm, Likert was not simply 
trying to spread a particular rhetoric or style of social cohesion in a divided society. In his mind, 
the US was on its way to transcending its longstanding conflicts, and needed a new system of 
egalitarian administration to support the organizations of the future.  He looked sympathetically 
at the students of the New Left demanding participative democracy, explaining that while “we 
have legitimized the right of the people to be involved in decisions affecting them,…we have not 
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changed the institutions in which people live to enable them to be involved in decisions.”122  The 
government, schools, communities and corporations simply needed to catch up with the 
philosophical and economic conditions of the future.  The right kinds of organizations would 
guide American society into a phase of humane democracy that was—in Likert’s eyes—
inevitable.  His broad concerns about humankind, though often expressed in quantitative terms, 
shared foundational assumptions with the foremost humanistic thinkers of his day.
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Maslow on Management in the 1960s 
 
 
 By the time that Abraham Maslow’s second book, Toward a Psychology of Being, was 
published in 1962, the psychologist had transformed into a cultural icon.  Legend has it that in 
the summer of that year, while driving through the fog on California’s Big Sur coastal highway, 
Maslow was drawn to an intriguing sign that read “Esalen,” and pulled over to explore.  He soon 
found himself in the country’s first “human potential” and personal growth center, a bastion of 
early countercultural types dedicated to self-exploration in cliff-side hot springs.  Coincidentally, 
on the day of his arrival, Esalen staffers had just received copies of his recent book—a testament 
to his transformation from academic outsider to popular-psychology guru.
1
   
 Maslow’s new book built upon the ideas published in Motivation and Personality, but 
presented more philosophical meditations on the nature of personality and experience.  In his 
1962 volume, Maslow argued that each person contains an “essential inner nature” that is 
fundamentally good.   Each person’s nature is to some extent unique, and to some extent 
common, containing qualities shared across all people and cultures. As people learn and exist in 
the world, the voices of their inner natures tend to become weaker and quieter, and can be “very 
easily drowned out by learning, by cultural expectations, by fear, disapproval, etc.”2  Because the 
inner nature is a fundamentally positive force, the healthiest and most authentic people are those 
who learn how to hear their inner “impulse-voices” and let them guide their sense of what they 
are meant to do in the world. If we can “bring out” and “encourage” the voice, Maslow argued, 
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and if it is “permitted to guide our life, we grow healthy, fruitful, and happy.”3  Conversely, if we 
suppress our inner voices, we become “sick,” either in the present or in the future.  
  Maslow extended his argument beyond the realm of the individual, locating critical 
processes in society at large.  “A new vision is emerging of the possibilities of man and of his 
destiny,” he promised, “and its implications are many, not only for our conceptions of education, 
but also for science, politics, literature, economics, religion, and even our conceptions of the 
non-human world.”4  A sick culture, he explained, encourages the stifling and repression of 
spontaneity and self-expression, while a healthy culture grants its members opportunities to hear 
their inner voices and act without the mediation of criticism or control.   
 Maslow classified a new subset of psychology as “Being” psychology, which would 
focus on the moment of the “peak experience.”   The peak experience built upon Maslow’s 
existing conception of self-actualization: it was the moment in which one experienced creative 
pleasure, self-insight, and “mystic communion” and identified one’s “essential biologically based 
inner nature” and “deepest needs.”5  Maslow couched individual transcendence within a larger 
quest for the unification of mankind: “The ‘good human being’ can be defined only against some 
criterion of humanness…A good human being (or tiger or apple tree) is good to the extent that it 
fulfills or satisfies the concept ‘human being’ (or tiger or apple tree).”6  While Maslow once 
again presented his work as subset of psychology, claiming empirical evidence for his theories of 
peak experience and self-actualization, his writing had veered into new territory.  One reviewer 
wrote that “although Professor Maslow's book is addressed to students of psychology, it is laced 
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with philosophically provocative contentions.”7  With this new work, Maslow called into 
question the contours of selfhood, the value of culture, the nature of man, and the meaning of 
existence itself.
8
   
 
 
 Surprisingly, Maslow ultimately found that the most suitable context for his philosophical 
ruminations was not Esalen or one of its countercultural offshoots, but a series of American 
corporations and the rising field of organizational psychology.  As previous chapters have 
addressed, Abraham Maslow’s ideas were a foundational inspiration for much of the humanistic 
management theory of the 1950s and ‘60s, but Maslow himself did not put thought into 
management techniques – or read McGregor’s treatise—until the early 1960s, when he became 
interested in American industry as the next pivotal arena of large-scale social change. After 
observing corporate relationships firsthand and immersing himself in the humanistic 
management theories of his day, he published his own revelations about enlightened 
management.    
His 1965 book Eupsychian Management, in turn, spawned a new chapter of Maslow’s 
career—one in which he hobnobbed with corporate executives, delivered speeches at business 
schools, consulted with businesses, and entered active dialogues with the management theorists 
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  The ten years before his death in 1970 found Maslow emerging simultaneously as a 
figurehead of the West Coast counterculture and of America’s transforming business culture.  
Maslow saw no fundamental tension between these two worlds.  The more critical he became of 
the counterculture’s individualistic tendencies, the more confident he grew that American 
organizations could be a significant agent of mass self-actualization.  Over the course of the 
1960s, Maslow’s support of Theory Y management reflected both a patriotic commitment to 
American growth and a conviction that all workers could find enlightenment if offered the right 
tools.  
 Maslow’s formal entry into the world of management theory came about thanks to a man 
named Andrew Kay, whom he met in 1958.  Kay was the CEO of Non-Linear Systems, a digital 
test equipment company founded in 1952 and based out of Del Mar, California, famous for 
producing the first commercial digital voltmeter.
10
  The company, which employed 350 people in 
1964, was non-unionized and originally functioned with a strictly pyramidal structure.  By 1964, 
it was conducting about $7 million in business annually.
11
  Kay himself was a child of eastern 
European immigrants who became interested in chemicals and electronics as a teenager.  
According to Andrew Gabor, he tried to reproduce Nikola Tesla’s rocket propulsion experiments 
in his parents’ basement, nearly blowing his leg off, before heading to MIT for a Bachelors 
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degree and then to work for a company called Jet Propulsion Industries after World War II.
12
   
Launching Non-Linear Systems a few years later, he joined a legion of engineers on the West 
Coast committed to innovating digital technology; one writer christened him “one of the fathers 
of the digital revolution.”13   
 Kay first encountered Maslow’s Motivation and Personality in the late 1950s, when he 
was experimenting with ways “to unleash the potential” of the several hundred employees who 
worked on his company’s assembly lines.14  After several years of operating his company, he had 
noticed a pattern in the morale of these workers: The workers at the beginning of the line were 
unhappy, while “the happiest ones were at the end of the line that finished the job”15 – because, 
he concluded, those at the beginning had “little or no contact with the final product,” and 
therefore no “closure” or “sense of job well done.”16 Kay began reading voraciously in the field 
of motivational psychology in search of a technique that would stimulate this feeling of 
accomplishment in all members of his assembly line, not just those at the end.  With Maslow’s 
Motivation and Personality as his guide, he embarked on a “radical management experiment” to 
boost the health and happiness of his workforce, convinced that the self-actualization of his 
employees would also fuel their productivity.
17
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 The resulting experiment would have stirred pride in McGregor, Likert, or any other 
humanistic management guru of the era.  Reflecting on the period, NLS vice president Arthur 
Kuriloff explained that while many companies of the era were “quietly experimenting” with 
Theory Y, his was one of the first to publicly “make the switch” and actually “[talk] about it.”18 
The result of Kay’s reform was not just a new style of managerial communication, but a 
dismantling of the entire assembly line system--- and, within that, a rejection of Taylorist 
methods in favor of those closer to the pre-industrial craftsmen system. NLS did away with the 
assembly line, introduced a horizontal corporate structure, gave workers unprecedented 
autonomy in their own self-management, and increased the material rewards of the job.  Kay and 
his collaborators believed that their experiment would not only boost the profits and productivity 
of their organization (which it did, in the mid-1960s), but also that they could engineer self-
actualization among the ranks of their workforce. 
 Unlike many other experiments with Theory Y management of the era, Kay’s reforms 
touched every level of his organization, and were widely heralded as some of the most successful 
experiments of their kind.
19
  He and Kuriloff began by eliminating the assembly line altogether.  
They broke workers into teams into six or seven people, and made each team responsible for the 
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entire manufacturing process, from assembly to inspection.  The teams would determine their 
own production schedules and decide how the work could best be accomplished.  Kay 
encouraged employees to “’learn as much as they could about all of the operations” so that “it 
got to the point where each person in the group was able to do the entire assembly line from 
beginning to end.”20  As the products produced by NLS grew more complicated, he encouraged 
workers to write and design their own work manuals—rather than delegating such duties to a 
staff or management position – and to organize their work in the ways they thought would work 
best.
 21
  In most cases, one worker would be responsible for the manufacture of an entire product 
from start to finish, a process that could take up to three weeks.  (NLS warned its customers that 
they should be patient with delivery times, for the company prized quality over speed.)
22
   One 
internal company memo celebrated, “What an opportunity for individual advancement and 
growth!  Instead of the boring and stultifying experience of performing repetitive operations, one 
has the opportunity to uncover his latent abilities by assuming more and more of the complete 
task.”23   
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 Upon completion of a product, the worker would sign his or her name to it, thus taking 
pride in its accomplishment and responsibility should something go wrong—in which case a 
customer could return to that particular worker for repairs.
24
   If there was a call for particularly 
quick delivery, two or three workers in a group might pitch in to make a device together, but the 
original builder maintained “prime responsibility for its perfection.”25  According to Kuriloff, the 
idea of “closure”—that an employee should have the opportunity to complete a task from start to 
finish—was central to his company’s implementation of Theory Y.26  Employees were 
encouraged to work in the areas of their greatest pride and competence; to shift to new areas as 
they saw fit; and to continually develop skills that would allow them mobility and flexibility in 
the company.  Though NLS claimed it was too young to offer a profit-sharing or pension 




 Non-Linear Systems’ work teams were offered an unusual level of autonomy in their 
work lives.  They set their own hours (within the framework of a 40-hour week) and designated 
their own breaks, and their pay was not docked for lateness or absences.   The company 
adamantly banned time clocks because, according to Kuriloff, time clocks were “an offense to 
human dignity and imply a mistrust of people.”28  Even the architecture of work spaces reflected 
this emphasis on trust:  Each team of six or seven members received its own room (about 16x20 
                                                 
24Vance  Packard, “A Chance for Everyone to Grow,” Readers Digest, November 1963, 114-118, folder “OD 
Behavior,” box M445, Maslow Papers, AHAP.  Packard notes that Chris Argyris experimented with a similar 




 Packard 115. 
 
26
 Kuriloff 25.  
 
27
 “Motivating Employees to be Manager’s [sic] Partners,” 628. 
 
28






feet) in a low-rise complex, with its own separate door to the outside.  Workers were encouraged 
to exchange information and ideas with fellow units, but they were also encouraged to conceive 
of their team as “its own little business.”29  More than one observer of the company’s experiment 
noted enthusiastically that workers at NLS had the opportunity to decide the décor and color 
scheme of their designated work rooms.
30
   
 The corporate structure of NLS reflected the company’s commitment to the more 
material manifestation of McGregor’s Theory Y principles.  Every worker at the company earned 
a salary.  Laborers started out making $85 a week, but received promotion to $100 a week after a 
short trial period—a wage that was roughly $24 more a week than comparable jobs in the area, 
and was calculated to ensure that workers would earn enough to cover their fundamental living 
expenses with some amount of money left over.
31
  Salary increases were doled out frequently, in 
$10 or $15 increases, so that workers could receive steady doses of validation, and there was no 
salary ceiling for any given position.  The company celebrated its commitment to hiring people 
carefully, training them consistently, and promoting from within to ensure a sense of mobility 
and possibility within its ranks.   
 Kay also simplified the hierarchy of his company into a 3-part horizontal structure.  On 
each team, one worker was appointed as a technician, who loosely coordinated the work of his 
peers but distinctly did not act as a foreman.  Above the team level, thirty department managers 
oversaw the day-to-day tactical activities of the organization; Kuriloff insisted in his account of 
NLS management that “we regard management as basically an affair of teaching and training, 
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not one of directing and controlling. “32  Just as workers attended skill-building seminars and 
classes, managers attended leadership training that taught them how to be concerned with “the 
whole human being, not just a pair of hands, “ and to recognize people as “individuals, with 
different attitudes, aptitudes, talents, and needs.”  The job of the manager, according to one 
account, was not to direct but to “discover” those aptitudes so that “these people’s creative 
talents will be unleashed; they’ll do more and better work; they’ll get satisfaction from their jobs 
and lead more rewarding lives.”33  Finally, Kay built an executive council of eight people – 
himself and seven vice presidents—whose job it was to be in constant communication with these 
managers and every other member of the organization.  Instead of issuing a string of formal 
memos, he urged the executive council members to engage in informal, open-door conversations 
and solicit feedback from their underlings.   
 The rhetoric surrounding Non-Linear System’s Theory Y management invoked Maslow 
explicitly.  In his 1964 account of the company’s experiments, Vice President Kuriloff explained 
the ways in which NLS policy would satisfy the needs of man (a “creature of ever-expanding 
wants”) at every level of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. Physiological needs, he argued, were met 
by the living wage and sick pay.  Safety and security needs were met through the maintenance of 
a “calm, unharried atmosphere” and through NLS’s promise of steady employment (as opposed 
to the common practice of letting works go after peak production cycles had passed).   The small 
group approach, with its stimulation of “gregariousness, affiliation, belonging” would satisfy the 
social needs of employees, and the skilled labor expected of each member would bolster his or 
her “ego needs”; workers would develop pride and display competence to their fellow 
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teammates.  Finally, Kuriloff promised that NLS work could offer the coveted achievement of 
“self-actualization” to its employees, and that this factor “holds the greatest potential for 
organizational growth and improvement.”34  Attentive managers would “release dormant 
creativity” in employees, and training classes would challenge employees to gain skills that 
would, in turn, increase their sense of competence and possibility.  A job at NLS would 
theoretically “engage the whole man,” so that “self-actualization becomes a vital motivating 
force.”35  Such self-actualization , according to Kuriloff, would bolster the growth of both the 
individual and the organization. 
  In 1963, the famous social critic Vance Packard –author of the previous decade’s 
bestselling The Status Seekers (1959) and the advertising expose The Hidden Persuaders 
(1957)— built on these accolades with an article about Non-Linear Systems in Reader’s Digest.  
Entitled, “A Chance for Everyone to Grow,” Packard reinforced the idea that NLS offered 
employees opportunities for personal growth that had been squelched by the Taylorist 
institutions of the industrial landscape.  Calling NLS “one of the most revolutionary companies 
in America,” he celebrated the company for “[throwing] out” not just assembly lines, but “a host 
of assumptions which businessmen have been making for 50 years about the nature of man as an 
employee.”36   The recognition that “ordinary people have great potentialities for growth,” he 
insisted, flew in the face of control-based management that reduced jobs to their dullest, most 
repetitive elements—the very techniques that made workers resist working in the first place and 
made them feel “impoverished about their lives.”  Packard (already a great critic of modern 
culture, from its suburban competitions to its false consumer promises) thus reinforced the 
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convictions of Kay, Kuriloff, and some of their humanistic management comrades.  He 
suggested that the foundational premises of modern enterprise were stifling capitalist progress 
rather than unleashing it in the postwar period. Old-fashioned skill and craft would redeem the 
American economy as it soared into the future. 
 By the early 1960s, Kay’s determination to get workers to “think like owners” had 
proven profitable.
37
  After an initially rough 9-month transition period (when some employees 
and managers had trouble adjusting to a less structured, routine-based environment), the 
company’s sales and productivity “soar[ed]” while turnover and customer complaints decreased 
substantially.
38
      Both efficiency and morale of the workforce were “way up” and turnover had 
dropped to 25% of the national average.  According to Packard, sales doubled after three years of 
the new regime, and although NLS had 30 competitors in its area, it dominated half of the 
market.
39
  While it is inherently difficult to identify the exact causes of industrial upturns—and 
dangerous to suggest that such a shift could have been uni-causal, stemming only from NLS’s 
shift to Theory Y management—the company’s observers in the period were anxious to attribute 
it to just that.  NLS emerged as a poster child for Theory Y’s psychological and economic 
promise. 
 At the dawn of the 1960s, Kay invited the most high-profile observer yet to assess his 
company’s management techniques.   Kay had met Abraham Maslow in 1958, after Kay attended 
a seminar in the San Diego area for the heads of companies (the same seminar that had first 
introduced him to Maslow’s work).  One of his fellow attendees, Richard Farson, encouraged 
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Kay to stop with him in Boston to meet Dr. Maslow (whom Kay later remembered as “a very 
strong individual,” with “a head which reminded me of Stalin’s.”40) Impressed with their 
encounter, Kay offered Maslow a fellowship at NLS for the summer of 1962: Maslow would 
spend time simply observing company operations – not consulting or offering feedback—and 
recording his thoughts each night with a tape recorder.  Unlike McGregor’s experiences at 
Procter & Gamble or Likert’s experience at Detroit Edison, Maslow was brought to NLS to 
witness a company whose Theory-Y “transformation” was “complete,” not because it was in 
need of external guidance.
41
  According to Kay, Maslow thought of the experience as a “luxury” 
because NLS provided a secretary to transcribe his tapes as he dictated them.  The experience 
also left Maslow with time to meet with business leaders and thinkers on the west coast, 
particularly the faculty members of UCLA who would travel to meet with him in San Diego.
42
   
 It was during and after observing the operations at NLS in the summer of 1962 that 
Maslow immersed himself in the field of Management theory, reading the works of McGregor, 
Likert, Argyris, and Peter Drucker with particular vigor.  Only then did he realize the extent to 
which those authors either confirmed or explicitly deferred to his own view of human nature.  He 
later reflected: 
I had never before had any contact with industrial or managerial psychology, so 
the possibilities for general psychological theory hit me with great force, as I read 
first the books by Drucker and McGregor that were used as ‘textbooks’ at Non-
Linear.  I began to understand what Andrew Kay was trying to do there, and I 
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As he recorded his observations of Non-Linear Systems, he also dictated his responses to the 
management treatises he began to explore.  The resulting book, Eupsychian Management, 
announced Maslow’s presence on the organizational landscape when it was published in 1965. 
 
 
 Eupsychian Management read unlike any other management treatise of its time.  Because 
it assembled the transcriptions of a large number of tape-recorded memos that Maslow recorded 
while in residency at Non-Linear Systems (typed by secretaries and published without evidence 
of a strong editorial hand), its prose struck many readers as disjointed and free-associational.
44
  
Chapters could range from a paragraph in length to many pages, and sometimes included 
incomplete sentences.  From one to the next, Maslow might offer his own observations of 
organizational life or a synopsis of the reigning principles in humanistic management theory.  He 
strove for a sense of spontaneity in his dictating, allowing his readers to discover new principles 
and ideas as he did.  The work was distinctly not a case study of “a particular plant,” he 
explained, but rather the study of “the plant that opened up to me a body of theory and research 
which was entirely new to me and which set me to thinking and theorizing.”45  Maslow also 
made clear in his writing that he was not inventing a new theory of management, but rather 
exploring a preexisting body of management literature (which he called “enlightened”) and 
observing that theory in action at NLS.   
 The tone of Eupsychian Management could vary from one chapter to the next.  On the 
one hand, he repeatedly expressed optimism for the possibilities of worldwide change through 
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better management in organizations, heralding “enlightened” management as one of the next 
major frontiers of social reform.  In the absence of offering universal individual psychotherapy, 
he suggested, humanistic management might be the most realistic hope for a transformation of 
human consciousness across the world.  (The very term “Eupsychian” was his invented 
shorthand for the kind of society that could exist if all of its members were self-actualized and 
living in a state of perpetual psychological health.
46
)  Maslow celebrated the workplace as the 
site of most people’s creative self-actualization (where the process he called “synergy” was most 
likely to take place), and argued that, by extension, the transformation of workplaces offered 
increased likelihood for mass self-actualization.  He also positioned “enlightened” management 
as a tool for American transcendence in the Cold War—an arena in which the American spirit 
could triumph both therapeutically and politically.  In spite of some criticisms of the era’s most 
well regarded spokespeople for participative management, Eupsychian Management offered an 
endorsement of McGregor and Likert’s ideas and thus helped Theory Y reach a broader audience 
seeking human transcendence in a corporate age.   
  In Eupsychian Management, Maslow approached the workplace simultaneously as arena 
and agent of change.  Given the primacy of work in the lives of most human beings, Maslow 
explained, work had the potential to exert a greater influence on Americans than education, 
religion, or individual psychotherapy.  (“I gave up long ago the possibility of improving the 
world or the whole human species via individual psychotherapy,” he explained.  “This is 
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impracticable.”47).  Work emerged in his analysis as a perfect testing ground for the questions 
and hypotheses of humanistic psychology: “How good a society does human nature permit?  
How good a human nature does society permit?”48  It could provide a “new kind of life-
laboratory” for Third Force psychology, a site at which to examine the compatibility of 
humanistic psychology with real-world aims.
49
   
Maslow optimistically surmised that industrial psychology could also become the most 
important, effective tool of his field. He proposed that the “proper management of the work lives 
of human beings, of the way in which they can earn a living, can improve them and improve 
their world and in this sense can be a utopian or revolutionary technique.”50  The “industrial 
situation” could, in other words, serve as the “new laboratory for the study of the pseudo-
dynamics, of high human development, of the ideal ecology for the human being.”51  Though 
Eupsychian Management found Maslow wrestling with foundational ideas of industrial 
psychology and questioning some of the foundations of the field’s preeminent theorists, his 
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 Maslow’s faith in management’s transformative potential rested on some fundamental 
assumptions about the very essence of self-actualization.   Maslow chided the “youngsters” of 
the early 1960s who conceived of self-actualization as “a kind of lightning stroke which will hit 
them on the head suddenly without their doing anything about it.”   They misconstrued self-
actualization, he charged, “in terms of the getting rid of all inhibitions and controls in favor of 
complete spontaneity and impulsivity.”53  And they could not be more wrong: Self-actualization 
was not an individualistic experience that occurred when one retreated from the world and 
pursued spiritual enlightenment; it was, to the contrary, the product of symbiosis between a 
person and his world, the act of submitting oneself to a task that benefitted the larger whole.  
Maslow clarified, “S-A [Self-Actualization] work is simultaneously a seeking and fulfilling of 
the self and also an achieving of the selflessness which is the ultimate expression of real self” – a 
process that “resolves the dichotomy between the selfish and the unselfish... so that the world 
and the self are no longer different.”54  He connected this principle to his friend Ruth Benedict’s 
ideal of synergy, a culture in which what is beneficial for the individual is beneficial for 
everyone.  In contrast to some of his followers’ misguided, hedonistic assumptions, self-
actualization not only required hard work and dedication, but was most frequently achieved 
through the act of work.    
 Maslow’s treatise rested on the claim that because work delivered salvation, it should be 
nothing less than a calling.    He cited the Japanese concept of Ikiru, “i.e. salvation via hard work 
and total commitment to doing well the job that fate or personal destiny calls you to do, or any 
job that ‘calls’ for doing.”  It was only through “commitment to an important job,” he explained, 
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that one could locate “the path to human happiness”; by extension, “[t]he only happy people I 
know are working toward something they consider important.”55  Work emerged in his prose as 
not only a duty, but as a product of fate or destiny.  It was each person’s task to locate the job for 
which he was most suited, and to immerse himself completely in that job upon locating it. He 
warned, “One must respond to one’s fate or one’s destiny or pay a heavy price.  One must yield 
to it; one must surrender to it.  One must permit oneself to be chosen.”  The act of choosing a 
professional path was akin to that of locating a soulmate and “pick[ing] one’s wife,” and the act 
of performing work could verge on the erotic:   “[T]o recognize one’s responsibility or one’s 
work out there is like a love relationship, a recognition of belongingness, a Zusammenhang; it 
has many of the paradoxical or dichotomy-transcending qualities of sexual intercourse and love 
embracing, of two becoming one perfectly.”56  
Such sentiments exposed some fundamental contrasts between Maslow and management 
thinkers like McGregor or Likert: While hints of the spiritual could infuse the rhetoric of the 
loftiest management thinkers, no others discussed work in terms of cosmic destiny.  And 
Maslow’s celebration of the transcendental properties of work revealed a critical limitation of his 
management treatise. In linking jobs to fate and even salvation or deliverance, Maslow failed to 
acknowledge the realm of unskilled labor in an industrial economy, or the other necessary jobs 
that rarely tapped anyone on the shoulder with a message of cosmic inevitability.  His book 
fluctuated awkwardly between a discussion of managing lower level workers and a celebration 
of high-level work in the professions. 
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 Having established a connection between self-actualization and work, Maslow offered a 
detailed presentation (consisting of thirty-six principles, to be exact) of what he labeled 
“enlightened management policy”—principles gleaned primarily from the works of McGregor, 
Argyris, Likert,  and Drucker.  His chapter labeled “Enlightened Economics and Management,” 
in fact, read very much like a humanistic psychologist’s summary of McGregor’s Theory Y 
(which was, in turn, a management theorist’s application of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs to the 
world of work).  Here, Maslow reiterated what he viewed as the central tenets of “third wave” or 
“humanistic” management—while withholding his own evaluation of the principles’ validity.  
His list of tenets included: “Assume everyone is to be trusted”; “Assume in your people the 
impulse to achieve”; “Assume that everyone can enjoy good teamwork, friendship, good group 
spirit…and group love”; “Assume the preference for working rather than being idle”; and, in one 
of the most direct references to his own theories, “Assume that everyone prefers to feel 
important, needed, useful, successful, proud, respected, rather than unimportant, 
interchangeable…unused.”57   Having gleaned these principles from works like The Human Side 
of Enterprise and Likert’s New Patterns of Management, and from their application at Non-
Linear Systems, he went on to lament some of the limits of the principles’ applications. 
 In a number of chapters of Eupsychian Management, Maslow offered systematic critiques 
of the theorists under consideration.   Peter Drucker, he concluded, was too focused on crude 
motives like low turnover and high profits, rather than the utopian goals fueling Maslow’s own 
strides toward psychological revolution.  While promising that enlightened management would 
deliver material returns, he urged management thinkers to espouse the principles because they 
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valued healthy societies, healthy organizations, and widespread self-actualization.
58
  Maslow 
encouraged managers, in turn, to formulate concrete goals and “think in broad-range terms, in 
utopian terms, in value terms”—and to trust that by taking into consideration “utopian and 
eupsychian and ethical and moral recommendations,” everything about an enterprise would 
improve – “and this includes profits.”59  Reflecting on the larger landscape of management 
thinking, he concluded that “an awful lot of people are doing an awful lot of things and doing a 
lot of talking, and they don’t have the courage to delineate carefully the goals, the purposes, the 
far aims of all that they are doing.”60   
 At the same time, he criticized a thinker like Rensis Likert for thinking too loftily about 
human nature, presuming that participative management would work in any variety of industrial 
settings or in any number of economic contexts.  While enlightened management might work 
perfectly well in good times, at a good company, there was no telling what results it could 
produce in less favorable circumstances.  He conceded that “enlightened management policies 
are in fact very fine in today’s United States, with citizens who are fairly healthy, sophisticated, 
and autonomous” – where the workers were “brought up under political democracy and in 
circumstances of wealth where they can tell a boss to go jump in the lake and can go off and get 
a job if they didn’t like the one they have.”61 But he challenged Likert’s naivety for not realizing 
that, should the United States be hit by an “atomic catastrophe” or a “great bubonic plague,” or 
should the country even enter stormy economic times, there was no assurance that participative 
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management would continue to prove effective.  A theory for only good times, he argued, was a 
limited theory indeed. 
 In his assessments of McGregor’s theories, Maslow played a spirited devil’s advocate.  
He ultimately concluded that Theory Y management promised far more success in every arena 
than the outdated, authoritarian style of Theory X, but he nonetheless challenged many of the 
foundational premises of McGregor’s The Human Side of Enterprise.   While there was enough 
data to justify experimenting with Theory Y, he suggested – and enough data to suggest the 
inutility of Theory X –we should not overstate the finality of that data.  In a strange turn from his 
own argumentation, he argued: 
 [T]he whole philosophy of this new kind of management may be taken as an 
expression of faith in the goodness of human beings, in trustworthiness, in 
enjoyment of efficiency, of knowledge, of respect, etc.  But the truth is that we 
don’t really have exact and quantitative information on the proportion of the 
human population which does in fact have some kind of feeling for 
workmanship…[W]e don’t have any mass surveys of large populations that would 
give us some quantitative indication of just how many people prefer to have 
somebody else do their thinking for them, for instance.  We don’t know the 





In another departure from his own presumptions expressed earlier in the book, he suggested that 
psychologists did not yet know for sure what proportion of the population actually wanted to 
participate in management decisions, or the extent to which a fundamental “physical…or psychic 
inertia” made people lazy.  He also acknowledged that McGregor had based many of his 
conclusions on Maslow’s own work—but conceded that “I of all people should know just how 
shaky this is as a final foundation” and urged psychologists to produce more concrete studies of 
industrial situations before assuming congruence with Maslow’s own studies of individual 
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  In conclusion, he suggested that there was insufficient evidence to treat 
Theory Y as a fact of human nature or social psychology, but that there was even less to support 
the application of theory X. 
 In spite of Maslow’s pronounced reservations about Theory Y management, his book 
ultimately offered a powerful endorsement of enlightened management.  Not only did he come 
out in favor of McGregor’s principles (and by extension, Non-Linear System’s practices), but he 
offered one of the most evangelistic, hyperbolic celebration of Theory Y yet to be published.  On 
the one hand, Maslow ultimately argued that Theory Y management would improve the 
psychological health of society at large.  He cited what he called a “network of interrelations”:  
“The better the society, the better the productivity; the better the managers, the more 
psychologically healthy the individual men; the better the leaders, the better the managers; the 
better the individual men, and so on and so on, the better the enterprise.”64  Having established a 
firm link between participative management and the self-actualization of workers—which would 
function predictably as long as the organizational conditions were healthy—he elaborated what 
can best be understood as a self-actualization trickle-down model: Self-actualized managers 
would encourage personal growth and productivity in their underlings, and these underlings 
would then influence the world around them in positive ways, leading to an overall elevation of 
the human spirit.  The consequences he suggested were nothing short of a therapeutic revolution 
with implications for the entire species. 
 Maslow at many points in his treatise appeared less concerned with universal salvation 
than he did with the very particular circumstances of the United States in the postwar period.  
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Namely, he argued that the widespread adoption of participative (aka democratic) management 
would help the US win the Cold War.  Maslow established that so-called “authoritarians” would 
have no place in the “enlightened organization”, in which the “sharing of goals” and 
“identification with team objectives” would be standard.  For authoritarians accustomed to 
dividing the world into “hammers and anvils, lambs and wolves,” or to organizing the world into 
the controllers and the controlled, the “brotherhood” of Theory Y would never work.65  But 
Maslow’s argument about Cold War dominance transcended metaphorical claims.  He suggested 
that humanistic management techniques would produce two main products: economic 
productivity (or profit making) and “human products, that is, the psychological health of the 
workers, their movement toward self-actualization.”66  The role of the first “product” in the Cold 
War was a given, and consistent with the dominant capitalist ethos of the postwar era.  It was the 
second “product,” Maslow promised, that would deliver to the US an unexpected edge and 
ultimately swift victory in its rivalry with the Soviet Union and would take on “huge 
importance” in coming years.   
 Maslow explained that the public image of the United States would be critical in winning 
the race against Russia.  How, he wondered, could the US positively affect perceptions of itself 
around the world?    The answer lay with management practice:  
The question is who will be loved and respected more by the neutral nations, 
Russia or the United States?  And how shall this be judged except in terms of the 
individuals that people will see as tourists al over the world, and from what they 
read in the newspapers about what goes on inside the United States?  And, in 
effect, what else does this mean but that the cold war will be won by the nation 
that turns out the better type of human being.
67
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Because Theory Y management “definitely turns out a better kind of human being, a healthier 
person, a more lovable, more admirable…more attractive, friendlier, kinder, more altruistic kind 
of person than does the Theory X or authoritarian management,” Maslow deduced, it could also 
help Americans be more “liked throughout the world.”68  He cited the Germans in contrast, 
reminding his readers that “The Nazis were about the most unpopular people there were.”  He 
lamented that he had no corresponding data about the popularity of “Russian tourists and visitors 
and diplomats” in neutral nations.69  Given this uncertainty, it was that much more important that 
the United States continue to produce a “better type of human being” and that major leaders 
recognize the potential of Theory Y in doing so.
70
    
 Maslow’s celebration of likeability as a weapon in the Cold War related paradoxically to 
many of his other assertions in the book.  If the ultimate goal of self-actualization was to locate 
and fulfill one’s own destiny and higher calling, how did the popularity of US tourists in neutral 
nations fit into the scheme?  If Theory Y principles were as context-specific as Maslow insisted, 
why would they necessarily be appreciated or admired in the transfer from one culture to 
another?  Ultimately, Maslow’s plug for the political utility of enlightened management provided 
just another peg in a rather free-associational – and deeply evangelical—defense of his beliefs.   
Perhaps the most transparent endorsement of his views came with his insistence that 
“Enlightened management is one way of taking religion seriously, profoundly, deeply, and 
earnestly” – not  “for those who define religion just as going to a particular building on Sunday 
and hearing a particular kind of formula repeated, this is all irrelevant”, but for those who define 
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religion in terms of  “deep concern with the problems of the human species.”71  His book offered 
less an endorsement of the “science” of management (in spite of his protests to the contrary) than 
of an ethical, democratic mindset that would propel the US toward both unprecedented collective 
psychological fulfillment and global dominance.   
 In his 1998 foreword to the republished and retitled edition of Eupsychian Management, 
Warren Bennis (acolyte of Douglas McGregor) reflected on the impact of the Maslow’s only 
management treatise.  It attracted little attention upon its first publication in 1965, Bennis 
explained, and slipped into obscurity among actual managers and corporate executives.
72
  The 
book inspired mostly tepid reviews, in which reviewers warned that its jargon would alienate a 
general audience and that its free-associational, “disjointed rambling” might lead some to 
perceive it as an incomplete work.
73
  While nodding to the freshness of Maslow’s ideas, his 
reviewers agreed that his impressionistic, data-less delivery failed to substantiate his claims with 
the force he likely intended.  That said, Eupsychian Management undoubtedly helped propel 
Maslow into a position of power in the broader management community.  By the end of the 
1960s, he was lecturing at business schools, consulting with new corporations, and being cited 
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 As Maslow became absorbed by his own meditations on management practices, he 
entered the network of those thinkers and businesses that exemplified humanistic business 
thought in the postwar period.  No connection was more significant than his developing (though 
short-lived) relationship with Douglas McGregor himself.   Between Maslow’s arrival in Del 
Mar in 1962 and his tome’s publication three years later, Andrew Kay engineered an 
introduction between Maslow and McGregor. Having learned with shock that the two men had 
never met in spite of living in the same city (Maslow taught at Brandeis and McGregor at MIT), 
Kay seized the opportunity during one of his trips to Boston in the early 1960s to introduce the 
two.  Reflecting on the occurrence years later, he recalled that he said, “’Abe, grab your coat!’” 
and drove the psychologist to MIT to meet McGregor, his kindred spirit.
75
  McGregor died 
within two years of the encounter, but Maslow continued to pay tribute to the man and his ideas 
through his own career on the 1960s business circuit.
76
  In 1970, Maslow corresponded with a 
psychology doctoral student at the University of Chicago who inquired about the students most 
influenced by Maslow’s work.  The short list Maslow assembled included McGregor’s name 
with a caveat: “Douglas McGregor was not a student but rather a friend.  His use of my 
motivation theory in The Human Side of Enterprise had very great influence on management 
theory.”77  Though the two men had communicated briefly as far back as 1944, and McGregor’s 
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book had paid open tribute to Maslow as intellectual inspiration, their meeting signaled a torch-
passing of sorts. After McGregor’s death, Maslow would continue to advocate for the adoption 
of Theory Y by corporations that he deemed healthy and prepared for humanistic shake-up. 
 In 1965, less than a year after McGregor’s death, Maslow delivered a lecture to his 
Brandeis psychology students entitled “The Human Side of Enterprise.”78    This lecture, an ode 
to McGregor and the larger field of Organizational Psychology, reflected the extent to which 
Maslow had begun to integrate his thoughts about organizations into his larger schema of Third 
Force Psychology.   In this lecture, Maslow commanded that his students read The Human Side 
of Enterprise some time in the coming decade—not just because of what it would teach them 
about business and industry, but because of what it communicated about society as a whole.  
Because Theory Y was, in its broadest sense, about the delicate balance between freedom and 
control, one could apply Theory Y logic to the act of child-rearing or to the subtle power 
dynamics of marriage.
79
   “I would like you to be large enough,” Maslow instructed, “to see [the 
book] not in its…immediate aspect…I would like you to see it in the way that I do as a first step 
in the direction of a new kind of thinking for the next century or so. …Everything he says here is 
applicable for instance to our situation right here at Brandeis University on this campus.”80 He 
lamented that McGregor had titled his book with an emphasis on “Enterprise,” for “I know many 
of you are not interested in business or the factory or labor-economics … I wish he would have 
called it ‘The Human Side of Society,’ ‘The Human Side of Organizations.’”81  Maslow 
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suggested that had McGregor lived longer, he “would have gone on to generalize to the social 
problems…the relationship between human nature and society.”   
 Having made such concessions to less industrially oriented students, Maslow offered a 
ringing endorsement of Theory Y in practice and of the field of industrial psychology in 
general.
82
  American businesses, he lamented, still largely operated according to the “carrot and 
stick notion of motivation,” assuming that people are “buyable” – that “if you pay them well 
enough they are supposed to do anything that you want them to do.”83  This theory went hand in 
hand with a larger cultural conception that money could buy happiness and that “material 
satisfactions” were the primary reward of a job well done.  The burgeoning field of industrial 
psychology, with McGregor’s tome at the helm, challenged these assumptions in a fundamental 
way by suggesting that the motivation to work, and the rewards of working, could be 
psychological rather than merely material.   
 Maslow also challenged Marxist critics of humanistic management, like Herbert 
Marcuse, who “didn’t like this [Theory Y] at all” and thought that “[t]his was a plot” intended 
simply to manufacture greater profits through the manipulation of workers.
84
  Marxist critics 
missed the point, Maslow suggested, in assuming that there was a necessary inverse relationship 
between the interests of workers and the interests of bosses.  “I don’t think Marx is that foolish,” 
he explained, but Marx’s interpreters had erred in assuming that workers and managers operated 
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with a fundamental antagonism—a position that unwittingly mirrored the perspective of Theory 
X managers themselves.  Maslow encouraged these critics to open their minds to the Theory-Y 
conception that “what’s good for the workers seems to be also good for the boss or the 
stockholder.”85  Citing “dozens” of examples of supporting experiments in the literature, he 
issued his most emphatic endorsement to date of Douglas McGregor’s guiding assumptions and 




 Maslow supported McGregor’s ideas through the circuit of major American business 
Schools, which he traveled throughout the 1960s, and particularly at the end of the decade:  By 
the time of his death in 1970, he had lectured three times at Harvard Business School, visited 
Robert Tannenbaum’s seminar at UCLA, and met with Sloan Fellows of the Stanford University 
Business School.
87
  Maslow’s relationship with Harvard Business School reached back into the 
1950s.  In the second half of that decade, Professor Fritz Roethlisberger (who famously 
collaborated with Elton Mayo on the Hawthorne Studies of the 1930s) started building a faculty 
group devoted to Organizational Behavior, which later became its own department.
88
   The 
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members of this group, some of whom had originally been Roethlisberger’s students, drew their 
theoretical orientation from humanistic psychologists like Maslow, Carl Rogers, Erich Fromm, 
and Rollo May, and were steeped in the languages of behavioral science and humanistic 
psychology.
89
   Though Roethlisberger’s most public collaboration was with Carl Rogers, that 
other pillar of midcentury humanistic psychology, his correspondence with Maslow dates back to 
1955.
90
  In that year, Maslow produced and circulated a list of people involved with the areas of 
"Creativeness, Self, Being and Growth" and circulated it to his network of correspondents.
91
  Of 
the twenty-one names on the list (an assortment of psychologists, anthropologists, and 
educators), Roethlisberger was the only representative of a business school.
92
 Five years later, 
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Roethlisberger and Maslow worked together--- albeit unsuccessfully—to get an article by 
Maslow published in the Harvard Business Review, and the two men later appeared as panelists 
at the 1967 Douglas McGregor Conference at MIT.
93
 By the end of the 1960s, as has been noted 
elsewhere, Maslowian management had gained prominence and acceptance at the nation’s top 
business school.  
 Maslow’s appearance at a Stanford Business School seminar in the late 1960s found him 
endorsing but also wrestling with the idea of Theory Y management.   While continuing to 
celebrate McGregor—calling him “a friend of mine[,] a charming man, a lovable man, just a 
marvelous guy, and a psychological connoisseur”94—he balanced his endorsement of the 
theorist’s ideas with new nuance.  McGregor had insisted that to build a “Theory Y person” one 
need only build a “Theory Y environment,” thus assuming a direct, causal relationship between 
environment and the psychology of man.
95
  Maslow challenged this equation and called for 
increased empirical support.  He had been studying psychopaths, he explained, and a number of 
subjects whom one could consider “evil.”  He believed increasingly not only that “there is human 
evil,” but that this evil “comes out of genes, partly, and bad biochemistry.” Behavioral scientists 
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therefore needed to be cautious about attributing all human failings to damaging environments 
and social structures.
96
   Conversely, while truly “evil” subjects might comprise 1% or less of the 
larger population, so might the truly self-actualized among us exist with rarity: the ability to 
flower creatively and operate with total, enlightened purpose was a cherished trait of the 
privileged few.  While insisting that it was in society’s best interest to build democratic and 
participative institutions, Maslow suggested to his audience that they avoid conceiving of 
enlightened management as panacea for the human condition.  
 
 When the National Industrial Conference Board released its 1968 report on the 
application of Behavioral Science in industry, it found that Maslow was one of the five most 
influential thinkers in the field.
97
   (By this time, Maslow was also the president of the American 
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Psychological Association and increasingly a household name.) “If someone had surveyed 
businessmen ten years ago to find out which…behavioral scientists had influenced them,” the 
report offered, “it is unlikely that the name Abraham Maslow would appear on the list” – adding 
that Maslow himself had not evidenced “any particular awareness” of the “world of work” until 
the early 1960s.  Yet by the time of the report’s publication in the late 1960s, “the influence of 
Maslow on the whole behavioral science movement in industry is profound.”  The report’s 
author suggested that the hierarchy of needs had fundamentally redefined the way many 
managers conceived of motivation.
98
   
 Though Non-Linear Systems was the first company to gain notoriety for its connection to 
Maslow, it was not the first to forge a relationship with him. The end of the 1950s found Maslow 
scheduling talks at the Aluminum Company of America (as part of their Creativity Program) and 
at Sylvania Electronic Systems.
99
  After 1960, thanks to the publication of McGregor’s Maslow-
indebted treatise and Maslow’s own involvement with Non-Linear Systems,  Maslow’s ideas 
appeared increasingly in corporate literature, and his relationships with businesses increased 
exponentially.  Nationwide Insurance Companies sent Maslow a copy of their corporate mission 
statement in 1963.  Their “Summary of Principles and Objectives” could not have been more 
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“desired expression" column, and emerge with a score that was simpler and more reliable than Chris Argyris's test.  
Note that the researchers tested this survey out on a group of 332 salaried managers, hourly paid workers, and 
independent businessmen in a Southern industrial community. 
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clearly indebted to the psychologist’s theories.100  The document began with a declaration:  “We 
believe that man has human, social, and economic needs which the individual must satisfy in 
order to realize his greatest worth as a human being“ and that  “business organizations should 
help all people satisfy those needs.”101  Pledging itself to social progress, sound economic 
practices, and the promotion of “the dignity of the individual,” Nationwide announced its 
responsibility to “[engage] individuals in activities which help them gain a sense of personal 
worth, dignity, and freedom” because ““WE BELIEVE THAT PEOPLE HAVE WITHIN 
THEIR OWN HANDS TO FASHION THEIR OWN DESTINY” [their emphasis].102  
Nationwide declared its determination “[t]o promote the growth of the individual” by “engaging 
the individual in activities that will challenge him as a whole person, that will help him gain 
insight into the meaning of his work and life, enabling him to tap those spiritual resources that 
lead to self-awareness and self-fulfillment.”103  
 Ultimately, the insurance company promised the same self-actualization trickle-down 
effect that Maslow would suggest two years later in Eupsychian Management. To promote the 
growth of the individual, the company’s mission statement explained, was to promote the growth 
of the whole, for “spiritually mankind is indivisible: one man’s spiritual poverty makes all men 
poorer; one man’s spiritual growth improves the lot of us all.”104  While Nationwide did not 
address the psychological growth of the individual as its only aim – its mission statement also 
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emphasized the importance of corporate social responsibility, the power of democratic 
ownership, and the role of collective decision-making—its explicit valuing of “self-realization” 
and “self-awareness” revealed the extent to which Maslow’s language had penetrated the 
mainstream by even the early 1960s.  Throughout the 1960s, this rhetoric would be replicated in 
the corporate publications of Canada’s Northern Electric Company, Limited105 and the 




 One of the companies most famously affiliated with Maslow’s “Third Force” psychology 
in the late 1960s happened also to be one of the most reviled corporate agents of the era.  Dow 
Chemical emerged from the 1960s as a symbol of corporate complicity in the Vietnam War—
linked to iconic images of Vietnamese children covered in Napalm, skin singed and faces 
contorted in horror.  Few other corporations inspired such massive protest for their complicity in 
war crimes. Yet in its day, the management press celebrated Dow for its triumphant global 
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expansion, attributing the company’s success to its embrace of so-called “enlightened” or 
“humanistic” management.  In April 1967, Chemical Week published an article saluting Dow for 
its tremendous success.  President Ted Doan and Chairman Carl Gerstracker had taken the 
Midwestern company from a largely domestic operation in the 1950s to a staggeringly successful 
international corporation by the late 1960s, with profits increasing roughly 15% a year since the 
beginning of the decade, and with financial stats trumping those of its major competitors, DuPont 
and Union Carbide.
107
  While any number of factors might have helped propel Dow to success 
(including wartime demand), author Bruce Bendow emphasized one change more than any other: 
the company’s transition from a hierarchical management structure ruled by “a few strong men” 
to a “structured decision-making organization” built on communication and teamwork.108  He 
cited president Ted Doan’s convictions that “’[b]ureaucracy is dying’” and that “the traditional 
pyramid scheme of command is obsolete”—for “the only organization that will work is an 
‘organic’ one” that is “loose, freedom-oriented.”109  The shift to team-based management and 
horizontal corporate structure had allegedly ensured Dow’s emergence as an international 
powerhouse. 
 In mid-1968, one of Abraham Maslow’s associates at the Thomas Jefferson Research 
Center (TJRC) wrote to the psychologist to celebrate the Chemical Week article’s revelations.  
The California-based research center, a non-profit corporation, was dedicated to the application 
of “professional systems management and Third Force Psychology to the solution of social 
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problems.”110  Working primarily with organizations in the non-profit sector, the Thomas 
Jefferson Research Center’s Consultant roster included an all-star cast of humanistic social 
scientists– Abraham Maslow, Warren Bennis, Chris Argyris, Rensis Likert -- and one 
corporation: The Dow Chemical Leadership Training Corporate Education Department.
111
  
When Frank Goble of the Center wrote to Maslow in 1968, it was to alert him to the application 
of his ideas at Dow, which the Thomas Jefferson Research Center had celebrated in a recent 
newsletter.  Citing external reports and Down’s own mission statement, Goble wrote of the 
company, “I think it is one of the outstanding examples of Theory ‘Y’ management in a large 
corporation.”112  He quoted Dow’s “Corporate Objectives,” which pledged to promote 
“participation in management…to the highest degree possible” and “the development the 
individual” through “systems that contribute to the growth and fulfillment of their 
participants.”113   
 The TJRC newsletter attributed the company’s triumphant earnings since 1963 to the 
adoption of Maslow and McGregor’s management philosophies and concluded, “DOW HAS 
DEMONSTRATED THAT THE AMERICAN ETHIC WORKS JUST AS WELL IN THE 
BUSINESS ENTERPRISE AS IT DOES IN GOVERNMENT,” thanks to its strong emphasis on 
“freedom, justice, integrity, optimism, opportunity, respect for the individual, decentralization, 
and individual responsibility.” Dow’s team-based approach proved to this community of social 
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 This Dow document was reprinted in the Thomas Jefferson Research Center Newsletter No. 17, June 1967, folder 







scientists that while some members of the business world initially “greeted McGregor’s text with 
considerable skepticism,” McGregor and Maslow’s principles were in fact “highly practical.” 114   
Unfortunately for such proponents of Theory Y, the Dow story never made it into the 
lexicon of Maslow’s successes.  In June 1968, Frank Goble suggested to Maslow that they 
include the story of Dow Chemical Co.’s management transformation in a book the two men 
were putting together about “third-force psychology in action.”   Maslow firmly resisted.  While 
the case study did seem thematically consistent, he explained, “We have done a little testing of 
college student reaction and it tends to be rather negative and emotional in regard to Dow 
Chemical.   As we presently visualize the audience for the book we are writing, college students 
may be an important segment of that audience.”115  Goble and Maslow shelved the prospect of 




 Maslow’s final relationship with an American corporation developed in the last months 
of his life.  At a time when Maslow was growing increasingly impatient with both Brandeis 
undergraduates and humanistic growth centers like the Esalen Institute, he was offered a 
fellowship to spend multiple years at a food service corporation in Menlo Park, California, called 
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 Note that continued to experiment with behavioral science throughout the 1960s and into the early 1970s.  See 
correspondence between C. P. Alexander, a Project Manager of Functional Products and Systems at Dow, and 
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Saga Foods.  Maslow had met the president of Saga, William Laughlin, in the late 1960s at a 
National Training Laboratories T-group for young corporate presidents. Maslow had served as a 
speaker-observer in the group, and Laughlin took an immediate liking to him.
117
  Soon thereafter, 
Laughlin attended another NTL T-group for chief executive officers at which he met Andrew 
Kay, whose company Non-Linear Systems had hosted Maslow for a summer some years before.  
When Laughlin mentioned to Kay that he was interested in similarly bring Maslow to his 
company, Kay engineered a conversation between the two men.
118
   
 Laughlin called Maslow on December 9, 1968 and made an unusual offer: He was 
willing to provide a two-to-four year fellowship at Saga during which time the Professor would 
have no formal obligations to Saga whatsoever.  Laughlin had learned that, by the late 1960s, 
Maslow was increasingly frustrated with teaching – not just because his unruly undergraduates 
confounded him (to be discussed below), but because a serious heart condition left him easily 
fatigued and concerned about his health.  Laughlin told Maslow that, having heard of his 
discontent, he “simply wished to give him unlimited free time for writing and scholarly work.”119  
Laughlin would fund the fellowship using his own personal account (not that of Saga 
Administrative Corporation), offering Maslow a “handsome” salary, a new Mercedes Benz, and 
a private office “with full secretarial services” at Saga’s Menlo Park headquarters, which was 
close to Stanford University.   Maslow would use his office at Saga as a haven for writing and, if 
he wished, the occasional observation of managerial workings.  Thanks to Saga’s location, 
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Maslow would also able to maintain regular contact with his longtime West Coast colleagues, 
visiting for seminars at Stanford and UCLA and the Esalen Institute.   
Maslow took a week to consider the offer, which would mean relocating himself and his 
wife Bertha to California after nearly 18 years of living in the Boston area, near a strong network 
of friends.  In that period, he visited Saga to meet with Laughlin and two of his top collaborators: 
William Crockett, the director of management training, and James Morrell, the executive vice 
president.  Impressed by what he observed, Maslow accepted the fellowship in the last weeks of 
1968.  A press release issued by the WP Laughlin Foundation on March 4, 1969 announced 
Maslow’s acceptance of the fellowship and his intention to spend his time at Saga working on 
seven different projects (papers and books on topics ranging from race relations to the nature of 
evil) and to ultimately “develop and promote an all-inclusive psychological approach to human 
nature and society” whose paradigm-shifting import would rival that of Freud, Darwin, or 
Einstein. 
 Maslow’s biographer, Edward Hoffman, suggests that Maslow felt his decision validated 
by events on the Brandeis campus in the period before his departure.  At the end of the 1960s, a 
group of young black militants took over a campus building to protest institutional racism, and 
their actions spurred the vandalism of student theses in the campus library.
120
  Maslow was 
“disgusted with their behavior” and also the “timidity of his colleagues” in responding to the 
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  Moreover, he found the tone of his final seminar meetings at the school to be “angry 
and confrontational” and announced to his students that he was leaving his post there “partly 
because he was too old to put up with [their] adolescent nonsense.”  He came to believe that they 
had learned nothing from him about the nature of humanistic psychology.
122
   
 Soon thereafter, having moved to California, Maslow gave a talk at the Esalen Institute in 
which he articulated this growing set of concerns about the student Left and the counterculture.  
During a broader discussion of the relationship between humanistic psychology, democracy, and 
politics he decried “’the tendency among the counterculture, and some specifically at Esalen, to 
ridicule those with conventional values and lifestyles’” and urged his audience to have greater 
“’respect for individual differences.’”  “’In any political situation’,” he explained, “’this respect, 
coupled with the willingness to compromise for the greater good, is essential for our democratic 
way of life.’”  He also lambasted the young Left for their embrace of violence “’as a legitimate 
response to social problems like poverty and racism,’” suggesting that violence should only be 
used as a “’last resort,’” when the rule of law had evaporated—as in the Deep South on the eve 
of the Civil Rights movement.
123
   
 This expression was typical of the psychologist’s stance toward the domestic disorder of 
the late 1960s.  Maslow, whom his biographer has christened “the uneasy hero of the 
counterculture,” repeatedly insisted that the radical Left was causing more harm than good.124 
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Having witnessed “how close Western civilization had come to collapsing under the onslaught of 
Nazism,” he was “not going to let the situation happen again.”125  At the same time, he charged 
the more spiritual expressions of the counterculture—epitomized by Esalen’s experiential 
curriculum and the spiritual expressions of what Tom Wolfe would later call the “Third Great 
Awakening”126 – as being frivolous, self-absorbed, and ultimately “divorced from ethics.”127  
According to his biographer, Maslow had grown “deeply concerned, even alarmed, about the 
widespread tendency to seek unusual sensations in the name of the spiritual.”128 His departure 
from Brandeis afforded him an opportunity to both physically and ideologically reject the 
restless, chaotic stirrings of America’s radical youth.   At Saga Foods, he located a peaceful 
haven in which to express a psychologically based patriotism that would have seemed 
anachronistic to many of his youthful devotees. 
 Saga Foods was a rapidly growing, 20-year old company when Maslow became a fixture 
of its pastoral campus in early 1969.  The company had been established in 1948 as a small 
partnership between Laughlin and two other young men, who recognized a need for coordinated 
food services in the struggling cafeteria of Hobart College.  They pooled their resources, started 
running the dining hall and soon won the contract at a local women’s college as well.  The 
company was running the food services of 19 colleges by 1957, and 98 by 1961.  Throughout the 
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1960s Saga diversified, venturing into the arenas of hospital and retirement communities, and it 
went public in 1968.   
In spite of dramatic economic and geographic growth – or perhaps because of it—the 
company struggled with a “steady deterioration of employee morale.”129  Two surveys conducted 
in the mid-1960s revealed a population of workers who felt pushed out of decision-making and 
largely powerless within the company.  In response to these findings, Laughlin recruited two 
management consultants from the rapidly growing field of Organizational Development.  One 
was Robert Tannenbaum, the UCLA professor who famously championed T-groups and worked 
closely with Sheldon Davis in his experiments with behavioral science at TRW Systems.
130
  The 
other was William Crockett, who had been a career foreign service officer with the State 
Department, and appointed by John F. Kennedy as the State Department’s Deputy Under 
Secretary for Administration.   In the mid-1960s, Crockett worked with Yale professor and 
National training Laboratories affiliate Chris Argyris, who studied the management system of the 
State Department and helped engineer its “managerial revolution.” Crockett ultimately wrote the 
preface to a report that deconstructed the Department’s dysfunctional communication patterns 
and proposed a revamping of its “living system.”131 Crockett was also in charge of inviting 
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civilians to serve as advisors to the Department, one of whom was Laughlin of Saga Foods.  The 
two men struck up a friendship.  Soon after offering Maslow his fellowship, Laughlin asked 




 Saga’s Organizational Development (OD) Program, was one of the era’s most celebrated 
OD efforts, with its blend of humanistic management training and concrete survey research.  
133
   
Laughlin and Crockett went far beyond the efforts of a company like Nationwide or Dow, for 
whom the ideal of self-actualization had shaped corporate rhetoric more than corporate practice.  
At Saga, Crockett and Laughlin embraced humanistic theory and practice, running countless T-
groups (the company preferred the term “team-building sessions”), making the candid expression 
of feelings a centerpiece of corporate procedure.
134
 Maslow took great pleasure in being on 
premises.  From his arrival at Saga in early 1969 through his death in June 1970 at age 62, 
conversations with Crockett and Laughlin -- whom he “particularly liked” – became part of his 
daily routine.
135
   
Each day of his Fellowship period, Maslow would rise in the morning and go for a swim 
in his Laughlin-funded pool (doctor’s orders because of his cardiac condition), then head to his 
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Saga office for a day of writing and reading.  He commonly stopped by the offices of his Saga 
colleagues to chat and lunched with employees in the company cafeteria (in which, adhering to 
Theory Y tradition, people from all levels of the organization mingled and ate together).  
At Maslow’s suggestion, Crockett and Laughlin formed a kind of “permanent encounter group” 
with each other, agreeing to be “completely open with one another in expressing their 
feelings.”136  Crockett later recollected, “The first time I met Abe he said we must not let any 
phoniness endanger our relationship.  We could be much better friends if we could be completely 
candid with each other about our feelings, and it did indeed work out that way.”137 
 Maslow possessed a keen awareness of his declining health while at Saga and devoted 
much of his time there to intense work on his own projects  – exploring the topics of humanistic 
education, spirituality, politics, democracy, and others.  But he took time, too, to meditate on 
Laughlin and Crockett’s organizational experiments and continued to build on his theories about 
healthy relationships between people and organizations.   In a memo from February 1970, 
Maslow explained that a conversation with Bill Crockett had helped him understand links 
between men, their status, and their workplace.  “Every man,” he wrote, “is sacred and infinite.  
Ultimately, like beautiful sunsets, or beautiful women, or beautiful flowers, they are 
noncomparable” – for “[e]ach one is…. the most perfect in the world.”138  
The challenge of Saga’s team-building groups, according to Maslow, would be to build 
their members’ sense that “they all live up to their best possibilities” and “can be said to be 
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 Abraham Maslow, “AH Maslow Journal Memorandum,” 23 February 1970, folder “OD Behavior,” box M445, 






equal, noncomparable, equally worthy of respect and love, equally transcendent.”139  For men to 
have healthy esteem, they needed to be made aware of the things they excelled at, regardless of 
pecking order.  They also needed to adopt a “non-rivalrous” attitude, to “opt out of the 
dominance hierarchy” without a fear of “jeopardizing any sense of masculinity, or of adulthood, 
or of strength.”140  Saga’s team-building efforts would succeed if members of those teams could 
do away with inferiority complexes, hero worship, and ruthless competition.  According to 
Maslow, there was a place for the celebration of everyone’s strength’s in an organization like 
Saga, as long as people learn to toss macho pride aside and not take hierarchies personally. 
 Our best record of Maslow’s response to Saga’s Organizational Development efforts 
comes from a memo he wrote after observing a conference of ten College and Hospital Division 
managers at corporate headquarters in Menlo Park in November 1969.  Sherm Moore, the 
company’s executive vice president, invited Maslow to sit on one of his team-building 
workshops.
141
    Moore arranged the meeting to solicit feedback from the division managers 
about what might work better at the company, and urged Maslow to contribute feedback as well.  
When Maslow recorded his impressions of the meeting three months later, he could not have 
offered a more celebratory endorsement of its success, or of Saga’s Organizational Development 
efforts in general.  “Of all the jobs I’ve ever had in the organizations I’ve been in,” he wrote, 
“I’ve just never seen anything like this.  It’s about the best I’ve run across in terms 
of…openness, the possibility of discussing things – and the open ear.“142    
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Maslow marveled at the candor of the managers’ communication with each other, their 
lack of any evident fear in front of their executive vice president, and their comfort with the 
presence of a psychologist in the room.   Calling the company’s meetings a “marvelous” example 
of “Theory ‘Y’ in action,” he went so far as to suggest that their “set up represents a great 
revolution in the history of mankind.”143  He labeled this revolution “post-Marxist,” because 
Saga’s employees had clearly transcended class conflict and power struggle:   
We’re working together in goodwill and good faith, and the assumption is that it’s 
desirable for you to do a good job, even for your own sake in the sense that you 
don’t think of your next level of superiors as your innate, inborn enemies or 
anything like that.  You have to get along with them…You behaved like a group 
of colleagues… If this works out well, then mankind has a very different interest 




For Maslow, Saga’s OD triumph was evident in its managers’ willingness to identify with the 
organization as a whole, and to treat one another as trusted comrades. 
 To Maslow, the success of Saga’s OD program did not just signal a triumph for a 
particular corporation or loftily abstract revolution for humankind; it reflected the strength of the 
American dream and a validation of the nation’s prowess in the world stage.   Saga’s 
experiments affirmed the patriotism that had been bubbling within Maslow since his youth as a 
Jewish immigrant, and which he felt had been fundamentally challenged by the events of the 
1960s.  “It’s going to sound very corny and very square,” he conceded, “but the kind of thing 
that’s happened here in the last couple of days just wouldn’t happen anywhere on the face of the 
earth except in America.”  He continued:    
There’s a lot of talk about American imperialism, this, that, and the other thing, 
but the fact is that Americans are more efficient, more desirable, and accomplish 
more wherever they go.  They just do a better job than other people do. And half 
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of this is capital and the bigness of the country, etc., but the other half is just 
American management.  This managerial skill, by the way, is essentially a by-




In an unusual moment of autobiographical reflection, he related Saga’s successes to his own 
biography:  
I’m a sidewalk boy who’s gone on to a marvelous vocation.  I got to exactly the 
spot that I was born for…I don’t know where you come from individually, but the 
fact is that it could be anyplace.  None of you need any pull; you don’t need a 
relative; you don’t need any privilege; you don’t have to go to a particular 
school…It depends on your capability and talents.  I think that it’s helpful, as it 
has been for me, to be very aware of simply or good fortune, just our plain luck -- 
in being part of this American dynamic…I feel this fact for myself, and I suggest 
that you become aware of it and just feel privileged to be an American… 146 
 
Having celebrated the patriotic potential of “enlightened” management in Eupsychian 
Management five years earlier, Maslow had finally located a corporation whose humanistic 
techniques would lift the United States from a troubled decade into an era of restored political, 
economic, and cultural leadership on a global scale. 
 Five months after writing this memo celebrating Saga’s OD efforts, on June 8, 1970, 
Maslow rose for his typical morning swim and collapsed suddenly by his home’s pool.  By the 
time his wife Bertha rushed over to him, he had died from a massive heart attack.   Yet according 
to his Bertha, he died at what he would have thought to be a high point of his career.  Reflecting 
on her husband’s West Coast tenure in the Foreword to a memorial volume of his writings, she 
celebrated the “unparalleled good fortune” that she and Abe had to be associated with the W.P. 
Laughlin Charitable Foundation (which had been renamed International Study Project, Inc., and 
was dedicated in part to the posthumous coordination of Maslow’s unpublished writings). The 
Saga Administrative Corporation had, she gushed, “offered the climate and conditions absolutely 
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ideal for Abe’s work.  He was ecstatically happy and productive during his too-short tenure as a 
Fellow with the Foundation.”147 
  
 Maslow is commonly memorialized as a philosophical hero of the 1960s counterculture, 
the mascot of self-seekers who wanted to transcend mere material satisfactions to achieve “peak 
experiences” and self-actualization.148  Yet in the end, Maslow was more at home on the campus 
of a corporation than in the halls of a university or in the encounter groups of Esalen.  His 
“Eupsychia” turned out to be compatible with the very capitalist and corporate principles that 
many of his youthful disciples intended to dismantle.  As he grew disenchanted with the 
individualistic expressions of humanistic psychology and alienated from the political actions of 
the nation’s youth, Maslow retreated from countercultural arenas to what would have been 
considered the most conservative environment of the 1960s: an American corporation.  Yet for 
Maslow, this retreat did not signal a decline of idealism.   In the end, a food service corporation 
seemed to him more likely to him to fulfill the promise of mankind than many of the more self-
consciously utopian communities with which he had become affiliated.  Maslow, a second-
generation immigrant, never stopped being fiercely dedicated to the American dream, and he 
viewed corporations as one of the most likely agents to fulfill the dream’s promise.  A product of 
World War II and the ideology of the Cold War, he also believed that humanistic management 
could restore America’s reputation on the world stage and offer peaceful ammunition against its 
ideological foes.  In the years following his death, these assumptions would come under attack 
by a number of critics from both inside and outside the world of business.
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The Decline of Humanistic Management Theory and the 
Return of “Benevolent Autocracy” in the 1970s 
 
In 1969, the National Industrial Conference Board published a 170-page report entitled 
Behavioral Science: Concepts and Management as part of an ongoing series on Personnel Policy.  
Writing on behalf of the Conference Board, an “institution for scientific research” whose “sole 
purpose [was] to promote prosperity and security,” Harold M.F. Rush reported that behavioral 
science had taken the business world by storm over the course of two decades.
1
  In a study of 
more than 300 American and Canadian firms, approximately 80% indicated interest in the 
findings of behavioral scientists, and many of those had initiated programs within their 
companies to implement prominent theories from the field.
2
  Rush assembled the Board’s survey 
findings and summarized the theories of those purported to be the business world’s six most 
significant theorists: Douglas McGregor, Chris Argyris, Rensis Likert, Robert Blake (with Jane 
Mouton), Frederick Herzberg, and Abraham Maslow.
3
  He offered analyses of the period’s most 
prominent behavioral science applications (primarily sensitivity training and a variation on 
sensitivity training called the Managerial Grid) and detailed corporate experiments with 
                                                 
1
 Harold M.F. Rush, Behavioral Science: Concepts and Management Application (New York: National Industrial 
Conference Board, 1969).   
 
2
 The firms surveyed for this study represented a broad range of industries and company sizes.  For example, the 
Conference Board surveyed twelve companies with under 1,000 employees and twelve companies with more than 
100,000 companies, with the majority falling somewhere in between.  It surveyed companies representing industries 
including aerospsace, textiles, chemicals, electronics, machinery, retailing and merchandising, the service industry, 
banking, and metals.  Rush concluded in the survey that it was very difficult to reach conclusions about the kinds of 
industries that were more or less likely to experiment with behavioral science techniques.  We should also leave 
room for the possibility that some of the firms that expressed interest in behavioral science did very little to build on 
that interest on a day-to-day level. 
 
3
 Case studies included American Airlines; Armstrong Cork Company; Corning Glass Works; Genesco, 
Incorporated; Hotel Corporation of America; Raymond Corporation; Steinberg’s, Ltd.; Syntex Corporation; Texas 
Instruments, Incorporated; and the Systems Group of TRW, Inc.  These firms were noteworthy for being particularly 
dedicated to the application of behavioral science theories, primarily through their use of sensitivity training and the 
Managerial Grid.  The six behavioral scientists were chosen based on the number of firms that cited them as 






behavioral science.  One took place at the Armstrong Cork Company, a 21,000-employee 
company in Lancaster, Pennsylvania that had developed an in-house “Seminar in Human 
Behavior” after sending a training executive to “one of the earliest sensitivity training 
laboratories.”4  Other companies using laboratory training or similar offshoots (going by names 
like “team building laboratories,” “organizational planning,” and “power structure seminars”) 
included Corning Glass Works in Corning, New York; Genesco, Incorporated, an apparel 
company in Nashville, Tennessee; the Hotel Corporation of America in Boston, Massachusetts
5
; 
the Syntex Corporation, a pharmaceutical corporation in Mexico City; and Texas Instruments 
Incorporated in Dallas, Texas.
6
 
Sensitivity training groups, also known as T-groups, appeared in the report as the most 
significant manifestation of behavioral science principles in management training.  Rush 
suggested that sensitivity training had evolved into “perhaps the most influential and widespread 
application of behavioral research in education and in industry,” employed to instill in managers 
the self-awareness necessary for productive and transparent communication networks.
7
  At the 
same time, he suggested, the technique was “controversial,” noting that “among executives who 
know about it, it is common to find strong opinions ‘pro’ or ‘con,’ and usually those opinions are 
coupled with strong emotions.”8   
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Rush presented the experience of T-groups in existential terms similar to those of Alfred 
Marrow’s Behind the Executive Mask (discussed at the beginning of Chapter 7): 
The rationale for sensitivity training, simply stated, is this: persons tend to live by 
a set of ritual roles or patterns of behavior that they have learned through living in 
a particular culture.  One presents a ‘public façade’ and lives his life through these 
roles, which may not be indicative of the real character of the individual.  
Sensitivity training provides an opportunity for participants to discard the facades 
they present to the world and to experiment with expressing their true feelings.  
Participants may behave with one another according to their inherent natures, 





Here, corporate sensitivity training emerged as a tool for the achievement of personal 
authenticity—and yet was not, according to Rush, equivalent to therapy.  In group therapy, he 
explained, the purpose is “overcoming the neuroses or psychoses of the individuals who 
constitute the group,” whereas in the T-group the focus is “on the process of group interaction 
and the individual’s role in this interaction, and not on the personal problems of its members.”10  
According to Rush, statistics suggested an increased rise in corporate sensitivity training 
since its “modest beginnings” with industrial groups.  A Conference Board report from 1964 
reported that 38% of companies responding to a survey about management development 
practices reported “that they had used sensitivity training to some extent,” and 80% of those 
companies indicated that they planned to continue using it.  The Conference Board issued 
another survey in 1968 to 241 companies that had indicated interest in or experience with 
behavioral science.  Of those, 85 reported that they had used sensitivity training sponsored by 
NTL or universities, and 18 reported that they conducted sensitivity training in-house.
11
  Rush 
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explained that of those who participated in sensitivity training, the “majority” characterized it as 
an “emotionally moving experience,” commonly ending with “separation anxiety” as participants 
faced the prospect of returning home.  Participants experienced “emotionally shaking encounters 
with each other, ranging from contempt, to acceptance, to respect, to genuine affection.”  One 
executive commented at the end of a session: “’It was the first time in fifty years of living that I 
felt anybody cared for me as a human being and not because of what I could do for them.’”12  
Another reported that having participated in a T-group, “’I’m more capable of authentic 
relationships with people now.’”13 
By the early 1970s, however, the National training Laboratories and other practitioners of 
T-groups faced a crisis.  The use of T-groups had steeply declined in American corporations and 
business schools, and researchers increasingly questioned the legitimacy of the method.  Many 
found that while sensitivity training could predictably boost levels of “self-actualization” in 
individuals, there was little to no evidence that the technique increased profits or fueled 
organizational reform.
14
  Critics charged that the T-group produced personal authenticity, not 
organizational efficiency.  At the same time, participative management theory became hotly 
contested in the business world.  As the economy of the 1970s plunged downward, critics began 
to question the bottom-line benefits of participation and democratic decision-making.  Some 
called for statistics confirming participation’s material benefits; others called for a wholesale 
rejection of the anti-hierarchical model and a revival of traditional authority within 
organizations.  The end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s marked a crossroads for the 
theories of Lewin, Likert, McGregor, and Maslow.  Though these men had always celebrated 
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participation and self-actualization as tools for the larger good (including organizational profit), 
their methods and theories fell prey to ultimately damning charges of self-indulgent 
individualism and senseless idealism. 
The rhetoric of authenticity surrounding T-groups represented an increasingly potent 
identity crisis within the ranks of the National Training Laboratories.   According to the founders 
of NTL, its exponential institutional growth in the 1960s was a mixed blessing that marked a 
“decade of continued crises.”15 NTL President Leland Bradford noted that one of the central 
forces behind the T-group’s explosion was its evolution away from the original principles of 
Kurt Lewin’s  Basic Skills Training Group, from a focus on “group behavior and social and 
organizational change” to “self-awareness and interpersonal relations.”16  T-groups had always 
aimed to integrate humanistic psychology with theories of group behavior and organizational 
change, and NTL’s original founders had adamantly privileged training in “democratic 
leadership” over the therapeutic growth of individuals.  These two foci entered a heated 
relationship through the 1950s, but developments in the 1960s exacerbated the rift.  Most 
notably, the “Encounter movement” took the west coast by storm and introduced a new realm of 
theories and exercises to the intensive group movement, equating T-groups with personal growth 
and presenting self-actualization as an end in itself.  
 NTL had maintained a dialogue with west coast institutions since the early 1950s, when 
Paul Sheats left Bethel to establish the Western Training Laboratories in Group Development 
(WTLGD).  From the beginning, he had aligned the institute strongly with humanistic 
psychology and emphasized the dynamics of individuals over group relations.  A tension began 
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to grow between NTL and WTLGD.
17
  In 1959, Carl Rogers opened his own institute, the 
Western Behavioral Sciences Institute, which took the term “sensitivity training” (first 
popularized by the Western Training Labs in 1954) and raised it to a new level.  Whereas NTL 
had long insisted that its function was educational as opposed to therapeutic, Rogers envisioned 
his establishment as a provider of “therapy for normals”—an extension of the idea that “the best 
solution to any problem is the people who have the problem.”18  His counseling methods 
advanced the key principles of humanistic psychology, aiming to liberate people’s healthy cores 
through “peak experiences” within small groups.  Like Maslow, Rogers envisioned man as an 
inherently good, inherently healthy creature whose potential could be maximized by locating the 
“divine spark,” the “deep, untapped resources of decency and strength and good” within him.19  
Throughout the 1960s, this tendency would intensify and fuel the Human Potential movement, in 
which techniques expanded from intensive group talk to include meditation, massage, holistic 
medicine, and yoga.  Writing in 1969, New York Times writer Marylin Bender summed up the 
growing regional dichotomy: “On the west coast, encounter groups emphasize joy, ecstasy, and 
nudity.  On the east coast, the stress is on making corporate and organizational life more 
tolerable, fully clothed.”20 
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 It would be misguided, however, to draw a sharp dividing line between west coast and 
east coast wings of the encounter movement, for the two camps remained in dialogue throughout 
the 1960s.  The relationship between NTL and the Esalen Institute, founded by Michael Murphy 
and Richard Price in 1962, reveals the extent to which the T-group united the two coasts.  Esalen 
embodied the Human Potential movement more than any other growth center on the west coast 
(Abraham Maslow was said to have called it “one of the nation’s most important educational 
institutions”), but its “encounter” methods were derived from an early exposure to NTL’s 
methods.
21
  Murphy’s original inspiration for the establishment of Esalen came from a talk by 
Aldous Huxley on “Human Potentialities.” He established the center as a venue for continuing 
dialogue about the kinds of mind-expanding techniques that Murphy and Price were attracted to 
in the work of people like Huxley and Maslow, as well as Eastern religions (Murphy had studied 
in India after leaving Stanford in the early 1950s).
22
   
 In 1963, Murphy expanded his mission to include workshops in group dynamics inspired 
by—surprisingly enough—an event being held by the American Management Association at 
Highlands Inn in Carmel, California.  One of Murphy’s biographers recounted of the training 
session: 
It was a 5-day T-group for junior executives, a real encounter session in which 
people talked about their feelings, confronted each other, worked through 
problems right there in front of everybody. Murphy found the workshop as 
much of a mindblower as psychedelic drugs.  In fact, he wrote an essay about 
the similarities between the group experience and the drug experience, and 
concluded that, of the two, groups were more powerful and effective.  Groups, 
he decided, would be one of the New American Yogas—a path of union 
between the individual and the cosmos.  Straight out of the world of the 
corporations and the bureaucracies came a process that was showing people 
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Murphy exported the T-group from the American Management Association to the cliffs of Big 
Sur, California, where it remained a trademark of the Esalen experience throughout the 1960s.  
 Soon after, Murphy began recruiting members of NTL’s staff to lead workshops at 
Esalen.  Most notably, he stumbled upon a social psychologist named William Schutz who had 
been leading T-groups since the mid-1950s, and who embodied the changes taking place at both 
Esalen and NTL.
24
  Schutz had begun his career with group dynamics work at the University of 
Chicago after earning his PhD from UCLA in 1951.  Soon after, he went Harvard, where he 
started teaching a group dynamics seminar as a “modified T-group” and continued to do so for 
four years.  After running some workshops at the Western Training Laboratories, in 1963, he was 
invited by Murphy to conduct a seminar at Esalen.  He turned down the opportunity because he 
was about to move to the east coast to serve an appointment at the Albert Einstein School of 
Medicine in New York, and to experiment with new methods of experimental group work at the 
National Training Laboratories.  He commuted between Einstein and Bethel through the mid-
1960s.   
Schutz had been recruited by NTL in the aftermath of its becoming “rigid in the late 
1950s, a victim of its own success.”  The institute was “looking for new ways to loosen it up,” 
and Schutz was one of a small group of trainers who fit the bill.
25
  Due to NTL’s concern that 
things might “go too far and charge off into unexplored emotional territory,” Schutz was 
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cautioned to proceed with “extreme caution.” Nonetheless, he experimented with “things that 
people in T-groups had never done before”: 
[T]hey drew pictures, tried group fantasies and nonverbal exercises, tried 
‘happening’ sessions with no prearranged structure, just making things up as they 
went along.  They got rid of the huge oak tables that had been a standard feature 





Meanwhile, Schutz began studying more experimental forms of therapy.  In the mid-1960s, he 
introduced some of them to Bethel’s newly developed Personal Growth labs: imagery work from 
psychosynthesis, emotion-releasing techniques from bioenergetics, and action methods from 
psychodrama.  In one new T-group exercise called “High Noon,” he had people who were in 
conflict stand at opposite ends of the room and walk to meet each other in the middle, “at which 
point they were to do whatever they felt like doing, anything that expressed the truth about where 
they were with each other at the moment—wrestle, embrace, shake hands, whatever.”27   
 As Schutz continued with this work, he became dissatisfied with the label of “T-group” 
or “sensitivity training” and opted instead for “open encounter.”  Soon thereafter, in 1966, he 
agreed to leave the east coast in order to lead three Esalen seminars at Big Sur.  He had a cause: 
“He wanted to bring encounter to the world.”28  In the summer of 1967, he began leading more 
workshops, and soon thereafter became a fulltime leader of Esalen’s residential program.  
Schutz’s greatest lasting legacy was his 1967 book Joy: Expanding Human Awareness, which 
proved a huge success; it propelled Schutz onto the talk show circuit and attracted the greatest 
amount of publicity for Esalen that it had yet received.
29
 Ironically, as one observer has pointed 
                                                 
26
 Anderson 154. 
 
27
 Anderson 155. 
 
28
 Anderson 157.   
 
29





out, the book became an emblem of west coast culture even though it had been written in New 
York, using information gathered on the east coast—particularly at NTL.30 
 Will Schutz’s biography illuminates the identity struggle taking place at NTL in the 
1960s, as the organization’s leaders scrambled to define the institute against the backdrop of 
larger changes taking place within the encounter movement.  On the one hand, NTL’s Personal 
Growth labs (established in 1964) accommodated the sort of experimental, self-expressive 
techniques that were coming into vogue on the west coast.  By the time journalist Jane Howard 
attended a 2-week “Advanced Personal Growth Laboratory” in Bethel in the late 1960s, her 
exercises included crawling around like an oozing blob on the floor, dancing on her hands, 
playing an imaginary tug of war with an imaginary rope, and envisioning herself as a tropical 
fish.
31
   
 In 1966, a philosophy professor from MIT named Huston Smith wrote a report for the 
NTL newsletter in which he attempted to capture the transcendent experience of such a 
laboratory.
32
  The experience of his first Laboratory on Human Relations, he reported, “proved 
fascinating and engrossing beyond all expectations.   Only marriage, my first trip around the 
world, and LSD compare.”33  His free-associational report read more like a treatise from Ken 
Kesey or William Burroughs than like that of a social scientist: 
 Days of near-delirium and wide-ranging, disordered thought.  Deeper currents of 
feeling.  Two weeks crawling around the playpen of love and pain, the human 
heart…Attempts to answer strange signals.  What do I feel?  And what is 
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appropriate to speak?  How difficult to be honest, or even to know what honesty 
means in such a setting.  One may say, ‘Now, for these days, just as an 
experiment, I’m going to speak the truth,’ but the truth hears and runs away and 
hides before one’s even done speaking…Confusion so great it is metropolitan.  
With meanings not double or triple, merely, but in countless wavering outlines, 
the possibilities for misunderstanding endless.  Normal bonds of communication 
have been torn to shreds.…What- the- hell – is- going – on!  How curious this life 
we have been given to lead.  No model will ever be subtle enough for it. …People 
sprung loose from their defenses, their masks, their fixations.  How hard it all is!  
Is this what Kierkegaard had in mind when he said, ‘Only when we have known 
hell through and through will we become really serious’? 34 
 
Smith’s experience at NTL’s Human Relations training lab—with its “river of grief and self-
condemnation,” its “extreme intensity” and “heavy sorrow” paired with the ecstasy of deep 
human connection, represented the experiences of a growing population of seekers who entered 
human relations labs seeking transcendence and left with new selves in tow. 
 
 Meanwhile, NTL’s more conservative leaders like Bradford began panicking about the 
institute’s declining emphases on group behavior and social change.  Bradford feared that Esalen 
and similar growth centers around the country had set off a wave of publicity for brands of 
therapy and T-group training that were “erroneously connected” to NTL.  “While some was 
helpful to NTL,” he explained, “much was not,” and “NTL faced the problem of living with an 
image foreign to its activities.”35  NTL’s quarterly newsletter, Human Relations Training News, 
reflected the heated dialogue about the goals of laboratory training.  In the spring of 1962, a staff 
member from the Temple University Group Dynamics Center wrote that he was “increasingly 
concerned” about the mission of NTL and its many offshoots.  “If I recollect correctly,” he 
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wrote, “the early NTL training was not oriented toward sensitivity as such; it was oriented 
toward skill training (the groups were called basic skill training groups).  The concept that was 
active was that awareness of a situation and ability to diagnose it were requirements of effective 
skill development.”36  He regretfully noted “an increased emphasis on self and other-awareness 
in relationship to group situations” and urged the organization to clarify “the status of the therapy 
vs. training issue.”37   
 Other members of the NTL community disagreed and urged the discarding of such 
dichotomous distinctions.  In response to the lament above, for instance, another NTL member 
wrote to suggest “that both the increased participation of clinicians and the greater emphasis on 
self-awareness and personal sharing are not indicative of a distortion of the original goals of 
training, but rather a response to deep-seated needs in the trainees for authentic relatedness.”38   
The increasingly therapeutic orientation of the staff, he suggested, might reflect not only the 
needs of these trainees (whom he commended for having “the folly, courage, and most of 
all…the human need to move into new realms of human relations training”) but also the 
changing skills of their trainers, who increasingly came from psychological and therapeutic 
professional backgrounds.
39
  Warren Bennis, one of NTL’s most prominent and respected 
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members, similarly expressed his contention that “[a]uthenticity, ‘leveling,’ and ‘expressing 
feelings’ comprise an important part of the laboratory argot, all of which can be summed up in a 
passage from King Lear: ‘Speak what you feel, not what we ought to say.’”40 
 Such arguments in favor of authenticity and soul-bearing did not persuade NTL Director 
Leland Bradford.  During an “historical meeting” in July 1965, Bradford and his comrades 
developed the “Vision 70” document, which proposed a redefined direction for the organization.  
“Now is the time,” they declared, “to move actively and aggressively in the direction of 
becoming an organization seen as the key organization for applied behavioral science, turned to 
by government, industry, education, and other institutional and community areas for action, 
guidance, and conduct of programs of training, research, and action.”41  It was time for NTL to 
return to its roots and cultivate a more scientifically legitimate character.  For Bradford, the key 
to success lay with NTL’s occupational labs—those used by industry, education, and 
government—because their fundamentally organizational focus could serve as “a counteractive 
force or, perhaps, as an equally strong divergence from the emphasis on self-awareness 
training.”42 Other attempts at legitimization included the publication of NTL’s Journal of 
Applied Behavioral Science beginning in 1965—marking an effort to cultivate a distinctly 
scientific and academic character for the organization—and the changing of NTL’s name to NTL 
Institute of Applied Behavioral Science in 1967.   
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 Unfortunately, the management press of the 1960s repeatedly challenged Bradford’s faith 
in the scientific legitimacy of occupational labs.  Many critics charged that since the 1950s, in 
spite of their organizational rhetoric, occupational labs had been steadily advancing toward the 
same fate of NTL’s personal growth labs: they had become workshops for self-expression and 
self-actualization.  Social scientists and corporate witnesses began to testify that there was no 
empirical evidence to support the T-group’s effectiveness on an organizational level, and that—
even worse—T-groups could do harm by making executives feel too liberated from the 
constraints of corporate convention.  They suggested that the structure of the T-group, meant to 
nurture the intimate connections between individual and organization, had left the second part of 
its equation behind.  Many critics focused on the lack of empirical evidence as a central problem 
within sensitivity training.  According to these skeptics, not only was there insufficient evidence 
to show that T-groups accomplished what they were supposed to accomplish within a small 
group setting, but there was not even satisfactory methodology in place to test the effectiveness 
of T-groups on participants.
43
  
One observer commented that “Although sensitivity training has actually been used since 
1947, there is little scientific research evidence that the training actually changes executive 
behavior.  Returning trainees seem to feel that they have benefited, but they can’t be specific 
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about the changes.”44 Another critic lobbed his attack directly at NTL, claiming that “after 
almost 20 years of operation,” the organization was “unable to produce supporting evidence 
through scientifically designed studies to prove that labs actually produce changes in human 
behavior.”  The same survey of research reported that of 200 executives and managers who 
participated in sensitivity training laboratories in 1960, 22% of the participants did not notice any 
changes in their behavior.
 45
  Another scholar diagnosed a “honeymoon-disillusion cycle” 
regarding sensitivity training within industry, suggesting that corporate leaders had gotten fed up 
with experimenting with new training programs only to find that the results were at best vague, 
and at worst nonexistent.
46
 
 Other critics deduced that T-groups helped bolster self-awareness within individuals, but 
that without sustained programs of organizational support, increased self-awareness had no effect 
on the larger organizational structure or rates of productivity.
47
  “Without the supporting social 
interaction,” one critic charged, “the norms and values of sensitivity training wither 
away…Sensitivity trainers might be able to create, momentarily, for a small group, a ‘little bit of 
heaven,’ where authenticity and trust reign, but there would be a need for intermittently 
resensitizing the group.”48  Here was Bradford’s nightmare: one spokesman for General Electric 
complained that “Sensitivity training…is designed to change an individual, not necessarily the 
environment he works in,” so that “when the individual attempts to use what he has learned, he 
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often finds his coworkers unwilling to accept it.”49 Even when participants were able to cite a 
concrete change in their group behavior in the aftermath of a T-group, it seemed, positive results 
would begin to fade out within the first year after training—leaving participants right back where 
they started, under-actualized and with an organization that neglected the interpersonal needs of 
its employees.
50
  In worst case scenarios, some critics argued that T-groups could actually retard 
sensitivity or, in the case of already-fragile individuals, lead to psychological breakdowns.
51
 
 In 1969, the Wall Street Journal published an exposé suggesting the possibility that 
sensitivity training was working too well.
52
  It acknowledged that a growing number of 
companies were “taking a much more critical look at sensitivity training” due to unproven 
effectiveness and the aforementioned problem of institutions changing without a necessary, 
corresponding change in corporate structure.  The article also introduced a new segment of 
sensitized managers: those who had reached such heights of self-actualization that they ditched 
the corporate world altogether: 
Last year a big New York consumer products company sent Mrs. D., a product 
manager, to a week-long sensitivity training program.  Mrs. D. loved that part.  ‘It 
was a whole week of truth serum, all openness,’ she recalls.  ‘But then I came 
back to work and found it shrouded in the usual unnecessary tactfulness and 
diplomacy.  I discovered that training had so opened me of that I was tired of the 
Mickey Mouse.’  When her superiors wanted to delay a decision on a new product 
development program she had been working on for more than a year, she told 
them she was tired of their procrastination and quit to take a comparable job 
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elsewhere, where she has more latitude.  Her old employer dropped the sensitivity 




In another worst case scenario, a “ruthlessly aggressive guy” was sent by his company to 
sensitivity training, “where he found out exactly what people thought of him.  So he stopped 
being a beast…and his effectiveness fell apart.  The reason he’d been so good was that he didn’t 
understand what a beast he was.  Eventually, they put in a new manager.’”   
 Finally, the article offered an anecdote that reaffirmed the cultural dichotomy between 
the counterculture and corporate culture.  An advertising executive for a “major West Coast 
firm” had attended a “far-out sensitivity training program” at the Esalen institute, and he was so 
profoundly affected by his experience that he quit his job to become a dishwasher at Esalen.  At 
the time of the article’s publication, he was unemployed.  These examples—and the larger realm 
of criticism of T-groups—challenged the very foundation upon which NTL had developed its 
methodology: the idea that self-actualization was not only good for the soul, but also for the 
organization, and that bureaucratic woes could be erased by the establishment of more authentic 
relationships between people.  Even more powerful than the critique that T-groups failed to 
bolster personal authenticity was the critique that authenticity was not good for the workplace in 
the first place.   
  
 At the same time that NTL was enduring assaults from the management press and 
beyond, the participative management theories of Douglas McGregor and Rensis Likert came 
under attack.  By the early 1970s, the fundamentally utopian visions of Theory Y and System 4 
had earned a slew of harsh critics.  Skeptics charged that humanistic management theorists’ 
research was insufficiently scientific; that their theories found little support in real-world 
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practice; that their utopian dreams would necessarily crash and burn during hard economic times; 
and that satisfactions of individuals and productivity of the organization were, in fact, rarely 
compatible.   
 The idea of participative management was already in dispute by the late 1950s.  In 1958, 
Robert McMurry published a widely read Harvard Business Review article that encapsulated the 
opposition’s stance.   In “The Case for Benevolent Autocracy,” McMurry argued that 
participative management—which he alternately referred to as “democratic,” “humanistic,” or 
“bottom-up” management—was a theoretically inspiring but pragmatically bankrupt idea.54  
According to McMurry, the approach disregarded fundamental facts about both individuals and 
the organizations in which they worked.  McMurry launched a multi-pronged assault against 
contemporary management theorists’ persistent emphasis on “groupness” and their insistence 
that “management must democratize” – which he said was already “everywhere” by the time of 
his writing in the late 1950s. “Such a philosophy is a welcome swing of the pendulum away from 
the brutality of the ill-famed Pennsylvania Coal and Iron Police and the ‘company store,’” he 
explained, “[a]nd it is a fine ideal – an ultimate to goal to shoot for.  But it is as one-sided as the 
pessimistic vision of human nature it replaces…Human nature being what it is, democratic 
management is practical in only a small minority of companies.”55   
McMurry presented multiple reasons for participative management’s inevitable failure.  
First, he argued, the theory grossly over-estimated most workers’ appetites for self-direction and 
work itself.  There will always be a group of workers who chronically dislike their work, he 
explained, and who will not perform well no matter what psychological enticements they 
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receive.  Conversely, there will always be a group of middle managers – the emblem of which 
McMurry called “The Bureaucratic Man”—who like their work as it is.  They are comforted by 
bureaucracy; they crave it security and stability; they “’live by the book.’” He elaborated, “Such 
people often make excellent subordinates.  In their search for security, they do their best to meet 
their superiors’ expectations as completely as they can…they are the ‘good soldiers,’ the loyal 
‘organization men.’  Bt they cannot administer, direct, or inspire others.”56  And the qualities 
lacked by these men were precisely those embodied by the best of top management: “hard-
driving, ego-centric entrepreneurs” who may not always rub people the right way, but who 
ultimately know how to lead and get things done.  McMurry added to these concerns his larger 
suspicions of group work, which he believed often generated a sort of “group autocracy” rather 
than the kind of self-expression and individualism envisioned by Likert and McGregor.
57
   
McMurry concluded that the most realistically desirable system of management was 
“benevolent autocracy.”  This system provided a strong leader with a clear vision who “does not 
exploit his employees or willfully mistreat them,” but might “[forget] at times that they are 
human beings with their own needs and problems.”58  The benevolent autocrat would act like a 
“’father figure’” who invited employees’ perspectives but ultimately reach his own conclusions 
about what was right.  He might even “stress the desirability of the humanistic, democratic 
philosophy of management” when communicating with workers, in order to “convey the 
impression that the holders of supreme power in the company are in favor of the avant-garde 
                                                 
56
 McMurry 83. 
 
57
 McMurry 85. 
 
58






decision-making” – while privately recognizing the fundamental limitations of the bottom-up 
system and doing as he saw fit.  McMurry ultimately promised:  
What benevolent autocracy offers is not a beautiful vision of a world to come.  
Instead, it simply accepts reality with all of its limitations.  While hardly a noble 





McMurry could not have known the prescience of this sentiment in 1958, when many in the field 
of management remained optimistic about the potential of participation in the workplace.
60
   
 By the time Rensis Likert published his second volume of management theory, The 
Human Organization, in 1967, he likely anticipated a glowing response akin to that received by 
New Patterns of Management in 1961.  Instead, he found that the tide had started to change.  
Critics slammed the new work for its pseudo-science, blind optimism, and flawed logic.  
Abraham Zaleznik, a professor at Harvard Business School, lambasted Likert’s desire to 
“convert managers from authoritarian to democratic styles” and his promise that the latter was 
inherently more effective.  “The problem is,” Zaleznik explained, “the research proves no such 
thing.”61   Zaleznik charged Likert with gross over-simplification, incensed that he had 
overlooked the intrinsically complicated and unpredictable nature of organizations and the large 
role played by uncontrollable external forces (like foreign competition and business cycles).  He 
also challenged Likert’s romanticized conception of the “unsung middle managers” who toiled 
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against the tyranny of top management.  Surely, Zaleznik insisted, some middle managers were 
stubborn tyrants in their own right, while top management could consist of human beings with 
good intentions.  The only thing Likert had effectively demonstrated was the way in which 
“social science can be used in the service of making myths.”62  
Another critic questioned Likert’s repeated assertion that “’the art of management can be 
based on verifiable information derived from rigorous and quantitative research’” and his 
insistence—“again and again”—that his system of management was “science-based.”63  What 
about the limitations posed by cultural variation, this critic implored, or differences in 
personality?    Yet another lamented that Likert’s unconvincing data were gathered, 
problematically, from the perspectives of organizational members rather than from more neutral 
observers.
64
  In six years, Likert’s work had transformed from fashionable avant-garde to 
whipping post.   
The critique of participative management grew increasingly scathing as the US economy 
declined.  In 1970, Management Review published an article by George Berkwitt declaring, 
“Recession Explodes New Myths of Management.”65  “Forged in the boom years of the 1960s,” 
Berkwitt explained, “a number of management’s most compelling new maxims held up until 
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they met the acid test of a receding economy” in which “earnings collapsed.”66 In the 1960s, the 
maxims held lofty promise of an egalitarian and cooperative industrial future; in hard times, the 
principles simply could not hold.  Berkwitt cited participative management as one of the prime 
offenders, with its conviction that work motivation increased as employees were “allowed more 
self-expression and more influence.”  “All well and good,” he explained “– “in boom times, that 
is.  In times of consolidation and retrenchment, participative management becomes a myth.”67    
Such pronouncements set the tone for the 1970s, as advocates of participative 
management dwindled and critics grew increasingly scathing.   A 1976 Management Today 
article announced that Likert’s theories were “no longer ‘in’” and explained that “the most recent 
recession, the worst since the 1930s,” had dealt a fatal blow to the organizational theory of the 
1960s, with General Motors as one of the few exceptions.
68
  The author’s article explained that 
“Many sacred texts and tenets in the behavior field didn’t stand up to reality in a grimmer, 
results-oriented environment”; “It was goodbye to Chris Argyris, Rensis Likert, Douglas 
McGregor, and all that.”69  He elaborated, “The ugly word power, which the behaviorists 
brushed under the carpet, is now again a part of the vocabulary.”70  The humanistic assumption 
that democratic participation could make coercion and inequality obsolete now seemed a quaint 
relic of affluent times.
71
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 In the late 1960s, NTL too faced a crisis.  The institute was in financial trouble, criticism 
of its methods was mounting, and its core leaders were anguishing over NTL’s deviation from its 
original mission.
72
  The T-group had exploded within the American cultural landscape to an 
extent that the institute’s founders never could have anticipated, but its increasingly therapeutic 
orientation alarmed many of those who held it dear.  In 1969, Bradford prepared to retire as 
Director of NTL, and many within the organization agreed that Warren Bennis would be an ideal 
replacement.  Bennis had been affiliated with NTL for years and had co-edited one of the most 
influential volumes on sensitivity training.  He was also young, dashing, and the author of 
multiple popular business volumes about the challenge of organization in a “temporary” 
society.
73
 Bennis hesitated accepting the appointment at first due to his reservations about the 
character of NTL, and laid out a “reorganization of purpose” as a prerequisite for his assuming 
the position of director.  He issued three main resolutions: “Social change was to be the primary 
aim”; “the board would be reconstituted to de-emphasize business connections”; and a 
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university-like institute would be built near Washington, D.C. for the training of “change 
agents.” 74   
Briefly convinced that NTL was prepared to conform to his vision, Bennis accepted the 
directorship, but soon thereafter backed down, having concluded that the institute was not ready 
to go in his direction after all.  After lengthy searching (and many rejected offers), the Board 
chose a man named Vladimir Dupre to assume the position of director in the fall of 1970.  
Amidst other changes, Dupre instituted a new training program that offered accreditation to T-
group leaders—a gesture towards the air of renewed academic credibility that some staff 
members at NTL craved.
75
  He also pledged to draw the institute into closer affiliations with 
professional researchers, psychologists and behavioral scientists within the academy.  He aimed 
to signal a return to the NTL of the 1950s, when the organization had been linked in the public 
imagination to universities and government agencies as opposed to frolicking hippies and 
psychedelic gurus. 
The end of the sixties had delivered an ironic fate to the NTL: the institute had 
bequeathed its methods to a nation of soul-searchers and gained great notoriety within the rapidly 
expanding Encounter community, only to denounce its legacy as a deliverer of self-actualization 
to the masses.  By the end of the 1970s, the T-group had reached epidemic proportions as a 
staple of the Esalen Institute and est, while NTL had faded into anonymity.  Its greatest 
contribution to postwar culture, in the end, had been that which it ultimately denounced: With 
the T-group, Leland Bradford, Kenneth Benne, and Ronald Lippitt had developed a technique 
that enabled people from all walks of life to comfortably discuss their feelings with a room full 
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of strangers.  In an age and a culture in which authenticity was increasingly prized as the 
pinnacle of human experience, these men had located a method that ostensibly delivered it within 
a two- to three-week laboratory training course. 
 NTL’s management labs, in particular, had signaled a cultural transformation within the 
corporate world.  While intended to cure management and productivity problems within 
organizations, T-groups had introduced something quite different to the world of the 
Organization Man: the groundwork for what Tom Wolfe has termed the “Third Great 
Awakening.”76  As critics and scholars reflected on the massive movement toward sensitivity 
training that took place within industry in the 1950s and 1960s, especially in light of its 
conspicuously absent empirical evidence, they began to speculate that T–groups, once 
envisioned as the ultimate bureaucratic panacea, had served instead as a sort of spiritual panacea 
for the managerial leaders of the new middle class.  Reflecting on the lack of evidence regarding 
T-groups’ organizational effectiveness, Kurt Back concluded that sensitivity training provided  
“a faith, a sense of mission” for its adherents and suggested, “Perhaps the industrial state today 
needs more a new religion than a new technique, and for this purpose sensitivity training is as 
good a candidate as any.”77  Another observer noted “an almost metaphysical attraction to the 
Maslow hierarchy” within organizations and asserted, in light of recent research into the 
effectiveness of humanistic methods, that “for now faith rather than empirical evidence must be 
used to support the concept.”78  Warren Bennis supported such analogies with his own 
eulogizing of Abraham Maslow: “Science to Abe was a way of life and love,” Bennis explained, 
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“and debureaucratizing it (or as he would prefer—resacralizing it) was his goal… Science was 
his poetry, his religion, his wonder.”79   
It was not just faith in the T-group’s efficacy that invited religious analogies.  Other 
observers concluded that the entire T-group exercise was a secularized version of traditional 
spiritual quests for conversion through candor and intimacy. A 1969 New York Times article 
noted a swelling of spirituality on college campuses throughout America.
80
  It cited young 
people’s growing dissatisfaction with the rational emptiness of the modern world and found them 
turning to witches, warlocks, cultists, and Asian religions for a greater sense of authenticity.  
(One young man explained, “’What we’re really concerned about is whether anything is real, I 
mean, whether it is is really real.  Is there something that is so powerful that It can even make us 
real?”)  In addition to alternative religions, the article noted that the “quest for community in 
small groups makes the neo-sacralists quite conscious of the relevance to their quest of T-
groups…encounter groups, and the whole bag of group-dynamics tricks. Just as for some 
students of group dynamics or sensitivity training becomes almost a religion, so for others 
already involved in quasi-religious behavior, sensitivity training and its cousins become an 
important means of religious growth.”81   
In a 1972 book entitled The Intensive Group Experience: The New Pietism, Protestant 
theologian Thomas C. Oden took this argument one step further.  He argued that sensitivity 
training embodied the fundamental tenets of 17
th
-century Judeo-Christian pietism, with its 
emphasis on “here and now” experiencing , intensive small-group encounter, honest confession, 
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 He recognized in T-groups a “resacralization of intimate 
relationships” that would eventually bridge the secular proponents of intense group experience 
with the religious traditions of the past.
83
 
By the early 1970s, then, NTL and the legion of humanistic management theorists faced a 
mission of redemption.  How might they restore sensitivity training to its rightful place among 
strategies of organizational efficiency, as opposed to new-age religion?  Chris Argyris suggested 
a defense in an article encapsulating the ideological paradox that had plagued NTL since its 
inception.  In the 1973 article “Organization Man: Rational and Self-Actualizing,” he responded 
to a critic of humanistic management who charged that self-actualization damaged the rational 
efficiency of organizations.
 84
  Firmly establishing himself on the straight side of the 1960s and 
‘70s countercultural explosion, Argyris decried “the bankruptcy of most of the youth rebellion” 
(while suggesting that “we are partially responsible for the rebellion because we provided no 
model of organization that went much beyond the traditional ones.”). 85  He affirmed his role as 
an advocate of organizations—not selfhood—by declaring, “I am not against structure” and by 
differentiating between “Maslow’s global view of self-actualization and a more restricted view 
that I have suggested.”86  Addressing the charge that his work sacrificed efficiency for emotional 
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expression, Argyris explained, “a primary purpose of my research…has always been to enhance 
the rational activity of rational activity in organizations….Reason, for me, is not, and has never 
been, a shackle of freedom.”87  Try as he might to re-align himself with the Organization Man, 
however, Argyris’s attempt came too late.  By the end of the 1970s, bottom-up management had 
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